

CASELL'S HISTORY OF
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR




A BATTERY IN TROUBLE.

CASSELL'S . . .
HISTORY OF THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

ILLUSTRATED

SPECIAL EDITION
VOLUME II

CASSELL AND COMPANY, LIMITED
LONDON, PARIS, NEW YORK AND MELBOURNE
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED



CONTENTS.

	PAGE
CHAPTER XXV.	
LOOKING BACK—A CHOICE OF THREE COURSES—CONTEMPORARY HISTORY—NO LIGHT TASK—HISTORICAL RETROSPECT—THE GERM OF THE WAR—A PARALLEL—HOW RUSSIA COURTED TROUBLE—BLUFF AND PREPAREDNESS—WEST AND EAST . . .	289
CHAPTER XXVI.	
THE FIRST PHASE ENDED—A GENERAL SURVEY—SOME ADDITIONAL POINTS—OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—A HERO'S FUNERAL—ENGINES OF WARFARE—HIGH-ANGLE FIRE—SINKING OF THE "YOSHINO"—TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY—SOME LESSONS—THE ONLOOKERS	303
CHAPTER XXVII.	
THE MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION—STRATEGICAL DEVELOPMENTS—POSSIBLE CHANGE OF PLAN—OBJECTS NOW IN VIEW—BRITISH NAVAL AND GERMAN MILITARY TEACHING—ENVELOPMENTS—RUSSIAN STANDPOINTS	320
CHAPTER XXVIII.	
THE NARRATIVE RESUMED—THE OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—JAPAN'S SECOND ARMY—ADVANCE UPON KIN-CHAU—THE BATTLE OF NAN-SHAN—A DESPERATE STRUGGLE—DEVOTED GALLANTRY—HEAVY CASUALTIES—OCCUPATION OF DALNY—ANOTHER NAVAL BOMBARDMENT	333
CHAPTER XXIX.	
FURTHER OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—RENEWED BOMBARDMENT—THE JAPANESE CREEPING CLOSER—THE BELEAGUERED GARRISON—MOVEMENTS FURTHER NORTH	350
CHAPTER XXX.	
THE RUSSIAN POSITION—KUROPATKIN AT LIAO-YANG—HIS DIFFICULTIES—FRICTION WITH ALEXEIEFF—PROPOSED RELIEF OF PORT ARTHUR—INTERVIEW AT MUKDEN—A MOMENTOUS DECISION—KUROPATKIN OVERRULED—COSSACK RAIDS	361
CHAPTER XXXI.	
A BATTLE PROSPECT—RELIEVING ARMY FOR PORT ARTHUR—POSITION AT TELISSU—JAPANESE AT PORT ADAMS—OKU'S ADVANCE—FIGHTING ON JUNE 14TH—BATTLE OF TELISSU—ARTILLERY ADVANTAGE—HORRORS OF A RETREAT	372
CHAPTER XXXII.	
EFFORTS TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON PORT ARTHUR—BOLDNESS AND INITIATIVE—JAPANESE OVER-CONFIDENCE—CRUISERS LEAVE VLADIVOSTOK—SINKING OF JAPANESE TRANSPORTS—A SCENE OF BUTCHERY—KAMIMURA IN PURSUIT—SOME LESSONS—ANOTHER RAID	387
CHAPTER XXXIII.	
AFTER TELISSU—THE JAPANESE ADVANCE—OUTPOSTS—OCCUPATION OF SUN-YAO-CHEN—JOINING HANDS—A GLANCE AT NIUCHWANG	400
CHAPTER XXXIV.	
WITH GENERAL KUROKI—STRATEGICAL MOVES—THE FOREIGN ATTACHÉS—AN AFFAIR OF OUTPOSTS—THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PASSES	410

CHAPTER XXXV.

- THE FLEET AT PORT ARTHUR—REPAIRS—THE HARBOUR ENTRANCE—THE SQUADRON EMERGES—A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT—TOGO ON THE WATCH—AN ACTION EXPECTED—BAFFLED HOPES—TORPEDO ATTACKS 420

CHAPTER XXXVI.

- THE PORT ARTHUR PROBLEM—QUESTION OF ASSAULT—COMPLICATIONS—PRELIMINARY MEASURES—SIEGE OPERATIONS—EARLY FIGHTING 431

CHAPTER XXXVII.

- RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS—ALEXEIEFF AT MUKDEN—KUROPATKIN AND THE GRAND DUKE BORIS—HOME AFFAIRS—THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND HIS RUSSIAN REGIMENT—STOPPAGE OF BRITISH STEAMERS 443

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

- TEN YEARS AGO—JAPAN'S WAR WITH CHINA—PORT ARTHUR IN 1894—THE OPERATIONS IN LIAO-TUNG—COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS 456

CHAPTER XXXIX.

- THE SECOND ARMY—DELIBERATE MOVEMENTS—THE RUSSIAN POSITION—ADVANCE ON KAI-CHAU—A REAR-GUARD ACTION—OCCUPATION OF KAI-CHAU—THE SITUATION . 468

CHAPTER XL.

- GENERAL KUROKI'S ARMY—THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED—ADVANCE FROM FENG-HWANG-CHENG—A RUSSIAN GENERAL WOUNDED—BATTLE OF MO-TIEN-LING 479

CHAPTER XLI.

- REAPPEARANCE OF THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON—A "DEPLORABLE ACCIDENT"—THE CRUISERS IN THE TSUGARU STRAIT—THE SINKING OF THE "KNIGHT COMMANDER"—INDIGNATION IN GREAT BRITAIN 495

CHAPTER XLII.

- THE SECOND ARMY OF JAPAN—RUSSIANS AT TA-SHI-CHAO—THE JAPANESE ADVANCE—BATTLE OF TA-SHI-CHAO—A NIGHT ATTACK—THE RUSSIANS RETIRE—THE JAPANESE AT NIU-CHWANG 505

CHAPTER XLIII.

- RUSSIA'S TREATMENT OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING—THE "MALACCA" INCIDENT—THE DARDANELLES—DOUBTS AND FEARS—THE QUESTION OF CONTRABAND—THE "KNIGHT COMMANDER" AND THE "HIPSANG" 523

CHAPTER XLIV.

- JAPAN'S STRATEGY—CAUTIOUS COUNSELS—DAREDEVIL HEROISM—NAN-SHAN, TELISSU, HSIHOYEN—NAVAL POLICY—PREPAREDNESS—A MIGHTY ARSENAL—NAVAL CADET COLLEGE—HOSPITALS—DOMESTIC SACRIFICES 535

CHAPTER XLV.

- RUSSIA AND THE SECOND PHASE—NOTES ON PAST BATTLES—LIFE AT LIAO-YANG—THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY—HOME AFFAIRS—DOMESTIC TROUBLES—A USEFUL PRESS—PUBLIC DISTRUST 552

CHAPTER XLVI.

- THE SECOND PHASE ENDED—THE SITUATION—NAVAL REFLECTIONS—MILITARY POSSIBILITIES—COUNTING THE COST 563
- THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR 567

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

	PAGE		PAGE
Siberian convicts, under ward of soldiers, working upon the Trans-Siberian Railway . . .	289	A Japanese Council of War in the field . . .	377
Russia's advance in the Far East, 1858-1898 . . .	291	Japanese operations against the Russian position at Telissu—June 13, 14, 15 . . .	379
The outbreak of war: wives and children of Russian officers leaving Dalny for the West . . .	293	Russian Cossack artillery . . .	381
The first attack upon Port Arthur: the torpedoing of the <i>Tsarevitch</i> . . .	296	"Banzai!" . . .	384
Admiral Baron Kakubei Yamamoto, Minister of Japanese Navy . . .	299	Celebrating a victory: a street scene in Tokio . . .	385
The Prime Minister addressing the lower House of Parliament at Tokio . . .	301	Dr. Shimose, the inventor of the Shimose explosive . . .	386
Japanese Scout . . .	302	Map of Vladivostok harbour and vicinity . . .	389
Funeral of Commander Hirose . . .	305	Vice-Admiral Bezobrazoff . . .	391
Japanese Shinto priest offering <i>saké</i> . . .	307	Admiral Skrydloff . . .	393
The Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovitch . . .	308	Rear-Admiral Kamimura . . .	396
Hole blown in side of the Russian ship <i>Palada</i> at the first attack upon Port Arthur . . .	309	The Japanese transport <i>Hitachi Maru</i> . . .	397
Recovering the bodies of the victims of the <i>Petrovsk</i> disaster at Port Arthur . . .	313	"Scientific fanatics": General Oku's troops storming entrenchments at Kin-chau . . .	401
Marshal Kodama, Sub-chief of the Japanese General Staff . . .	316	After the fight: bivouac on the field of battle . . .	405
Japanese cavalry of the line . . .	317	Map showing positions covering Liao-yang . . .	407
Vice-Admiral Uriu . . .	319	From the carriage window in Eastern Siberia . . .	409
General Kuroki . . .	321	At bay: Russians attacked in a village . . .	413
A picturesque street in Mukden . . .	324	Some of the <i>personnel</i> of a Manchurian troop train . . .	417
Cossack regiment at Liao-yang . . .	325	Cossacks and a Chinese cart . . .	419
Coolies carrying medical stores . . .	329	Russian battleship <i>Peresviet</i> . . .	423
General Rennenkampf . . .	332	Japan's great disaster: the sinking of the battleship <i>Hatsuse</i> . . .	425
Sketch map of the Kwang-tung Peninsula . . .	334	Russian cruiser <i>Diana</i> . . .	428
General Oku . . .	336	Russian gunboat <i>Bobr</i> on the Liao river at Niu-chwang . . .	429
Last military honours to Japanese warriors: Shinto funeral rites . . .	337	The Japanese Victoria Cross . . .	432
Battle of Kin-chau: plan . . .	339	An episode during the battle of Nan-shan . . .	433
Japanese officers drawing the fire of the Russian guns . . .	341	The defences of Port Arthur . . .	437
Storming the heights at Nan-shan . . .	345	Preparing to welcome the Japanese: strengthening the defences at Port Arthur . . .	441
Retreat . . .	348	A typical Japanese gunboat, the <i>Akagi</i> . . .	442
Admiral Alexeieff reviewing troops at Niu-chwang . . .	350	Removing the big guns from the fort at Niu-chwang . . .	445
Sketch maps showing position of the rival armies at the end of April and at the end of May . . .	353, 354	Russian bivouac in a Manchurian temple . . .	449
Russian infantry in full marching order, at Niu-chwang . . .	356	Sketch map showing position of the rival armies at the end of June, 1904 . . .	453
The defence of Niu-chwang by the Russians . . .	357	The Dardanelles: looking towards Constantinople . . .	455
Vice-Admiral Saito . . .	359	At close quarters: Japanese detachment attacked by Cossacks . . .	457
Water-tower on the Trans-Siberian railway . . .	360	Russian war craft, in harbour at Dalny, before its evacuation . . .	461
A Russian commander at Niu-chwang . . .	361	Japanese siege artillery in winter . . .	463
The Russian St. George's Cross . . .	362	Beleaguered Port Arthur. A brisk moment in a Russian battery . . .	465
General Kuropatkin . . .	365	A Japanese field hospital: bringing in the wounded during an action . . .	469
Tried for his life: a Japanese spy before a Russian court-martial held in a Manchurian temple . . .	369	General Sakharoff . . .	473
Russian transport train . . .	372	Russian infantry, wearing the white summer tunic, entraining near St. Petersburg . . .	475
General Stackelberg . . .	373	General Count Nozu . . .	477
Typical Russian pioneer family in Manchuria . . .	375	Departure of a Japanese regiment for the front, Kobe . . .	481

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

	PAGE		PAGE
Japan's scientific warfare: the field telephone connecting up an advanced post with headquarters	485	The German ss. <i>Scandia</i> , stopped in the Red Sea	532
Sir Claude Macdonald and Sir Ian Hamilton being received by the Emperor of Japan	489	The ss. <i>Knight Commander</i> , sunk by the Vladivostok squadron	533
Russian troops on the march along the Siberian railway	493	A <i>mêlée</i> in a thunderstorm: combat between Cossacks and Japanese cavalry at the battle of Telissu	537
Skrydloff's pursuer: Rear-Admiral Kamimura	497	Fighting their battles over again: a street scene in Hiroshima, Japan	541
Map of Japan	500	Captain Arima	543
The <i>Malacca</i>	501	Human birds of prey: Chinese bandits robbing the dead	545
Overlooking Vladivostok	503	Nurses in Tokio	548
The main street, Vladivostok	504	The price of victory: Japanese wounded soldiers entering Tokio	549
Russian cyclist scouts	505	Old Japan	551
Sketch map showing the Japanese advance to Kai-chau, Ta-shi-chao, and Ying-kau	507	Stackelberg's futile attempt to relieve Port Arthur: the Russian shelter-trenches stormed by the Japanese	553
Japanese Imperial Guards	509	General Sampsonoff	556
"Death, that reconciles all mortal feuds, hath made them one"	512	General Mishtchenko	557
Major-General Fukushima	517	Kuroki's lines of advance to Liao-yang	559
The seamy side of war: wounded Russians returning to Liao-yang	521	The capture of Kin-chau	561
A glimpse on the Trans-Siberian railway	522	The late M. Plehve	562
The action at Wa-fang-kau or Telissu: the retreat of the Russians before the Japanese	525	Russian prisoners going on board Japanese transports <i>en route</i> for Japan	565
Sketch map showing position of the rival armies at the end of July, 1904	528	A main thoroughfare in Dalny	566
The seizure of the <i>Malacca</i> : a boat's crew from the volunteer steamer <i>Peterburg</i> about to board the liner	529	A Temple prison-house: Japan's handsome treatment of her Russian captives	573

LIST OF PLATES.

A BATTERY IN TROUBLE	Frontispiece
SWEARING IN A MOHAMMEDAN RECRUIT FOR THE CZAR	To face p. 360
GUARDING THE LINE	" , 478



SIBERIAN CONVICTS, UNDER WARD OF SOLDIERS, WORKING UPON
THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

CHAPTER XXV.

LOOKING BACK—A CHOICE OF THREE COURSES—CONTEMPORARY HISTORY—NO LIGHT
TASK—HISTORICAL RETROSPECT—THE GERM OF THE WAR—A PARALLEL—HOW
RUSSIA COURTED TROUBLE—BLUFF AND PREPAREDNESS—WEST AND EAST.

THE time has now arrived when the reader may usefully be invited to follow the writer in a rather extended retrospect. The latter, again, must be prefaced by a few remarks in the nature of a "personal explanation." When this work was first projected there were three courses open to those concerned in its production. The first was to wait until the War was sufficiently advanced to allow of the accumulation of material on which to base carefully elaborated descriptions and matured judgments. The second was to make the story a contemporary one, and, at the outset, to trust largely to the telegraphic correspondence in the Press for details. Between this lay the middle course of commencing the publication forthwith, but

of antedating the narrative so that, by the time the outbreak of war was reached, letters from Press correspondents would be arriving to supplement the earlier and necessarily more meagre cables.

After very careful consideration the second course was adopted. The first was open to the obvious objection that it may be years before the materials for an ideal history of this great War can be collected, sifted, and arranged. To take an instructive and topical example, one of the most important military histories which has ever been issued is that of the South African War, compiled under conditions which offer unexampled facilities for the production of a work of this kind.

Yet in Midsummer, 1904, only two out of five or six volumes of the "History of the War in South Africa" had appeared, and a good many months must necessarily elapse before the completion of this monumental undertaking is in sight. In the meantime there are other histories of the Boer War—"Cassell's" among them—from which countless readers have probably obtained a far more vivid and, on the whole, perhaps, a not less accurate idea of the great struggle in question than they might find possible after a conscientious study of such a mass of detail and closely reasoned argument as the more complete record will ultimately present.

The "middle way" suggested in connection with the present work seems safe and easy. But it was dismissed as a half-measure which would secure neither the fulness and complete accuracy of a history produced with real deliberation, nor permit the narrative to be invested with that added dramatic interest which arises from a nearly contemporary publication.

Accordingly, after an Introduction by Mr. Diósy, every word of which is as much to the point to-day as it was when it was written, the present record was made to commence with an actually warlike episode, the firing of the first shot of the War, followed swiftly by a narration of the midnight attack upon Port Arthur on February 8th. The subsequent course of events was somewhat closely followed at first, not because it was thought desirable to be promptly up-to-date, but because until lately the operations have been marked by certain rather baffling delays which, coupled with the reticence more especially of the Japanese authorities, have been the cause

of some tribulation to contemporary chroniclers.


But, notwithstanding this drawback, it may be claimed that the foregoing narrative is what it professes to be, namely, as full and as accurate an account of the War as was possible at the time of writing, and that such minor deficiencies as were inevitable are of small account compared with the vivid presentment of occurrences while the latter are still fresh in the public mind. Of the various sorts of history, to many the most fascinating is that produced in what the Germans so aptly call the *Sturm und Drang* of current movement and action. Nor should even the careful student disdain to seek material for his final estimate, more especially perhaps of great wars, in narratives of engagements and other operations published within a few weeks of the events themselves. Such contemporary records may lack complete impartiality; they may not possess great depth of focus, but they can be, and often are, much more graphic and realistic than more pretentious histories produced when time has cooled righteous indignation, and details of deep human interest have become obscured by larger issues on which the true historian is anxious to lay stress.

Yet it must not be supposed that this story is the result of mere casual glances at the telegrams in the daily papers, coupled with a lively imagination and a strong desire to "make pictures" out of every episode which lends itself to that process. Long before the War broke out the present writer made extensive preparations for following the course of a campaign which he felt was inevitable, and in which he was, for various reasons, peculiarly interested. Nor, since the commencement of hostili-

ties, has any labour been spared to supplement the facts available in the Press by other information only accessible to those who make a special study of such matters. As regards the newspaper accounts, a number of these have been

geographical points by reference to the best available maps.

Incidentally, a warm tribute may be paid to the general accuracy of the Press despatches sent under extremely trying conditions. In no recent campaign has



most carefully collated with a view to securing the utmost accuracy possible in cases where on the spot there has been a divergence in the details gathered by industrious correspondents, and the greatest pains have been taken to verify

the censorship been more strict, nor the temptation to supply deficiencies of fact by imaginative effect more strong. Yet, on the whole, there has been a singular absence of reckless and of baseless assumption, a circumstance of peculiar im-

portance to the present writer, who has had exceptional opportunities in the early stages of the War of discovering the true worth of the telegraphic information in the various leading papers. Of his indebtedness to this or that particular source it will, perhaps, suffice to say briefly that in specific cases due acknowledgment has been made and will continue to be made. But the general scheme of this narrative is the writer's own. Here and there the views of others are necessarily reproduced, although not necessarily copied. "Great wits jump" more harmoniously in regard to the eternal principles of warfare than in connection with most scientific studies, possibly because those principles are so constantly receiving such practical and forcible demonstration. Nor is it the aim of this publication to puzzle its readers with new and striking propositions in regard to strategy and tactics, but rather to explain any "problems" in a popular style, and by methods which the great majority of experts will probably agree in considering satisfactory.

After this personal preface let us proceed to the historical retrospect foreshadowed in the opening sentence of the present chapter. Already from time to time in the course of this narrative it has been necessary to glance at facts and happenings lying a little apart from the actual sequence of the warlike operations. For the history of a great struggle like this has many aspects besides those connected with purely naval and military science. A famous writer once spoke rather disparagingly of "drum and trumpet history," but at least it may be claimed for the right kind of war chronicle that it is, nay, must be, comprehensive. For this

reason our record of the campaign in the Far East has already contained something of political, geographical, and ethnographical interest outside the tale of weary marches on land, swift movements by sea, and desperate fighting generally. And now a point has been reached at which a still broader view may well be taken. A distinct stage of the War has been completed, and a situation produced into the details of which we shall presently enquire. Is not this a favourable opportunity for a dive into the sea of the Past, and an attempt to bring to the shore of the Present some more of those big facts which alone can make real history of mere annals of heroic blood-letting?

With the causes of the Russo-Japanese War Mr. Diósy has dealt with admirable clearness in his Introduction to this History. In that lucid statement will be found summarised both Russia's aim at the attainment of complete supremacy in Asia, and Japan's determination to withstand that far-reaching effort as far, at any rate, as the integrity of Korea was concerned. Sixteen weeks of war have brought both Russian purpose and Japanese resistance into stronger relief; but they have done more. They have revealed what could not have been guessed with absolute accuracy even by the shrewdest student of history, politics, and war. They have not only allowed us to isolate, as it were, the bacillus of war; they have not only shown in a very striking manner with what uniformity that bad bacillus works when similar conditions favourable to its development are present. They have sharply defined the central fact that, at the commencement of 1904, Russia was no more ready to fight Japan than Spain was ready to fight the United States in



THE OUTBREAK OF WAR: WIVES AND CHILDREN OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS LEAVING DALNY FOR THE WEST.

1898; than France was ready to fight Germany in 1870; than, to take an earlier and still more instructive example, Persia was ready to fight Macedon in 334 B.C. With these revelations have been combined a number of others tending to demonstrate with peculiar force and completeness the marvellous insight of the great Greek writer who first discovered that history is self-repeating, and who, in a memorable passage, may be said to have foreshadowed the French Revolution. History repeats itself! There were few indeed who, when Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia, would have cared to prophesy that in a few weeks comparisons would be drawn, and seriously and effectively drawn, between the Russo-Japanese War and those bygone conflicts which successively humiliated Persia, France, and Spain.

It has been said that the first-named of these three past wars is likely to prove a more useful parallel than the other two, and this point has been made the subject of some deeply interesting remarks by clever writers. The comparison has been strengthened by allusion to the fact that, when Persia clashed with Macedon, she was not really an effete and worn-out nation any more than Russia is, but was merely badly organised for any important warlike effort. For years she had relied on her prestige and apparent strength to impose her will upon others, and in many cases the fear of bringing such vast possibilities into hostile movement was sufficient to check any serious opposition to her ambitions and ideas of self-aggrandisement. In time she struck upon hard rock in the shape of Macedonia, already converted into a compact military organisation by the genius of Philip, who was assassinated

just when his dream of successful resistance to Persia might have been realised. The crossing of the Hellespont by Alexander has some points of general resemblance to the crossing of the Yalu by the Japanese, not as a military operation, of course, but as the commencement of, to all intents and purposes, an invasion of a huge Empire by a small but hardy nation. The comparison may be fancifully enlarged, but no further attempt need here, for the present at any rate, be made to extend it. It has merely been introduced as a lesson in history, one which may be pursued or not according to the reader's taste, but which even in a bare statement has a certain vigorous significance.

Attempts have been made to emphasise the connection between race-hatred and the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan. But the truth seems to be that race-hatred is itself a product rather than a cause, and that it is not at all safe to draw any very large deductions from its existence. The Russians have been taught to hate the "yellowskins," and the Japs have been indoctrinated with the idea that the Russians in general are treacherous, greedy, and unscrupulous to the last degree. But it is idle to seek the origin of the War in such crude sentiments, and equally foolish to think that the latter will have any effect upon the continuance of the struggle. As a matter of fact, there is so much in common between Russia and Asia that, but for conflicting aims, Russians and Japanese might be the best of friends. There are thousands of soldiers in Russia's vast army who are quite as Asiatic in their ideas and habits as even the Japanese of the provinces, and in both the cis-Ural Russian and the Jap there are qualities of simple faith, of

kindliness, of good humour, which would go far to produce a bond of friendly intercourse in happier circumstances.

But Russia, like the Persia of classical times, is swayed by forces in which national temperament and characteristics have long been crushed to make room for the realisation of giant ambitions and the satisfaction of devouring earth-hunger. One after another she has taken in the Central Asian tribes, and would by this time have absorbed Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, but for the counter influence of Great Britain exercised through India. Spreading Far-Eastwards, she had attained one of her objects by securing a comparatively speaking, warm-water terminus for the Siberian Railway at Port Arthur. That was the crisis, the turning-point—for this is what a crisis really means—in her latter-day history. Few fairer prospects have ever been open to any nation than that which Russia had before her in 1903. Of tremendous weight in the councils of Europe, she had secured in Asia a foothold comparable only with that won at an infinitely greater expenditure of blood and time by Great Britain herself. As long as she was content with what she already possessed there was no one to interfere with her, and there were several steady influences, such as Great Britain's anxiety to keep the peace in southern Asia, and China's existence as a great conservative force in the north-east. There is little that Russia could not have achieved, and achieved cheaply and with glorious credit, had she been content to work peacefully and in good faith towards the improvement of her splendid position. A Siberia teeming with mineral wealth; two Far-Eastern

ports linked up with St. Petersburg itself by rail; industrial centres, like Harbin, already in a state of astonishing prosperity—these, and a score of other advantages, Russia risked by a "forward policy," as fatuous in its execution as it was objectionable in its design and scope.

Never did a nation more deliberately seek war than did Russia in this instance. Not merely because she prepared for war, but because her preparation was both offensive and inadequate. If having made Port Arthur impregnable she had assembled there and at Vladivostok a fleet so obviously superior to that of Japan that the latter would not, in common prudence, have ventured upon any hostilities unless she had actually attacked, Russia might conceivably have attained her wished-for supremacy by sheer weight of metal. But she made the fatal mistake of multiplying her actual strength by her own inordinate conceit, and of looking to mere "bluff" to make up for real deficiencies, more especially in sea power. This, too, in the face of a nation which had been watching her every movement for years, was inspired with a longing to pay off old scores as regards Russia's acquisition of Port Arthur, and had, ever since her own war with China, been preparing steadily for a possible collision with a more formidable foe.

Never has national arrogance been more recklessly displayed than it was in this case. Russia had increased her armaments in the Far East considerably during 1903, more especially as regards the despatch of ships from her Baltic squadron to swell the Fleet under the newly appointed Viceroy of the Far East. But even in this respect she took no proper care to secure that large



THE FIRST ATTACK UPON PORT ARTHUR: THE TORPEDOING OF THE TSAREVITCH.

preponderance which alone would have justified her offensive attitude. She remained blind to the fact that her best warships were not so modern or so powerful as those of Japan, and she fell into war, while her naval superiority was little more than nominal, without any regard to Japan's immense advantages as regards dockyards and arsenals. How she could have imagined that, with such indifferent preparation, she could not only secure but retain the command of the sea in opposition to an enemy which showed such naval aptitude as Japan did in 1894, passes comprehension. Yet she must have confidently anticipated some such result, or she would have surely hesitated to court the fearful damage more especially to her prestige, which could not but follow a clear loss of supremacy at sea.

There can be but one explanation of an attitude so completely at variance with the rules of common caution. To the very last, one half of Russian officialdom must have believed that "bluff" would deter Japan from entering into war until Korea had been effectively occupied, as it doubtless would have been in the spring. The other half may well have been ignorant of the real strength of Japan, and of the real weakness of Russia in the Far East, and doubtless trusted to the mere names of the Tsar and his Viceroy to overcome any trifling opposition that might be offered to Russian designs. Such insane ideas were fostered by the absurdly exaggerated accounts of enormous reviews of ships and men at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and by the half-contemptuous procrastination displayed in the negotiations with Japan. The notion gained ground, even among some European nations which might have known better, that

Russia was putting the final touches to her work, was making assurance doubly sure, was waiting until she felt that she had merely to shake her warlike crest to inspire at any rate Japan with panic fear.

Yet in the early days of 1904 Russia was remaining nearly passive, save for a final naval reinforcement which Japan first discounted by purchasing the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* from the Argentine Republic, and then rendered impossible by destroying the fancied Russian naval superiority in a single night. She was taking no sound measures to consolidate her military forces in the Trans-Baikal region. The Eastward movement of her troops, hampered as it was by the difficulty of keeping them supplied, had been only imposing when exaggerated by doubtful reports. She evidently had no definite plan of campaign in the event of war. Port Arthur had been fortified most strongly, but little had been done for Vladivostok. Nearly everything, in a word, was being left to chance, in the confident hope that once more the watchword "Mighty Russia and the Tsar!" would make up for all deficiencies. "Everything is ready, Sire, to the last gaiter-button," was the assurance which Napoleon III. received from Marshal Lebœuf on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War. Similarly, no doubt, Nicholas II. learnt from Alexeieff that no detail was lacking to demonstrate Russia's capacity, if necessary, to grind Japan to powder. Yet less than three months of war was needed to show that on land as on sea the only real superiority possessed by the Colossus of the North lay in the latter's extraordinary belief in the power of bluff as opposed to the results of unwearying patience, marvellous tenacity, and forethought covering the

minutest details in the way of warlike preparation.

There is, as has been suggested before in this narrative, some temptation to carry the comparison with what happened in 1870 a little further and to compare Japan's readiness with that of Prussia. But it has already been shown that any such attempted parallel is unfair to Japan as well as otherwise misleading. An added point is that the struggle for which Japan had been gathering her strength for ten long years was of more serious moment to her than a war with France could in any event have been to Prussia. Had France been successful the formation of the German Empire might have been delayed, and German commercial progress rudely checked. But in a few years the country would have recovered itself as completely, if not perhaps so quickly, as France did. For Japan the outlook, in the event of failure to withstand the first shock of a collision with her mighty antagonist, is altogether different. This war means to her a struggle for existence, and, in the clear knowledge that it is so, her preparations have been on a scale which, taking the relative size and wealth of the two countries into account, must be reckoned more elaborate and effectual even than those of which the corner-stone was the genius of von Moltke.


The fact that Japan had to prepare for a long and arduous series of naval operations, as well as for a land campaign, alone differentiates her case from that of Prussia. What has happened in the past sixteen weeks further raises her on this account to a level never reached in modern history by any nation in the world. Ready by land and sea! What country has been clearly, indisputably, this since war became a matter in which

armies run into hundreds of thousands of men, and each one of a half-a-dozen ships in a single squadron may mean an expenditure in money alone of over a million sterling? Without pursuing reflections which might take an invidious turn, let us try to consider what sacrifices such requirements have imposed upon a country like Japan, which, but a short two score years ago, had not emerged from a state by the side of which the England of Norman times compares, in some points of civilisation, rather favourably. What patient self-abnegation on the part of the manhood of a nation just beginning to "find itself" is involved in the institution of a military organisation which, at a stroke of the pen, can put a quarter of a million trained soldiers at least into the field! What repression of legitimate domestic ambitions is indicated in the careful husbanding of resources which enables Japan to spend million upon million in the acquisition of warships of the most modern type!

The teaching of history in the case of both these two now belligerent nations seems to merit a few passing remarks. What will, perhaps, strike the intelligent observer more forcibly than any other aspect of this great struggle in its preliminary stage is the fact that here the East seems to be moving for once very much more quickly than the West, and that this does not seem at all in accordance with the established rule of things. It is true that Russia cannot be described as a type of Western progress, and that in many parts of that vast, and often barren, country the march of civilisation is represented at best by a thoroughly corrupt and unscrupulous officialism. "Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar" is an old adage

sometimes easy of effective application even to the townbred Slav. But still Russia in Europe is European in many attributes with which unassisted Asiatic progress has little in common. Or

nation or tribe which is not absolutely controlled by a European Power. One makes the latter reservation because there are Asiatic communities—the Parsees, for example—which for culture



ADMIRAL BARON KAKUBEI YAMAMOTO, MINISTER OF JAPANESE NAVY.

rather, to put it in another way, the average Russian, since at any rate the emancipation of the serfs, has a clear right to regard himself as belonging to a higher order of civilisation than the average Asiatic belonging to an average

and conduct will put many a European community outside Russia to shame.

Yet Russia, owing to the fatal gulf which separates her governing power from her people, is being taught a costly lesson by Japan without having made

any serious effort at all to avoid that humiliation. It is not because she has not had lessons in the past; it is not because her people are inert or cowardly; it is not even because she has attained to such wealth and grandeur that, like the Rome of the Cæsars, the India of the Moghuls, she has become luxurious to the verge of decadence. There is, as has been constantly urged in these pages, much to admire in the Russian national character; there is even a great deal which commands respect in the work of the autocrats and statesmen who of late have controlled her destinies. But her progress has not been on the right lines. The Russian Ship of State is like an immense, but old-fashioned, cargo-boat into which have been put engines of the very finest type such as might be suitably fitted to a first-class cruiser. The result has been that she has been driven at too high a speed for her frame, and the hull may at any moment show sign of having been badly strained in the process.


The Far Eastern policy of Russia is in some respects a grand conception, and the construction of the Siberian Railway as one of the first foundations of that policy is something of which any country and ruler might be proud. But, while she has gone far and fast in this direction, she has not taken the precautions necessary to prevent a sudden, perhaps complete, check to her progress. This is the more surprising because, in Central Asia, Russia has been for the most part singularly successful in her gradual advances. Latterly she has, let us hope, met a sufficiently high wall of prejudice in Afghanistan; but elsewhere, notably in Turkestan, she has not only made good her foothold, but has conferred many benefits on populations formerly ranking

very low indeed in the social scale. In Manchuria she has never, despite apparent prosperity, played a great part. To the Chinese she has been hard and sometimes terribly cruel, while her cynical disregard of solemn undertakings, the tortuous character of her negotiations with Peking, her flagrant efforts to dominate Korea through the medium of a timber concession, had long ago disgusted fair-minded European observers. But her real folly consisted in her overbearing attitude towards Japan, an attitude which she failed to back up by a reserve of promptly available force.

And what of Japan? Volumes have been written in which the astonishing rise of this country from a condition of semi-barbarism to a recognised position among the great Powers of the world has received appreciative record, and indeed the theme is an inspiring one. But it is not always that the true inwardness of this extraordinary development is realised. In order to examine it properly we must not rush too hastily into vague estimates of national character, but rather take sober calculated views of political factors, just as we have recently done in the case of Russia. The latter's early failure to justify her attempted expansion towards the Far East was, as we have seen, largely due to the fact that in Russia there is not that true relationship between the Government and the governed which there must be in any well-ordered State, whatever are the principles on which it is ruled. Japan's triumph has sprung chiefly from the Mikado's shrewd realisation of the fact that a Constitution would eventually give his country just the backbone it required, rendering it a healthy, hardy, vertebrate creature instead of a mere

iridescent jelly-fish. That is the true germ of Japan's success, just as it has been the germ of success in the case of another and greater Island Nation. The New Constitution of Japan was at first regarded with some amusement by Western nations, who smiled to see the most artistic and apparently informal nation in the world arraying itself in

mass, in which many old national faults were crushed into insignificance. Henceforth good government became the mainstay of Japan, and, thanks to her insular position, she was able to lay the foundations of her future greatness without interference, which might have hopelessly retarded her development. Her progress was amazingly fast, but she



From a Native Drawing.


THE PRIME MINISTER ADDRESSING THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT AT TOKIO.

European garments and aping Parliamentary forms of procedure. But it soon became evident that the Mikado, in fulfilling his promise to give his people a Constitution, had taken the very best means of securing not only their advancement but their protection against Western aggression. By its means he welded them, or rather they welded themselves, into a purposeful

had everything in her favour—an enlightened ruler, a ductile people, a fertile country, and more than enough native shrewdness on the part of her progressive politicians. Having addressed herself to the great problems of defence, she sought and obtained the best advice, profited by the examples of others, put herself into the hardest sort of training, spent money royally, and

took care to have good value for it in the way of ships, and guns, and other war material. When trouble arose with China she gave the world a glimpse of her capacity, and showed what good government, superadded to Oriental aptitude, had done for her. Europe had another such warning in the short struggle which culminated in Königgrätz. But, just as in 1870 France had failed to realise, or had forgotten, or had blinded her eyes to the fact, that in 1866 a new military star of the first magnitude had arisen in the sky, so in 1904 Russia

failed to profit by the warning she in common with others had received ten years before. What may be the ultimate result of these errors on the one part, and earnest strivings on the other, remains to be seen. But already in the operations against Port Arthur, and in the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, we have seen history made of a pattern which may cause the more thoughtful to wonder how much longer the East and the West will serve as terms of any but mere geographical expression and of no further significance.



JAPANESE SCOUT.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE FIRST PHASE ENDED—A GENERAL SURVEY—SOME ADDITIONAL POINTS—OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—A HERO'S FUNERAL—ENGINES OF WARFARE—HIGH ANGLE FIRE—SINKING OF THE *YOSHINO*—TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY—SOME LESSONS—THE ONLOOKERS.

HAVING touched lightly and discursively on some historical aspects of the War, it remains to dot the i's and cross the t's of the preceding narrative in regard to certain points as to which, at the time of writing, there was no very complete information available. It has already been indicated that, at the end of the third week in May, a new stage of the operations was about to commence. The present, therefore, is a most convenient juncture at which to supply unavoidable deficiencies and, at the same time, to "take stock" generally, with a view to arriving at a correct estimate of the business that has been done in the period under review.

To the first phase of the War may be roughly assigned the preliminary operations, chiefly naval, against Port Arthur; the landings in Korea, and the advance of the First Army of Japan to the Yalu; the Passage of the Yalu, the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, and the advance to Feng-hwang-cheng; and the landing of the Second Japanese Army in the Liao-tung Peninsula and the consequent isolation of Port Arthur. In the foregoing narrative other movements have been dealt with, such as those in connection with Vladivostok. But, although these belong to the first phase of the War from the chronicler's point of view, they have reached no definite stage, and there is, accordingly, not much to be gained by

subjecting them, for the present, to any detailed scrutiny by the light of later information.

Of the first great episode of the War, the midnight attack upon Port Arthur, there is little to add to the description given in the first chapter of this work, unless it be by way of emphasising the completeness with which the Russian garrison was taken by surprise. It is even reported, says a correspondent, who was residing at Port Arthur at the time of the attack, that a Russian naval officer on shore in the New Town, when his attention was directed to the firing on the fort, remarked airily, "Ah, they are carrying out some night manoeuvres. Such things must be; for some day, perhaps, we shall have to deal with the Japanese!" The same correspondent gives a thumb-nail sketch of Port Arthur which may be useful in following the later operations against that place. It is, he says, like most of the Russian settlements in the Far East, "rather an agglomeration of villages than a town. It consists of a port, of old and new Russian towns, miles apart; of old and new China towns; of garrisons, batteries, stores, and markets, all isolated. Many of the residents knew nothing of the night torpedo attack until long after daylight. To some the first notice of hostilities was the bursting of shells in the town itself."


Clearly there has been no exaggeration in this narrative of the disquieting effects upon Port Arthur of the bombardments. Speaking of that on February 9th, this eye-witness says: "The immediate effect of the firing in the town was general consternation of the civilian population. Men ran anywhere for shelter; the streets were deserted. Hours after the firing ceased people congregated in small groups and told their experiences; they thronged the Bund and quays to inspect the havoc wrought by the shells, and to receive from each other the moral encouragement they needed. That same evening saw the first rush for the railway station and a crowding to the passenger steamers in the harbour. That night the town was in total darkness. Men were busy disposing of their goods and making plans to leave. Much property changed hands. The next day, and the next, and the next, the exodus continued; processions of stretcher-bearers conveyed the wounded from the port to the hospitals; the dead were buried twenty at a time. Port Arthur was impressed."

Yet it appears that this first lesson was not entirely effectual. For "Japan has not yet wounded deeply the self-esteem of the Russian. He is even now more confident of victory than he was before. It is right; we are at war; Japan will be taught a lesson she will never forget—such are the words of men who belong to a race of which this present generation has not yet learnt the first word of the 'lesson' with which it threatens Japan. But the boastings, the idleness, the insincerity, all are of the junior officers only. The really responsible men, those in high positions, now know, if they did not realise before, how dangerous the position of the Russian Empire in the Far East has become, and how slight is


the hold she has upon the territory she believed she had acquired with her railway concession outside the Great Wall of China."

Written with reference to what occurred in February, these words form a singularly instructive prologue to what occurred in March, April, and May, and go far to justify the severe estimate formed in the preceding chapter of Russia's strange misconception of her own weakness and her adversary's strength.

In the interests of accuracy it is, perhaps, expedient to state that the attack on Port Arthur by the *Asagiri* and *Hayatori*, as described in Chapter V., was not the first action in which the Japanese destroyers had been engaged. In the early accounts of the first torpedo attack it was stated that torpedo-boats were engaged, but it has since transpired that here, too, the destroyers were in evidence. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd flotillas of these craft were sent against Port Arthur, but apparently only two of them carried out the attack. This correction enables us to quote an account of the operation given by a Japanese officer who actually took part in it. He says:—"The two flotillas steamed straight into the enemy's fleet at anchor, keeping a parallel formation. After firing their torpedoes the left flotilla turned to port, while the right turned to starboard, and steamed back again in the same formation. Just before delivering the attack the *Oboro* came in collision with the *Ikazuchi*, and bent her bow slightly, and as she raised a good deal of spray in consequence she had to be run at half speed, but she did well. Then the torpedo turntable on board the *Inazuma* jammed through a piece of wood being washed into the cog by the sea, so the commander turned her over to the



FUNERAL OF COMMANDER HIROSE.



other side and fired. Our torpedo-boat destroyers went so close that they could plainly see men rushing about the decks with lamps in the enemy's ships. Each boat fired one 18-in. Whitehead torpedo, and three took effect. The Russians did not open fire till we were almost out of range, fearing perhaps to hit their own ships. Yet during the confusion three out of the four Russian patrolling torpedo-boats sank, taking each other for Japanese, so there are a less number of torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers in Port Arthur than is believed in Europe."

The apparently foolish neglect of the Russians to remove the cruiser *Varyag* and the gunboat *Koriets* from Chemulpo has been explained by the fact that the Japanese intercepted the Russian wireless messages directing the two doomed ships to withdraw. It is now established that the Japanese ships which took part in the action off Chemulpo were the *Asama*, *Chiyoda*, *Naniwa*, *Niitaka*, *Takachiho*, and the *Akashi*, a despatch-boat. The torpedo-boats remained spectators throughout. The battle commenced at about four and a half miles with a shot from the *Koriets*, and was at its warmest when the interval narrowed to about three miles.

Of the Port Arthur reconnaissance and blocking operations perhaps the most active episode was the fight between Captain Asai's and Captain Matoussevitch's destroyer flotillas, resulting in the loss of the *Steregutchy*, as narrated in Chapter VIII. But greater inspiration is unquestionably to be derived from the second attempt to sink Japanese merchantmen in the harbour entrance, that extraordinary act of gallantry which culminated in the death of Commander Hirose, of which a brief account was

given in Chapter XIV. Allusion was made on page 173 to the great public funeral which was accorded to the hero's remains, and, as details of these impressive rites have since arrived, we may take the opportunity of studying a ceremonial both closely associated with the War and intensely characteristic of Japanese sentiment. A peculiarly graphic account is that furnished by Mr. E. J. Harrison, the Tokio correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, who, after alluding to Commander Hirose's varied claims to distinction—he was a noted scholar and athlete, as well as a first-class fighting man—gives the following picturesque description of the Shinto burial honours.

"The weird wail of the 'shono-fue,' a peculiar pipe blown by the priests, intimated the approach of the procession. Here the foreigner recognised old Japan. Soon came the contrast, for, just as the two mounted policemen, who headed the procession, hove in sight, the naval band struck up with splendid effect the superb funeral march of Chopin. And yet, after all, this seeming incongruity was not so very incongruous, for was not Chopin himself a native of the land which of all others, perhaps, had most reason to hate the name of Russia? The guard of honour consisted of two hundred blue-jackets from Yokosuka—fine, sturdy fellows, whose faces testified to an unfeigned sorrow. Perhaps the sentiment of comradeship had something to do with their unwonted grief, since the romantic friendship between Sugino, the warrant officer, and the Commander shows how broad and deep were the sympathies of Hirose. . . . Following the guard of honour came two Shinto priests, 'kan-nushi,' dressed in white, and riding in a carriage of American make; then the 'sakaki,' or *Cleyera Japonica*, the sacred

tree of the Shinto religion, borne by blue-jackets, with a flag bearing the name and rank of the deceased.

"The coffin lay on a gun-carriage, drawn by thirty bluejackets, and on either side walked three officers, class-mates of the Commander at the Naval College. Miss Kaoru Hirose, the little niece of the deceased, was chief mourner, dressed all in white, the mourning colour of the Japanese.

"The route lay through some of the most picturesque parts of the capital, which in turn offered strong contrasts. Here on the one hand might be seen some of the few remaining 'nagaya'—the severely simple white-plastered two-storied barracks which in feudal days surrounded and protected the 'Yas-hiki' of the 'daimio,' and served to accommodate the two-sworded retainers, ever spoiling

for a fight; on the other, numerous modern dwellings in foreign style, tenanted by both Japanese and foreigners, might be accepted as a concrete indication of the reality of the nation's compromise with the spirit of ancient conservatism. Much of the way was along avenues of cherry trees, the falling flowers of which covered the ground with a light pink carpet. There was little ritual at the shrine. Common

wood benches served to seat the principal mourners, and the altar was severely simple. A white banner, bearing the name and rank of the deceased in Chinese ideographs, surmounted the coffin, and two of the 'sakaki' were erected at the side of the altar.

"The rites, known as the 'shokonsai,' were opened by the chief priest, a vener-

able old man. Lights and offerings, including salt, water, rice, *saké*, cakes, fish, fruit, dried sea-weed, and vegetables, were brought in one by one and placed on a shelf in front of the coffin. The chief priest read a funeral address, a chronological recital of the career of the deceased, in that strange monotonous sing-song affected by the Japanese on these occasions, and then came Lieutenant Matsumura. This officer was wounded during the first attack on Port



Photo: Church Missionary Society.

JAPANESE SHINTO PRIEST OFFERING *SAKÉ*.

Arthur—Hirose perished in the second—and was only recently discharged from Sasebo Naval Hospital. He read a message from Admiral Togo, warmly eulogising the bravery of the deceased. Several orations followed, and during the intervals the priestly orchestra elicited ear-piercing strains from the 'shono-fue.' The British Minister, Sir Claude Macdonald, and General Sir Ian Hamilton, the latter

in uniform, took part in the ceremony, and nearly every other foreigner present showed himself eager to follow their example.

"The grave had been dug at the summit of a hillock, in sight of the spacious Aoyama barracks, and in the hollow below the firing party of blue-jackets was stationed. Three volleys were fired, the band striking up a few bars of an inspiring march after each, the mourners threw earth into the open grave, and the public ceremony came to a close."

Of the sinking of the *Petropavlovsk* with Admiral Makaroff and Grand Duke Cyril on board and Grand Duke Boris as an eye-witness, some fuller accounts have been received since Chapter XV. was written, but none which satisfactorily

clears up the mystery of her extremely rapid disappearance. It is suggested that she struck more than one mine, but it is thought that this would not account for her submersion in two minutes. The theory as to the bursting of the boilers has been noticed, and we may add the conjecture that some loaded torpedoes on board the *Petropavlovsk* were exploded by the shock of contact

with the mine, and that the vessel's bottom was literally torn open.

Be this as it may, it is abundantly clear that the Oda mine, of which some mention was made on page 181, is indeed a marvellous engine of destruction. From details now available, it is understood that this "torpedo-mine,"

as it is called, possesses the special merit that it can be dropped overboard without any special precaution, and that it adjusts itself automatically, whatever the depth of the water. It does not drift from its position, it ignites without fail, and it is said to develop a destructive energy far greater than that of any mechanical mine hitherto in use. Of the deadly efficiency of the Oda mine the sinking of the *Petropavlovsk* is in any case a striking proof.

But an almost more

important point in this connection is that the possibility of the disaster was really due to the facility with which this class of mine can be laid. The actual process of dropping her mines at midnight on April 12th is said to have occupied the *Koryo Maru*, whose exploit was described at the opening of Chapter XV., only about a quarter of an hour. To this she must have largely




THE GRAND DUKE BORIS VLADIMIROVITCH.

owed her escape from the fire of the Russian forts. There is now some question whether either the *Koryo Maru* or the attendant torpedo craft suffered any interruption at all from the shore batteries during this momentous short period, since, according to one later account, the search-lights, though busy, at first failed to bring the approaching

Admiral hesitated long before exposing his men to such terrible risk. For had even one well-planted shell struck the *Koryo Maru*, she would have been likely to fare as ill as the ill-fated *Yenisei* fared at Dalny.

While on this subject it may usefully be recorded that, besides the Oda mine and the well-known Arisaka quick-firing



HOLE BLOWN IN SIDE OF THE RUSSIAN SHIP *PALADA* AT THE FIRST ATTACK UPON
PORT ARTHUR.

enemy into their field. But if the operation of mine-laying had been protracted, as it would necessarily have been if the ordinary mines had been used, discovery would almost inevitably have followed. A well-informed correspondent, after remarking that this was the first occasion on which Admiral Togo ventured to send a torpedo-transport within point-blank range of the Russian batteries, alludes to the rumour that the

rifle, the Japanese have introduced several improvements of their own in war material and naval appliances, of which it is possible we may hear more in the course of this instructive war. One of these is the Yamanouchi gun-platform; another the "Ijuin fuse," invented by a Japanese Admiral, and said by gunnery experts to be a remarkably efficient contrivance; the third, the "Miyabara" water-tube boiler, de-

signed by a Japanese Chief Engineer who received his scholastic and technical education in this country.

The *Times* correspondent, who supplies much of the foregoing information with reference to the mine-laying at midnight on April 12th, makes a curiously realistic reference to the work done on the morning of April 15th by the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, as described on page 194 of the present work: "The first duty of the two cruisers was to silence this fort, which feat they seem to have accomplished without any difficulty. Then they commenced to bombard the harbour and town with high-angle fire. The remaining vessels of the Japanese squadron treated the affair as a kind of picnic spectacle. They lay off the harbour's mouth just beyond effective range of the forts, and the officers watched the flight of the cruisers' shells, shouting 'Banzai!' whenever a good hit was scored. The Russians had to suffer it all tamely. They failed to inflict the smallest damage on the *Kasuga* and the *Nisshin*, which kept constantly moving throughout the operation."

There is something rather painfully familiar in the idea of treating a bombardment as if it were a cricket-match, and "Well hit!" or "Well bowled!" were correct expressions to apply to the effect of twelve-inch shells. But sailors have always been prone to speak thus airily of the flight of huge projectiles, of which none understand better than themselves the real power. "They're bowling pretty straight, sir," was the cheery remark of one of our own bluejackets in the Crimea to an officer who, he thought, would appreciate the metaphor, although the ball that was "coming down" was a shell from a gun of then considerable calibre.

"Japanese naval officers," we are told, "evidently place much faith in high-angle fire. Possibly their judgment is influenced by the serious consideration that their fleet cannot be reinforced throughout this war; every ship disabled means so much permanent loss of fighting power. They therefore possess a very vivid appreciation of the familiar arguments that, whereas a warship's armour and ordnance are limited, a fort's are unlimited, and that the havoc wrought by a shell striking a vessel may be great beyond comparison with the havoc wrought by a shell striking a fort. At all events, they do not attach conclusive importance to the experiences of either Farragut or Seymour. They claim, on the contrary, that the injury inflicted by high-angle fire, judiciously directed, is much greater than experts have hitherto been disposed to admit, and that the enemy's inability to protect himself against such fire is as demoralising as the immunity enjoyed by those using it is valuable. Port Arthur, however, is specially vulnerable to high-angle fire, so that no general theory can be based on the results achieved there."

Before leaving the preliminary operations against Port Arthur, some interesting details may be added to the account given in Chapter XXIII. of the sinking of the cruiser *Yoshino* by collision with the *Kasuga*. It appears that the heavy loss of life was due to no want of precaution, but to a truly lamentable accident. The *Kasuga* struck the *Yoshino* on the port side near the engines, and the blow destroyed the dynamos, leaving the ship in the darkness of a particularly dense fog. Directly the collision took place the collision-mats used on such occasions were promptly got out and hung over the hole, but the latter

was too big to allow of any successful attempt to stop the inrush of water. The ship began to settle quickly with a heavy list to starboard, and Captain Sayegi ordered the whole crew on the upper deck. Five boats were now lowered on the starboard, and one on the port side, but before the former could get clear the ship lurched to starboard and went down, all five boats being smashed by the masts and davits.

"The captain himself never left the bridge, but stood there while the crew were getting into the boats, and cried 'Banzai!' to them. When last seen he was shaking hands with Commander Hirowatari in a last farewell. Lieutenant Naito sprang overboard and swam to the only cutter, that on the port side, which escaped and rowed to the *Kasuga*. He returned at once with three of the latter's boats, but found no trace either of the *Yoshino* or her crew, apart from six men who had already been rescued by the cruiser *Chitose*."

Not a great deal needs to be said by way of supplementing the details already given of the advance of the Japanese First Army through Korea. But some very interesting details are now available concerning the transport and supply operations, to which appreciative general reference has been made on several previous occasions. In particular a British military correspondent in Korea writing to the *Times* has given some valuable information regarding the manner in which the Japanese utilised and supplemented the existing transport facilities in a country of doubtful roads and an indolent population.

The Korean road at best is but an unmetalled track deeply rutted by the heavy wheels of the rough country bullock carts, and after a thaw or rain it becomes, as we

have seen, a morass. Indeed, during the rainy season proper, which lasts from the middle of June till the end of August, travelling in Korea is said to be quite out of the question, since not only are the roads impassable, but the smallest streams become raging torrents, a river having been known to rise as much as twenty-nine feet in a single night. It may be well to bear these last facts in mind in view of future possibilities, and, in the meantime, although the difficulties which the Japanese had to contend against in the winter and early spring were not quite so formidable as here indicated, they were undoubtedly serious, more especially during the melting of the snows.

"The usual Korean means of transport," says the correspondent above referred to, "are pack animals and coolies. The oxen of the country are of an especially fine and massive breed, short-horned, docile, and capable of doing a vast amount of work; 300 lb. is considered an average load for a bull to carry daily on a long journey. Unfortunately for the Japanese, a scourge of that ubiquitous cattle disease, rinderpest, has recently decimated the cattle in the north-west of Korea, so that the best form of local transport is unobtainable. The small Korean pony is a marvellous animal to carry weight; 200 lb. for thirty miles a day is only what he is used to doing all his life. No amount of hard work cures him of biting and kicking whenever he gets the opportunity. For this reason the ponies are all slung up at night to rafters overhead, in such a helpless position that they are unable to hurt one another. Fixed in this manner they are fed on a hot water mash of beans out of a trough.

"The Japanese military authorities have bought up every available quadruped capable of carrying a load; but the

number obtained is microscopic compared to that required for such a large army as three divisions. The Japanese, therefore, have to depend almost entirely on the means of transport which they have brought with them from their own country. Each one of the thirteen divisions of which the army in Japan is composed has a train battalion, which in peace time forms a school of instruction for the whole of the regimental and other transport of its own particular division. In this battalion soldiers serve for three years as in other branches of the army, but a large reserve of drivers is obtained by training four batches per annum for three months each in the elementary principles of horse management and the packing of loads, after which they are passed into the reserve. In war time the train soldiers act as superintendents to the various transport columns, while the drivers lead and look after one pony each. On mobilisation the battalion is broken up, and provides men and material for the transport of regimental baggage, hospitals, ammunition, columns, and pontoons. The latter are carried on small four-wheeled trollies pulled by one pony each. The ordinary transport cart has two wheels, no sides, and is capable of carrying about 350 lb. It is pulled, as a rule, by one pony led by a man, but in emergency may be drawn by three or four soldiers or coolies. These carts seem exceedingly handy and useful. Their track is so narrow that they can be taken along almost any mountain path or through the streets of Korean towns."

As regards "supply," there are in each division four supply columns which carry three days' ordinary rations for man and horse, also one reserve ration for men. The soldiers carry two days' reserve and one day's cooked ration in their knap-

sacks; while there is also one day's ordinary ration in the regimental baggage. Each horse carries one day's forage, and that for two more days is supposed to be in the regimental heavy baggage. Thus, in all, six days' forage and five days' ordinary and three days' reserve rations for men are with the army. Besides the supply columns of one-horse carts and pack animals, the Japanese have enlisted thousands of so-called "military coolies" who pull light hand-carts capable of conveying about 200 lb. of baggage. These men are the rejections for height of this year's conscription—that is, they are below the *minimum* height for infantry, five feet two inches, but are otherwise medically fit. They are chosen from among the agricultural classes, who are used to pulling carts; for in Japan manual labour largely takes the place of draft animals.

Of the supply arrangements a very picturesque description is also given by Mr. McKenzie of the *Daily Mail*, who comments on the appearance of the above mentioned "military coolies" in every town between Seoul and Ping-Yang. He adds:—"One man, in officers' war uniform—free, that is, from all superfluous decoration—takes possession of a temple or a palace, and gigantic stocks of food and clothing rise, as it were, from the earth. Here is a mountain of red blankets, here an avalanche of coolie loads of rice. Here come men from fifty miles away, bringing cattle. In Tho-san they are slaughtering chickens and in An-hop they are gathering pigs, while the advance guard of the Japanese fighting men is eighty miles away.

"You enter a village, knowing that it is at least two days before the first soldiers, pushing on from Seoul, can reach there. At the entrance to the village you



RECOVERING THE BODIES OF THE VICTIMS OF THE PETROPAYLOVSK DISASTER, AT PORT ARTHUR.

will probably find a newly-erected notice-board, with a large map showing every house and road around, and with minute directions below for billeting. You go some miles off the main road to find one or two cavalry vedettes there, and a civilian bargaining with the Koreans about the purchase of their pigs and rice. And very likely an army of coolies is setting out in another direction for soldiers who are coming by a side road.

"The same foresight is shown in every detail. The rice is made up to the exact weight for a coolie to carry. These weights are further calculated, so that so many of them go to a pony or ox load. Picked natives are decorated with stripes of red, to show that they are now in the service of his Imperial Japanese Majesty's Transport Corps. At this time the Japanese do not haggle over money. Coolies are paid wages scarce dreamed of by them before, and the price of pack-ponies has gone sky-high. I had to pay 144 dollars for the hire of three pack-ponies from Seoul to Ping-yang."

The trouble of the Japanese Commissariat officers has been two-fold. As regards the supplies available in the country itself, these are, comparatively speaking, insignificant. The country is wretchedly poor, thanks largely, it would seem, to the easy-going ways of the inhabitants, and the Koreans, however willing to make hay while the sun shines by getting big prices from the Japanese, have next to nothing to sell, and in many cases have themselves been reduced by the hardness of the past winter to eating crows. On the other hand, there has also been great difficulty in bringing over stores from Japan, as all the transport has been badly wanted for the troops. In a word, the problem has been a frightfully perplexing one, the

solution of which might well have been hopeless to any nation less terribly in earnest than Japan.

The wonderful prevision of the Japanese General Staff is shown by the vigour with which, all this time, the construction of the military railway from Seoul to Wi-ju, to which reference was made on page 133, is being pushed on under General Yamana. Steamer loads of material have been arriving constantly at Chemulpo, and work on various sections of the line has been progressing so briskly that it is confidently expected that Ping-yang will be reached at the beginning of December. Nor is this the sum of Japan's energetic performance in Korea in rear of the advance of her First Army. At Seoul her influence is beginning completely to dominate the political situation. Early in April the Korean Emperor's palace had been destroyed by fire, and to this untoward event considerable significance was at first attached. The disaster was regarded by the populace as a sign of Buddha's wrath against the ruling family, and disturbances might have occurred but for the prompt measures taken by the Japanese and British authorities on the night of the fire to avert an outbreak. Later, the gradual introduction of Japanese protégés into the Korean civil service appears to have had a good effect, and the continued receipt of tidings of Japanese successes cannot but have had a reassuring influence upon the Emperor and his Court.

As an interesting additional detail pertinent to this portion of our survey, it may be mentioned that the salvage operations in connection with the sunken ex-Russian cruiser, *Varyag*, in Chemulpo Harbour, have been steadily pushed forward, and there now seems a distinct

possibility that in due course this powerful vessel will be added to the Japanese Navy. Already all her guns and other movables have been taken to Sasebo, but the work of raising the great ship is said to present very grave difficulties, as she lies port side down in the soft mud, which is continually oozing in through the cruel rents made by the Japanese shells.

Reverting to the Japanese advance, it may be long before such really complete and authentic details are available concerning the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng as will enable the careful student to follow each movement of that momentous fight with absolute accuracy. But it may now be placed on record that the brunt of the day's work was borne by about 5,000 Russians and about 25,000 Japanese, the former occupying the Russian front of some five miles from Kiu-lien-cheng to the Ai river, the latter being the force actually engaged in forcing the Russian line. According to the *Times* correspondent, whose messages, despatched some days after the battle took place, have a special value for their statistical accuracy, the Russian force originally consisted, as surmised, of an army corps of two divisions, the component parts being sixteen battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, forty-eight guns, and two companies of pioneers. Of these, three battalions at Antung and six in reserve at Hohmutang took no part in the battle of May 1st. The posts on the line of communications and the detachments elsewhere reduced the number by 2,000, and there was a further notable diminution of fighting strength by casualties and by withdrawals for the purpose of removing guns and wounded. The last-named allowance brings into relief the inadequate nature of the

Russian hospital arrangements, since, in modern war, it is always considered important to minimise the number of men lost to the fighting line by the necessity of rendering service to the wounded. In the old days it used to be a military axiom that it was more useful in a battle to wound your enemies than to kill them, not for humanitarian reasons, but because a wounded man requires two men to take him to the rear, and that thus three fighting men were placed *hors de combat*! But the latter-day excellence to which Army hospital work in the field has attained has discounted the value of this old saw, and nowadays men in the fighting line are seldom encouraged to neglect their proper business for that which is far more efficiently and, as a rule, most devotedly performed by bearer companies working under such protection as is afforded by the Red Cross.

"On April 30th," says the above quoted correspondent, "the shelling of the Russian camp and picketing lines, which the Japanese saw through a gap in the hills at a point of seven miles down the river, caused great slaughter of men and horses. Those who were wounded lay where they fell and received the Japanese fire time after time. This, added to the insufficient protection afforded by the flimsy earthworks and shallow trenches against the plunging fire from the howitzers, accounts for the extraordinary proportion of killed to wounded."

It is added that "the preliminary artillery fire on May 1st completely shook the Russian line, which retired before the Japanese attack was driven home. The retirement was precipitate, resembling a rout rather than an ordinary retreat. The reserves at Hohmutang made no move in support of

the body surrounded two miles away. When the Russians were attacked at Hohmutang they fought desperately, and only surrendered at the point of the bayonet just when the Japanese guns arrived."

The information which has come to hand since the early accounts of the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, and of the subsequent advance of General Kuroki's Army to Feng-hwang-cheng, confirms the impression that General Sassulitch took more on his shoulders than General Kuropatkin intended him to do in the matter of attempting to check the Japanese on the right bank of the Yalu. The subsequent swift removal of Sassulitch from his command indicates that at least he had not acted to the satisfaction of his superior officer, and the suspicion is strong that his

failure was largely due to a hope of distinguishing himself by a successful contest of the river passage. But his generalship was doubtful throughout, and was further hampered by his uncertainty as to the points the Japanese intended to select for their crossings; by the tremendous weight of the Japanese artillery fire; and by the exceedingly smart work done by Admiral Hosoya's squadron, consisting, it now appears, of the old battleship

Fuso, six gun-boats, eight torpedo-craft, and some armed launches, the crews of which occupied the attention of large numbers of Russian troops between Antung and the mouth of the river. First boldness, then indecision, and finally ignominious muddle, seem to have characterised Sassulitch's tactics, and the effect of this baneful sequence was observable until, after a leisurely pursuit, the retreating Russians hurriedly evacuated Feng-hwang-cheng. On the still worse demoralisation which must have ensued had not General Kashtalinsky, who was wounded in the course of the battle, displayed brilliant courage and determination in carrying out orders which he knew to be based on a totally wrong conception of the situation, it is hardly necessary to dilate.



MARSHAL KODAMA, SUB-CHIEF OF THE JAPANESE GENERAL STAFF, AND SPOKEN OF AS THE LORD KITCHENER OF JAPAN.

This chapter may be appropriately concluded with a brief reference to the attitude, at the stage which we have now reached, of those interested but not engaged in the War itself. Such a subject can, of course, be only dealt with here very discursively and in quite general terms. For it is still to some extent the business of diplomacy to be secretive, and some of the Governments of the on-looking nations may have taken stronger lines in their relations with one or other

or both of the belligerent nations than has been apparent even to the best-informed private individuals. But it is seldom that, in such cases, some reflection of what has occurred does not appear in

tions, many of them chiefly of personal significance, around which queer growths of intrigue had clustered till the original issues had well-nigh disappeared.

It is hardly too much to say that, thirty



JAPANESE CAVALRY OF THE LINE.

the Press, even of countries whose organs of public opinion are closely controlled by official checks. Moreover, the tendency of diplomacy nowadays is far more in the direction of open and straightforward dealing than it used to be formerly, when the statesmanship of Europe was embarrassed by dozens of smaller ques-

or forty years ago, such a war as this between Russia and Japan would have almost inevitably been followed not leisurely but promptly by at least one European collision. It is true that Prussia and France, Russia and Turkey, England and Afghanistan, Bulgaria and Servia, China and Japan, the United States and

Spain, Turkey and Greece, have all been at war during the past forty years without any embroilment of third parties; but in none of these cases was the inducement to outsiders to break the peace so great as it has been in the case of the Russo-Japanese struggle. Apart from any question of taking sides, the mere fact of Russia's preoccupation could not but tempt more than one European Power to assume an attitude towards a neighbour which Russia's support of that neighbour would have rendered very bad policy a few short months ago. But, so far, there has been no rupture even in the Balkans, where trouble was looked upon by many competent observers as certain to occur as soon as Russia found herself with her hands full. Europe has kept its head and its balance during four critical months, and, although the danger is by no means over, it is a splendid tribute to the increasing "common-sense of most," of which Tennyson wrote so hopefully, that it should have been hitherto averted.

As has been pointed out, the present most serious source of trouble lies in the doubt whether China will be able to preserve her neutrality, and the mere fact that there is no greater present peril than this—disquieting as it is—is of itself reassuring. For China is Russia's own equal in the art of extricating herself from a compromising situation, and, even should her troops or her populace violate her neutrality, she may find some way of escape short of being dragged into a war in which other European nations besides Russia might take a hand.

For the rest, the attitude of Europe has been wonderfully full of dignity and restraint. With the eyes of the world upon her, France in particular has

afforded a spectacle of correctness, combined with a characteristic regard for sentiment, which is wholly admirable. Full of sympathy for the reverses suffered by her ally, and quietly conscious of her own grave obligations in certain contingencies of the war, she has readily accorded a chivalrous recognition to Japanese gallantry, and naval and military capacity. To take a single instance out of many: when General Mishtchenko wrote home privately that "those little Japs are real soldiers," an enemy "who should be respected if not feared," this warm encomium was at once forwarded to Paris by the St. Petersburg correspondent of a French paper, and duly appeared in the *Petit Parisien* as one of a series of similar appreciations in the leading Paris journals.

The attitude of Germany has been less open, and the suspicion has gathered force that, in offers to Russia of support in the event of certain complications, the Kaiser has been more profuse than Russia's own ally. But here are diplomatic depths into which there is no occasion to dive for the purposes of this narrative. Nor need we at present, at any rate, seek to investigate at all closely the effect which the course of the War is having upon Turkey, that astonishing "Sick Man" whose temperature rises and falls according to no known rule of diplomatic medicine. Certain it is that Turkey is deeply interested in the Far Eastern struggle, and it is very possible that, but for the presence of Austria, Russia's official helpmate in the business of Macedonian reform, the Porte might have been quite unduly exhilarated by the blows which her old enemy has received at the hands of an Asiatic adversary. But here, as elsewhere, the "common sense of most" has so far been

instrumental in preventing an exhibition of feeling which the existence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet might make inconvenient from many standpoints.

Of the English-speaking nations it is sufficient to say that the United States has from the first criticised the events of the war with greater frankness than, perhaps, any European country, and has animadverted with especial vigour on the recklessness displayed in the matter of sowing the Far Eastern seas with mines which may be a great source of danger and may possibly do untold harm to neutral shipping in the future. Russia, through Count Cassini, her representative at Washington, has made vigorous endeavours to secure a more friendly recognition by the United States of her part in the present struggle; but "Uncle Sam" has continued to view the course

of affairs with a shrewd insight into the value of facts as opposed to fancies.

Of Great Britain's attitude the correctness has been admitted even by the leading Russian journals. This country is naturally inclined to favour its ally, and there are reasons why a check to Russia's progress in Asia cannot be wholly distasteful to us. But we have no cause, and, if we had, we should lack the disposition, to exult in the humiliation of a great Power bound to us by ties of Royal family connection, as well as by those of existing political friendship. Least of all would we care to glory in the reverses and sufferings of a brave Navy and Army, largely due to that over-confidence and under-estimation of the enemy's strength to which we ourselves, as a fighting people, have repeatedly shown ourselves to be addicted.



VICE-ADMIRAL URIU, WHO COMMANDED THE JAPANESE FLEET WHICH SEIZED CHEMULPO AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION—STRATEGICAL DEVELOPMENTS—POSSIBLE CHANGE OF PLAN—OBJECTS NOW IN VIEW—BRITISH NAVAL AND GERMAN MILITARY TEACHING—ENVELOPMENTS—RUSSIAN STANDPOINTS.

AT the close of the third week in May a military and naval situation has been developed which is full of interest even to the lay reader, to whom the niceties of strategy do not appeal. Hitherto, owing to the secrecy in which the Japanese plans have been shrouded, it has been necessary to use the greatest caution in attempting to construct a clear and coherent narrative out of such details as have been available. But the veil is now beginning to be lifted, and we shall presently be able to resume our story with a surer grasp of the end and aim of each particular movement than has been possible up to this point. To do this, however, it will be necessary to take yet one more step in the "taking stock" process to which already two chapters have been devoted. In the first of these, a glance has been given at the historical aspects of the War in its earliest stage; in the second some additional details were given, and certain lessons and circumstances discussed, in connection with the leading episodes of the conflict up to date. The object of the present chapter will be to set forth in as simple language as possible the technical aspect of the situation as it appears to those who are obliged to study these things professionally.

It may be objected that the War is quite interesting enough to those who look at it purely from a civilian standpoint, without seeking to examine it

through naval or military magnifying-glasses. Also, there are not a few amateur critics who are confident of their ability to foretell what will happen, and to explain the reasons for what has happened, without any assistance, more especially from a popular historian. Yet there is assuredly a very numerous class indeed which does like to have the true inwardness of an epoch-making war explained to it, and which is not ashamed to admit that sometimes it finds the course of a many-sided campaign rather difficult, without assistance, to understand. Again, it sometimes happens that the amateur critic, even he who conscientiously sticks little flags into big maps whenever two patrols exchange half-a-dozen shots, fails to see things in their true perspective. It is not pretended by the present writer that, in attempting to play the guide, philosopher, and friend in this direction, he will be able to satisfy all the requirements of those who yearn for knowledge, or to impart much added knowledge to those who think they know enough already. But he may reasonably hope that, in the course of his occasional surveys, he may teach some of the one class to think for themselves, and, perhaps, induce the other to expend a little additional care in mastering first principles before dealing with very complicated developments.

There are some who seem to think that the great fascination of the study of the



GENERAL KUROKI, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE FIRST JAPANESE ARMY.

art of war consists in the resemblance of the latter to a game of chess. This is a serious mistake, for the similarity alluded to is quite occasional, and, where it does exist, often misleading. As a simple matter of fact, the average campaign has a much stronger likeness to a game of draughts than to one of chess, more especially nowadays, when the size of armies necessitates more directness and simplicity than formerly. But there is an essential difference between War and, practically speaking, any sedentary game—a difference of which special heed should be taken in this instance. It is the possibility that at any time one of the combatants may make two or more moves to his adversary's one. This is particularly the case in a war in which navies as well as armies are engaged; but, even where only land operations are concerned, it is a matter of the greatest significance. In neither chess nor draughts is there anything comparable with the simultaneous march of two or three armies upon one objective, and not infrequently the failure to realise what a paralysing effect such a simultaneous advance may sometimes have upon a defending-force, is a great stumbling-block to the study of a campaign.

We shall probably see this two-moves-to-one capacity exemplified on a very large scale at a future stage; but evidence has not been wanting already of its existence as a factor in the preceding operations. On the very first day of the War, Admiral Togo made a double move, while his adversary remained motionless, by sending torpedo flotillas to Port Arthur and a squadron to Chemulpo, with striking results in both cases. But this was an instance of diverging attacks, and does not carry out the idea of the preceding paragraph so well as the cap-

ture of Feng-hwang-cheng by General Sasaki's brigade, which came upon the place by a roundabout march while the position was still forming the objective of General Kuroki's main army.

Some may ask why it is that a war like that between Russia and Japan should lend itself more freely to this unequal sort of strategy than other wars ancient and modern. The answer may seem a little complicated, but it conveys some deeply interesting truths, and a little trouble may well be taken to understand it. In the first place, what may be called an up-to-date war is perhaps chiefly distinguished from an ancient war not so much by the changes in the war material, or by alteration in tactics, as by the use of the telegraph. When a nation wants to make two moves in the field to the enemy's one, it splits up its forces, but keeps them linked by telegraph wires, not necessarily running from one army to another—that would often be impracticable—but all communicating with a common base.

Thus, when two armies are landed at points far apart on a coast, and are ordered to converge gradually on one place, they can now do so with an exactitude almost hopeless in the old days, unless there was a complete absence of opposition. For the commander of A army, on arriving at a halting-place, has merely to send a message by his field telegraph to headquarters to say where he is, and, this having been transmitted to the commander of B army, the latter knows exactly how far the A army has got towards the common goal, and quickens or steadies his own advance accordingly. By this means two considerable forces can be made to arrive simultaneously within striking distance of the same objective, and, by splitting

up the force, a very great gain in mobility has been effected, and infinite labour saved, especially where the country is mountainous or otherwise difficult to permit of the easy passage of large bodies of troops.

It is an added special feature of the Russo-Japanese War that, while the Japs have a great advantage in being thus able to direct two or three armies against one objective by the use of the field telegraph, the absence of an existing network of telegraphic communication may make it impossible at times for the Russians to keep thoroughly in touch with the advancing enemy. All that can be done by scouts and patrols will doubtless be done, but there are points at which the Japanese might land and proceed inland for many miles before any intimation of their approach could reach the Russian headquarters. In a civilized country the first appearance of an enemy is, of course, promptly telegraphed to headquarters, unless exceptional success has attended hostile efforts to circumvent the local signallers.

When it is remembered that to the advantages they possess in this respect the Japanese have added the secrecy only possible in the case of an Island Power, which, moreover, has resolutely muzzled all the newspaper correspondents, much of the situation reached at the beginning of the fourth week in May is explained. There are some campaigns in which it does not matter a great deal whether your enemy is or is not pretty fully aware of your movements. For instance, when Lord Kitchener took his army to Omdurman, it would probably have made not the slightest difference to the result if he had previously sent the Khalifa a polite note saying that on September 2nd he intended to attack

him with some 25,000 men. But in dealing with Russia, Japan unquestionably scored some of her first points by concealing as far as possible her intentions, and by thus causing her enemy a great deal of purposeless labour and waste of strength in defending points not seriously threatened. The Japanese mastery of the details of this kind of craft has been shown repeatedly in minor events of the War, such as the frequent feints upon Port Arthur, and the mock preparations for the passage of the Yalu at Wi-ju. But these are on quite a different plane from the veiled strategy which has been the leading feature of the first phase of the War, and which has in reality cost the Russians a heavier price than even the sharp collision at Kiu-lien-cheng.

The initial influence of the Command of the Sea upon the success which Japan has gained in this direction may seem to have been unduly ignored in the foregoing reflections, and some sticklers for the priority of the Sea Service may cavil at the phrase "Military and Naval Situation" which occurs in the synopsis of this chapter. But it must be remembered that we are now dealing with broad issues and future consequences rather than with the exact process by which the present situation was reached. What the Japanese Fleet has accomplished is of enormous importance. It has blocked the Russian Fleet from interfering with the movements of the Japanese armies, it has greatly assisted the latter, and it has subjected the main Russian stronghold to a wearing series of preliminary attacks. But the interest of the present situation is more military than naval, and in its development the telegraph is playing an almost more important part than Admiral Togo's



A PICTURESQUE STREET IN MUKDEN.

ships. The latter have paved the way for the land operations, they have helped them on, and will continue to do so ; but for the strategical developments of the future we have to look mainly to the War Council at Tokio and its telegraphic communications with the two or three armies already in the field, to which in due course a fourth, perhaps a fifth, may be added.

A curious supplement to what has been said, and quite justifiably and appropriately said, as to the secrecy which has shrouded Japanese strategy hitherto, now demands consideration. There are two sorts of secrecy in relation to military movements—one which has regard to their conception, the other to their execution. As far as the last are concerned, the effectiveness of Japanese methods has been proved by actual fact. Even the


acutest European critics have been forced to fall back upon mere conjecture, not invariably accurate, as to what the next move of the Japs might be, and the extent to which the Russians have been misled has been clearly shown by their vacillation in such cases as, for instance, the premature evacuation of Niu-chwang. But it is possible that even the Japanese have not been able throughout to prevent that dangerous sort of leakage which consists in the betrayal of plans long before the latter can be put into practice.

It is impossible to speak with complete confidence on this delicate subject. But there is no gainsaying the fact that a very explicit and circumstantial statement has been made by more than one correspondent to the effect that a betrayal of Japanese plans actually did take place, and that the Japanese General

Staff was compelled in consequence to modify some of its original intentions. The story—in which the name of the culprit is given—is that an officer of rank belonging to the Staff was found to have betrayed his trust, and to have sold official secrets through a Russian attaché at Tokio who had been his fellow student in Germany. The Japanese officer, having excited suspicion by his extravagant style of living, is said to have been secretly court-martialled and shot, but in the meantime the suggestion is that already the military plans of Japan had been foiled to some extent by the singular preparedness of Russia at certain points, the real importance of which was supposed to be unknown outside the "Elder Statesmen" and the Japanese General Staff.

It must be admitted that some colour is lent to this story—which, as far as the

knowledge of the writer goes, was not contradicted by the Japanese military authorities—by a certain want of sequence in the early military operations. It may, perhaps, not be the case that Japan was embarrassed in this way, and that from the first her plans were adhered to. But there is at least some ground for the belief that the original idea provided for a speedier investment of Port Arthur, and possibly even for a larger move against Harbin itself. There were at one time certain indications of a contemplated landing in Possiet Bay, and there is little doubt that, if a brisk offensive on a great scale had been taken by Japan early in March, the Russians, if not forewarned, would have found themselves badly pushed to meet it. As it was, Russia was able to employ the intervening time in bringing up a great many more troops and supplies from home, and



COSSACK REGIMENT AT LIAO-YANG.

the opposition which must now be encountered before Liao-yang and Mukden can be passed, must be much more severe than it would have been two months ago.

Without, then, putting too much faith in what may prove to be a doubtfully accurate statement, the latter must not be wholly disregarded until the Japanese authorities see fit to meet it with a complete and unequivocal denial. If, on the other hand, the story should be absolutely true, it will not only explain a good deal, but should increase our admiration for Japanese astuteness and capacity. The elaboration of an alternative plan of campaign is always an extremely complicated and laborious task, and if, in this case, it was done after the War had actually broken out, the Japanese General Staff is indeed to be congratulated on a great feat.

Of course it is not to be supposed that the Japanese plans could have been altogether upset by any such leakage as that indicated. As far as Korea was concerned there would in almost any event have been no modification, and the clock-work character of all the operations in this quarter shows pretty clearly that the occupation of and advance through the Hermit Kingdom were executed precisely as had been arranged very possibly some years back. Any changes that might have taken place—and, let it be emphatically repeated, there is no sort of certainty as to the making of any changes whatever—would have been in the selection of an immediate objective, and in the arrangements for isolating Port Arthur. But enough has been said on the subject, which has chiefly been introduced to show how possible it is for big operations to be delayed or complicated by the leakage of information, and that no nation, how-

ever secretive, however patriotic, can afford to disregard risks of this painful sort.

Let us now turn to the objects which recent developments have shown to be actually in view by the Japanese, and to the processes likely to be employed in bringing these objects within the domain of practical politics. First, let us reckon the unquestioned accomplished facts. These are: (1) Korea occupied; (2) an army pushed forward from Korea towards Liao-yang and deployed evidently with the idea of joining hands with other troops landed in Korea Bay, and (3) Port Arthur isolated. Everything seems to point clearly to an attempt to carry Port Arthur by storm, and subsequently to envelope the Russian position at Liao-yang, or, if Kuropatkin withdraws hence, at any point at which a stand may be made. Port Arthur must be attacked by land as well as by sea—of that there can be no question. Nor is it altogether safe to delay much longer a comprehensive move against the main Russian Army. When land forces are set in motion in an offensive campaign, protracted periods of preparation for clashing with the enemy are seldom productive of anything but diminished "go," and sometimes mean sickness and other troubles.

But it is not all plain sailing, even for the finely organised army of Japan, this double effort to reduce a mighty stronghold, and to cope with a large force strongly posted and led by a man who, whatever his limitations may be, has as yet been guilty of no serious error, and may now rise fully equal to a great occasion. The previous operations against Port Arthur and the Battle of Kiu-liencheng sink into insignificance beside what is really a great Operation of War,

and one which may be rendered strangely difficult by unforeseen contingencies. For we have no right to suppose that Kuropatkin has been wholly idle, or intends to remain so, until the moment chosen by Japan to attack him. In his rear, movements may be taking place which may have unexpected seriousness some weeks hence, and Port Arthur may develop a yet more stubborn resistance than that which it is pretty certain to offer in any case. Accordingly, the situation is not without real gravity for Japan, and, even if her methods of attacking the problem prove ultimately successful, it may be that the wear and tear involved will create a strain on her resources which could be far better borne by her opponent.

The operation will be rendered intensely interesting by the fact that in all probability it will illustrate in a very striking fashion the influence upon Japan of European teaching. In naval matters Japan has, of course, closely followed British methods, and no finer compliment could be paid to the British Navy than the extent to which the Japanese have first copied us, then proved the excellence of our original design. The dashing manner in which the Japanese destroyers have been handled has, in particular, been borrowed from British naval practice; while it is an interesting circumstance that, notwithstanding the demonstration of the value of the torpedo and the mine, the Japs have, since the War began, contemplated the construction of more battleships on the latest British models. The whole naval strategy of Japan, moreover, has been clearly based upon the broad views taken of the functions of a navy by British experts; while the spirit which animates the Japanese naval officer and

bluejacket is wonderfully like that which has always marked the *personnel* of the greatest Navy in the World. There is, of course, a distinction with a difference owing to the slight tinge of Orientalism which still clings to Japan, and sometimes assists her in the prosecution of particular designs. But the Japanese Navy is as nearly British as any but the American Navy could be, and throughout the naval operations of this War we may look to see the influence of British example sharply defined whenever the Fleet of Japan has to show any unusual activity.

In the matter of her Army, Japan has taken another model, and has followed it with equal thoroughness, and, so far, with equally conspicuous success. From the first, the modern Army of Japan was organised on German lines, and, since conscription was introduced into the country in 1874, the effort to impart German thoroughness and precision to every detail of the military machine has been continuous and conscientious to the last degree. It may well be that Japan has in some ways outstripped her teachers, for she has evidently studied closely the methods of other European countries, and has profited in respect of various details in which the Germans have preferred to remain staunchly conservative. But the general foundation of the Japanese military system is German, and this effect has been emphasised by the training which many Jap officers have received in Germany itself. It is an interesting circumstance that, shortly after the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, Major-General Meckel, one of the leading German professors of the art of war, formerly Military Instructor in Japan, and the reputed author of a very striking military study entitled "A Summer

Night's Dream," received a very flattering cablegram from the Japanese General Staff at Tokio. The message conveyed was to the effect that the victory on the Yalu had been won by officers who had learnt their tactics from the German veteran, a courteous acknowledgment which the latter may well have been proud to receive from the victors in such a hard-fought fight.

As has already been indicated, the influence of German ideas upon the Japanese Army was early shown by the careful forethought displayed in the matter of preparation, the exhaustive system of collecting military intelligence, and the precise and elaborate manner in which every detail, more particularly of the disembarkations, was carried out. We have found the Japanese to be fully ready in every sense with plans of campaign. Their information concerning the enemy's movements and the countries in which they were about to operate has been so complete, that here they have almost surpassed their instructors. For it is on record that, in the advance through Korea, the dealings of the military authorities with the villagers were facilitated by the fact that, in anticipation of this war, little biographies even had been prepared of all the village headmen! The plans adopted to lessen confusion in the landing of troops have already been noticed, as has been the German regularity with which, when any movement has been decided on, troops and guns have followed in due course and at the appointed intervals.

But these matters pertain chiefly to strategy, or the art of generalship, as it is practised sometimes long before contact with the enemy has been established. In the presence of the enemy the business of using troops is called

tactics, and, though the boundary line between tactics and strategy is sometimes hard to define, the distinction here drawn will suffice to mark the additional fact that in tactics, as well as in strategy, German influence upon Japanese methods has fully justified the Japanese General Staff in despatching to Meckel a telegram which may become historic.

For at Kiu-lien-cheng there was a double exhibition of German tactics which is very instructive both as regards that particular battle and the probable aspects of several future engagements. The crowding of the Japanese at the Ai ford was doubtless due to some extent, as has already been suggested, to natural causes; but it must not be forgotten that the Germans, notwithstanding our experience in South Africa, are great believers in the advantages of attacking in a dense formation when a force has men to spare for this purpose. The idea is that those terrible panics, to the occurrence of which the German author of the "Summer Night's Dream" bears lurid testimony, are best avoided by packing the men together, so that, however deadly the carnage, the places of those who have fallen will be speedily filled, and the attacking column, frightfully diminished maybe, but still compact and full of "go," shall be enabled to advance irresistibly to the final stage of the attack. This theory may have been at the bottom of the huddled crossing of the Ai, which cost the Japanese so many casualties, and it is certainly the keynote to the fighting of an action of which it will become necessary to give a description in the next chapter.

Again, at Kiu-lien-cheng we saw an illustration of those ideas of envelopment which are now becoming apparent on

a larger scale in the working of the Japanese armies against Liao-yang and Port Arthur. The wars of the future, says Hoenig, a very well-known German military writer, will be mostly "wars of circumvallation," which is a form of en-

assumes immense labour in the execution of preliminary preparations, the utmost care in procuring accurate information of the enemy's movements, and considerable activity in drawing in the net when once it has been spread. But it



COOLIES CARRYING MEDICAL STORES.

velopment, and there is no doubt that envelopment in one form or another is the favourite object of German tactical movements. Like the advance to the attack in close formation, it presupposes those big battalions on the side of which a great man once impiously said that Providence is wont to fight. Further, it

is notably effective, more especially as regards moral effect, for the bravest troops, who will cheerfully face any odds as long as the enemy are fairly and squarely to their direct front, may become unsteady when they begin to perceive attackers closing in upon them, sometimes from all points of the compass.

With the aid of a little imagination it is possible to construct an extremely interesting parallel between the manner in which the enveloping process was carried out at Kiu-lien-cheng and that in which it is being attempted before Liao-yang. Further, the fact that the 2nd Division in the former engagement was sent down the river, evidently with the intention of occupying the attention of the troops in Antung had any troops remained there and given trouble, may be taken to resemble dimly the landing of the Second Army in the Liao-tung Peninsula in order to effect the reduction of Port Arthur. Curiously enough, the parallel can here be extended by comparing the work of Admiral Hosoya's squadron at the mouth of the Yalu—*mutatis mutandis*, of course—with that of Admiral Togo before Port Arthur. Returning to the main attack, we find the 12th Division at Kiu-lien-cheng crossing the Ai and taking initiative in deploying against the enemy's main position, very much as General Kuroki's whole Army, after the passage of the Yalu, of which in reality the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng is a part, was the first Japanese force to deploy in opposition to the Liao-yang position; being subsequently supported by the Third Army, just as the 12th Division was assisted in the process of envelopment by the Guards Division on the right bank of the Yalu.

And now let us try to look at the situation from the Russian standpoint. The difficulties which confront the military authorities are indeed serious; but it is altogether a delusion to regard the position of affairs as in any way hopeless, and, to give the Russians due credit, there is no suggestion of despair, and very little indication of unabated confidence in their attitude. Of course,

with them the question of Port Arthur's capacity for resistance is the immediate paramount consideration, and the subject gives rise to much besides mere controversy. There is no doubt that, although the fall of Port Arthur might not mean any very serious check to the prosecution of the War, it would certainly be attended by such a loss of prestige, and by such an encouragement to the enemy, that the effect would be far-reaching and perhaps permanent. Accordingly, from the moment that the isolation of Port Arthur became an established fact, there has been in some Russian quarters a strong feeling that steps ought to be taken to relieve the pressure on the stronghold from the land side. It is understood that Admiral Alexeieff is strongly of this opinion, as is indeed natural considering the extent to which the "Viceroy of the Far East"—the significance of the title is gradually becoming a little thin—was responsible for the pinnacle of importance that Port Arthur has attained. The belief is current that Admiral Alexeieff has pressed these views upon the Tsar, and the latter, "torn asunder by every wind of doctrine," has asked General Kuropatkin whether it would not be practicable to relieve the beleaguered fortress, in preference to trusting the prestige of Russia to the hazard of a siege. But the military Commander-in-Chief has explained that in the present condition of the land operations such a movement is, in his opinion, most undesirable, if not impossible. Accordingly, the Tsar issues a sort of Imperial mandate to the Port Arthur garrison in which the Fleet is enjoined, as a last resort, to cut its way out and rejoin, if possible, the Vladivostok squadron, no Russian ships being allowed to fall into the enemy's hands.

We shall probably never know with exactitude the secret history of the Russian military policy in the two or three weeks succeeding the isolation of Port Arthur. But there is ground for supposing that the tension between Alexeieff and Kuropatkin has been extremely severe, and there is probably a good deal of significance packed up in the remark attributed to a Russian General in St. Petersburg, "Kuropatkin has not yet defeated the Japanese, but he has beaten Admiral Alexeieff."

There are other suggestions of very singular import in connection with this period. In some directions the Russians can be quite as secretive as the Japanese, and, with a man of Kuropatkin's known capacity, it is difficult to believe that all this time he has been merely engaged in levelling up his forces at Liao-yang in order more effectively to meet the Japanese onslaught. At one time it seemed as if he would be warranted in detaching a considerable portion of his army and sending it into the Liao-tung Peninsula with the object, not only of "relieving" Port Arthur, but of trying to catch the Japanese Second Army between two fires. But it may well have been the case that such a course was prevented by a previous and much broader distribution of the Russian forces, which would have rendered any such detachment as that proposed a source of undue weakness to the Haicheng—Liao-yang position, whether as regards defence or a possible offensive. For a long time past there has been much uncertainty as to the proceedings of General Linievitch, one of the most able and trusted, as well as most experienced of the Russian leaders in the Far East. The suggestion now is that General Linievitch is really in command of a very large force, of

which the Trans-Baikal Cossacks under command of General Rennenkampf form the vanguard, and the rôle of which is to lie on the flank of the Japanese advance. Already the Cossacks have made themselves felt both in rear of General Kuroki's position at Feng-hwang-cheng and in north-eastern Korea, but, so far, their movements have been disconnected and rather desultory. The possibility of a Russian descent on a large scale from the region of which Vladivostok is the chief centre has long ago been foreshadowed in these pages. Whether it now takes shape depends largely on the extent to which General Kuropatkin continues to be given a free hand, and on the capacity of the Japanese to outflank again this flanking movement by naval and military operations on the coast between Vladivostok and Gensan.

The position at the beginning of the fourth week in May is thus one in which very careful regard must be had to contingencies on the Russian side, as well as certainties on that of the Japs. It cannot be said that Russia has as yet recovered from her neglect at the outset to take proper precautions in the way both of offence and defence. Nor is there yet any sign that the loss of naval supremacy can be repaired. Rumour follows rumour as to attempts more or less successful to persuade the Sultan to permit a portion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to pass out of the Dardanelles, and dates are confidently given for the sailing of the Baltic Fleet. But there are other Powers besides Turkey interested in the keeping the Russian warships in the Black Sea the right side of the Dardanelles forts. With regard to the Baltic Fleet, there is now not only the difficulty of coaling *en route* to be considered, although that is regarded by

experts as insuperable. For, even supposing the voyage by the Suez Canal only occupied sixty-three days—a minimum calculation—some 65,000 tons of coal would be consumed by the twelve warships of the squadron, of which about 50,000 tons would have to be carried by colliers and trans-shipped at sea.

But outside this difficulty there now arises the question whether, if Port Arthur should fall and Vladivostok be blockaded, the squadron, on arrival at its destination, would be in the ignominious position of having no base whatever, and no source of further coal supply. Lastly, the despatch of practically the whole of the Baltic Fleet to the Far East means the withdrawal of the greater part of the naval defences of the Empire, a grave risk to take when the political condition of Europe can hardly

be regarded as one of absolute tranquillity. But apart from the sea, and even apart from the possible fall of Port Arthur, it must be repeated that the Russian military position at the stage we have now reached is one of no mean strength. Envelopment may be a very effective process, but it has the disadvantage or drawing out armies into long thin lines which may for a considerable distance be crumpled up by a determined counterstroke on the part of a solidly-placed enemy. In other words, attempted envelopment of the Russians at Liaoyang will not necessarily mean paralysis of such Russian strength as lies outside that position. The reverse is probable, and it is even possible that, as a result of continued Japanese pressure, we may see Kuropatkin's remarkable display of passive resistance followed by an interesting exhibition of calculated activity.



GENERAL RENNENKAMPF.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE NARRATIVE RESUMED—THE OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—JAPAN'S SECOND ARMY—ADVANCE UPON KIN-CHAU—THE BATTLE OF NAN-SHAN—A DESPERATE STRUGGLE—DEVOTED GALLANTRY—HEAVY CASUALTIES—OCCUPATION OF DALNY—ANOTHER NAVAL BOMBARDMENT.

LET us now pick up the thread of our narrative at the point at which we left it as far back as Chapter XXI. We have since progressed in other directions, and have also indulged in various retrospects. But the sequence of our record will be found to have been strictly preserved, and, if we now revert to the operations in the Liao-tung Peninsula, the commencement of which was described in the chapter referred to, we may hope that our chronicle will continue to march forward with the well-ordered precision of a military movement.

Some readers, moreover, may find compensation for the rather discursive nature of the last three chapters in the fact that the resumption of our story takes place at a juncture likely to be followed by stirring events. Here in the Liao-tung Peninsula we may surely expect something more thrilling than the encounters between outposts and small detached parties, which are all that can for the present be looked for in the region separating Kuropatkin at Liaoyang from Kuroki at Feng-hwang-cheng. General Oku's army, the Second Army of Japan, has landed, not, for the moment, to take part in any great combined movement by land for the purposes of envelopment. It is obviously bent upon one single piece of work, an attack upon Port Arthur, in which it will be assisted by the Fleet, but in the military

performance of which it is as yet, and may continue to be, solely engaged. Well may that Army be proud of the massive enterprise entrusted to it, and well assured may the onlookers be that General Oku will lose no time in striking the successive blows which will be necessary before Port Arthur becomes for a second time the prize of Japanese valour and determination.

Very different are the conditions in which this terrific task is being attempted from those in which Port Arthur was "rushed" in 1894. Then, as now, the initial Japanese landing took place near Pi-tsu-wo, but from that moment any real comparison fails. For, apart from the fighting quality of the present garrison of Port Arthur, apart even from the extraordinary strength of the present inner defences of the place, a wonderful alteration has taken place in the system of outer defences, which include advanced positions, of which one near Kinchau is the first, and a belt of entrenchments extending over ten miles. These last are said to be connected by forts, of which there is one at every 1,000 yards, and mines and barbed wire entanglements have been liberally provided. In negotiating these obstacles there will be, we may be sure, very little of the "marching and countermarching and then going into winter quarters" of the older style of strategy. Moreover, while


the services of field engineers will no doubt be requisitioned largely in order to secure such protection as is possible for the attackers, there must be times when shelter will have to be abandoned, trenches left, the support of great siege guns temporarily held in abeyance, and the onslaught made in a tempestuous mixture of set determination, lust of battle, utter indifference to death, and—grimmet of factors in such cases—cold steel.

The Second Army of Japan consists, as we have already seen, of three divisions, the 1st (Tokio), 3rd (Osaka), and 4th (Nagoya), and it has already been recounted that General Oku has met with considerable opposition in the concentration of this large force, and its movement southwards in the direction of its great objective.

On May 16th a sharp engagement, as has been already related in Chapter XXI., took place with considerable casualties on both sides, the result being that the Japanese forced the enemy back and took possession of a line of hills about a mile and a half to the north of Kin-chau. Here their guns were said to dominate the latter, but, as will be presently seen, the advantage thus secured is slight, as the first real resistance to the Japanese advance is to be made by the Russians not at Kin-chau, but at a strong and elevated position further south.

While the Japanese are making the most of their temporary success by the construction of batteries, and by completing their preparations for a critical stage of their coming attack, we may usefully examine the "lie" of the ground over which the last is to be accomplished. For the operation about to be described is not a matter of a short, sharp day's fighting, but one of a continuous, and at times positively desperate, struggle lasting from May 21st—it will be recalled that for some time

past the term of the First Phase of the War as here narrated has been placed at the end of the third week in May—until a glorious culmination is reached on the evening of the 26th. It is a little strange that both the first great military performances of the Japanese in this campaign, the Passage of the



SKETCH MAP OF THE KWANG-TUNG PENINSULA.

Yalu terminating in the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, and the forcing of the neck of the Kwang-tung Promontory with the Battle of Nan-shan as its *finale*, may each be said to have occupied in all six days. But, while the actual fighting in the later operation was more severe, the area was much more restricted, and, partly as a natural consequence, the resulting "butcher's bill" much heavier.

A glance at the map will show that the Liao-tung Peninsula narrows near Kin-chau to a neck of land in parts barely two miles in width. This neck connects the Kwang-tung Promontory, on which

Port Arthur and Dalny are situated, with the mainland of the Peninsula. On the west of the neck lies Kin-chau Bay, on the east one of the inlets of Talien-wan, known as Hand Bay. To the south of Hand Bay is a little promontory running in an easterly direction, on the extremity of which is a heavy Russian battery of eight guns firing seawards, and affording a serious check to any attempt on the part of Japanese warships to operate in Hand Bay.

About two miles south of Kin-chau, and in what would appear to be the very narrowest part of the neck, is Nan-shan Hill, the centre of the present Russian position. This is strongly held by a force of which the main body is the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, commanded by General Fock. The Russians have made great efforts to improve the position, evidently with the intention to make a most determined stand, which they confidently anticipate will be successful. In front of the position there are mines and wire entanglements, and it is said that there are ten strong forts "of a semi-permanent character," in which a variety of heavy guns have been mounted. The nature and extent of the defending artillery will become apparent at a later stage of the narrative, but for the present it is sufficient to say that it must have been greatly superior to any which the Japanese could here bring in opposition to it.

The defect in the position is that it is commanded by Mount Sampson, four miles to the east, but, as the *Times* military critic observes, with this exception it has everything in its favour, being short and strongly fortified, having its flanks secure, and being held by a garrison more than ample for its defence. "If a Russian division of 8,000


to 12,000 men, backed up by fifty or more siege guns and sixteen quick-firing field-guns, cannot hold 3,000 yards of front, strongly entrenched, and secure on the flanks, against the rush of infantry in the open restricted to a frontal assault, it is hard to say what position it can expect to defend with success."

The determination of the Russians to hold this narrow neck at all costs is very easy to understand. Even the lay reader will appreciate the fact that not often can the land approach to a vitally important citadel, such as Port Arthur to all intents and purposes is, be barred by an unbroken line of works only 3,000 yards long. As a matter of fact, the Russians here had the choice of two advanced positions, the one of which Nan-shan Hill was the centre, and another a little in rear. The latter would not have been commanded, as the former was, by Mount Sampson, but it had the disadvantage of being six miles long, and consequently required more than three times as many men to hold it properly. Although a division was hardly necessary to hold the entrenchments at Nan-shan, probably two divisions would have been necessary to render the line in the rear reasonably safe, and these would have constituted a heavy drain upon the total garrison of Port Arthur.

As the *Times* military critic remarks, so long as this neck was in Russian hands, not only was the road to Port Arthur obviously barred, but a sally-port also remained open through which General Stoessel might hope to march to co-operate with the expected, or at all events promised, advance of the army of succour from the north. The skill of Russian military engineers is well-known; the bravery and endurance of Russian troops, more especially when acting on

the defensive, is a matter of history. Well, then, may General Stoessel and his divisional commanders, Fock and Smirnoff, have been confident of being able to repulse the Japanese heavily at

thus erected. In particular they will have realised the deadly significance of the enemy's artillery superiority, and the disadvantage under which they themselves suffered in not being able to derive



GENERAL OKU, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SECOND ARMY OF JAPAN.

this point, and, possibly, even to follow up the advantage of re-establishing communication with Liao-yang.

The Japanese, on the other hand, can hardly have been under any illusions as to the formidable nature of the barrier

a full measure of support from their ships. The problem presented to General Oku was, indeed, a terribly serious one, which might well have daunted even a resolute and daring leader. For here the chances of being



LAST MILITARY HONOURS TO JAPANESE WARRIORS: SHINTO
FUNERAL RITES.

able to deliver any but a frightfully costly frontal attack were very remote. We have already noted the presence of the heavy battery on the Liu-shu-tun Promontory, which made it impossible for the Japanese gun-boats to operate in Hand Bay, and we have now to consider the shoal water in Kin-chau Bay and on the west side of the Promontory generally, which rendered it difficult for war-ships to support any landing on the left flank or in the rear of the Russian position.

As to artillery, it would have been a serious matter to wait until more siege guns could be brought from Japan, and, indeed, any sort of delay was objectionable owing to the approach of the rains which are due about the end of June. Accordingly, the alternative lay between more or less complete inaction and what are known as "Algerian tactics," from the fact that chiefly by dashing frontal attacks the French foothold in North Africa was won and maintained. One can imagine that it is with something of painful reluctance the Japanese commander arrives at a decision which he is perfectly well aware must mean the sacrifice of many hundreds of his gallant troops, without the least certainty of being able to effect the object in view.

On May 21st General Oku commences his operations against the Nan-shan position by a careful reconnaissance, at the same time gradually bringing up his own artillery from Pi-tsu-wo and other points further north in the Liao-tung Peninsula. The first reconnaissance is with a view to ascertain the weight of the enemy's artillery on Nan-shan Hill, and pains must have been taken to draw the enemy's fire. For, according to the official report of the day's proceedings, "observation and enemy's cannonading showed enemy had at Nan-shan Hill,

south of Kin-chau, four 15-centimètre shrapnel, ten 9- to 15-centimètre cannons (10.5 centimètre shells proved range 8,500 metres), two 12-centimètre quick-firers, besides at least ten forts." The Japanese reconnaissance further showed the foothills to be protected by wire entanglements and mines.


May 22nd, 23rd, and 24th appear to have been largely occupied in bringing up the infantry divisions behind Mount Sampson and in further reconnaissance. On the first day, according to General Oku, the "attacking force commenced operations prearranged," from which we may infer that, in addition to the preparations noted, positions were selected for such artillery as the Japanese were able to bring into action to the east of Kin-chau. On May 23rd a reconnaissance discovered the presence of the heavy battery of eight guns on the Liu-shu-tun Promontory, of which mention has already been made above. This battery was posted at a point marked in some maps as Huashangtao, and formed a sort of detached post in extension of the real right of the Russian position. It commanded, as has been mentioned, the waters of Hand Bay, and was later supported by the Russian gun-boat *Bobr*.

Evidently the reconnaissance drew the Russian fire freely, and it indicates the acute observation of the Japanese officers that they were able to estimate from fragments of the enemy's shells the calibre of the various guns opposed to them.

On May 24th the reconnaissance was pushed up to within easy distance of Kin-chau, which, it was found, was still occupied by a small force of Russian infantry and artillery. On May 25th Kin-chau was attacked, the artillery on Nan-shan Hill being simultaneously engaged

to divert their attention. The place, however, does not seem to have been definitely occupied by the Japs until the following morning, and would, doubtless, have been untenable by daylight for any

the high wind and rough sea. A gun-boat squadron, consisting of the *Tsukushi*, *Sai-yen*, *Akagi*, and *Chiokai*, and the 1st torpedo-boat flotilla, duly arrived in Kin-chau Bay at noon on May



BATTLE OF KIN-CHAU: POSITIONS OF THE FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATIONS.

length of time as long as the Nan-shan Hill forts were active. This attack on Kin-chau was probably made on the understanding that a naval force would co-operate from Kin-chau Bay. Such assistance was unfortunately lacking owing to

25th, but, from the causes noted, was obliged to take shelter instead of co-operating, as intended, with the batteries on shore.

A word must be given in passing to the share taken by the gun-boat squadron

in these intensely interesting operations. In the first place, it will be noted that the squadron is emphatically not one of first-class ships, which Admiral Togo might well have been reluctant to risk against powerful land batteries, even if in such shoal water he could have brought battleships and cruisers within effective range. Two of the gun-boats, the *Akagi* and the *Chiokai*, are 600-ton vessels only, and consequently of light draught; the *Tsukushi* is an old Elswick ship of 1,370 tons, and the *Sai-yen* is the old Chinese vessel *Tsi-yuen* of 2,264 tons, which was captured in the Chino-Japanese War. Between them these four ships only carried fifteen guns of moderate calibre.

The above may not seem a very exciting prelude to a very dramatic piece of hard fighting, but it is very possible that in reality there was much of thrilling interest in these preliminary operations, and it is quite certain that in any case they were conducted by the Japanese with consummate skill. This has been specially recognised by German military critics, one of whom says that the account of the careful reconnaissance and other preparatory operations reads like a chapter out of a modern text-book on tactics, and that the whole six days' fighting will become "an academical example for analysis in the study of war." While the lay reader can hardly be expected to wax equally enthusiastic over a performance which it is almost impossible to invest with any picturesqueness or variety, he may be induced by these considerations to pardon the writer for delaying any account of the final rush until the steps leading to it shall have at least been outlined.

At midnight on May 25th the situation is as follows: The Nan-shan Hill posi-

tion is guarded by some three-score guns in position and eight machine guns, fronted by several lines of shelter trenches, wire fences and mines, with quick-firers in the intervals—"the whole constituting an almost permanent fortress, garrisoned by one division of infantry, two field batteries, garrison artillery and marines, evidently with the intention of effectually checking the Japanese advance." The Russian gun-boat *Bobr* is also about to take up a position in Talien Bay which will enable it to render effective assistance in the morrow's fight without being itself exposed to any fire but that of light field-guns posted on Mount Sampson.

From the Japanese commander's point of view the position of affairs is a terribly anxious one. After five days' fighting he has only broken off the husk of the hard nut he has to crack before this, the chief advanced position of the Port Arthur defences, can be considered won. Such artillery preparations as he has been able to make can have had but trifling effect upon the extremely strong position in front of him, the mere weight of metal behind which cannot but tell terribly upon the infantry attack that must now be directed upon it. If ever there were a case in which a commander was justified in shrinking from a nearly hopeless task, here it is. A repulse is probable, and repulse or success cannot but mean enormous casualties. For the attack can only be delivered at best in circumstances resembling those which proved so costly at the Ai fords in the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng. It is necessary for General Oku to use the full strength at his disposal in order to have the least chance of producing an impression upon such a defence as this, and there is no room for the proper deployment of three

divisions of infantry. The alternative is that huddling which means such frightful loss whenever well-directed artillery and machine gun fire have to be faced.

Russian superiority lies in the quality of the Japanese infantryman, the leadership of his officers, and the co-operation of the gun-boats in Kin-chau Bay.



JAPANESE OFFICERS DRAWING THE FIRE OF THE RUSSIAN GUNS AND EXAMINING THE SPLINTERS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE ARTILLERY IN THE FORTIFICATIONS ABOVE.

Owing to the presence of the Russian gun-boat in Talien-wan the advance from behind Mount Sampson will be exposed on the left to a galling fire to which no sort of useful reply can be made, and the only counterpoise to the huge weight of

General Oku's sentence is for carrying out the attack to the bitter end. It is a momentous conclusion and, as an able critic aptly remarks, "no one who has felt the overwhelming responsibilities of command at such a moment can fail to

recognise and admire the splendid audacity which decided to throw at once for the whole stake."

It is just 2.35 a.m., and a foggy morning, when on May 26th the Battle of Nan-shan opens with an artillery duel which lasts three hours. In this the gun-boat squadron in Kin-chau Bay joins, and the Russian batteries reply with spirit. This artillery duel probably transcends in noise and viciousness anything of the sort that has occurred hitherto in the course of the War, for the reply of the Russian artillery to the Japanese opening fire at Kiu-lien-cheng was insignificant, and there is a great difference between the sustained passion of a combat of guns like this at Nan-shan and the stately deliberation of a naval bombardment.

In about three hours the Japanese fire appears to have told a little on the defence, and the moment is held suitable for the infantry advance.

On they come, the splendid little infantry of the Island Nation, the 4th, or Osaka Division, on the right; the 1st, or Tokio Division, in the centre; and the 3rd, or Nagoya Division, on the left. The formation is a close one, partly from choice, partly from necessity. Even if German ideas of solidity in frontal attacks were not prevailing with the Japanese leaders, the extent of ground available does not permit of any but a narrow front. Thus, when the 4th Division has made its first rush through Kin-chau, it has to contract its front to half the normal extension in order to carry the works immediately in front of it, being exposed all the time to a concentrated fire from the whole length of the Russian position. At an earlier stage there is said to have been so little room for deployment that battalions of infantry had to stand waiting in the sea.

The 3rd Division on the left is terribly exposed throughout the advance. From ten o'clock in the morning it suffered greatly from the enfilading fire of the Russian gun-boat in Talien-Wan Bay, and later it is persistently shelled by a four-gun battery a little to the south of Nan-shan. As a matter of course, the Tokio men in the centre have their full share of the miles of guns along the Russian line of works. Yet all press forward until they have gained positions actually not more than 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's advanced trenches.

It is at this point an episode occurs which gives some idea of the awful possibilities of a frontal attack. Between the Russian outworks and the advancing attack lies a village called Mauchiaying. About midday the energy of the Russian defenders in the works between this village and the main line of defence appears to be exhausted by the fire from the Japanese gun-boats in Kin-chau Bay. Two Japanese battalions are told off to make a desperate effort to carry the works. What follows is best told in the words of the *Times* correspondent, who tells the story, and whose narrative is here merely transformed into the historic present:—"At first the straggling walls of Mauchiaying give them some cover, under which they have a moment's breathing space. Then the gallant little infantry press on again up the breast of the slopes of the Russian position. It is an almost impossible task. As yet the defenders are not sufficiently shaken. An avalanche of concentrated fire from the infantry in the trenches, the machine guns in the Russian works, and the quick-firing field artillery supporting the defences strike the Japanese full. They melt away from the glacis like solder before the flame of a blow-pipe. A few

who seem to have charmed lives struggle on till they reach the wire entanglements. It is a vain, if heroic, effort. Wasted within fifteen minutes, these two battalions cease to exist except as a trail of mutilated bodies at the foot of the Russian glacis."

For a time after the failure of this attack it seems as if it were hopeless to expect success. To all ordinary intents and purposes the Japanese have already been repulsed, and it is not too much to say that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the operation would have been discontinued at this point. But General Oku and his Army are made of truly stern stuff. While for the moment the infantry are checked, a tremendous effort is made by the Japanese guns on Mount Sampson, and the Japanese gun-boats in Kin-chau Bay, the two smallest of which, the *Akagi* and *Chio kai*, have stood in boldly, to concentrate their fire on the Russian left, and so to make an opening into which the point of an infantry wedge can be driven.

The attack now becomes little more than a succession of "forlorn hopes." Again and again the glorious Japanese infantry advance, and assault after assault is delivered upon a series of desperately defended positions. Sometimes the tide of onslaught slackens, for the Russians stick doggedly to their positions, and are only ousted as wave follows wave of attackers in a frenzy of fighting fury at the sight of their dead comrades. Many Japanese are hopelessly entangled in the obstacles at the foot of the slopes, but the Russian mines, on which the defence have evidently counted, prove harmless. And hereby hangs a tale which is finely illustrative of Japanese contempt of death.

After the first attack has proved fruit-

less, the Japanese scouts creeping warily ahead discovered the existence of these mines, and it is determined to locate them by the heroic process of sacrificing a certain number of men. Hundreds of soldiers immediately volunteer for an enterprise which seems to promise certain death, and these devoted fellows are placed at the head of the second advance. Without hesitation they rush forward, expecting every moment to be hurled into eternity, or at best to escape with ghastly wounds. As they near the fateful zone, however, they find that the heavy rains have washed away the earth which had covered the mines, the latter being left exposed. The conducting wires are joyfully cut, and danger from this source is happily at an end. It is painful to be compelled to add that most of the gallant volunteers are subsequently killed in the succession of attacks upon the main position.

It is now about six o'clock in the evening, and the fight has been raging with little or no cessation for fifteen hours. It is said that the Japanese have charged the main position on Nan-shan Hill nine times, and it is added in one account that the ammunition of the Japanese field artillery is running short. The time comes for a supreme effort, and, after a final hail of artillery fire, the 4th Division presses irresistibly forward on the Russian left.

The Osaka men, of which this Division is composed, have been twitted in bygone days with lack of courage; but after the Battle of Nan-shan it will require some hardihood to level such a taunt against these splendid fighters. Already they have distinguished themselves on the extreme right of the Japanese line by working their way along through the shoal water to Kin-chau Bay, under the partial

protection of the gun-boats. While thus engaged they have encountered the Russians, and a hot fight has been carried on by the two forces both waist-deep. "When the Russians finally retreated," says the Reuter despatch in which this episode is narrated, "the water was literally crimsoned."

And now the 4th Division crowns its glorious record of a glorious day by being the first of General Oku's larger units to make an impression on the Russian position. The Russian left begins to give way before the Japanese right; the Japanese centre and left, sadly shattered as they are, pull themselves together in order to follow the example of the Osaka men, and with a roar of triumph the greater part of the Second Army of Japan surges forward in one grand victorious onslaught.

Still at every parapet there is resistance shown, and defenders and attackers cross bayonets at many points until the 4th Division has made good its foothold on the Russian left, when the whole line of defence begins to waver. The attack never falters, the men leaping over the bodies of their dead comrades, and literally hustling the Russians out of their trenches. In about an hour the last phase of this awful struggle is over. The Russians retire, in utter confusion from the more advanced parts of the position, but in decent order from the less exposed parts.

About half-past seven in the evening, while the Japanese guns are shelling the fugitives, a great cry of "Banzai! Banzai!" goes up as the Japanese flag waves in triumph over the forts which yesterday Russia deemed to be impregnable, and which were impregnable save to troops of altogether extraordinary merit, magnificently led, and animated

by a courage and resolute tenacity never surpassed and not often equalled in the annals of warfare.

As the Japanese, worn out but proudly happy in the consciousness of a great work greatly accomplished, sleep the sleep of the victors on the ground they have won, we may well look back on what has occurred, look around on the situation which has been created, and look forward to a future of marked significance.

First, it is necessary to devote a few lines to the part played in the Battle of Nan-shan by the Japanese gun-boat squadron. We have already noted how the squadron joined in the opening artillery action, and how the *Akagi* and *Chokai*, taking advantage of their light draught, approached as close as possible to the shore. At this stage a Russian shell glanced off the foredeck of the *Chokai*, and a lieutenant and two men were killed, and two others were wounded. At 8 a.m. the gun-boats, thinking that the enemy's forts had been silenced, temporarily suspended their firing.

A portion of the torpedo-boat flotilla now commenced firing on the railway lines, while another portion, supported by the *Tsukushi* and the *Sai-yen*, availed itself of the rising tide to steam nearer inshore and cover the advance of the extreme right of the 4th Division, as already narrated.

Subsequently, from time to time, the squadron assisted the land operations by judicious bombardment, and the Army's indebtedness to it was in due course warmly acknowledged by General Oku. It must have been handled with an admirable combination of boldness and skill, for, notwithstanding its near approach to the shore, and the warm attentions it received from the fort batteries,

none of the ships suffered any damage except the *Chokai*. On board the latter there were fresh casualties at the close of the day's work, a shell having exploded beside one of the guns, with the result that the captain of the ship was killed

of all this desperate and continuous fighting. First let us see the price that has been paid by the victors, a price at first sight so heavy that one is inclined to wonder if it be not altogether excessive, considering that as yet only the fringe of



STORMING THE HEIGHTS AT NAN-SHAN.

and a sub-lieutenant and three men were wounded. At 7.30 in the evening the squadron, to use the simple language of the despatch narrating its operations, "stopped fighting and returned to the naval base."

Let us now take a glance at the results

the Port Arthur defences has been reached. The official return of the Japanese casualties on May 26th gives a total of 4,204, whereof 749, including 33 officers, are reported killed, 3,455 having been wounded, including 100 officers. Probably this means that about 12 to 15

per cent. of the total force engaged were put *hors de combat*, and, although this proportion is small compared with that shown by the returns of casualties in many important battles, it may seem a heavy bill to pay for the capture of a single position. Yet, when one comes to reckon the frightful obstacles which the gallant Japanese had to encounter, the cramped space in which they operated, the extraordinary strength of the enemy's works, and the advantages possessed by the Russians in the matter of superior artillery, and of enfilading fire, the wonder begins to grow that the losses were not even more severe. But the main point is, of course, the fact that the figures given are, as we have seen, the price of success, not the added penalty of failure. If General Oku had lost two or three thousand men in the futile effort to storm such a position, surprise could not reasonably have been expressed. With a thousand or two more casualties to have hurled a Russian division in a single day from what were to all intents and purposes semi-permanent fortifications is a feat which no competent military student can criticise even on the score of "expense."

Of the Russian casualties it is impossible to speak very definitely, as the information available is, to say the least, conflicting. General Stoessel reports that the Russian losses were 30 officers and about 800 men, killed and wounded. But either this is a very doubtful estimate, or the proportion of killed to wounded must have been altogether exceptional. For the explicit statement furnished officially by General Oku is that the Japanese military administration commission and gendarmes carefully buried the corpses of 10 Russian officers and 664 men found at Nan-shan and in its vicinity, besides

30 which were buried by the Japanese troops in the neighbourhood of the camps. In another report General Oku says that a number of Russian officers and men were taken prisoners, together with 68 cannon, 10 machine guns, one locomotive, three search-lights, 50 mines, many rifles, and much ammunition.

The news of the loss of the Nan-shan position was published in St. Petersburg on the Russian holiday commemorating the Emperor's coronation. The despatches posted on the bulletin boards were all from foreign sources, and the Government made no effort to suppress or minimise the evil tidings. The Press, on the other hand, endeavoured strenuously to belittle the significance of the event, special editions being sold in the streets announcing a Russian victory and Japanese losses of 15,000 men! Even less imaginative prints assured their readers that the defence of the Nan-shan position was really a matter of no consequence, and that, if anything, the capacity of Port Arthur to stand a siege was now vastly improved. "Despite these words of comfort, however," writes a St. Petersburg correspondent, "the gloomiest pessimism prevails almost everywhere. A military authority with whom I have conversed on the subject assures me that, after having read the accounts of the attack on Kin-chau, he entertains little expectation that Port Arthur will be relieved, and hopes only that when the end approaches the battleships may effect their escape under cover of night."

It is this foreboding spirit which invests the news of the Battle of Nan-shan with peculiar meaning, more especially, of course, for the nation most intimately concerned, but to a scarcely less extent for all intelligent spectators. For this

great conflict marks yet another and wholly distinct stage in the appreciation of Japanese fighting capacity. Important as was the victory on the Yalu, this is even more so, for here was no question of divided Russian counsels, nor even of elaborate Japanese dust-throwing in Russian eyes by means of feints and carefully masked batteries. Nor had the Japanese any real superiority of force. In artillery they were positively inferior, and in the attack of such a position the numerical advantage possessed by Japan amounted to very little. The Russians had quite enough men and to spare for their purpose, and they may never again meet the Japanese under much more favourable conditions for inflicting a heavy blow at the cost of comparatively insignificant losses. The absurd theory that it was not intended to dispute the position seriously may, of course, be lightly dismissed. Even Russian generals cannot afford to leave 700 corpses on the field and 78 guns in the enemy's hands merely as a handsome present to a pushful adversary. The sum of the whole matter is, that the Russians selected their position at Nan-shan with consummate skill, and held it, on the whole, with praiseworthy stubbornness. But they were simply driven from it by better fighters than themselves. Nor does it need special prescience to foresee that the officers and men who wore down the Russian resistance on this occasion will leave their mark yet again on the armies of the Tsar, even if the latter ultimately succeed in bringing apparently overwhelming forces into the field. For it is not too much to say that General Oku had at Nan-shan a harder battle to fight than if he had met the Russians in the open with only three divisions to their four.

As to the question whether the Battle of Nan-shan proves the efficacy of the German theories regarding frontal attacks, the sound conclusion probably is that no single action of this sort can demonstrate what must largely depend on circumstances. We ourselves found "Algerian tactics," even with our extended lines, very deadly in South Africa, not merely because, as the Germans prefer to think, our leadership, distribution of forces, and marksmanship were at fault, but because the enemy's powder was so unusually straight. If the Russians had shot like the Boers, even the Japanese might not have carried Nan-shan Hill. On the other hand, it is not every country that can afford 4,000 casualties in the preliminary stage of a simple operation. While, therefore, there is nothing that succeeds like success, and, admitting that the Japanese were justified here in their adoption and brilliant illustration of German views, this is no reason why the British Army should, on the strength of this one example, seek to ignore the hard and convincing lessons it has learned in its own recent practice.

Let us, above all, remember in regard to the Battle of Nan-shan that it was essentially one of those collisions in which for a time the balance trembles, and it seems as if a feather would turn the scale. If the tenth attempt had failed, as had the previous nine almost equally desperate onslaughts, what assurance have we that an eleventh effort would have been possible? Further concentration of artillery fire might not have been feasible in view of the failure of ammunition, and the Japanese might have been compelled to fall back, undaunted maybe, and ready to resume the operation on the morrow, but terribly shattered, and no nearer their object than the day before.



RETREAT !

Where would, then, have been the striking demonstration of the value of a closely formed frontal attack? Surely it is idle to argue seriously from such touch-and-go performances, in which a glorious and important victory is only separated by the incidents and accidents of perhaps half an hour from a mortifying and costly repulse.

Early on May 27th the Japanese took up the pursuit, and found that during the night the enemy had evacuated the Liu-shu-tun promontory, leaving four guns, which fell into the hands of a detachment under General Nakamura. A further retreat towards Port Arthur was evidently in progress, and the Japanese pressed as close as was prudent on the heels of the fugitives, driving them through Nan-san-shi-li-pu, a station on the branch line to Dalny, eight miles south-west of Nan-shan.

Meanwhile, Dalny itself has reached an exciting crisis in its history. As soon as the result of the fighting on May 26th becomes known the small Russian garrison left in the town falls back on a line parallel with that taken by General Steessel's force, destroying the railway culverts behind it. In the town itself a state of anarchy immediately ensues. Such European non-combatants as can get passages hasten off in Chinese junks to Chifu. Only Chinese officials are left in power, and these allow the gaol, which contains about 200 cut-throats, to be forced. For two or three days the town on which Russia has lavished so many millions, in the hope of making it the great commercial emporium of the Far East, is at the mercy of a gang of desperadoes. Yet, evil as is this chance, it is from the Russian standpoint, perhaps,

preferable to what follows. For on May 30th a detachment from General Oku's victorious army enters the town, and Dalny becomes, temporarily at any rate, Japanese. Order is, of course, promptly restored, and a careful survey shows that the prize is, indeed, a valuable one. The great pier, as mentioned in Chapter XXIII., has been destroyed, and some steam launches have been sunk at the mouth of the dock. But the other piers and docks are still in good order, and over 100 warehouses and barracks, besides the telegraph office and railway station, are found to be uninjured. Some 300 railway cars are also reported by General Oku to be still usable.

The significance of these captures is obvious. There is much to be done before Talien-wan, or Dalny Bay, can be freed from the mines which have been sown with reckless prodigality, but still with considerable ingenuity, in this important field. Further, as the smaller railway bridges on the branch line have been destroyed, it will necessarily be some time before the latter can be used for any heavy traffic. But, none the less, Dalny, with its existing piers and docks, is a very desirable acquisition to a country which may require to land further military forces in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and which, in any case, may well be grateful for such a grand ready-made sea-base for its further operations against Port Arthur. If only, then, because it has been so rapidly followed by the seizure of Dalny, the Battle of Nan-shan is far the most important success which has as yet attended the Japanese operations on land, and may even ultimately prove more far-reaching than Admiral Togo's brilliant triumphs by sea.




Photo: J. F. J. Archibald.

ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF, VICEROY OF THE EAST, REVIEWING TROOPS AT NIU-CHWANG.

CHAPTER XXIX.

FURTHER OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—RENEWED BOMBARDMENT—THE JAPANESE CREEPING CLOSER—THE BELEAGUERED GARRISON—MOVEMENTS FURTHER NORTH.

AFTER the battle of Nan-shan the Japanese set to work very methodically to draw as close a cordon as possible round the Gibraltar of the Far East. Already during the later preliminary operations leading up to the great fight on the 26th, Admiral Togo had resumed his task of keeping a large portion of the Port Arthur garrison busily occupied, and on May 24th a considerable bombardment is reported to have taken place. On the night of the 28th, according to a Mukden despatch, yet another attempt was made by the Japanese to block the harbour entrance. Merchant vessels are said to have been sent in under escort, and the despatch adds that they were discovered by the Russian searchlights, one Japanese gunboat and two destroyers being sunk. No confirmation of this damage inflicted upon Admiral Togo's ships appears to be forthcoming, and it is possible that in the doubtful light the

entire purpose as well as the details of this attempt were obscured. For there is reason to believe that Admiral Togo has now, for a time at least, abandoned the idea of blocking the harbour by merchantmen in favour of sowing the roadstead with Oda mines, in view of an eventual effort on the part of the ships within to escape in a body. The Russians are well aware of this future danger, for they continue to sweep the Port Arthur roadstead, just as the Japanese have been sweeping Dalny Bay, and between May 18th and 21st have taken up eleven mines sown by the indefatigable enemy.

In the early morning of May 30th a very daring reconnaissance was carried out under Admiral Togo's orders by four Japanese gunboats, two destroyers, and two torpedo-boats, with the object of discovering what is the state of the channel, and whether any new guns have

been placed in position. The eight vessels carry out their dangerous work with great skill and daring, notwithstanding a heavy fire from the land batteries. They note that a new Russian searchlight station has been erected, and that one or two new forts have been constructed on the Liau-ti-shan Promontory. The new searchlight is believed to have been due to the enterprise of Colonel Spiridonoff, who, as described on page 219, succeeded in bringing in a train-load of ammunition and, as it now appears, other material, into Port Arthur just before the fortress was finally isolated. That last train is said to have contained some badly-wanted dynamos, without which not only would the new searchlight have been an impossibility, but even the old ones might have been useless, now that communication with the power-station at Dalny is cut off. For it will be remembered that Dalny is now in the hands of the Japanese, having been finally evacuated by the Russians after the Battle of Nan-shan.

The naval reconnaissance just alluded to is attended with some little damage to one of the gunboats, which is struck by a shell, one petty officer being killed, and three bluejackets wounded. The operation is insignificant except as showing the unrelenting activity of Admiral Togo during this period. In point of fact, it merely forms an incident in the general blockade which the Japanese Navy has now established round the coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, south of a line between Pi-tsu-wo to the east, and Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams) to the west. The blockade, it has been officially declared, will be strictly maintained, and the Port Arthur garrison presently discovers that this is no idle threat.

Nevertheless, the beleaguered fortress


is not wholly without means of communication with the outside world. Some results have been attained with wireless telegraphy, and carrier-pigeons are being used with fair success. There are also instances of daring escapes, one in particular of a Russian officer who left Port Arthur in a Chinese junk which was stopped by the Japanese off Kin-chau and searched. The officer, however, being hidden under some fishing-nets, escaped detection, and subsequently made his way to Niu-chwang.

Inside Port Arthur, in spite of the "tall talk" in Russia as to the capacity of the fortress to hold out for a year if necessary, there is much parsimony exhibited in the distribution of rations. All the available supplies have been "pooled," and heavy punishment is inflicted on those who secrete provisions or sell them. Notwithstanding this, salt is being sold privately by some of the commissariat officers at the sensational rate of ten shillings an ounce, and is being carefully husbanded against the chance of an outbreak of scurvy. For there are no fresh vegetables, and little milk or sugar. The chief ration is biscuit, of which 10 oz. a day per head, with 4 oz. of canned meat, is issued. These details are furnished by a *Daily Express* correspondent, who has obtained them from a fugitive Chinese trader. The latter adds that the civil population are being subjected rigorously to martial law, and that the strictest discipline is maintained on all sides. General Stoessel makes several stirring addresses every week to the garrison, and the men reply with shouts of "No surrender!"

At the same time, the besieged garrison cannot but feel the effect of the continuous and increasing pressure put upon them. From time to time the Japanese

continue to bombard the forts and town, and according to all accounts the damage done to the latter is very extensive, the important building of the Russo-Chinese bank, for instance, having been totally destroyed. Considerable apprehension,

The state of the Port Arthur roadstead, and the anxiety felt on this account by the authorities, may be gauged from an incident reported by Admiral Togo as having been witnessed by the Japanese destroyer flotilla engaged in blockading



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF APRIL, 1904.


too, must be felt at the gradually decreasing stock of coal, of which apparently an immense quantity has been expended since the commencement of the siege to very little purpose. By the middle of June it is estimated that the supply has dwindled to 3,000 tons of Japanese coal and a still smaller amount of Cardiff.

Port Arthur. It was about half-past seven in the evening of June 4th, and two Russian gunboats, some destroyers, and steam launches appeared to be engaged in sweeping the roadstead for mines. Suddenly one of the gunboats is blown up and sunk, "probably," Admiral Togo drily observes, "by our mines." The remainder of the vessels hastily flee

inside the harbour, and it may readily be imagined that a disaster of this sort does not add to the popularity of mine-clearing as an occupation calculated to relieve the monotony of a siege.

In the second week of June the Chinese

Meanwhile, the Japanese by land as well as sea are drawing the net closer round Port Arthur. Early in June sufficient progress has been made with the mine-clearing operations in Talien-wan to allow of the use of one passage through



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF MAY, 1904.

begin to leave Port Arthur with the permission of the Russian authorities, who, however, are by no means generous in the matter of providing the refugees with food. Several junks, in fact, leave the place without having succeeded in obtaining any provisions at all, and are supplied by the Japanese cruisers which stop them for purposes of examination.

the shallows. The work is now being carried on with the assistance of Japanese shell-divers from the Kushiro province, who have volunteered, and are said to be wonderfully expert. An idea of the magnitude of the task may be gathered from Admiral Togo's report that between June 3rd and June 6th no fewer than forty-one mines were discovered and exploded.

At Dalny large stores of siege material and supplies are being accumulated. This base is linked up with the army of investment now slowly advancing nearer and nearer towards the defensive works which form a great semi-circle to the north of Port Arthur. All the useful eminences are being prepared with cement platforms for the reception of siege artillery, and daring reconnaissances are being carried out right up to the defensive works themselves. Sentries are posted at fifty yards' interval, and we may take it that there is very little chance of getting between these vigilant watchers without suffering considerable damage in the process.

On June 13th a Japanese torpedo-boat flotilla, accompanied by a steamship called the *Taihoku Maru*, is carrying out some mine-laying operations by night, when a mine explodes, and an officer and 19 men are killed, and 2 officers and 7 men are wounded on board the *Taihoku Maru*. As the damage to the latter is unimportant, it may be presumed that the explosion took place before the mine was lowered, and the loss of life is a striking illustration of the deadliness of these Japanese mines under almost any conditions. The following day at noon, while a destroyer flotilla and three torpedo-boat flotillas are firing on the enemy ashore near Shao-ping-tao, in order to facilitate a reconnaissance which is being carried out by the troops, an incident takes place which shows that even now the Russian ships at Port Arthur have some freedom of action. With the help of tugs the cruiser *Novik* comes out into the roadstead, accompanied by ten destroyers, and sharp firing is exchanged. The Japanese, by gradually retiring, endeavour to entice the enemy, but the latter are not to be drawn, and after

three hours' ineffectual firing re-enter the harbour.

We must now turn our attention to the more northern portion of the Liao-tung Peninsula, where some stirring events, a detailed description of which will be given in a subsequent chapter, are about to take place.

While for the present Dalny forms a convenient new sea-base for the operations against Port Arthur, and while these operations are, for the time being, distinct from those being carried on elsewhere in the theatre of war, it is clear that the Japanese cannot afford to allow the difficult and dangerous work of investing Port Arthur to be carried on without doing all that is possible to protect it from interruption. There is still a possibility that the Russians may attempt a relief of Port Arthur from the north, and although the most favourable time for such a movement may have passed, the anxiety of Alexeieff to render some assistance to his beloved Port Arthur may yet, and, as a matter of fact, is about to, produce serious results in this direction.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Japanese should in the early part of June take special precautions with regard to the Liao-tung Peninsula, in addition to the naval blockade which, as noted above, is being maintained by Admiral Togo from Port Adams on the west round to Pi-tsu-wo on the east coast. Exactly what these precautions are it is impossible at the time of writing to explain in detail, and for the purposes of this narrative it is unnecessary to do so. But the intention of the Japanese to interpose a thick screen between the enemy and what is going on in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur is clear, and this object is satisfactorily achieved partly, perhaps, by

fresh disembarkations, and certainly by a concentration of a considerable force on the line between Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams) and Pi-tsu-wo. Simultaneously, detachments from Admiral Togo's fleet range along the north-west coast of the Peninsula, paying special attention to the neighbourhood of Kai-ping (otherwise Kai-chau), a previous demonstration against which was described in Chapter XXI.

The naval operations last from June 6th to the 12th, and consist chiefly of minor bombardments, more it would seem with the idea of producing a moral effect than in the hope of inflicting material damage. For the time has not yet come for final pressure to be put upon the most important point of this part of the coast, namely, Niu-chwang, which is still in more or less fitful Russian occupation. The word "fitful" is used advisedly, for it is reported that once more the appearance of the Japanese in the neighbourhood of Kai-ping causes a sudden Russian evacuation of Ying-kow, the port of Niu-chwang, although it cannot have been many hours before the Russians are again in evidence in this important quarter.

Meanwhile, on land the Japanese throw out advanced parties from Port Adams, clearly with the intention of obtaining the earliest possible intimation of any distinct Russian movement southwards. Their prudence and vigilance receive early justification, for it soon becomes evident that there is in contemplation a Russian attempt to exert considerable pressure on the new barrier which the Japanese have thrown across the Peninsula.

At first, however, only desultory fighting takes place to the north of Port Adams. The Russians are preparing the way for their advance by reconnaissances,

and the Japanese, by continuing to throw out mobile detachments in front of their main line of resistance, baffle inquiry as to the strength of the latter, in addition to keeping continuously in contact with the enemy. On May 30th a fairly brisk affair occurs, of which the Russian and Japanese accounts are very conflicting, but which may, perhaps, be fairly outlined as follows:

For some time before the Battle of Nan-shan the Russian cavalry had been pushing down the Liao-tung Peninsula in the hope of harassing General Oku's Army, and in the course of a recent reconnaissance some horsemen of the Frontier Guard, led by Colonel Koschouba and Count Armfeldt, had captured a Japanese forage convoy. With a view to avenging this loss, and checking further audacity on the part of the Russian cavalry, a body of Japanese horse, supported, it would seem, by three battalions of infantry, moved out under command of General Akkiama from Port Adams, towards the station of Wa-fang-kau. Here were stationed two sotnias of the Russian Frontier Guard, which the Japanese cavalry proceeded to attack. A sharp fight ensued, the Russians in the meantime sending word to a detachment consisting of Primorsky Dragoons, Cossacks, Chasseurs, and a battery of artillery, which was known to be on its way from Vandiazlin under command of General Samsonoff. According to the Russian official despatch this detachment received the message about noon, when it was three miles from Wa-fang-kau. General Samsonoff immediately ordered an advance at the trot, two squadrons of the dragoons being sent to support the Frontier Guards, and one sotnia and a detachment of chasseurs being told off to protect and reconnoitre the Russian

right flank in the valley of the Fu-chau River. About 1 o'clock two squadrons of Siberian Cossacks, having crossed the railway, attacked the leading squadron of the Japanese cavalry and inflicted considerable loss on it. It is difficult from the various accounts of what followed to obtain at all a clear idea of this action,

very highly coloured. Speaking of the Cossack charge, one Russian correspondent, after remarking that the lance was here used for the first time, says "they speared the troopers through and through and then wounded the horses. Like a raging torrent the Cossacks destroyed everything in their passage, and only



Photo: J. F. J. Archibald.

RUSSIAN INFANTRY IN FULL MARCHING ORDER, AT NIU-CHWANG.

since both Russians and Japanese claim to have driven their adversaries back. But there seems no question that the Russian cavalry charged with great impetuosity, and that the lances used by the Cossacks were very fairly effective. The Japanese admit that they had 26 killed, including one officer, and 37 wounded, including 4 officers, but the Russians claim to have annihilated one entire Japanese squadron, and to have severely handled another. They themselves return their own casualties at 17 killed and 23 wounded.

Some of the accounts of this affair are

stopped before the discharge of six machine guns which vomited on them a torrent of bullets, which, however, did not cause them any perceptible loss. Our battery, commanded by Captain Ivanoff, had already been placed in position, and after some trial shots kept up a fire of surprising accuracy. The shells burst in the midst of the crowded enemy, who were posted on a hill in serried ranks. The performance did not last long. The Japanese were scattered. At that moment a storm burst over the scene. The rattle of the machine guns and the roar of the artillery mingled with

the thunder-claps. Flashes of lightning answered the flash of guns. In the attacks of the Japanese cavalry I was astonished at the courage exhibited. By no means disconcerted by the sustained fire directed against them, they threw themselves on us with the war cry 'Banzai!' without the least hesitation. But they met with a similar resistance on the part of our Cossacks, our dragoons, and our Frontier Guards, who finally made them beat a retreat. In endeavouring to save themselves certain Japanese officers took off their boots in order to be better able to run. The Cossacks have collected some of these shoes as trophies."

It is rather a curious commentary on the above account that, according to General Kuropatkin's own statement, the

Japanese should have halted at a distance of less than three miles from the station of Wa-fang-kau, where they took up a position and proceeded to fortify it. Perhaps the fairest inference from the several contradictory descriptions of the fighting is that the Russian cavalry did obtain some superiority in the action, but that the arrival on the scene of the Japanese infantry changed the complexion of affairs, and that the Russian force eventually withdrew. If the success of the Russians had been so complete and shattering as Russian accounts would indicate, there would have been serious confusion on the one side and hotly pressed pursuit on the other, nor would the Japanese have either desired, or been in a position, to remain, practically speaking, on the ground on which the affair took place.




Photo: J. F. J. Archibald.

THE DEFENCE OF NIU-CHWANG BY THE RUSSIANS.

Troops carrying through the streets of the town the electric cables which were laid down to connect the mines in the Liao River with the Observation Station.

For ten or twelve days after the action at Wa-fang-kau the Japanese in the northern part of Liao-tung continue to strengthen their forces round Port Adams, General Oku coming up from the south to direct the new concentration at this point, which is said to have a front, looking northwards, of about ten miles. Fighting between advanced parties continues to take place, but until June 13th, when, as will be seen later, the situation in this quarter suddenly becomes dramatic, there is no development of particular interest.

It is necessary at this point to make another rapid survey of the position of both combatants, for it is evident that big happenings are imminent. To Russian preparations and movements a separate chapter will presently be devoted, but the present seems a convenient point at which to cast a glance at the gradual but sure changes which are taking place in the Japanese operations.

The fortnight which succeeds the Battle of Nan-shan may seem to have made little alteration in the general scheme of Japanese advance, but in reality the progress made has been very considerable. General Kuroki's army still faces that of Kuropatkin, but, thanks to the reinforcements landed at Takushan, it has been able both to extend its front and to present to the enemy a barrier through which parties of Cossacks may continue to penetrate, but which Kuropatkin has no present chance of breaking down by any large forward movement. In particular Siu-yen, which lies some thirty-two miles to the north-west of Takushan, has been definitely occupied by the Japanese, and sharp fighting has taken place at Saimatse, about thirty-five miles north of Feng-hwang-cheng, resulting in a temporary Russian retirement.

The exact nature of the force landed in Korea Bay at Takushan is not yet absolutely certain. According to some accounts it simply consists of reinforcements directly pertaining to General Kuroki's army; according to others we have here the Third Army of Japan in three divisions, commanded by General Nozu. The latter is the view taken in the map published on page 353 which shows the disposition of both combatants at the end of May. In a campaign in which such extreme reticence is observed something must occasionally be ventured, and there is much to support the theory in question, although as late as June 24th the Russian Staff evidently regard the armies of Generals Kuroki and Oku as the only large Japanese forces in the field.

Be this as it may—and the point is not at present one of first-class importance—the matter requiring immediate attention is the fact that the Japanese forces, whatever they are, which are fronting the main Russian position centred on Liao-yang, are not as yet in touch with General Oku's Army in the Liao-tung Peninsula. The Russians may be said to be in sufficient strength during the first half of June to close the greater part of the interval between Siu-yen and Port Adams to the Japanese, with the result that General Kuroki remains a little longer in a condition of masterly inactivity. The process by which the Russian wedge between the two Japanese forces may be removed, and the Japanese advance co-ordinated, is likely to prove a very beautiful piece of strategy, the details of which belong to a later stage, but the possibility of which is best foreshadowed at this point.

This chapter may be suitably closed with a reference to a significant develop-

ment which is about to take place in the higher control of the Japanese military operations. It has now been determined that Marshal Count Oyama, who has been acting hitherto as Chief of the General Staff at Tokio, with General

chief of the General Staff by Major-General Nagaoka. Simultaneously a number of important promotions both naval and military are announced. Admiral Togo and Admiral Yamamoto, the Japanese Minister of Marine, have been




Photo : Topical Press Photo Agency

VICE-ADMIRAL SAITO, VICE-MINISTER OF THE JAPANESE NAVY.


Baron Kodama as Vice-Chief, shall proceed to the front as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Manchuria, with General Kodama as his Chief of the Staff. Marshal Oyama's place at Tokio is taken by the veteran Marshal Marquis Yamagata, with, it is said, the title of Generalissimo of the Army of Japan. General Kodama is succeeded as Vice-

promoted to the rank of Kaigun Taisho, the highest rank in the Navy, and Rear-Admirals Saito (Vice-Minister of Marine), Uriu, and Dewa are promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral. Several Lieutenant-Generals commanding Divisions, together with Lieutenant-General Kodama, are promoted to full General, all in recognition of meritorious service.

The promotions are self-explanatory, but may be adduced as evidence that the Japanese themselves concur in the view we have taken that the first phase of the War was concluded some three weeks ago. The appointment of Marshal Oyama and General Kodama to executive commands has greater significance, since it clearly means that a combined movement is about to take place, requiring the presence in the field of an officer of the highest rank, together with that of the man who, as noted on page 128, is looked upon as the "Kitchener of Japan." There is something curiously impressive in this forceful system of employing men like Oyama and Kodama in the home control of the various armies in the field during the earlier stages of a campaign, and then, at the psychological moment, sending them out to translate into tactical action the result of their carefully worked-out strategy. It may be suggested that here we see a marked advance upon the plan not unknown in this country, not to speak of Russia, of commencing a war in a hurry, with a very imperfect idea of the requirements to be met, without any proper strategical

plan of operations, and then, as the result of some rather painful surprises, despatching to the front in a hurry the best military talent available.

But it must be remembered that Japan in this connection enjoys a great advantage in the striking personality of the Emperor—an advantage which, without impropriety, it may be said we ourselves should enjoy, if this country were unhappily embroiled in another great war during the reign of our present King. Where from the outset the last word as to great naval and military operations can be made to rest with a Sovereign of exceptional sagacity and experience, a solidarity is imparted to strategical plans and their accomplishment, the effect of which can hardly be exaggerated. With the Emperor still the real head of both the Navy and the Army, the transfer of the great office of the General Staff at Tokio from the control of one Marshal to that of another is quite unlikely to affect the course of the subsequent operations. Certainly it will not, we may be sure, affect the precision and regularity with which every future move will at least be attempted if not accomplished.



WATER TOWER ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")



SWEARING IN A MOHAMMEDAN RECRUIT FOR THE CZAR.



Photo: J. F. J. Archibald.

A RUSSIAN COMMANDER AT NIU-CHWANG.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION—KUROPATKIN AT LIAO-YANG—HIS DIFFICULTIES—FRICTION WITH ALEXEIEFF—PROPOSED RELIEF OF PORT ARTHUR—INTERVIEW AT MUKDEN—A MOMENTOUS DECISION—KUROPATKIN OVERRULED—COSSACK RAIDS.

SOME interesting particulars are available concerning the condition of affairs at Russian military headquarters during the first few days in June. As yet the actual military situation has not been seriously modified by the Battle of Nan-shan, although there is reason to believe that the receipt of detailed intelligence concerning that great operation has produced a very general feeling of uncertainty as to the capacity of Port Arthur to make any prolonged resistance against such soldiers as the Japanese have now fully proved themselves to be. But for the moment all is much as it was before General Oku embarked on the six days' fighting which culminated in the storming of Nan-shan, and resulted in the evacuation of Dalny and the investment of Port Arthur. The Russians still hold a line

fronting their main position at Liao-yang, a line which may be said now to have its right resting on Niu-chwang and its left on Saimatse, thirty-five miles north of Feng-hwang-cheng. In advance of this line there are detachments, as we have seen in the last chapter, pushed down into the northern portion of the Liaotung Peninsula. General Kuropatkin is still at Liao-yang, General Liniévitch at Vladivostok, and there are Cossacks scattered in a variety of places, their main operations being carried out in North-Eastern Korea.


The first reinforcements which General Kuropatkin will receive from Russia will consist of the mobilised reservists of the 10th and 17th Army Corps, but early in June the order is given for the mobilisation of the 1st or St. Petersburg Army

Corps, which it is intended to send to the front as a more or less complete unit under the command of Baron Meyendorf. The latter is a veteran soldier of great distinction who has reached the age for retirement, but has begged to be allowed to go to the front in order to earn on the battlefield the St. George's Cross, "the only decoration he does not as yet possess." Unfortunately, as has been hinted before, the Russian plans of mobilisation are not working very smoothly, and in the manufacturing districts exemptions are being freely allowed owing to fear of Socialist propaganda. It must also be borne in mind that between an Army Corps in Russia and one ready to take the field under General Kuropatkin there is a gap of some forty days' travelling. Accordingly the troops at the front still consist mainly of Siberian Rifles and Infantry with perhaps a score of battalions of the 10th and 17th Army Corps.

The weary waiting until a sufficient number of troops shall be at his disposal to enable him to take the offensive must be profoundly vexatious to a man like Kuropatkin, who, for all his dash and personal gallantry, is said to be a profound believer in the virtue of numbers. His present position forcibly recalls the remarks he made when he first accepted the mandate to take up the military command in Manchuria. "We must be patient," he said, and to an intimate friend he added: "The first month they will say that I am inactive; the second month that I am incapable; and the third month that I am a traitor, for we shall be repulsed and beaten without

serious consequences for what will follow, or, indeed, for the result of the operations. I shall let people talk, and stick to my resolve only to advance in July, when I shall dispose of the overwhelming masses that I require."

Some very graphic accounts are given by various correspondents of the Russian military headquarters at Liao-yang. The latter is described by Mr. Douglas Story, the representative of the *Daily Express*, as "a square-built, drab-tinted Chinese city that has sprawled incontinently over its mud walls into suburbs and subsidiary hamlets." To its south and west is the railway station where General Kuropatkin lives in a railway car, the officers of his Staff being scattered about in wagons, huts,



THE RUSSIAN ST. GEORGE'S CROSS, AWARDED FOR VALOUR ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

and the cottages of the railroad administration. "As in all modern warfare, there is an utter absence of the pomp and panoply of battle. Guns there are none. The only flag is an enlarged handkerchief marking headquarters. The number of sentries would not satisfy a provincial German mayor. The scientific factor alone is prominent. The officers are directors of engineers or commissariat or transport. The men are electricians, and telegraphists, and railway administrators. The air is ruled with telephone wires, as a usurer's cash-book with money columns. The officers in uniform are but exalted messenger boys carrying despatches from the brain in the railway car to the men in shirt-sleeves at the telegraph office. Twentieth century war is reduced at headquarters to the appearance of a stockbroker's office."

General Kuropatkin has not settled down even to this condition of sedentary activity without having made a very complete inspection of the forces at his disposal. There is no point in the line held by the troops under his immediate command which he has not actually visited; no circumstance of the situation with which he has not striven to become personally familiar. Even now he makes a point of welcoming the troops as they come in, and does his best to foster in every way that curious idea of family kinship which forms such a remarkable bond of union between all ranks of the Russian Army.

But strong, self-reliant, capable man as he is, Kuropatkin cannot but at times find the burden of his position very oppressive. He has before him an enemy whom he is too good a soldier not to view with increasing respect, and the story goes that he is beginning to awaken to at least one trait in his adversary's character of which he was not previously aware. His former conception of the Japanese as soldiers is said to have made full allowance for their bravery, but to have included an altogether wrong estimate of their strategical capacity. He believed that the Japanese would sacrifice much real efficiency to theatrical effect, and has been somewhat disagreeably surprised to find that not only have they a full measure of dash and daring, that not only can they "stand punishment" to an almost incredible extent, but that their strategy and leadership are alike of the highest order. He recognises now that no sort of liberty can be taken with men who, whatever the operation may happen to be in which they are engaged, appear to be controlled by brains fully equal to those to be ordinarily found in any European War Office. Such discoveries are

emphasised by the continued presence of an army in front which cannot be safely attacked, by the probability that this army, supported by others, may advance before appreciable Russian reinforcements can be accumulated, and by the unpleasant consciousness that nothing has as yet occurred to render a Russian army certain of being able to beat a Japanese force of even equal numerical strength.

Among special additional causes for disquietude Kuropatkin cannot but reckon his increasing commissariat difficulties and the doubtful quality of many of the guns at his disposal. It is true that, for the time being, Port Arthur is in a sense off his hands as regards supplies, and Mukden is able to look after itself to some extent, as it is drawing a certain amount of provisions up from the sea through Niu-chwang. But outlying detachments can only with extreme difficulty be kept furnished with food, not only because there is no great superfluity of the latter, but because there is so little transport available, and the roads are almost everywhere in a terrible state. The Chunchuses are continuing their daring attacks upon the railway, and several untoward breaks in the communications increase the difficulties of a Commander-in-Chief to whom every day lost in this way means from one to two thousand fewer troops at hand, with added commissariat troubles.

As regards artillery, there can now be little question as to the Russian inferiority in all save the fortress guns mounted at Port Arthur. It is definitely stated that of some three hundred field guns at General Kuropatkin's disposal, less than half are of later date than 1898. This is the more serious, of course, in view of the proved efficiency of the Arisaka quick-

firing field gun, and the full supply there seems to be of this powerful and accurate weapon in the Japanese armies.

General Kuropatkin's outward show of confidence and sangfroid in the face of these embarrassments is quite remarkable. Now, too, that he has settled down in earnest to his task, he inspires perhaps more zeal in the real workers around him than if he imitated the rather reckless personal habits of his old chief, Skobelev. A portrait of him furnished by Reuter's correspondent at Liao-yang describes him as working practically all day, except for half-an-hour's siesta after luncheon, and occasionally relaxation in the form of good literature. Despatches from leaders in the field are brought to him at all hours of the day or night, but his rule is to rise at seven and retire at midnight, after drawing up his daily message to the Tsar, in which the situation is summarised. It is added that the Russian Commander-in-Chief sets a general example of abstemiousness to his officers, eating of simple dishes and partaking sparingly of wine.

A striking indication of General Kuropatkin's increasing apprehension lest he may not be able, at Liao-yang or Mukden, to stem the tide of the Japanese advance, is afforded by the preparations which begin to be in evidence about this time for fortifying Harbin against the contingency of the siege. A Moscow correspondent of the *Times* writes, under date May 28th, that he has learned from an unusually well-informed Russian source that this fortification is to be carried out without loss of time and irrespective of expense. Some time previously it had been mentioned that a number of heavy siege guns were being despatched to the Far East by rail, and it now transpires not only that these are intended for Har-

bin, but that a further considerable number of heavy guns are to be removed for the same purpose from Kronstadt and other first-class fortresses.

But a more serious trouble, perhaps, than any which has arisen in connection with supplies, or men, or war material, has been that which has its source in divided counsels. The friction between Admiral Alexeieff and General Kuropatkin has of late been growing extremely severe, and the operations of General Oku's Army in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur have brought about a crisis in the relations between the Tsar's two leading representatives in the Far East, which cannot but be attended by grave consequences.

Some revelations recently made concerning the manner in which Admiral Alexeieff became Viceroy of the Far East go far to explain why General Kuropatkin can hardly be expected to regard his superior now at Mukden with any special friendliness. They also illustrate with painful clearness that weakness and susceptibility to casual influences which have rendered the Tsar so hopelessly incapable of controlling the work of his representatives in the Far East with the necessary mixture of firmness and confidence.

It is now pretty generally understood that Russia was involved in war largely through the evil counsels of M. Bezobrazoff, formerly a Secretary of State, but now in retirement in Switzerland. M. Bezobrazoff had previously held an appointment in the Far East, and, on returning to St. Petersburg, was influentially recommended to the Tsar, in whose favour he rose rapidly. When in the summer of 1903 General Kuropatkin was despatched to the Far East, the Tsar, "who is at times seized with distrust in



GENERAL KUROPATKIN, COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES.

his Ministers," sent M. Bezobrazoff after Kuropatkin "with a view to exercise some kind of unofficial control over the General's movements, and over the report he was expected to deliver." It will be remembered that General Kuropatkin's journey culminated in a great council held at Port Arthur, and attended by a number of high officials. At this it was decided to recommend the institution of a separate Viceroyalty of the Far East, and it is conceivable that General Kuropatkin may well have imagined that his own claims to be given the new appointment would be favourably considered. But there were other forces at work. Immediately after the council was closed M. Bezobrazoff returned to St. Petersburg, sought an audience with the Tsar, and submitted his unofficial report. As a result of his interview the Tsar nominated Admiral Alexeieff for the Viceroyalty, and Kuropatkin on his return, to his and almost everyone else's astonishment, learnt that the recommendations he was about to make officially had been anticipated, and that Alexeieff had already secured the coveted post.

The memory of this intrigue has naturally rankled, and it was not to be expected that Kuropatkin would do more than outwardly patch up his difference with the man who had so clearly gone behind his own back in a great affair of State as well as one of personal interest. We have seen how General Gilinski, a man of notable tact, has been specially appointed to Kuropatkin's Staff, in the hope that he would prove a useful intermediary between the latter and the Viceroy. But from the first there must have been serious disagreement, intensified by Alexeieff's repeated interference in matters which should surely have been left to the Commander-in-Chief's sole dis-

cretion. Attention has already been drawn in Chapter XXIV. to the existence of these troubles, and the probability that to them the reverse at Kiu-lien-cheng was partly due. It is now suggested that when Niu-chwang was evacuated one day by order of Kuropatkin, it was re-occupied the next by command of Alexeieff, and it may be readily understood that such a state of affairs has become almost intolerable to a high-spirited man like the Russian Commander-in-Chief.

Towards the end of May and at the beginning of June Alexeieff's friends at Court, for whom he has doubtless to thank the former zeal and industry of M. Bezobrazoff, bring all the influence they can possibly collect to bear upon the Tsar in order to procure an attempted relief of Port Arthur. We have already seen that the Tsar has referred the matter to General Kuropatkin, and has been assured by the latter that in the present condition of affairs the thing is impossible. But the determined manner in which General Oku has set to work in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and, above all, the failure of the Russians to hold even such a strong position as that at Nan-shan against a Japanese attack, have reopened the question, and a controversy of extraordinary warmth and some acrimony ensues; one, moreover, which is destined to have very tragic results.

The Battle of Nan-shan was fought on May 26th, and we may reasonably take it that the severity of the blow was increased for General Kuropatkin by the knowledge that here was an argument which his opponents might well turn to their advantage. Doubtless he had said, "What need to talk of relieving Port Arthur yet? Why not wait until the Japanese have blunted their bayonets,

and lost thousands of their soldiers, in a futile attempt to storm the advanced defences of Port Arthur, defences which nature and art have combined to render impregnable?" What a peculiarly bitter reflection for the Commander-in-Chief it must have been that now, in addition to being saddled with much of the responsibility of this past misfortune, he would have renewed pressure put upon him to retrieve the Russian losses by an operation probably still more ineffectual and costly than the stand made at Kin-chau and Nan-shan.

On May 27th, whether by Alexeieff's desire or on his initiative it matters not, Kuropatkin arrives about 5 o'clock in the evening at Mukden by special train. There is the usual official reception, but the Commander-in-Chief does not linger over this ceremony, and forthwith visits the Viceroy at the latter's quarters. Here there is considerably more show and comfort than in connection with General Kuropatkin's own unostentatious and very mobile establishment at Liao-yang. Indeed, several of the correspondents have remarked upon the singular difference of the surroundings in the two cases, from which we may infer that Admiral Alexeieff is careful to maintain, if only for the purpose of impressing the Chinese, a measure of Viceregal pomp. Russian officials, too, when they aim at being ostentatiously comfortable, and desire to create a favourable idea of their greatness and distinction, can generally succeed in producing a mixture of Eastern and Western magnificence which is highly effective from the spectacular standpoint.

A great deal of personal as well as of historical and political interest is centred in this interview. Both men concerned are men who have made history, but

there is a wide difference in the methods they have adopted. Both are men of action, but the action in the one case has been as distinct from that in the other as the work of a miner who toils with pick and shovel is distinct from that of the user of dynamite. Of the two, Kuropatkin's seems, from the English standpoint, the simpler, more direct, more straightforward character, a suggestion, perhaps, to be qualified by the reflection that as yet he has not been severely tried in any very tremendous ordeal. Alexeieff has undoubtedly risen to his present eminence as the result of intrigues, some of which may have been rather unscrupulous; for his rise to the Viceroyalty was entirely unexpected, so little had he apparently done to deserve such an exceptional elevation. On the other hand, it must be remembered that intrigue, more especially intrigue for personal advancement, is part and parcel of Russian official life, and there are probably few details of Alexeieff's career, including the sops which he is said to have thrown to the Russian Court in the shape of promised concessions and other profitable contingencies in Korea, which are not viewed with cynical tolerance in Russian society. There must, moreover, be something more than mere dexterity and obstinacy about a man who has contrived to retain his position in spite of the terrible reverses which his policy has already produced; in spite even of the appointment as Commander-in-Chief, with the privilege of independent communication with the Tsar, of a man who knows "by what by-paths and indirect crook'd ways," he himself became the Emperor's greater representative. Whatever faults Alexeieff may have, he is no weakling, and in the East, perhaps more particularly the Far East, it is often

better to be strong and wrong than it is to be right and flabby.

To turn to the interview, which seems to have been a stormy one, and which lasts until 10 o'clock, when Kuropatkin takes his departure and returns forthwith to Liao-yang. Our authority for what occurred as a result of this "violent discussion" is that of the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*, whose information is evidently of the best. He says that each of the two commanders sent a detailed report to the Tsar, Admiral Alexeieff insisting upon the necessity of saving Port Arthur in order to keep a base for the Fleet, and in order to avoid the evil effect which the capture of the fortress would have on Russian prestige. He pointed out that, to judge by the manner in which the Japanese had stormed the Nan-shan position, it was not certain that they would not sacrifice an enormous number of men in order to take Port Arthur. The Russian Army must, therefore, advance to its rescue.


General Kuropatkin's argument was that it would be folly for him to leave his strong position at Liao-yang in order to make any forward movement. With General Kuroki fronting him, and other Japanese forces at Takushan, it would be most imprudent to attempt a flank march from Liao-yang in the direction of Port Arthur. He preferred to keep to his original plan, and to remain at Liao-yang until he had 400,000 men (*sic*), leaving Port Arthur to defend itself. He considered, moreover, that the capture of Port Arthur would have no tactical importance.

Admiral Alexeieff and General Kuropatkin asked the Tsar to decide between them. The latter, on receipt of the two reports, assembled at Tsarskoe Selo a grand Council of War, which lasted sev-

eral hours, and at which General Sakharoff, Admiral Avellan, and M. de Plehve, the Ministers of War, of Marine, and of the Interior, were present.

Here, again, must have been an extraordinarily interesting discussion, one in which it would seem that the Tsar played a somewhat different part from that which would probably have been taken by most of his Romanoff predecessors. Indeed, one can hardly imagine some of the greater Autocrats of All the Russias condescending to consult anyone on such a point. That Nicholas II. derived much comfort from the consultation is doubtful, since he cannot but have perceived the force of General Kuropatkin's contention, and have felt the unwisdom of, so to speak, throwing good money after bad in an almost hopeless speculation. For the naval argument triumphs. Port Arthur, Admiral Avellan contended, must be kept as a base, a base "all the more necessary as the Baltic Fleet would not know where to go if Port Arthur were to fall." The damaged prestige card is also played for all it is worth, and the specially bad effect which the loss of Port Arthur would have on an agitated China, is carefully foreshadowed. Accordingly, the advice of the Council of War is that General Kuropatkin shall be instructed to attempt the relief of Port Arthur, but warned to proceed with extreme caution.

Alas, poor Kuropatkin! Seldom has a leader in the field been more unhappily placed than he is by this unfortunate decision. Obedience is imperative, and obedience can hardly mean anything but failure, except by a miracle. Even success would bring him little credit, for it would be said that he only undertook the operation under compulsion. But success is the last thing likely to happen in



TRIED FOR HIS LIFE: A JAPANESE SPY BEFORE A RUSSIAN COURT MARTIAL HELD IN A
MANCHURIAN TEMPLE.

the circumstances. The only hope left is that the consequences of failure may be minimised. There is probably no more loyal servant of the Tsar than the gallant Kuropatkin, but even he may find his loyalty severely tested at the trying moment when he receives the Imperial mandate. Surely he must envy Kuroki and Oku their tenure of commands in an Army which is not sacrificed to senseless indulgence of naval *amour propre*. For Kuropatkin knows well that the chances of any favourable turn in the tide for Russia can no longer depend—at any rate, for many months to come—on any naval consideration. He is well aware of the real condition of the Port Arthur fleet, and is under no delusions as to the capacity of the Baltic squadron to intervene effectually in the affairs of the Far East. Yet to satisfy naval exigencies he must risk thousands of the troops which he has been accumulating with such patience in a hopeless attempt to save a fortress, the fall of which would in reality simplify his own plan of operations considerably. How different this from the beautiful harmony which so clearly exists in the combined naval and military operations of the enemy! Kuropatkin, we may be sure, is not so wedded to the belligerent methods of Holy Russia as not to be able to recognise that Japan will indeed prove difficult to overcome, if her present advantages are thus materially increased by Russia's failure to use what strength she has to a right purpose.

While Kuropatkin regretfully prepares to carry out the Imperial behest by detaching a force for the relief of the beleaguered fortress in the south, we may cast a further glance at the Russian position in a quarter somewhat remote from those two centres of dissension, Mukden and Liao-yang.

Careful attention has been given in preceding chapters to the progress of affairs in Korea, and in Chapter XXII. allusion was made to an attack made on May 19th by a Cossack detachment on Ham-yeng, a rudely fortified town to the north of Gen-san. Later reports indicate that the Russians subsequently burned 500 houses in the suburbs of Ham-yeng, and partially destroyed the longest bridge in Korea, which spans the Song-chun river. The force, which is estimated at about 1,000 men with 12 guns, retires, but reappears later, causing the headlong flight of the Korean garrison. By the end of May Ham-yeng was in Russian occupation, some 300 troops being engaged in fortifying the hill immediately south of the town.

There are about 2,000 Japanese soldiers at this time in Gen-san, and on June 3rd a detachment of about thirty of these under a Japanese lieutenant fall in, a few miles north of Gen-san, with a Cossack detachment of five-and-twenty men, and, having drawn the enemy into an ambush, kills three and wounds severely two of the party. The engagement, trivial as it is, has some interest as being the first collision by land on this coast, and also as indicating the extended scope of the Cossack raids in this quarter. It may be added that as the Russians are burning the Korean villages in their retreat, the natives suddenly fell on them with old flintlock muskets and various other weapons, killing two and wounding several.

The roving Cossack bodies make no present attempt to attack Gen-san, but branch off westward, and we hear of them or kindred bodies harassing the Japanese line of communication between An-ju and the Yalu. The Japanese affect to regard these operations with uncon-

cern, and denounce the brutalities inflicted upon helpless villagers as wanton raids, to be classed with the sinking of small merchantmen by the Russian squadrons. It is true that these operations at present appear rather aimless, that they do not cause the enemy much direct damage, and that innocent natives are treated in some instances with considerable severity. But there is another side to the argument, which in fairness to Russia should be stated. Korea having accepted what is virtually a Japanese protectorate, is clearly at war with Russia, and the latter is perfectly justified in seeking to make the Koreans realise that fact. Her methods are certainly not of the kid-glove order, but if they were the Koreans would probably fail to understand them. It is, moreover, obviously to the advantage of Russia to create the impression in Korea that the latter country has been hasty in entering into an alliance that exposes her inhabitants to a succession of outrages, against which the allies are powerless to afford protection. The Cossack raids in Korea may not be a very lofty sort of warfare, but may still prove to assist the Russian cause materially, and the Japanese make a serious mistake if they really despise operations merely because they have not first-class military importance and cannot be dealt with strategically. Some of the Boer operations in the last South African War were of this description, and the amount of trouble they gave us was certainly not contemptible.

For the rest, there is still some chance that these apparently desultory performances may be the designed prelude to a movement on a larger scale. While it is

not desired to carry the tale of this chapter chronologically beyond about the first twelve days of June, we may in this case look a very little ahead, and take note of a special telegram from Gen-san to the Paris edition of the *New York Herald*, which is dated June 18th, and appears not without significance. The correspondent reports that the Russians have built a bridge across the Tumen River, using junks for pontoons. They have also restored the telegraph wires from Kyeng-seng to the north. An unconfirmed rumour states that a large additional force of Russians is crossing the Tumen and proceeding south.

This hint may serve to remind us that the Russians, as well as the Japanese, have what Kipling finely calls a "far-flung battle-line," and that we must keep our eyes constantly moving over an enormous tract of country if we wish to obtain a correct estimate of the immense strategical problems involved in this great War. Let us not forget that the distance from Vladivostok to Port Arthur, even as the crow flies, is some 550 miles, and that the responsibilities of the big bearded man in the railway-car at Liao-yang, which constitutes the Headquarters of the Russian Field Army, extend over a yet longer line of country, much of it most difficult, and most of it very imperfectly mapped. If then there are surprises yet in store from this quarter, we must be ready with our tribute of admiration for a man who can keep Vladivostok possibilities in view while forced, against his better judgment, to waste his growing strength in an attempt to do for Port Arthur what is not expedient, even if it be remotely possible.



RUSSIAN TRANSPORT TRAIN.

CHAPTER XXXI.

A BATTLE PROSPECT—RELIEVING ARMY FOR PORT ARTHUR—POSITION AT TELISSU—JAPANESE AT PORT ADAMS—OKU'S ADVANCE—FIGHTING ON JUNE 14TH—BATTLE OF TELISSU—ARTILLERY ADVANTAGE—HORRORS OF A RETREAT.

SHORTLY after daybreak on June 15th a portentous spectacle is revealed amid the hills and brushwood on both sides of the railway some thirty miles north of Port Adams. Here in a strong position lies massed a Russian force mustering over 30,000 of all arms, with nearly 100 guns. Such solidity, such strength, such genuine fighting efficiency, would seem to ensure, if not an easy victory against almost any army which the Japanese could at this moment bring to bear upon this point, at least ability to brush away attacks, and to resume if necessary an irresistible advance.

But a great body of troops occupying a narrow front has its limitations, and its peculiar risks. A further survey of the scene that is now about to be enacted in a parallelogram measuring some twenty

miles by ten, shows that not only is this powerful detachment from the main Russian army at Liao-yang being boldly attacked by a slightly superior Japanese force, but that the threshold has been reached of a great enclosing movement from which the Russians may only be able to escape with terrible loss. Already the points from which the Japanese guns are roaring in the grey dawn of this close summer day indicate that a ring of fire is being gradually formed, from which, as the day wears on, the crowded masses of the enemy cannot but suffer frightfully. Soon we shall see the artillery preparation slacken, and, bit by bit, the enveloping process will be rendered more distinct by the advance of great columns of infantry. The Russians, who have taken an early offensive, will find the pressure on one of

their flanks greater than they can bear. The offensive will shrivel up, not only from the fiery blast of opposition, but also from "lack of nourishment," since forces which should have supported it are needed to meet the attacks which are being developed on right and left, and which will even threaten the rear. A critical moment will arrive when, if the Russian commander persists in attempting to hold untenable ground, his troops, exposed the while to a pitiless storm of deadly fire, annihilation or surrender must ensue. At that critical juncture a retreat will be ordered, and at a ghastly cost the Russian army will be extricated from a

which immediate recovery is hopeless, which may seriously compromise the whole military situation as far as Russia is concerned, and which will certainly assist the forward movement, in strong and elastic co-operation, of the armies of Japan now in the field.

It is, indeed, a great and eventful struggle that is thus foreshadowed in the very early morning of June 15th. To those who have followed this narrative at all closely, even the rough outline given in the preceding two paragraphs may convey something of cause as well as of effect, since, from the position of the opposing forces, it will be readily



GENERAL STACKELBERG.

position which in a few more hours might have meant one of the most awful disasters in which any modern army has been involved. Even as it is, the Russians will have suffered a shock from

understood that here we have the almost inevitable result of the Russian decision to attempt the relief of Port Arthur, the making of which was narrated in the preceding chapter. But in any case the

Battle of Telissu—by some called Wa-fang-tien, by others, again, Wa-fang-kau—can neither be satisfactorily described in an outline sketch, nor fairly delineated merely by broad splashes of picturesque description. It is a very important action, in some respects far in advance of the culminating engagements on the Yalu and at Nan-shan; and, while not un-mindful of its more graphic aspects, we must not let such an important stage in our narrative pass without some detailed examination of the steps by which it was reached, as well as of the actual developments themselves.

We left General Kuropatkin in our last chapter ruefully making preparations to carry out the Imperial injunction to make an attempt to relieve Port Arthur, and “at the same time to exercise extreme caution.”

It says much for the steady, unostentatious work which the Commander-in-Chief has been doing since his arrival at Liao-yang, that no delay takes place in taking the necessary preliminary measures. For many weeks General Kuropatkin has been busily organising and welding into compact units the troops at his immediate disposal, and consequently he is enabled with very little difficulty to set in motion what may be described as a moderately strong army corps, with a cavalry brigade and the artillery usually attached to three Russian divisions—namely, about 100 guns. The command of this force is given to Lieutenant-General Baron Stackelberg, and it must have proceeded southwards by way of Haicheng during the early days of June, its concentration effectively covered by the cavalry screen which has for some time been standing across the north-western corner of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and troops from which were in evidence on

May 30th at the fight near Wa-fang-kau station, described in Chapter XXIX.

We have no precise knowledge at the time of writing of the movements of General Stackelberg's force prior to June 13th, and, having regard to the results of the action of the 15th, it is not likely that any very full details will ever be published. But it seems that Telissu, situated between Wa-fang-kau and Wa-fang-tien, and twenty-eight miles north of Pulantien (Port Adams), was not a mere halting-place on the line of advance, but a point of concentration, and was specially chosen with a view to an attempt to force the Japanese barrier between Pu-lan-tien and Pi-tsu-wo. Indeed, it is possible that on June 13th the concentration was hardly complete, since even on June 15th fresh troops were brought up by rail, which may well have been not reinforcements, but merely the remainder of the battalions required to make up three divisions of infantry. Some such supposition as this seems needed to account for the prolonged halt at Telissu, which would otherwise have been a strange proceeding on the part of a relief force, whose business clearly it was to push forward as quickly as possible in order to avoid a descent upon its flank by the Japanese forces known to be at Takushan.

On June 13th, in any case, we have the Russians in force under General Stackelberg at Telissu, with their outposts pushed out beyond Wa-fang-tien in the direction of Port Adams. Their main position was intersected by the railway which runs northwards through Kai-chau to Haicheng. Their left rested on a point, probably a little to the east of the railway, while their right appears not to have extended to any great extent beyond Ta-fang-shen,

some six miles to the west of the line.

The ground occupied is very broken, and is described as consisting mainly of a series of low, irregular hills and brown kopjes, which rise occasionally to a height of 500 feet. The railway cutting follows the gorges, and, winding up from the

may be mentioned that three or four miles nearly due south of Telissu is a village called Lung-wang-miao, with another called Ta-fang-shen some five miles to the westward. Three or four miles south of Lung-wang-miao, again, is Lung-kia-tun, and a little to the south-west of the latter is Yuhoton.



TYPICAL RUSSIAN PIONEER FAMILY IN MANCHURIA.

south-west, comes the Fuchau river. The latter, a little north of Telissu, enters a defile through which, and through others parallel with it, lay the only practicable line of retreat from the Russian position.

There is no need to complicate a simple account of a not very intricate battle by a number of names only marked on a few not generally accessible maps. But it

The Russian position had the obvious advantage that its centre rested on the railway, and that consequently reinforcements could be brought up even at the very last moment. It was inherently of considerable strength, and, if a broad front had been occupied throughout and the cavalry suitably employed on the flanks, any enveloping movement might

have been frustrated. But, from the first, the Russian tendency was to fight on a front which, although at the outset it may have seemed a fairly broad one, contracted with great rapidity, until on the morning of the decisive battle the Russians were, as will be seen, bunched up round Telissu, and subsequently driven with great loss through the defiles to the north. It is almost needless to add that these defiles in the rear constituted the main defect of the position. But, in the circumstances, and more particularly if he intended almost immediately to advance to the attack of Port Adams, General Stackelberg is hardly to be blamed so much for not securing a good line of retreat as for inviting attack in a position in which his fine force was unduly cramped.

But, whatever the virtues and defects of the Telissu position may be, it is time now to leave it and return to the Japanese, whom we left in Chapter XXIX. anticipating some such Russian movement as is now in evidence by massing a sufficient force along the Pu-lan-tien—Pi-tsu-wo line. General Oku has come up from the south, and is at Pu-lan-tien on June 12th, when a scout brings in news of the undoubted presence of a large Russian army at Telissu.


It would seem that considerable credit is due to the Russians for their cavalry screen work in the north-east corner of the Liao-tung Peninsula during the early part of June. After the action at Wafang-kau, on May 30th, they appear to have demonstrated steadily in front of the Pi-tsu-wo—Pu-lan-tien line under General Kharkevitch, with the result that they were able to veil the movements in rear very effectively, as well as to obtain the earliest possible information of any movement likely to interfere with the

concentration at Telissu. Many small encounters appear to have taken place during these few days, the Japanese being naturally as anxious as the Russians to get timely intelligence of any marked movement on the enemy's part. But the Japanese have the advantage of working within easy distance of a base at Port Adams, while the Russians deserve, perhaps, the greater credit, as they are probably dependent even for their supplies upon Haicheng.

The force which General Oku has at his disposal at Port Adams has been carefully concealed from enemies and friends alike, and its exact constitution must remain for the present a matter of conjecture. But it can hardly consist of less than three divisions, with a proportionate force of cavalry, while Russian accounts place the number of guns as high as 200, probably an estimate which may be safely halved. When the news comes in of the Russian concentration at Telissu, General Oku's decision is quickly arrived at. He will at once march out and attack the enemy, and there is abundant reason for this prudent resolve. In the first place, it has been throughout the campaign the Japanese plan to take the initiative; and although the Japanese superiority is not here so manifest as it was at Kiu-lien-cheng, and, numerically speaking, at Nan-shan, they have the enhanced *élan* which comes from previous victories, and the quick-firing Arisaka field-guns alone constitute a formidable advantage. Moreover, the Japanese commander is doubtless well aware of the disadvantage attached to the Telissu position, and will willingly risk something for such a splendid chance of inflicting a really serious blow upon the Russian armies. Finally, the great moment is now approaching when a com-

bined forward movement must be made, unless the various troubles which the rainy season entails are to be laboriously undergone. If the army intended to relieve Port Arthur can be beaten back

ese hands by their concentration at Telissu, if only enough weight can be brought on the latter to secure its evacuation without such Japanese losses as will preclude a subsequent advance.



A JAPANESE COUNCIL OF WAR IN THE FIELD.

from Telissu with sufficient vigour, an excellent opportunity will arise for coming into line with the forces at Feng-hwang-cheng and Takushan. In a word, the Russians have played into the Japan-

Accordingly, General Oku's force moves out from Pu-lan-tien and the vicinity on June 13th. The main body advances along the railway, the right by the Tasha river, the left by three

roads, the westernmost of which is the highway leading up to Fu-chau. The cavalry ride far away on the extreme right by a road leading from Pi-tsu-wo to Hiyugyochin.

Marching on such a broad front as this indicates, as the *Times* military critic observes, a confident reliance not only on the power of modern arms, but also upon Japanese skill and intelligence in battle. Further, from the outset, some indication of the idea in view is afforded by the plan of a centre sufficiently strong to act as something better than a containing force, and of wings prepared to overlap and surround the Russian flanks.

As the Japanese columns progress, the cavalry rout small parties of the enemy, and the infantry drive in many of the enemy's outposts, the columns bivouacking after a march of twelve miles.

On the morning of June 14th the advance is resumed, the left wing moving independently to Na-kia-ling, some twenty miles to the south-west of Telissu, while the centre and right reach the line Chia-kia-tan—Ta-ping-kau, which lies about eight miles south of Telissu. The country is hilly and the advance difficult, but the Japanese infantry and artillery press on steadily, while the cavalry push ahead and reconnoitre the enemy's position. This is found to extend from Ta-fang-shen on the west of the line to Lung-wang-miao on the east. Already 25 infantry battalions, 17 squadrons of cavalry, and 98 guns are present in the Russian fighting line.

It is now midday of June 14th, and the work of the Japanese centre and right consists mainly in pushing back advanced parties of the enemy, until about three o'clock the line Yuhoton—Lung-kia-tun is reached, when the battle may be said to begin in earnest.

By this time the Japanese artillery has taken up positions not only along the new line reached by the centre and right, but also on the heights to the west of Telissu; which have been occupied by the Japanese left wing. From 3 to 5 p.m. a cannonade is directed on the Russian positions, but no further advance is made until nightfall, when the Japanese centre moves round to the north-westward, the left pushing forward in a north-easterly direction, while the right remains in position opposed to the Russian left.


The object of this interesting manœuvre is not hard to understand. The intention is to envelop and press the enemy into the defiles north of Telissu, the Japanese detachment on the right keeping the enemy's left at Lung-wang-miao sufficiently occupied to prevent its supporting the Russian left and centre.

At daybreak on June 15th, then, the Japanese are already enveloping the contracted Russian position, and, as soon as it is sufficiently clear—for until 5.30 the morning is foggy—the artillery of the right and of the centre, which has now worked round to the Fuchau river, opens fire.

Meanwhile, the Russians have not been idle. They too have had hopes of carrying out a successful envelopment of the enemy's right, and have taken the offensive against the Japanese right and centre accordingly. The Russian infantry appear to have advanced with great determination, and the Japanese right must have suffered severely. In the early stages of the battle it received notable assistance from the Japanese cavalry, which galloped up and dashed against the enemy's flanks and rear. But the Russian reserves came up, and until 3 p.m. the fighting in this quarter is extremely hot. Twice the Japanese right has to be

reinforced from the reserves, and if the flanking movement on the left had not been carried out with singular skill and vigour the Russians under command of General Gerngross might have completely altered the character of the result. As

this movement are found to be badly wanted elsewhere, and even the reserves of the Russian centre, which has dashed against the Japanese centre now steadily advancing along the valley of the Fuchau river, have to be diverted to the right



JAPANESE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN POSITION AT TELISSU—JUNE 13, 14, 15.

it was, with the aid of a skilfully concealed battery, they somewhat more than held their own, and subjected the Japanese to heavy losses.

But all hopes of a Russian envelopment of the Japanese flank are soon at an end. The troops destined to carry out

flank. This last consisted largely, at the commencement of the fight, of Cossacks and Dragoons, who were doubtless being held back in the hope that effective use might be made of them at a later stage on what was believed to be the Japanese left flank. But by about ten o'clock it

became evident that the Japanese left wing had worked round sufficiently far to overlap the Russian right completely, and Cossacks and Dragoons now find themselves threatened by infantry and guns. They charge with desperate gallantry, but are hurled back, and the shrapnel begins to burst continuously among the devoted horsemen.


According to one account, it is at this moment that a train steams right up to the Russian lines laden with troops. These leap from the carriages, form up, and are almost instantly engaged; an interesting episode, and one which aptly shows how the extremes of modernity and antiquity may meet even on the battlefield. At first sight, the appearance of a train steaming up with reinforcements in the midst of a hard-fought action seems to indicate a pretty advanced stage of latter-day science as applied to the art of war. Yet, when we think of the war-chariot bringing up its contributions of fighting men to hotly contested sections of very ancient battlefields, one realises how easily old principles can be found at the bottom of much new practice.

Returning to the Russian right, now being laid bare by the rain of Japanese shrapnel, against which the reserves that General Stackelberg has hurried to this point are powerless, the beginning of the end is now apparent. The Japanese advantage runs from their left to their right in a diminishing scale. On the left they have little before them; in the centre they have met and are now turning the Russian main onslaught; it is only on the right that the issue remains doubtful. But when one of an enemy's flanks is laid bare and his centre shows signs of wavering, the fighting on the other flank can hardly readjust the balance. Thus at

about two o'clock the Battle of Telissu is to all practical intents and purposes won, and it is to the credit of the Russian commander that he realises this fact, and does not commit the fatal error of remaining on the ground until the Japanese envelopment is so complete that his line of retreat, defective as it is, is cut off.

The first effects of the intention of the Russians to retire is probably observable at the railway station, upon which Japanese shells are now beginning to fall. There are several trains in the station, and these file out one after the other, some packed with wounded, others carrying away valuable stores.

Meanwhile, the fighting continues, the Japanese artillery having secured complete predominance, which they use with deadly effect against the inferior guns of the enemy. Of this General Stackelberg affords evidence in his despatch announcing his defeat. He mentions that during the engagement the 3rd and 4th batteries of the 1st Artillery Brigade were literally cut to pieces by the Japanese shells. Of 16 guns 13 were rendered completely useless and were abandoned. One cannot withhold sympathy from the gallant Russian gunners, who stuck manfully to their posts in spite of this overwhelming superiority of power in the enemy's fire. The infantry, too, are to be sincerely pitied for their exposure to a storm of shrapnel which is said to have been of quite awful severity. The Russian trenches, as at Kiu-lien-cheng, appear to have been wretchedly constructed, and the deadly rain of bullets, which shrapnel shells on bursting send down, swept these with merciless completeness. Many of the wounded Russians afterwards interviewed in Liao-yang allowed not a murmur concerning their sufferings or the doubtful generalship of which they were the



RUSSIAN COSSACK ARTILLERY.

victims to pass their lips. "Their only grievance," says a correspondent of the *Russkoe Slovo*, "was that our inferiority in artillery had made the day go against them."

It has been doubted by critics whether too much may not be made of the Japanese artillery superiority in this engagement, and one brilliant writer goes so far as to say that "in the position taken up by General Stackelberg round shot or Greek fire would have been almost as damaging," since that position was turned on both flanks and exposed to fire at effective ranges from front, flanks, and rear. Such an assertion, if properly supported, might go far to neutralise the effect of the preceding paragraph, and so, in passing, a word of notice may be devoted to it. In point of fact, there seems sufficient evidence to show that, only because the Japanese guns were what they were, the Japanese left and centre were able to make such a marked impression, and that only in the very last stage of the battle was the Russian left flank effectively turned. For some considerable time it seemed as if the "boot were on the other leg," and, had the Russian centre succeeded in getting home on the Japanese centre, instead of being crumpled up as it seems to have been, largely owing to the resistance it encountered from the Japanese quick-firers, the elaborate flanking movement of the Japanese left wing might have proved futile. The question may seem a contentious one, but it is really of sufficient interest and importance to justify its being sandwiched into the narrative at this point. Whether quick-firing artillery has or has not contributed largely to the winning of a battle in which some 70,000 troops are engaged is a matter of very grave moment, and the writer deems

it a duty not to shirk an allusion to the subject, technical and controversial though it may be.

But to resume our narrative. At 3 p.m. the tide of battle finally turns. The Japanese centre, assisted by the left, has begun to press the Russians back from Ta-fang-shen on to Telissu, and General Stackelberg, seeing that further resistance is hopeless, gives the word to retreat. The melancholy order is evidently accepted with reluctance. In his despatch the Russian General says that many of his troops positively refused to retire until the order had been repeated, and doubtless this brave obstinacy is most clearly exhibited on the left, which, as the Japanese official accounts show, fought stubbornly to the last. The word once given, the aspect of the battle changes rapidly. Here and there a semblance of order is preserved, but there is little doubt that, for the most part, the retirement is a hopelessly confused one, particularly in the case of one section of the force, which has met with a very nerve-shattering experience. Having already commenced a retirement in the face of the advancing enemy, it falls at 1 p.m. into a trap set for it by the Japanese Commander, who had despatched two companies of infantry and one battery of artillery to lie in ambush for it. This ruse—one seldom attempted in the course of a battle—proves fearfully successful, and 700 or 800 Russians are so severely handled that further fighting is for them out of the question.

To the north of Telissu there are three roads by which General Stackelberg claims to have executed his retreat; but to all intents and purposes the beaten Russian Army is now in the lower tube of a funnel, and suffers accordingly, although the Japanese do not press the pursuit.

There is sufficient reason for this, perhaps, in the fact that the troops have had both hard marching and hard fighting in the last few days, and the prospect of meeting formed reinforcements sent down from Haicheng may also have been taken into consideration. But the real cause of the Japanese reluctance to follow up the victory probably lies in their cavalry deficiency, to which allusion has already been repeatedly made. There do not appear to have been more than 3,000 cavalry at most with General Oku's force, and many of these have been heavily engaged in co-operation with the Japanese right. The remainder, mounted on tired ponies, were probably quite unequal to the work of a pursuit which might otherwise have been pressed with very important results.

But, this disability notwithstanding, it may well be that the Japanese artillery did much to increase the horrors of the Russian retreat. Indeed, it is probable that here for the first time we see a notable practical illustration of the employment of field-guns in pursuit, which is regarded by the up-to-date artilleryman as a highly significant feature of modern tactics. There are occasions when guns properly handled can damage a retreating army even more than the sabres of pursuing horsemen. Along a road crowded with fugitives the troopers of a victorious army can but hack and thrust until their arms are tired, and their blades drip with a butchery sometimes hardly profitable even from war's cruel standpoint. There are times, too, when a few resolute men will turn, and with their last cartridges take a heavy toll of the pursuing squadrons. Far more complete, far less exhausting to the victors, far more deadly, sometimes, to the vanquished, are the effects of fire from a

few guns posted at the close of the battle on an eminence overlooking the line of retreat. The fugitives press on with incredible swiftness, and that utter abandonment of all hope and of all mental and physical resistance which characterises a *saute qui peut*. A dull feeling of satisfaction creeps into some experienced minds at the absence of the dreaded thunder of pursuing hoofs, the glitter of the descending sword, the thrust of the relentless lance. But another terror comes flying overhead to take the grim place of these. A dull resonant boom is heard in the distance, a shell screeches overhead and bursts, and down come the shrapnel bullets from the sky, quite as "ghastly dew" as ever the writer of "Locksley Hall" foresaw in his visions of the airy navies of the time to come. Stricken down by such far-ranging messengers of destruction, the fate of the poor wretches in a retreat is terrible indeed. For them there is the very minimum of hope unless they can limp painfully on until, after many hours of well-nigh intolerable suffering, they can stagger to the point at which their scattered comrades are beginning to pull themselves together.

But there is little need to expatiate on such horrors in detail. Let it suffice to say that, while the Japanese return their losses at under 1,000, those of the Russians are variously estimated at from 3,500 to more than double that amount. Fourteen guns and some hundreds of prisoners fell into the hands of the Japanese.

The hardships of the retreat must have been increased by a storm of great severity which broke out during the battle, and was attributed by some observers to the tremendous discharges of artillery. Many of the Russians had left

their great-coats in the trenches, and had to spend several nights in the open, seeking what rest they could find on the bare, sodden ground.

At the close of the day the Japanese, as at Kiu-lien-cheng and Nan-shan, bivouac on the battlefield, and it is not difficult to imagine the state of exultation

more toilsome operation. Yet Telissu has its own glory, and those who claim part or parcel of that glory may well be pardoned for "letting themselves go," as we may be sure both Japanese officers and men do here and there before they seek their well-earned rest.


Leaving the conquerors to their glow-



"BANZAI!"

which prevails. It is probable that a large proportion of those present have been in action for the first time, and with these the triumphant satisfaction of having shared in the past day's work may well produce feelings of pride and ecstasy. Kiu-lien-cheng may have been invested with the peculiar glory attached to the first action in a campaign, and the storming of Nan-shan Hill may have been a


ing reflections, let us turn once more to the sorrowful remnant of General Stackelberg's force, which trudges wearily on until it reaches Kai-chau. For, although it has the railway at its disposal, such trains as are available are required for other purposes, especially for the carriage of the many wounded who are being laboriously collected by the ambulances. At Kai-chau the troops fall into



CELEBRATING A VICTORY:
A STREET SCENE IN TOKIO.

shape a little, and a great effort is made to obliterate such traces as can be removed of the defeat, for the word goes round that Kuropatkin is coming to inspect the force. On the 20th the Commander-in-Chief arrives, and, like the good soldier he is, does his best to put fresh heart into the dispirited officers and men. In the course of his stirring address, he says, amid a storm of cheers: "I will see you soon again. We must settle with the Japanese promptly. If we do not, we shall not be able to go back to our homes." He

also interviews separately the regiments which have specially distinguished themselves in the battle, and presents 250 St. George's Crosses to those recommended for that coveted distinction. It is not always that a beaten force is on the way to recovery of its efficiency and self-respect so soon as is here indicated, and it would be a grave mistake to underrate the significance of such effects, produced by the genuine quality of the Russian army, and by the sympathetic soldierliness of its illustrious Commander-in-Chief.



DR. SHIMOSE, THE INVENTOR OF THE SHIMOSE
EXPLOSIVE, WHICH HAS MADE THE JAPANESE
ARTILLERY FIRE SO EFFECTIVE.

CHAPTER XXXII.

EFFORTS TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON PORT ARTHUR—BOLDNESS AND INITIATIVE—JAPANESE OVER-CONFIDENCE—CRUISERS LEAVE VLADIVOSTOK—SINKING OF JAPANESE TRANSPORTS—A SCENE OF BUTCHERY—KAMIMURA IN PURSUIT—SOME LESSONS—ANOTHER RAID.

WHEN the great Council of War assembled by the Tsar at Tsarskoe Selo came to the momentous and wrong-headed conclusion that a big effort must be made to relieve Port Arthur, it is probable that Admiral Alexeieff, as well as General Kuropatkin, received urgent instructions on this head. There is evidently still some means of communicating, at any rate occasionally, with the beleaguered garrison, and there is every reason to believe that the naval authorities at Port Arthur are made duly aware of the preparations on their behalf. In addition, it appears to have been suggested to Admiral Vitgert, commanding the fleet at Port Arthur, that, simultaneously with the appearance of General Stackelberg's force to the north of the Pu-lan-tien—Pi-tsu-wo line, a naval demonstration on the part of the blockaded squadron about June 14th might have a good result. This, doubtless, accounts for the sudden appearance outside the harbour on the date in question of the cruiser *Novik* and the ten destroyers, as narrated in the course of Chapter XXIX.

But yet another performance is to be synchronised with General Stackelberg's great and, as it turns out, abortive effort. Admiral Skrydloff at Vladivostok is also advised of the coming attempt to relieve the southern stronghold, now hemmed in on every side, and it goes without saying that this energetic officer is delighted

to have a chance of sending his one "fleet in being" to sea with the full approval of his authorities. Probably he cherishes a hope that the time is not far distant when, even if Port Arthur falls, some portion of the ships now lying torpid in that harbour may be able to slip out and join him, thus enabling him to assume the dashing *rôle* which his temperament favours. In any case, he is eager to display activity, and welcomes an order which will justify him in running some measure of risk. Already, it is understood, he has taken his three cruisers some distance out to sea, and it is quite possible that his torpedo-craft have been employed in some daring and far-reaching reconnaissances. For it is clear from the subsequent exploits of his squadron that the Russians at Vladivostok have some very good information of the enemy's movements, which they are hardly likely to have acquired except by fairly direct methods.

By the light of later intelligence there is good ground for thinking that, if a man like Admiral Skrydloff had been in command at Vladivostok, more particularly during the month of April, a different complexion might have been given to the earlier stages of the naval campaign. For it transpires that there were many opportunities which might have been seized by the Vladivostok squadron, not merely to harass the Japanese maritime

communications, but even, if desired, to join the Port Arthur Fleet. With such an addition to his force as the *Gromoboi*, *Rurik*, *Rossia*, and the now missing *Bogatyr*, such a commander as Admiral Makaroff would probably have taken steps which might have, at any rate, deterred the Japanese from such audacious attempts as that of laying the mine or mines which sunk the *Petropavlosk*. The close discussion of such lost chances may seem rather superfluous, but a glance at the subject is instructive as indicating yet another of the numerous disabilities from which Russia suffered at the outset of the War. Wherever, too, even a gleam of success rewards a bold achievement, we are reminded of the possibility, faint though it is, that the naval balance may still be redressed to Russia's advantage by the operation of that unequalled driving force which lies in vigorous personality. The story about to be told is not a thrilling one, and it is far from illustrating any very magnificent heights of naval enterprise. But it does show boldness and initiative, the two qualities of which the Japanese Navy appears hitherto to have had the monopoly. In the military side of warfare it is often the case quite early in a campaign that all the boldness and initiative in the world are, practically speaking, powerless to alter materially a foregone conclusion. But the torpedo assuredly, the mine occasionally, and the submarine problematically, modify the conditions of naval warfare to such an extent that an undaunted and skilful commander is often himself worth many ships to the most severely handled fleet.


Reverting to the receipt at Vladivostok of the intelligence that an attempt is to be made to lessen the pressure on Port Arthur, we find Admiral Skrydloff, as

hinted above, not only eager to assist this project, but prepared with useful information to this end. He is evidently aware that Japanese transports are still crossing the seas, and that in some instances the Japanese are so convinced of their naval supremacy that the transports are unaccompanied by ships of war. It is, probable, too, that he has been made acquainted with an incidental circumstance strangely suggestive of over-confidence on the part of the Japanese at a stage when no precaution should have been lacking in regard, more especially, to every sort of naval movement, however trivial.

For some time past it had been in contemplation by the Japanese authorities to give the foreign Naval Attachés and correspondents, and also some of the prominent members of the Japanese Diet, a chance of seeing for themselves the naval bases and other points of interest in the theatre of war. Accordingly, the captured Russian steamer *Manchuria* was fitted up for the reception of some sixty guests of the Navy Department, and on June 12th the ship left Yokosuka, one of the great Japanese dockyards, on a month's voyage. No secret was made of the vessel's departure, and the details of the trip were allowed to be telegraphed to Europe from Tokio. It is not at all unlikely that this news was telegraphed on from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, and that Admiral Skrydloff was seized with a desire to take advantage of Japan's audacity in attempting a "personally conducted tour" of this sort while Russia had still a mobile squadron in Far Eastern waters. In truth, the very idea of this tour could not but have been intensely exasperating to a man like Skrydloff, who would in particular resent the employment on such an errand of

a vessel only recently captured from Russia herself. Indeed, it is conceivable that he may at once have formed the idea of intercepting the *Manchuria*, or rather, to give it its new name, the *Manchu Maru*, and of thus providing the whole civilised world with a proof that Japan's

Vladivostok under command of Vice-Admiral Bezobrazoff who came out to the Far East, as did Skrydloff, after the death of Makaroff at Port Arthur. Admiral Bezobrazoff flies his flag on the *Rossia*, and his general orders are "to assume the offensive against the mari-



MAP OF VLADIVOSTOK HARBOUR AND VICINITY.

command of the sea was not quite so absolute as she imagined.

Whether this may or not have entered Skrydloff's mind can, however, only be guessed. The known act is, that on June 12th his three cruisers, *Gromoboi*, *Rossia*, and *Rurik*, of 12,336, 12,200, and 10,940 tons respectively, steam out of

time communications of the Japanese Army."

Now, as the strength of a chain is the strength of its weakest link, so the offensive possibilities of a squadron are largely restricted by the speed and coal capacity of the ship which in these important respects has the least effi-

ciency. This in the present case is the *Rurik*, whose nominal speed is eighteen knots, but which is not likely now to be able to steam much more than fifteen. The *Rurik's* bunkers, too, are believed to have a capacity of not more than 2,000 tons, which means that, steaming at a moderate pace—say eleven knots—she could go for about twelve days, and cover rather over 3,000 miles, without coming to a standstill for want of coal. At first sight this seems to indicate a very fair scope of operations, but it must be remembered that it is between 600 and 700 miles from Vladivostok to the Straits of Korea in a "bee-line," and that, even in the best-planned raids, some deviation from the straight is necessary. Accordingly, it may be taken for granted that, before the squadron leaves Vladivostok, Admirals Skrydloff and Bezobrazoff most carefully discuss every detail of their enterprise by the light of the *Rurik's* capacity to stand a strain which may at any moment be greatly increased by the appearance on the scene of a Japanese squadron.

One can well imagine that a good deal of excitement prevails at Vladivostok when it becomes known that the cruiser division is about to put to sea. There is very little doubt that, as at Port Arthur, the arrival of the gallant but ill-fated Makaroff galvanised the garrison into renewed activity and confidence, so the presence of Skrydloff and Bezobrazoff at Vladivostok has done much to dispel the dull monotony of the previous condition of affairs. For the part played by Vladivostok in the campaign has hitherto been a dreary one. It has suffered bombardment, it is being pinched by lack of supplies, it has lost one of its four big ships by an inglorious accident, and, beyond the sinking of the *Kinshiu Maru*, de-

scribed in Chapter XVI., it has nothing but a few sunk merchantmen to the credit even of its squadron. With fresh hopefulness, then, must the garrison learn that the new Naval Commander-in-Chief is about to assume the offensive, even though that offensive cannot at present take the shape of directly disputing Japan's supremacy at sea. At the same time it is probable that the more thoughtful of those who are still at Vladivostok realise somewhat clearly that, the more successful Admiral Bezobrazoff is in carrying out his raid, the more promptly and vigorously will the Japanese take measures to remove, if possible, such a standing menace to their security as a mobile Vladivostok squadron, with active Admirals in control and command, must necessarily be.

The three cruisers leave Vladivostok, as noted, on June 12th, probably in the early morning, and they should present a goodly appearance, since all are powerful ships, and advantage will have been taken of their inactivity, and of the dock accommodation in the Golden Horn, to get them into the best possible trim for real work. They steam due south, and on the morning of June 15th are advancing from the north towards the Straits of Shimonoseki, which separate Hondo, the central Island of Japan, from the southernmost Island known as Kiusiu.

When within about twenty miles of the Straits the Russians perceive on the horizon two steamers, which they chase but cannot overhaul, owing to the long start obtained by the fugitives. At the same time a third ship is seen, and the Russian Admiral signals to the *Gromoboi* to capture her. The vessel proves to be a transport of over 3,000 tons burden belonging to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha,

the famous Japanese passenger steamship line. Her name is the *Izumi Maru*, and she is *en route* from China, carrying chiefly sick and wounded. The Russians signal to her to stop, but she pays no heed. The *Gromoboi* opens fire, and the *Izumi Maru*, having been struck by several shells, heaves to. Those on board are seen to be leaping into the sea, and the *Gromoboi* now signals that the ship must be completely abandoned. In compliance with this peremptory order two boats are lowered, and the *Gromoboi* takes on board the crews of these, as well as the men in the water whom her own boats have succeeded in rescuing. The *Izumi Maru* is then sunk by the *Gromoboi's* guns. It is satisfactory to be able to add that the non-combatants are released the next day and transferred to a Japanese steamer, which brings them in due course to Maizuru.

Shortly after 9 a.m. two more large vessels are sighted to the south-east. These are found to be the transports *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru*, both of 6,000 tons register, the former carrying troops and stores, the latter some men of the Telegraph Corps, and about a dozen officers, in addition to stores and pontoons. The *Hitachi Maru* is leading by

seven miles when the Russian squadron comes into view at about 8,000 yards. On perceiving the three Russian ships the transports put about, and steam back towards Moji, at the entrance of the Shimonoseki Straits, at full speed. But the Russians are too quick for them. The *Rossia*, which is leading the Russian squadron, proceeds in pursuit of the *Sado Maru*, while the *Gromoboi* is ordered to capture the *Hitachi Maru*.

The accounts of what follows show some discrepancies, but it seems clear that in the case of the *Hitachi Maru* there is little chance given to non-combatants to escape. The ship is commanded by a British officer, Captain Campbell. Mr. Bishop, the Chief Officer, and the Chief Engineer, Mr. Glass, are also British.

The Russian official account says: "After several shots had been fired

warning the transport to stop, without effect, the guns opened in earnest against the vessel, and she stopped. Those on board, however, paid no attention to the signal to abandon the vessel, and only after several more shots had been fired did they begin to lower their boats. The transport settled down very slowly, and consequently the *Gromoboi* received orders to expedite the sinking."



VICE-ADMIRAL BEZOBRAZOFF.

According to the *Times* correspondent at Tokio the Russians opened fire on the *Hitachi Maru* at 1,000 yards, and continued firing till within 500 yards. Ten shells struck the unfortunate vessel, killing many of the men and disabling the ship. Later the Russians "rained shrapnel on the *Hitachi Maru* from a distance of 200 metres for nearly two hours, finally torpedoing and sinking her at 3 p.m. The first discharge of shrapnel killed and wounded over 200 men."

From this it would seem that many non-combatants must have been butchered without being given any sort of chance to escape. Surely something less than ten shells were required to bring the ship to a standstill, and some facilities might well have been given to the non-combatants to take to their boats. But the Russians appear to have been inflamed by the sight of the troops on board, and by the hope of causing substantial loss to the Japanese fighting line. As regards the soldiers, there is probably no real question of inhumanity any more than in the previous case of the *Kinshiu Maru*, since they certainly would not have surrendered. Indeed, it is said that they even tried to get ammunition in order to fire on the Russians, but the cruisers came to close quarters before this was possible. Most of the regimental officers—there appears to have been one battalion at full war strength on board—committed suicide with their revolvers or swords. Excellent discipline seems to have been maintained, Lieutenant-Colonel Suchi, commanding the troops, merely ordering one corporal to jump overboard and endeavour to swim ashore in order to give a report of the disaster.

The scene on board the *Hitachi Maru* during the time that the *Gromoboi* was

pouring shot and shell into her must have been a truly awful one. The decks could have looked like little else than shambles, and it is said that when the doomed vessel sank, and hundreds of men and horses were struggling in the sea, the water was literally red with blood. In the midst of this ghastly carnage the British officers, it is almost needless to add, remained at their posts, and the Japanese were afterwards loud in their praises of the gallant foreigners who thus bravely met their fate under an alien flag, "setting more value on their duty than on their lives."

The total number of those who were saved from the *Hitachi Maru* was about 150, and it is believed that about 1,000 were killed or drowned.

It is possible that the Russians may have soon begun to feel some compunction for their action in this case, for, while all the Japanese accounts agree in attributing great inhumanity to those engaged in sinking the *Hitachi Maru*, it is admitted that much clemency was shown to the combatants on board the *Sado Maru*. The latter vessel heaves to more promptly than the *Hitachi Maru*, and one of the four British officers goes on board the *Rossia* and returns with two Russian officers and a number of seamen. One of the Russian officers now descends to the captain's cabin and holds a long conversation with him. It is understood that a time limit is imposed, that the captain asks that it may be extended, and that the Russian officer politely regrets his inability to grant the request, inasmuch as consideration for the safety of the Russian squadron forbids delay. At the close of this conversation the Russian officer makes prisoners of the combatant officers on board.

Meanwhile, the other Russian officer



ADMIRAL SKRYDLOFF.

stands by the gangway, and, speaking Japanese, orders all on board to leave within an hour, warning them that, at the expiration of that period, the ship will be torpedoed. Ten boats are now lowered, and about 600 non-combatants leave the vessel. Four of the boats capsize, but there does not appear to be any great loss on this account, and the remaining six boats, crowded with men, head for Tsu-shima and Iki-shima, these islands being visible in the distance.

About 400 men resolve to perish with the vessel, against which the *Rurik* now launches two torpedoes. The vessel begins to show signs of sinking, and the Russian squadron, to use the cynical language of the official report, "considering the matter at an end, and in view also of the growing darkness," proceeds on its cruise.

The 400 Japanese left on board the *Sado Maru* have been cheering and preparing their weapons in order to commit suicide, when suddenly they notice the departure of the Russian ships. The Japanese may be indifferent to death, but they have also a very sane appreciation of the value of life, especially when it can be preserved without loss of honour. Accordingly, prompt efforts are made to stop the leaks caused by the torpedoes, and preparations are made for the construction of a raft. For twenty hours the vessel drifts, and, eventually, all those left on board are saved, an interesting instance of the vicissitudes of war. In all nearly 1,000 escaped with their lives from the *Sado Maru*, the number of those drowned or killed being thus relatively small.

Meanwhile, the Russian squadron has become aware of the fact that a Japanese cruiser has been watching it, and is doubtless glad to have the cover of night for a speedy withdrawal from a neigh-

bourhood likely soon to become dangerous. The squadron has certainly done considerable damage, since about 1,000 brave soldiers, and three fine steamers, aggregating 15,000 tons, and having on board a quantity of valuable stores, constitute no mean loss. But the blow to Japan might have been an even harder one, for it afterwards transpires that on this morning of June 15th there were no fewer than 13 Japanese transports in the channel not far from the point where the *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru* were caught, and the Russian "haul" was, therefore, not so great as it might well have been.

The Russian squadron after leaving the Shimonoseki Straits proceeds in a north-easterly direction, and is next heard of very early in the morning of the 18th as having arrived in the Tsuguru Straits. It has thus steamed continuously for about 700 miles at about 11½ knots. It is said that on the afternoon of June 16th the squadron sinks two sailing ships near the Oki Islands, but no mention of this exploit is made in the Russian official account, which states expressly that no other vessels were seen except those already reported and the British steamer *Allanton*. The latter was met and stopped in the Tsuguru Straits, the captain declaring that he was proceeding from Murovan to Singapore with a cargo of 6,500 tons. "The examination of the crew, the inspection of the ship's papers, and certain irregularities in the log, coupled with the fact that the steamer had previously conveyed contraband of war to Japan, led us to doubt," says Admiral Skrydloff in his report to the Tsar, "the neutrality of her cargo, and she was sent to Vladivostok under guard in charge of Lieutenant Petroff. There her case will be examined by the Prize Court."

After the meeting with the *Allanton* the squadron seems to have cruised about the Tsuguru Straits without any definite result, returning safely to Vladivostok on June 20th. During its raid it must twice have narrowly escaped encountering a superior force of Japanese ships, and the story of the risks it ran in this direction is an instructive and rather exciting one. In the first place, Admiral Togo was actually taking measures to cope with the Vladivostok squadron at the very time when the latter was putting to sea. A Japanese squadron bound for the Sea of Japan was off Fusan, the port (sometimes called Masampo) at the south-eastern corner of Korea, on June 13th, the day after Admiral Bezobrazoff left Vladivostok. "Fortune," as the *Times* Special Naval Correspondent remarks, "favoured the Russians. They kept eastward, bound for the south. The Japanese kept westward, going north, hoping that if the Russians were at sea they would follow the route of their previous cruise when the *Kinshiu Maru* was sunk. The squadrons missed one another. The Russians reached the track of the transports, destroyed them, and retired north."

It would seem that the above-mentioned Japanese squadron is distinct from the command of Admiral Kamimura, who is believed to have been on June 15th at Sasebo, when he became aware that the Vladivostok cruisers had appeared off Oki Island and were steering southward. Admiral Kamimura, on receipt of this intelligence, immediately despatched torpedo-boats to guard the channel between Tsu-shima and Iki Island, ordered west-bound steamers to take refuge at Takeshiki, and telegraphed to Moji Harbour to postpone all departure from the west. The further action taken by this ener-

getic, though hitherto rather unlucky commander is best told in the words of his own despatch, which is a model of clearness and brevity, as, indeed, every Japanese despatch seems to be:—

"I also ordered, by wireless telegraphy, the warships at Takeshiki and the scouting vessels to come to their appointed rendezvous, while the main fleet was doubling the southern end of Tsu-shima.

"The weather was thick and stormy, and we were continually losing sight of the vessels following us.

"When off Kanzaki I ordered our torpedo-boat flotilla to come out to force the enemy from the north, at the same time changing our course to the north of Oki Island.

"Meanwhile, the cruiser *Tsushima*, following the enemy, maintained close touch with them, and reported at noon that the enemy were fifteen miles to the south of Oki. Later, at 1.30 p.m., she reported that the enemy were five miles south of Oki.

"Then the weather thickened, and she lost sight of the enemy altogether.

"We hastened to the south of Oki Island, but did not sight the enemy owing to the fog.

"The *Tsushima*, by wireless telegraph, reported herself within our line, and we then gave chase to the northward. The storm increased, but we raised our speed, and went to a certain place, where we expected to intercept the enemy in the morning.

"Our torpedo-boats were searching all night, but without result.

"At daylight on June 16 we reached our destination, and the weather was clear, but no sign of the enemy was to be seen. We continued our search on June 17th, and steered to the south.

"The cruisers, while reconnoitring in the afternoon, 100 miles north-east of Tsu-shima Island, received a wireless message, stating that the enemy were off Hokkaido, so I returned to my base in the Straits on June 19, having proved unsuccessful."

It goes without saying that the loss of the *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru*, and the failure of Kamimura to overtake or intercept the Russians, occasioned a good deal of criticism in Japan and elsewhere. Of this criticism the most justifiable is that directed against the policy of sending transports to sea without a warship escort. Admiral Kamimura seems to have done all that could possibly have been done with a limited number of ships, and was certainly most unfortunate in the matter of the weather. Admiral Togo is clearly to be exonerated from the charge of having neglected Vladivostok, since he had actually despatched a squadron in that direction, notwithstanding his preoccupation in the matter of Port Arthur, and the blockade of the Liao-tung Peninsula generally. But there seems little excuse for the error committed in allowing transports crowded with men and stores to go to sea without any protection whatever, more especially after the lesson already taught by the sinking of the *Kinshiu Maru*. The Japanese have now paid somewhat dearly for their

neglect of due precautions, and there is little likelihood that they will again be caught napping. But it is well to point the moral of such an incident as the sinking of the *Hitachi Maru* and the *Sado Maru*, more especially as the lesson conveyed has a significance quite outside the present conflict.

To the world at large this episode shows first that the Command of the Sea is a term which must not be too loosely used, since a maritime supremacy which is not absolute is hampered by most serious limitations. Those who are familiar with Captain Mahan's epoch-making work on Sea Power can understand how it was that Nelson's storm-tossed ships stood between Napoleon and the realisation of the latter's dreams. But there was a marked difference between the complete and lasting supremacy achieved by Nelson's Navy and the present only partial, and possibly only temporary, superiority gained by Admiral Togo. Until the Vladivostok squadron is either effectually bottled




REAR-ADMIRAL KAMIMURA.

up or destroyed the Japanese are foolish to presume upon what they have accomplished—splendid as their record is—because the work is as yet only three-quarters done. A further lesson lies in the clearness with which the value to a maritime nation of a Navy which is not only efficient but large is here indicated. It is true that wireless

telegraphy does much to assist the commander who has only a few ships at his disposal and a large area of ocean to watch. But, failing a supremacy by sea which is so absolute and convincing that no warship of the enemy dares to leave harbour, the strain of guarding a number of points at sea is very great, and can only be endured satisfactorily by a Navy of the largest size. The Fleet of Japan has shown itself to be as superbly

which, as noted above, Admiral Bezobrazoff's cruisers returned on June 20th. It is evident that, during their absence, the authorities have taken into consideration the probability of early Japanese reprisals, for a telegram from Vladivostok to the *Novoe Vremya*, dated June 17th, states that the Commandant has just issued yet another Order of the Day urging Government *employés* and other inhabitants of the town to send their



THE JAPANESE TRANSPORT *HITACHI MARU*, SUNK BY THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON.

efficient as its best friend, the Navy of Great Britain, could desire. But those who have studied its responsibilities present and future know well that, if it were half as large again as it is, Admiral Togo would have little difficulty in finding steady and important work for every additional ship, officer, and man. For those—a happily small and decreasing class—who cavil at our own Navy Estimates, the number of ships required to render futile such a menace as the Vladivostok squadron has been to Japan should be a useful warning.

Let us now return to Vladivostok, to

families out of the fortress immediately. Notice is given that families remaining without sufficient reason may be expelled if circumstances require it. It is added that there are good grounds for the issue of this order, since the women and children in the town still number nearly 3,000.

On June 21st a division of Russian torpedo-boats, which had been carrying out an independent raid under the command of Captain Vinegradsky, returns to Vladivostok after a week's absence. This division has also done some damage to the enemy's smaller shipping, having

captured several trading and transport schooners, one of which it has brought back with it to the base. The division has also approached the port of Esashi, on the island of Hokkaido, but has been prevented from entering the port by fog.

About a week later Admiral Skrydloff makes another bold essay in the raiding line. On June 30th the Japanese Consul at Gen-san reports that early in the morning six Russian torpedo-boats entered the port, fired about 200 shots upon the settlement, and sank one steamship and one sailing vessel. They then rejoined three ships outside the harbour and disappeared. Two Japanese soldiers and two Koreans were slightly injured, and two dwellings were burned. The Japanese Consulate was hit by a shell, but the damage done was small. As in the previous descent on Gen-san, described in Chapter XVI., the inhabitants fled at the first shot to the shelter of the hills. The heavy rain made it impossible to discover the direction in which the squadron had gone, and a Japanese fleet which started off north in the hope of finding the enemy was completely baffled. On July 1st three Russian warships are reported to have appeared in the Genkai Gulf to the south-west of the Shrimonoseki Straits, and about 7 p.m. the same evening the squadron is sighted between Tsushima and the Oki Islands by Admiral Kamimura's squadron. Admiral Kamimura attempts to reduce the distance between his ships and the Russians, but the latter, finding themselves observed, steer north-north-east at full speed. At nightfall the Japanese Admiral orders his torpedo flotilla to get close to the enemy at any cost, and the swift little craft bound willingly ahead. The Russians, however, open fire heavily on the torpedo flotilla at 5,000 yards, and then, suddenly ex-

tinguishing all their lights, slip away in the darkness on an unknown course.

Although this last raid has produced no result of any positive importance, it emphasises strongly the force of the arguments based on the previous expedition. The Japanese authorities affect to treat these operations just as they do those of the Cossacks in Korea, with contempt, and the raids are certainly not very dignified exhibitions of Russian naval strategy. But they are at least skilfully calculated to do what the Japanese General Staff believes they are intended to do, namely, "arouse popular indignation to the extent of compelling the Government to detach part of Admiral Togo's forces for the purpose of blocking both exits of Vladivostok, and thus relieving the pressure on Port Arthur." Whether these tactics will succeed is another matter, but our modified admiration must not be withheld from Admiral Skrydloff, who has at least succeeded somewhat smartly in creating a remarkable sensation with only three cruisers and a few torpedo-craft.

Strong as the Japanese Government may be, the power of the Opposition, more especially, perhaps, in a country which is still new to the blessings of a Constitution, has still to be reckoned with, and, even among such devoted patriots as the Japanese, there are not wanting some very plain-spoken critics of the warlike methods which are now being adopted. We Britons ourselves have had, as a belligerent nation, similar experiences, and ought not to be surprised by the singular freedom with which, in some Japanese circles, the situation created by the performances of the Vladivostok squadron is discussed. We have it on the authority of the Tokio correspondent of the *Daily Express* that

Admiral Kamimura is for a time regarded as a most incompetent person by reason of his inability to capture the Russian cruisers, and the probability that his recall will be demanded is quite seriously foreshadowed. But a peculiar and essentially Japanese flavour marks the suggestion made in some quarters, that the gallant Admiral should expiate his failure by committing "Hara-kiri!"

Incidentally, the second attack upon Gen-san reveals a rather strange neglect upon the part of the Japanese to provide this rather important place with at least some more effectual protection against these inconvenient attentions than is afforded by a small infantry garrison. If a destroyer or two could not have been spared, at least it would not have been difficult to mount two or three large guns in such a way that the enemy's torpedo-craft would think twice about entering the port and damaging the shipping. Had a small battery, even of old-

fashioned 40-pounders, been in existence at Gen-san on June 30th, there might have been an excellent chance of sinking two or three of the enemy's torpedo-boats, and thus restoring confidence among the Korean inhabitants. The responsibility of protecting the latter does not seem to be weighing very heavily on the Japanese, either on the coast or in the interior, and this circumstance may not be without ultimate effect upon the consequences of the War.

It may seem but carping criticism to draw attention to these comparatively trifling matters when the general naval and military policy of Japan exhibits such unquestioned genius and capacity, and when so few Japanese errors have been made. But mistakes are almost always more instructive than successes, and no nation should be secure from criticism as to details merely because it is correct in its broad plans and successful in their general execution.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

AFTER TELISSU—THE JAPANESE ADVANCE—OUTPOSTS—OCCUPATION OF SUN-YAO-CHEN—
JOINING HANDS—A GLANCE AT NIU-CHWANG.


WE left the Japanese Army under General Oku, at the close of Chapter XXXI., bivouacking on the battle-field of Telissu, the troops worn out with an exceptionally hard day's fighting, and the surgeons busy with an exceptionally heavy list of wounded. It is now ascertained that the total casualties, at first reported to be under 1,000, amount to 1,163, made up of 217 killed, including 7 officers, and 946 wounded, including 43 officers. The humane necessity of burying on the following day many hundreds of the enemy's dead is an additional grim reminder of yesterday's fierce struggle, and it must have been with some feelings of relief that the rear-guard of General Oku's Army eventually leaves the scene of this hard-won, if glorious and important, victory.

General Oku's objective now appears to be Kai-chau (Kai-ping), but a really more significant end in view is to join hands with General Kuroki's Army and the Japanese force—whatever it may be—that is based on Takushan. According to unofficial reports General Oku has an important preliminary to attend to before he can make any serious advance. It is stated that his army has only been provisioned for the battle, and that this circumstance, combined with others to which attention has been drawn, had much to do with the Japanese failure to press the Russian retreat. The suggestion is that on the morrow of the battle, namely, on June 16th, General

Oku threw out outposts, and that his main force withdrew towards the sea in order to draw supplies from the Fleet. This may well have been the case, for the Japanese and Russian armies seem to have lost touch for some days, and it was not until June 21st that the former had reached a point only thirty miles north of Telissu.

The point in question is Sun-yao-chen (variously called Siung-yue-cheng and Sen-iu-cheng) which lies on the railway twenty-five miles south-east of Kai-chau. Before we bring the Japanese hither it may be of interest to describe their movements in some detail. In the first place, it must be noticed that the advance is by no means an easy one even for a victorious army. There has been a good deal of rain since the afternoon of the battle, and it is becoming evident that the regular rainy season will begin in a few days. The roads, such as they are, are only practicable for small and light carts, and the passage of artillery must be extremely difficult.

But the Japanese have something in their favour. On their left flank they have the sea, from which they doubtless continue to receive supplies without the possibility of let or hindrance on the part of the Russians. To the east of the rail, again, up to within about twenty miles of Kai-chau, there is a strip of mountainous country, the passes and defiles of which the Japanese take the wise precaution of guarding, thus securing that



"SCIENTIFIC FANATICS"; GENERAL OKU'S TROOPS STORMING ENTRENCHMENTS AT KIN-CHAU.

flank also, and making it impossible for the Cossacks to pass round and harass the communications with Port Adams.

On June 19th the Japanese are between six and seven miles south of Sun-yao-chen, their front occupying the whole interval between the mountainous district to the east of the line and the seashore. Their line of advance posts is strongly occupied by cavalry, of which nine squadrons are observed by the Russian patrols, with a screen of infantry. On June 20th a collision takes place between the Japanese mounted patrols and the Cossacks, and the latter report considerable movement among the enemy's cavalry and infantry. The Russian outposts, it should be mentioned, are now some three and a half miles south of Sun-yao-chen, the interval between the two screens being, therefore, only some three miles.

From the above it will be seen that theoretically, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say temporarily, a new situation has been developed in the five days which have elapsed since the Russians were driven in some confusion from the battlefield of Telissu, and to the lay reader it should be interesting to note such little changes in the course of a separate operation of wars, if only for the reason that they tend to vary the monotony of a fighting record. Of course, if the Japanese had been able to press hotly and continuously on the heels of the Russians after the Battle of Telissu, there might have been no subsequent situation at all, as far as the shattered army of General Stackelberg was concerned. It is in order to prevent any "subsequent situation" that an army which has been victorious generally does its best to pursue one that is vanquished, since it is only occasionally that a battle is in itself sufficiently punishing to the

beaten force to prevent its pulling itself together a few days later, if not pursued, and, if it is the right sort of army, again "facing the music."

We have seen how the Japanese were prevented, or, at any rate, abstained, from pursuing after Telissu, and we now have the natural consequence, namely, a pulling-together on the part of the beaten Russians, and a temporary resumption of a new position. The main body of General Stackelberg's Army is at Kai-chau, where, as noted at the close of Chapter XXXI., it is reviewed and "heartened" by General Kuropatkin on June 20th. But its outposts are duly pushed out to a little south of Sun-yao-chen, and thus, for the moment, we see the Russians again re-formed with their faces to the foe, and an intervening screen, the double duty of which is to veil the movements of the army behind it, and to give timely notice of the approach of the enemy in front.

An enemy can never be said to be beaten until he has lost the power of thus pulling himself together and presenting a fresh front, and accordingly it is customary, even for a powerful antagonist who has won one victory, to proceed with great caution when he finds the fugitives of a few days back once more acting as a coherent force. It may be that there is no intention on the latter's part to make a real stand. But the mere fact that they are evidently bent on disputing a further advance indicates that no liberties must be taken, and it is only a very reckless and foolish commander who in such cases pushes forward too precipitately, and gives a re-formed enemy a chance of retrieving his recent defeat.

Unfortunately for the Russians their present stand cannot well be other than a temporary one. It might have been

possible for General Kuropatkin so to strengthen General Stackelberg's army that the latter could, with some hopefulness, have given battle to the south of Kai-chau. But the pressure exercised by General Kuroki's army and the Taku-shan force has made this a very doubtful policy. Accordingly, all we shall see, as the immediate result of the new development described above, is a cautious but determined advance by General Oku, and a gradual falling-back on the part of the Russian advanced posts—perhaps the commonest process in warfare, and the least attractive to the lay reader. Yet it is really a very interesting part of the business of war, this pushful pressure on the one hand, and this skilful reluctance to give way on the other. Sometimes, too, it leads to very important results, especially in the direction of giving the retiring force a clearer idea of the enemy's strength.

In the present case, the forward movement of the Japanese is resumed at eight o'clock on the morning of June 21st. The Russians can, of course, only see the work of the advanced guard, but they watch this carefully, and General Sakharoff is afterwards able to give a very clear and simple account of the operations in a telegram to the General Staff at St. Petersburg. Naturally he does not enter into minute details, but that need not prevent us from trying to realise a scene which, if of no great significance, and, in fact, of a very ordinary sort, is typical of much that happens in the conduct of what may be called everyday warfare.

All night the advanced guard of General Oku's army has been bivouacking behind a screen of sentries supplied from a chain of outposts extending along the whole of the Japanese front. The

Commander of the Advanced Guard appears to have under him about a division of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and thirty-two guns. It is not certain whether on this occasion the outposts were furnished by the cavalry or infantry, but it is more than probable that infantry sentries, and not cavalry vedettes—a cavalry sentry is usually called a "vedette"—are posted at intervals of from fifty to one hundred yards along a front extending perhaps ten miles. There is no more trying and anxious work than outpost duty, and it is one which we may be sure is performed with scrupulous care and conscientiousness in such a model army as that of Japan. During the night there have doubtless been several alarms caused by the approach, imaginary or real, of the enemy's patrols, or of adventurous single scouts endeavouring to pierce the screen and obtain some glimmering idea as to when the coming advance is to take place. But such transitory excitement is confined to the outpost screen, behind which the considerable body of troops forming the advanced guard sleeps comfortably secure in the assurance that no vigilance will be wanting on the part of the sentries, no discretion on that of the Commander of the Outposts, to prevent anything in the nature of a surprise or other disagreeable interruption of a well-earned night's rest.

Probably on the afternoon of June 20th the Commander of the Advanced Guard receives his final orders to move forward on the morrow, and he, in his turn, passes the intimation on to the Commander of the Outposts. Very early in the morning of June 21st the latter gives orders for the sentries to be withdrawn, and gradually the long line of human specks disappears, the sentries falling back on their picquets, the picquets on

their supports, until the chain of outposts becomes once more a series of compact units ready to take their appointed places in the advance.

At 8 a.m. the whole of the Japanese advanced guard is set in motion, and marches forward along both sides of the railway towards Sun-yao-chen.

We must now turn our attention to the Russians, whose cavalry scouts have, ever since daybreak, been carefully scrutinising the Japanese position. Observing the signs of the enemy's advance they have promptly reported these to the commander of the Russian outposts—the latter are composed of mounted troops—who will have previously received instructions from Kai-chau as to the course he is to adopt in the event of the enemy's resumption of the forward march. As there is so little interval between the two lines of outposts there is no time to be lost, and probably none is lost in converting the thin screen of vedettes into more solid bodies capable of offering some resistance to the enemy's advance.

Probably a little desultory fighting takes place south of Sun-yao-chen, as the Japanese press steadily forward, and the Russians fall slowly back. There is no special need for concealment on either side, and on that of the Japanese it is impossible. Now and then a little bunch of Cossacks as it retires will work up to some rising ground and draw rein. The officer commanding descries at long range a party of the enemy's cavalry, gives the word to dismount, and a volley is fired, and, before the light smoke has floated away, the Cossacks have mounted, and are continuing the retirement. Or a Japanese cavalry detachment, pushing vigorously but cautiously onward, may espy a knot of the enemy's

horsemen emerging from behind a hill, or for a moment silhouetted against the sky-line, and a similar performance takes place. Such fighting means very little in actual casualties, but the manner in which it is conducted is a very good test of the efficiency of opposing armies. In this case there is, we may be sure, a very pretty exhibition of capacity on both sides, the one force seeking to carry out the idea of a great engine moving irresistibly forward in spite of every obstacle, the other displaying its *moral* by a dignified retirement as far removed as it is possible for a retirement to be from a flurried retreat.

The first halting-point in the backward progress of the Russian cavalry is Sun-yao-chen itself, but it is soon evident that any stay here will be out of the question. Accordingly, the bulk of the outposts continue to fall back until eventually they are only a little to the south of Kai-chau, where the main body of General Stackelberg's Army still rests. But a fringe of detachments will still be in touch with the advancing Japanese, and these in due course report that about noon a concentration of the enemy takes place in the direction of Sun-yao-chen.

The Japanese are very cautious, since, for all they know, there may be a position at Sun-yao-chen, towards which the Russian cavalry have been luring them. Their nine squadrons of cavalry are therefore working alertly to the front, and with them are guns ready to commence an engagement on broader lines, if necessary replying to the enemy's fire, and "keeping the ball rolling" until other artillery and infantry shall have come up into action. But it gradually transpires that these precautions, which have been rendered necessary by the skilful retirement of the Russians, are really

superfluous. As the Japanese force approaches Sun-yao-chen, the enemy becomes more and more evanescent, until

sign that no stand at Sun-yao-chen itself is intended. Other bold horsemen now push up to the outskirts of the town, and



AFTER THE FIGHT : BIVOUAC ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

Most of the Japanese soldiers are educated men. During the present war many of them are keeping diaries, which they post up at the close of each day.

leading scouts on the flank are probably able to report that Russian mounted detachments have been observed still retiring to the north of the station, a sure

find no trace of the continued presence of the Russians. All the time large columns of Japanese infantry have been converging to this point, and, towards

evening, Sun-yao-chen is finally occupied by a force comprising, according to the Russian official despatches, more than a division of infantry, a cavalry brigade, and thirty-two guns


What follows during the next two days is for the most part merely a repetition of what took place to the south of Sun-yao-chen, Kai-chau being substituted for the latter as far as the Russians are concerned. General Oku throws out a line of outposts about four miles to the north of Sun-yao-chen, the new Russian outpost screen being about eight miles further north. A little more fighting takes place, but of a purely sketchy character, and on June 23rd the Japanese continue their advance towards Kai-chau. The way is led by the cavalry in three detachments, followed by dense lines of infantry, and, behind these, infantry in columns. Towards evening the Japanese line of outposts lies several miles nearer Kai-chau, the left only about nine miles north of Sun-yao-chen, but the right curving up northwards and resting on a village called Moetsia-tung, which is occupied by infantry with machine guns.

Here, for the present, we may leave General Oku's Army as far as the advance on Kai-chau is concerned. But we must not neglect to note that at this point an extraordinarily important stage of the Japanese land operations has been almost automatically reached. For now at length we come to the long-expected, patiently striven-for, and carefully worked-out joining of hands with the Japanese forces now threatening General Kuropatkin from Feng-hwang-cheng and Takushan. The linking up of the latter with General Oku's Army cannot yet be complete, for some days will necessarily elapse before the force which has marched up from Port Adams

through Telissu and Sun-yao-chen can be sufficiently concentrated to admit of easy co-operation with bodies still some fifty miles to the east, with only mountainous routes communicating. But it is clear that touch has been established, and this in itself is a notable achievement. To realise its full significance it is necessary to look back and note the various stages by which it has been arrived at, and, having done this, we shall indeed be apathetic if we are not stirred to admiration by the careful strategy, the singular foresight, and the wonderful accuracy of calculation which have produced such a brilliantly impressive result.

Let us attempt to realise what it means, this consummation of a grand strategical design covering an area which would hardly be included in a square with sides 500 miles long. First, there is the attainment of a naval supremacy which, if not absolute, is at least sufficient for the swift and thorough execution of the preliminary operations of a land campaign, the transport of troops and war material, the disembarkation of these, and the accumulation of supplies at carefully selected bases. Then we have southern and central Korea dominated by the landing and march up the main road of a division to be joined in the north by the two remaining divisions of the First Army of Japan. The latter crosses the Yalu and hurls the Russians back from their strong position at Kiu-lien-cheng. This done, the Second Army lands in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and breaks through the outworks of the Port Arthur defences by winning the battle of Nan-shan and occupying Dalny. Fresh troops are landed, and General Oku is left free to strike north and cope with the effort which Kuropatkin is forced

nised in Chapter XX. (see p. 252), and as to which we may have more to say later. Then he rests in order to allow his col-



league to work up into line, neglecting no precaution necessary to render his own position secure, and doing his best to occupy the attention of the enemy in front. Meanwhile, General Kuroki

crushes the attempt to relieve Port Arthur, and, pressing onward from Telissu, comes into touch with the Japanese forces in position on his right. Each of the three chief points in the Russian position—Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, and Kai-chau—to the last of which the presence of General Stackelberg's unfortunate force gives new prominence—is now most seriously threatened, and the Russians are now faced by possibilities in the way of pressure with which their previous experiences, uncomfortable as they have been, afford no real comparison.

While the writer does not propose to yield to the temptation to linger over this splendid result of elaborate strategy coupled with perfect leadership, he would draw attention to one salient point in this remarkable connection. The situation which has now been created to the very great advantage of the Japanese might easily have been compromised, if not altogether wrecked, by any one of at least half a dozen failures to reach an unusually high standard of achievement. It is never easy to bring about such a co-ordination of large forces as this, even where simple, straight-forward working, with the minimum of opposition, is involved. But the Japanese have had little to help them save their own military genius and the quality of their troops. Neither Korea nor the Liao-tung Peninsula are first-class countries in which to move troops, and the passage of the Yalu and the approach to the Nan-shan position alone presented difficulties which might well have upset ordinary calculations. At the outset of the campaign the climate of Korea gave an infinity of trouble to a nation which has always made a point of paying heed to the well-being of the man in the ranks, instead of simply trusting to his endurance, after

the Napoleonic fashion. But, of course, the real measure of Japanese success in the great combined operations which have produced this notable concentration of force in Manchuria must be taken from the amount of opposition encountered. The "might-have-beens" of battles like that of Nan-shan and Telissu—Kiu-lien-cheng is not such a serious consideration—are quite sufficient to raise the question whether General Oku's performances in the Liao-tung Peninsula, preparatory to his arrival at Sun-yao-chen and extension to the right, do not render the resultant junction of forces one of the most wonderful of the many wonderful things that have happened in war.

Before we leave this portion of our subject we may profitably give a glance at Niu-chwang, not because any grave change has yet taken place in the prospects of this important place, but in order to bring the record of its existence a little more closely up to date in view of imminent possibilities. In any case, the position of Niu-chwang at this juncture is of very singular, and, in some respects, quite unique, interest. Within thirty miles events of the very highest importance are taking place, and yet at Niu-chwang the foreign residents have little but native rumour to feed their curiosity; and at times it must seem as if the place were completely detached from the theatre of war. Doubtless this is partly due to the fact that the Russian camp is some three miles east of Niu-chwang, and that the Russian officers are very guarded in their references to what is going on, especially to the southward. The principal news comes from Mukden, with which communication is drawn closer by Admiral Alexeieff's paternal interest in a place on which he appears

to be largely dependent for supplies. As late as the last week in June a proclamation is issued by the Viceroy practically closing all traffic on the Liau river between Niu-chwang and Mukden, and ordering all food stuffs to be held at the disposal of the Russians.

A field telegraph has, by the end of the third week in June, been laid between Niu-chwang and Kai-chau, but no sooner is it finished than it is cut in three places and five miles of wire are carried away. This, says Reuter's correspondent, was the work of Chinese in the pay of the Japanese, which shows the Russians that they cannot hope for the friendship of the Manchurians. He adds that large robber bands, which the Japanese have supplied with 1,000 modern rifles and much ammunition, are giving the Russian outposts to the north-east of Niu-chwang a great deal of trouble.

Telegraphing on June 28th, the same correspondent expresses much apprehension as to the future behaviour of the brigands in the neighbourhood. They had on the previous night attacked a village two miles south of Niu-chwang, and

it is feared lest, if the Japanese do not arrive within the next few days, the brigands will become bolder and enter the town, which is practically without protection. The Russians have now only about 70 men in the town proper, with a few Chinese, who are believed to be in league with the desperadoes outside the city walls.

An interesting reminder of the real position of Niu-chwang in regard to the operations, and also an instructive indication of what is taking place to the south, are afforded by the statement that on June 27th two Russian regiments which had come up from Kai-chau, possibly in consequence of the increasing pressure exerted by General Oku's Army, have marched towards Ta-shi-chao, which lies at the junction of the Manchurian Railway with the branch line to the Port of Niu-chwang (Yingkow). Ta-shi-chao will be remembered (see page 259) as having already had an interesting warlike experience in the shape of a visit from a Japanese force which had landed, and which subsequently re-embarked, at Kai-chau.



FROM THE CARRIAGE WINDOW IN EASTERN SIBERIA.

(By permission, from "The Real Siberia," by J. Foster Fraser.)

CHAPTER XXXIV.

WITH GENERAL KUROKI—STRATEGICAL MOVES—THE FOREIGN ATTACHÉS—AN AFFAIR OF OUTPOSTS—THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PASSES.

WE have now to revert to the Japanese forces operating on a line running S.W. to N.E. a little in front of Feng-hwang-cheng. The latter, which is General Kuroki's headquarters, may still be taken as the centre of the Japanese position as far as the First Army of Japan is concerned, but the presence of the force landed at Takushan, which the Japanese official despatches are now beginning to call "the Takushan Army," makes any precise division of the Japanese line into centre and flanks at this juncture rather misleading. Indeed, if we may assume that General Oku's Army has now come up into line, that Army would constitute the real Japanese left, the centre being held by the Takushan Army, and the right by General Kuroki's Army. But it is premature, and also unnecessary, to attempt these hard and fast definitions until some clearer indication is forthcoming that the three armies in question are not only in touch but also in co-operation. For the present our business is to bring the work of General Kuroki's Army and of the force landed at Takushan up to a date which will coincide as nearly as may be with General Oku's consolidation of his position to the south of Kai-chau—in other words, to the end of June or the early days of July.

General Kuroki's halt at Feng-hwang-cheng may seem a rather tedious one, even to those who understand that he is resting in order to give General Oku time to work up the Liao-tung Peninsula after the isolation of Port Arthur. But it is

certain that the First Army of Japan does not find the interval hang heavy on its hands for lack of occupation. In the first place, General Kuroki looks to his communications in rear, and by the end of the first week in June the road to Antung has been greatly improved: a light railway is said to be in course of construction, and a number of desirable bridges on the route have been built. In addition, the greatest possible care has been taken to provide the advanced posts with a really useful chain of fortifications. When, a little later, the foreign Attachés and correspondents are taken on a tour of these works, they are surprised to find with what pains they have been prepared, and experienced critics make the observation that European armies in similar circumstances would not have been at such considerable trouble. But the Japanese are nothing if not thorough, and clearly foresee the necessity of throwing up parapets and shelters which will not only serve present purposes, but may possibly be required to withstand torrential rains.

A passing allusion has already been made in Chapter XXIX. to the occupation of Siu-yen and to sharp fighting at Saimatse, and the time has now come to make rather more detailed reference to these happenings. Apparently, about June 6th, General Kuroki sent out four strong columns to reconnoitre the roads towards Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, Saimatse, and Siu-yen, with special orders as to driving the Russians out of the two last-

named places. On June 7th one of these columns occupied Saimatse, which lies about thirty-five miles to the north of Feng-hwang-cheng, after some brisk fighting in which the Japanese had three men killed and twenty-four wounded, the enemy leaving twenty-three killed on the ground, besides two officers and five men taken prisoners. General Kuropatkin telegraphs later that his troops have re-occupied Saimatse; but the Japanese have no intention of abandoning their attempts to gain control of this important point, and, by June 25th, we find it definitely in their hands and marking, for the time being, the extreme right of the Japanese position instead of, as formerly, the Russian left. Saimatse is of considerable value to an enemy operating against either Liao-yang or Mukden, as it controls a road by which both these places can be reached without the necessity of tackling the Motien Pass.

On June 8th the column reconnoitring towards Siu-yen, with help from the force landed at Takushan, occupied Siu-yen, driving a force of the enemy, consisting of 4,000 cavalry and six guns, towards To-mu-chan (sometimes called Shi-mu-cheng) on the Hai-cheng road, and Kai-chau. This movement appears to have been very skilfully carried out by converging forces which ultimately squeezed the Russians out of the place, in spite of a pretty stout resistance, in which three Japanese soldiers were killed and two officers and twenty-eight men were wounded.

With reference to Siu-yen, which absolutely controls the roads to Hai-cheng and Kai-chau, and the importance of which has been carefully foreshadowed in the present narrative, the *Times* military critic makes some suggestive observations. "It may have been noticed,"

he remarks, "during the earlier weeks of the campaign north of the Yalu that Siu-yen was long allowed to remain in Russian hands, and that all the activities of the First Army were directed towards the Motien-ling and districts far away to the north-east. It was not the correct game for the Japanese to draw the enemy's attention to Siu-yen early in the day, since this would have exposed their hand too much. Even as late as June 2nd the valley was still in Russian occupation, and it was only on the 8th that a column occupied the valley and drove out the Cossacks. Siu-yen is an ideal assembly ground for a large army in the mountains. It stands in a high and healthy open valley, fifteen miles by ten, with dry, porous soil, and it is traversed by three pure water streams. From the south it can be reached by three rough but fairly good cart tracks, passable in all seasons, leading from Pi-tsze-wo, Tachuang-ho and Ta-ku-shan. These tracks are bordered by steep hills, rising sharply from the valleys and covered with brushwood and coarse grass. From Siu-yen roads radiate in all directions, and even if circumstances compelled an army to remain in this valley during the rain, its situation would be infinitely preferable to that of another in the Liao Valley, exposed to the dreaded summer diseases of July, which may take a heavy toll of the Russian army. The Siu-yen-Hai-cheng road is well cultivated, save here and there a sandy waste, and the side valleys on each side of the road are not without a fair proportion of crops."

It is probable that the reconnoitring columns which, simultaneously with the movements to Siu-yen and Saimatse, work towards Hai-cheng and Liao-yang, contrive to pick up a good deal of useful information. At any rate, it is known at

Feng-hwang-cheng that at Liao-yang the Russians have guns of position mounted on the city wall, and that a great semicircle of trenches has been dug in the plain to the south of the city. It is suggestive of very well-organised military intelligence operations that the Japanese should be further aware of the faulty construction of these trenches, which are certain to be flooded in the rainy season now imminent. Such a detail as this could hardly have been ascertained except by scouting of the most daring description, or by a singularly efficient system of espionage.


During the whole of June the fighting in front of Feng-hwang-cheng is pretty continuous and, tactically speaking, it has considerable importance. But the general reader will not care to be wearied with a detailed record of minor skirmishes, and will doubtless be content with a passing reference to one affair of a little more than usual interest by reason of the fact that it must have been witnessed by a group of highly interested observers who were, moreover, extremely competent to deliver an opinion on what they saw.

The foreign military Attachés with General Kuroki's Army may well have chafed secretly at the delay which has been taking place in the business of coming to hand-grips with the main force of the enemy, although, of course, they will have clearly comprehended the necessity for such tactics. It is, no doubt, extremely interesting to watch a thoroughly well-found army settling itself for a spring, and at the same time taking good care that, when the moment for its spring comes, it will have all the advantages which first-rate condition and a good "take-off" will give it. But there is to men who have seen, and taken a promi-

ent part in, very considerable operations of war—like General Sir Ian Hamilton, for example—something a little fatiguing in bare reports of a succession of small combats which are felt to be a mere prelude to a movement of the first magnitude. Accordingly, we may take it that the Attachés gladly avail themselves of every chance offered by General Kuroki to inspect the outposts, on the off-chance that something in the nature of an actual collision may be witnessed.

On June 22nd a small slice of luck comes in the way of the Japanese Commander's distinguished guests. The rains which have been rather heavy of late have temporarily ceased, and in the high ground occupied by the Japanese the paths were quickly dried. The Attachés, accompanied by a strong escort, are visiting the Japanese outposts on the right flank near Saimatse, when a sudden Russian attack is developed by two regiments of cavalry, a regiment of infantry, and some guns, to a total number of about 4,000. The cavalry are understood to be part of the division under General Rennenkampf, which for some time past has been opposing the Japanese flank, though not to much serious purpose. The country is particularly mountainous in this quarter, and the Cossacks not only find the going difficult, but are a good deal harassed by want of forage and also by the attentions of native brigands. Presumably, they have on this occasion been specially reinforced by infantry and guns for the purpose of testing the strength of the Japanese outposts.

Any doubts the Russians may have had as to the capacity of the outposts to resist attack are quickly set at rest. It is true that the Japanese are fortunate in having a timely reinforcement, for the



AT BAY: RUSSIANS ATTACKED
IN A VILLAGE.



escort which has accompanied the *Attachés* is promptly made use of. One can imagine the keen satisfaction with which the new arrivals receive permission to take part in the fray, while we may be sure that all the Japanese soldiers engaged fight none the worse for the knowledge that some of the keenest military eyes in Europe are watching their performances.

An affair of outposts is seldom, if ever, of first-class importance, and the present one is clearly no exception to the general rule. Presumably the sentries give good warning of the approach of the enemy, and the Japanese commander, observing no indication that the attack is being backed up by a really large force, determines to hold his ground. The fighting is evidently pretty warm, for the Russians lose five killed and twenty wounded, and the Japanese have a major killed and nine men wounded. But the Russians do not succeed in making an impression, and towards sunset they retire, more or less satisfied with the information they have obtained as to the strength of the outposts on the enemy's right flank.

Towards the end of June the rains commence in earnest, and the business of conducting serious military operations begins to assume a totally different aspect. As yet the Japanese do not suffer very greatly from the tropical downpour, as the mountain tracks by which they move dry quickly owing to the porous nature of the soil. But the Russians are quite differently situated. The Hai-cheng plain is described already as a sea of mud, and a little later, practically speaking, the whole of the Russian main position will become one in which the intelligent co-operation of large forces will become extremely difficult. There is another special difficulty,

too, attached to warfare in the plains of Manchuria during the rainy season. This is the rapid growth of the grain called *kao-liang*, or sorghum, which in appearance resembles maize, and which, in the rains, shoots up to a height of about twelve feet. As this crop covers three-quarters of the Liao Valley its significance in a warlike sense may readily be understood. It is stated that the Russians during the Boxer troubles in 1900, found movement among the *kao-liang* stalks so difficult that they made no attempt to advance before *Ta-shi-chao* and restore their damaged railway until well on in September.

On June 26th the Japanese commence a concerted effort to win the crest of the mountains which separate General Kuroki's and the Takushan Army from the valley of the Liao, in which lie *Hai-cheng* and *Liao-yang*.

In order to understand the effect of this new movement—the first important advance which the Japanese forces, now between *Siu-yen* and *Siamatse*, have made since General Kuroki arrived at *Feng-hwang-cheng* from the *Yalu*—we must give a rapid glance at the Russian position, which has of late been gradually altering in character. For many weeks we saw the bulk of Kuropatkin's army massed at *Liao-yang*, a position in which he had the advantage of operating on what are known as "interior lines." Later we have the Russian Commander-in-Chief despatching the force under General Stackelberg to attempt the relief of Port Arthur, and this force, after its defeat at *Telissu*, does not fall back on *Liao-yang*, but remains for a time at *Kai-chau*, the bulk of it, apparently, being afterwards withdrawn a little further north to *Ta-shi-chao*. Thus the Russians have, practically speaking,

abandoned their interior lines, and are now standing on the defensive in two fronts, a southern and an eastern. Probably the advanced guard troops of the southern front are still at Kai-chau, from which, about June 26th, a reconnaissance in force was being made towards General Oku's position at Sun-yao-chen. At the same date the advanced guard troops of the Russian eastern front were posted before the three passes known as the Fen-shui-ling, Motien-ling, and Ta-ling.

This Fen-shui-ling must not be confused with the Northern Fen-shui-ling, which is near Saimatse on the road from that place to Liao-yang. The Southern Fen-shui-ling is thirteen miles north-west of Siu-yen, and here the Russians had for three months been preparing to offer a most vigorous resistance to the Japanese advance. According to the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, they had erected semi-permanent forts and even barracks, and abundant stores and supplies had been collected. The hills commanding the defile were strongly intrenched. Covered ways had been made, and the position was further protected by obstacles such as wire entanglements, pits, and palisades. Fourteen battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, with thirty guns, defended the position, which was impregnable by direct assault, without enormous sacrifices. Accordingly, outflanking movements were decided upon, and three columns were organised from the Takushan Army, a front of twenty miles being covered. One column under Colonel Kamada moved against the western heights of the Pass; a second, under Major-General Asada, took the eastern heights as its objective; and a third column, under Major-General Mariu was sent by a westerly *détour* to threaten the enemy's right

rear. Attached to this column was an auxiliary force, which was sent forward on the night of the 25th with orders to capture a line of hills to the westward, and so cover General Mariu's flanking march. This force fought an independent action which lasted all the 26th, the Japanese bivouacking at sundown and renewing the attack before dawn on the 27th. Three Russian battalions and eight guns were in position, but the Japanese succeeded in finally carrying the heights.

By 11 a.m. on June 27th General Mariu's column had worked round to the westward, driving back two of the enemy's battalions, and establishing itself in a position threatening the right rear of Fen-shui-ling.

General Asada's column also encountered some 2,000 of the enemy, which it had to drive back before gaining, on the night of the 26th, a position on the slopes of the eastern heights of the Pass. Here guns were posted, but when these opened fire at 5 a.m. on the morning of the 27th, it was found impossible to make headway against the Russian artillery in the forts, which had the advantage of firing with ranges previously marked. However, General Asada continued his pounding, and also detached a regiment which, diverging eastward, succeeded by 10 a.m. in getting round the enemy's left.

Colonel Kamada's column, on the night of June 26th, moved against the western heights, and by 7 a.m. had captured a position from which Fen-shui-ling could be enfiladed. Like General Asada, Colonel Kamada at once opened fire, and, under cover of the cannonade, sent his infantry to work round the Russian right.

Thus, by 8 a.m. on June 27th, another of those tactical successes has been gained which are only arrived at by the

most careful calculation combined with vigorous and complete accomplishment of preliminary steps. General Mariu is marching to the Russian right rear ; on the western heights is Colonel Kamada with his artillery in position raking the Pass, and with his infantry creeping round the Russian right ; while on the eastern heights General Asada is shelling the forts, one of his regiments having already outflanked the Russians on their left.


The Russians are not slow to perceive how completely they have been outmanœuvred, and by 8 a.m. their artillery has ceased firing, and preparations for a general retreat have been commenced.

There are those who, even with some knowledge of the subject, affect to despise "manœuvring," and it is a fact that the size of modern armies often renders this impossible, since, where an immense front is held, the time which would be occupied in working round an enemy's flank might mean dangerous delay and other risks. But it will be long before the right kind of manœuvring ceases to be applicable to many operations of war, and he will be a foolish general who neglects methods which may enable him to effect comparatively impossible objects at comparatively insignificant cost. Of such manœuvring the concerted attacks on the Fen-shui-ling are a splendid example; but it must be carefully borne in mind that the actual struggle for the Pass cannot fairly be regarded as an entirely distinct and independent performance. It is quite conceivable that if the Taku-shan Army had attempted the difficult feat of driving a large Russian force out of the Fen-shui-ling a week or two after it had landed, it would either have been disastrously repulsed, or have suffered very sanguinary losses. Some weeks

ago it would have been no easy matter to organise, much less to carry out, such an elaborate combined movement as this. Here were then large forces of Cossacks working among the mountains between the Russian and Japanese positions, and these might have sadly hampered the accurate timing necessary to make the advance of the three columns effective. The Cossacks have now mostly been drawn away to the Russian southern front, and the incessant fighting which has been carried on by General Kuroki's Army has been largely effective in forcing the Russians to occupy only a few advanced positions instead of holding the whole forward line more or less strongly. Thus, while the combined manœuvring which preceded the capture of the Fen-shui-ling is very noteworthy and extremely interesting, it must not be too freely accepted as a self-contained achievement, but rather as a brilliant supplement to all the tedious work of the previous four or five weeks.

But, although the Japanese have by 8 a.m. on June 27th already tactically won the Fen-shui-ling, we must not forget that there is still work to be done before the fruits of this not inconsiderable triumph can be tasted. Although the Russian retreat has commenced, there are still brave Russian troops in the trenches, and these are protected by some ugly obstacles.

General Asada's troops on the slopes of the eastern heights of the Pass are apparently the first to take advantage of the Russian inclination to retire. With the help of the Engineers gaps are made in the palisades, the entanglements are cut, and then, with a rousing "Banzai!" the infantry rush the position in front of them, and gain the summit of the eastern heights at 11 a.m. From this



SOME OF THE PERSONNEL OF A MANCHURIAN TROOP TRAIN.

point they can see the Russians in full retreat, after destroying their magazines and stores, in the direction of To-mu-chan (Shi-mu-cheng) on the Hail-cheng road. General Asada orders up his artillery, and, planting it on the heights, he inflicts considerable loss upon the vanishing enemy. It is afterwards found that the Russians have left ninety dead on the main line alone, besides losing eighty-eight prisoners, including six officers. The Japanese, too, have suffered somewhat severely, having 180 casualties, but this loss is, of course, insignificant compared with that which must have resulted from a frontal attack.

Nor does the struggle for the Fen-shui-ling end even here. For during the afternoon of June 27th the Russians, evidently maddened at the thought of having lost the control of such an important gateway, make an attempt to recapture the position with three battalions and sixteen guns. Time after time they attack, but the Japanese have quite made good their foothold, and at 7.30 p.m. the Russians are finally driven back.

While a portion of the Takushan Army is engaged in the capture of the Fen-shui-ling, General Kuroki is making an equally successful, and less laborious, attempt to gain possession of other important passes. On June 26th the Taling was occupied by five Russian battalions and sixteen guns. On the morning of the 27th the Japanese attacked the position with, according to Russian accounts, about one division of infantry—the Guards, it is reported—and three batteries of artillery. A short but sharp engagement ensues, which results in a Russian withdrawal towards To-mu-chan. The Japanese do not, however, hold this Pass, possibly owing to the fact that it

is becoming increasingly difficult to bring up supplies and guns, without which any effective occupation is impossible. For the same reason the Russians, although they are at first reported to have regained their lost ground, make no present attempt in that direction, and for some time the two forces bivouac on each side of the Pass, the Japanese probably secure in the thought that having once outflanked the position they can readily render it again untenable by similar tactics.

But the advantage of a successful flanking movement is demonstrated yet more clearly in the case of the formidable Motien-ling, in which it has been confidently expected that the Russians would make a stubborn stand. The Pass is one which has been regarded by experts as affording quite extraordinary facilities for defence, and General Kuropatkin had evidently relied upon his position here to offer a serious barrier to the pushful enemy. As at Fen-shui-ling, important works appear to have been constructed, and the Pass is held by 2,000 men of all arms under the command of Count Keller. The Japanese, however, have made acquaintance with the Motien-ling before, and, not only in the course of the war with China, but in the ten years that have since elapsed, have lost no chance of completing their knowledge of this mountainous district. When, therefore, the time comes to force this important Pass the Japanese appear dramatically on the Russian flank by means of a mountain track, and Count Keller's force retires to the strong field-works near Lien-shan-kwan, from which the approach to the Pass is commanded. On June 30th the Japanese advance in greater force and occupy the Motien-ling, at the same time sending forward troops to deal with the Lien-shan-kwan works. Evidently here

again a flanking movement is carried out, for the Russians desert their well-planned and elaborate entrenchments without firing a shot.

We may look forward a little into July in order to place on record here the circumstance that at dawn on July 4th the Russians, under cover of a thick fog, attack the Japanese outposts at Motienling with great determination. Three separate assaults are delivered by two infantry battalions, and some very severe hand-to-hand fighting with the bayonet follows. This must have been a most vigorous little engagement, for the Japanese had fifteen killed and thirty wounded, including an officer, and the Russians, who were eventually repulsed and chased westward for four miles, left thirty dead and fifty wounded on the field.

Meanwhile the northern Fen-shui-ling near Saimatse is occupied without fighting, on June 29th, by a detachment from General Kuroki's right, thus finally

giving the Japanese armies a new and advanced line, from which the approaches to Ta-shi-kao, Hai-cheng, Liao-yang, and even Mukden are controlled. But it does not follow that any immediate advance will take place, for the nature of the country is being completely altered by the torrents of rain. In the valleys the flooded rivers are taking up more and more space, and, convenient as the mountain paths may be for incidental operations, they do not afford facilities for such an advance as will be necessary before combined pressure can be put on the Russian position.

On July 6th Marshal Oyama, to whose appointment as Commander-in-Chief reference has already been made, leaves Tokio, accompanied by General Kodama and his Staff. The scene at the departure of the veteran leader for the front is one of extraordinary enthusiasm. The whole city is decked with flags, and the streets are lined with cheering crowds.



COSSACKS AND A CHINESE CART.

(By permission, from "The Real Siberia," by J. Foster Fraser.)

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE FLEET AT PORT ARTHUR—REPAIRS—THE HARBOUR ENTRANCE—THE SQUADRON EMERGES—A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT—TOGO ON THE WATCH—AN ACTION EXPECTED—BAFFLED HOPES—TORPEDO ATTACKS.

AT the commencement of the fourth week in June there is probably a good deal of suppressed excitement at Port Arthur, at any rate in higher naval circles. During the past fortnight there has been a considerable exodus of Chinamen employed in the dockyard, and we may be very sure that this would not have been permitted by the authorities unless there could be a prospect that the services of these skilled artificers could be safely dispensed with. It is, of course, important to relieve a besieged fortress as far as possible of the burden of non-combatant inhabitants, but the work in the machine shops on the damaged ships has been extraordinarily heavy, and the Chinese employed in them have until lately been worth a great deal more than their food. But about the second week in June, as has been noticed in Chapter XXIX., permission is being freely accorded to the Chinamen to leave Port Arthur, from which we may infer not only that the work on the injured war vessels has begun to slacken, but that an attempt is about to be made by the Fleet which may render the further presence of a large number of hungry dockyard hands unnecessary.

Incidentally it may be mentioned that some of the Chinamen who have found their way this time from Port Arthur to Chifu speak rather disparagingly of the manner in which the repairs to the damaged Russian ships have been carried

out. According to these, perhaps, rather doubtful witnesses, the method chiefly adopted has been to place sheets of steel over the holes made by shells and torpedoes, without any attempt to replace the crushed ribs. This may serve to explain something of what follows, and, in any case, does not seem improbable in view of the labour necessary to repair at all thoroughly warships which have been really badly knocked about.

As a matter of fact, there are some cases of "crippled ducks" at Port Arthur in which complete restoration to activity is impossible with the appliances locally available. Thus, the *Retvisan*, which was torpedoed on the night of February 8th, is described as having been badly holed below the water-line in the vicinity of her engine-room. "Her pumping and other auxiliary machinery was buckled and smashed, and her frames, angle ribs, and plating buckled and thrown out of alignment over a considerable area forward and aft of the rent made by the well-aimed Japanese torpedo. The structural damage caused to the vessel altered her alignment to such an extent that her main shafting buckled badly. . . . The only use to which the *Retvisan* could be put after her mauling was that of a floating battery." Another badly damaged ship was the *Tsarevitch*, which suffered great injury to her main steering gear. In this case, however, the Russians have been lucky in being able to supply,

before it was too late, a deficiency which could not have been locally dealt with. Allusion has already been made twice to that useful train which Colonel Spiridonoff succeeded in pushing through to Port Arthur almost immediately before the place was isolated. It seems that, in addition to war material and electric lighting plant, that last train carried a new rudder sent out by the French firm which built the *Tsarevitch*. Otherwise this fine battleship could never have made for the open sea under her own steam without serious risk of coming to grief.

When these and numerous other disabilities come to be considered, it is not surprising that some incredulity should have been aroused by a telegram published throughout Russia on June 20th, in which Admiral Alexeieff categorically stated, on the authority of the Admiral Commanding the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, that every one of the damaged Russian battleships, cruisers, and torpedo-boats at Port Arthur had at last been restored to full and complete efficiency. It was felt by those who understood what structural damage to a warship means, and who had some knowledge of the dockyard accommodation and facilities at Port Arthur, that restoration to full and complete efficiency was in the circumstances absolutely out of the question. Still, a coming revelation was to show that at least some remarkable results had been attained, and that in what is known as "repository work" the Russians had been quite extraordinarily successful considering their limitations. Later, perhaps, a doubt may be engendered whether the action of the authorities in encouraging a number of skilled workmen to leave a dockyard in which their services may yet be required was not a little premature.

But, before we pass to the revelation in question, we may profitably study another circumstance which renders the difficulties of the naval situation at Port Arthur extremely grave, however heroic and fortunate may have been the efforts made to remove the traces of torpedo and shell explosions on the various ships. This is the state of the entrance channel leading into the harbour, which, apart from the sunken merchantmen, is such as to hamper greatly a squadron wishing to get quickly out to sea. The present depth of the channel at low water, according to a well-informed French writer, is six metres (1 metre = 3·280 feet). "Consequently," says the *Times* military critic, commenting on this statement, "the *Novik*, with a draught of 5m.70, is alone able to leave or enter port at all hours, a fact which explains the constant activity of this cruiser. On the other hand, such ships as the *Pobieda*, *Poltava*, and *Peresviet* draw 8m.30, and as the mean depth at high water is at present only 8m.70, it is only during the comparatively brief period of high tide, and only then by day, that the battleships can put to sea. Whether due to the sunken steamers or to natural causes, the channel is extremely narrow, so much so that it takes half an hour for a battleship to leave port. Even by interpolating cruisers between battleships . . . the number of vessels that can go out in one tide is limited. It may be recalled that when the squadron put to sea before war was declared the operation took three days. Even after the first losses it was unable to put to sea at one tide, and can only accomplish this feat to-day in five hours with the utmost difficulty."

The significance of the foregoing details with reference to repairs and tides will presently be apparent. For the

moment we will revert to what was said at the commencement of this chapter as to the probable state of excitement in Port Arthur when it becomes known that, whether completely or incompletely restored to a state of efficiency, the Fleet is obviously once more in something like working order, and that evidently some early advantage is to be taken of this fact. One can understand that, although some regret may be experienced at the possible departure of the squadron to seek a junction with the cruiser division at Vladivostok, the garrison may contemplate with pride and satisfaction the chance that in the near future the naval strength of Russia may be reasserted. There is also the prosaic fact to be considered that, as long as the ships remain in harbour, they are of very small practical use, and for defence purposes might be almost dispensed with in view of the heavy armament of the Golden Hill and Tiger's tail forts. On the other hand, their daily consumption of stores is very considerable, and really hearty co-operation of the sailors with the military portion of the garrison does not seem possible. Well then may the beleagured soldiers and civilians feel that if the naval authorities are justified in asserting that their waterfowl can swim, even if they cannot fly, the sooner that interesting statement is demonstrated on an impressive scale, and in a practical fashion, the better.

Turning now abruptly to the Japanese, we find that at Tokio the prevailing impression seems to be that the condition of affairs as regards the Port Arthur Fleet is well-nigh hopeless. Telegraphing on the evening of June 21st, the *Times* correspondent at the Japanese capital says that accounts received in Japan from Chinese sources indicate that success has

hitherto not attended the Russians' strenuous efforts to free the entrance to Port Arthur. The *Novik's* recent passage out—this occurred on June 14th, and will be found referred to in Chapter XXIX. of the present narrative—was only accomplished with the help of tugs. "The destroyers," the correspondent remarks, "alone are able to leave the harbour, and are occupied in removing mines." He adds, "there is nothing now to indicate an intention on the part of the Russians to make a sortie with the squadron. Apparently, General Stoessel is staking everything on his capacity to resist the Japanese assault, and if he fails he will blow up the remnants of his squadron."

But, notwithstanding this confidence at Tokio in the immobility of the Russian squadron, the sagacious Togo has been leaving nothing to chance. He has noted the specially vigorous efforts which the Russians have been making during the last few days to clear the passage, and, in view of a possible sortie, has given instructions that a plan similar to the one followed on April 13th is to be adopted. In other words, an effort is to be made to decoy the Russian fleet by means of a weak cruiser squadron, while the battle squadron remains within easy striking distance. Such, at least, is the *Times* correspondent's account, although it seems strange that Admiral Togo should again so soon employ this particular ruse. It may be added that, in any case, the trick appears to have been quite unsuccessful, since apparently the Russians mistook what may have been intended as a decoy squadron for scouts. The detail, however, is not one of paramount importance. The main point is that on the morning of June 23rd Admiral Togo was evidently some distance—thirty miles

it is said—from Port Arthur, and he does not seem to have been apprised of the events of the past night quite so quickly as might have been expected from the previous efficient working of the Japanese system of wireless telegraphy.

For it is not until 11 a.m. that Admiral Togo receives the astonishing message from the picket ship stationed off Port

flotilla accompanied by the small cruiser *Novik*. During the morning of the 23rd the laborious task of working the big ships out of the harbour was continued, and about 2 p.m. the Japanese decoy or scouting squadron, whichever it may have been, witnessed a very remarkable spectacle. Temporarily at anchor in the roadstead lay, with one exception—the




Photo: Renard, Kiel.

RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP PERESVIET.

Arthur that a large portion of the enemy's Fleet has emerged from the harbour, and that the operation is still in progress!

As far as can be gathered from the rather conflicting accounts of this exciting episode, only three Russian battleships and four cruisers had succeeded in getting out of the harbour during the night of the 22nd. They are said to have been piloted out by merchantmen in order to unmask any newly-laid mine-field. Further, the exposed flank to the eastward had been guarded by a destroyer

sunk *Petropavlovsk*—all the battleships which Russia had at Port Arthur at the commencement of the War, namely, the *Tsarevitch*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Vitoff, the *Retvisan*, *Poltava*, *Sevastopol*, *Peresviet*, and *Pobieda*, together with the cruisers *Bayan*, *Pallada*, *Diana*, *Askold*, and *Novik*, and fourteen destroyers. In all a fleet of twenty-five warships, barely one-half of which it had been thought a week ago were fit for duty. The mere appearance outside the harbour of this squadron is a lasting testi-

mony to the vitality of the Russian Navy, and to the reluctance of those controlling its destiny in the Far East to acknowledge that a ship is *hors de combat*, even though she may have been battered almost out of recognition, and—to quote the single case of the *Askold*—have sunk apparently never to rise again.

In the history of the War up to date there has hardly been any episode more dramatic than this striking apparition outside Port Arthur of a "Fleet in being," previously believed, even by experts, to have consisted mainly of ships merely waiting for the moment when the melancholy order should be given for them to be blown in pieces in order to escape falling into the enemy's hands. Nor is it easy to avoid a feeling of regret that, after such a marvellous exhibition of skill and industry in the matter of effecting most extensive and difficult repairs, the resuscitated Port Arthur Fleet should not have made, if not a better fight, at least a more spirited dash for liberty.



While the last ships are emerging from the harbour the covering destroyers have a smart fight with three Japanese divisions of destroyers which have arrived on the scene and come swiftly into action. With the assistance of the *Novik* this first Japanese attack is beaten off.

At 2 p.m. the Russian squadron, preceded by a flotilla of mine dredgers, and covered by the torpedo-craft and the little *Novik*, steams in line ahead towards the open sea, the *Tsarevitch* leading. Having emerged from the roads without a mishap, it shapes a course southward, and sends back the mine-dredgers to port under an escort of armed picket boats.

It is at this juncture, at a little past 6 p.m., when the Russian Fleet, which now has the decoy or scouting cruisers on

its port beam, sights the main Japanese Fleet coming up behind the latter. A thrilling period follows, during which both the Russian and Japanese commanders must be the prey of very conflicting emotions. One can imagine the former counting with the keenest anxiety the number of his antagonist's vessels, in order to reckon his chances of a successful engagement. He is probably under no illusion as to the inferiority of his own individual ships, but he may well have hoped that the strain of assisting the land operations, as well as the desire of wreaking vengeance on the Vladivostok squadron for the loss of the *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru*, may have caused considerable detachments to have been made from Admiral Togo's squadron. The latter commander, we may be sure, is full of eager expectation that now at last the moment for which he has longed and waited so patiently has arrived. Since his last encounter with a representative portion of the Port Arthur Fleet he has lost one of his finest battle-ships, the *Hatsuse*, but he has still a noble squadron under his command, and his ships are all in first-class fighting trim. Small wonder then, that he gives chase, and that every Japanese naval officer and bluejacket under him feels his blood tingling with the glorious prospect of testing on the open seas the relative merits of the two main fleets of Russia and Japan.

The Japanese official reports are silent as to the exact constitution of Admiral Togo's squadron on this momentous occasion, the Admiral merely saying that he "advanced with the whole fleet except vessels on special mission." But the Russian report says that the Japanese squadron, which was steaming in divisions in line ahead, was found to be composed of four first-class and one



JAPAN'S GREAT DISASTER: THE SINKING
OF THE BATTLESHIP *HATSUSE*.

second-class battleship, four armoured first-class cruisers, seven second, and five third-class cruisers, one scout and one steamer, as well as thirty torpedo-boats in two divisions. This force will have included the decoy or scouting squadron, which is leading the battleships in line ahead, at a mile interval, with the three destroyer divisions on the port beam. The battleships are followed also at a mile interval by the first cruiser squadron.

The Japanese ships, steaming at full speed, rapidly gain on the Russian squadron, and between six and seven both fleets hoist their battle-flags and, to quote the *Times* correspondent, to whom the writer is chiefly indebted for the account of this notable operation, it seems that the naval battle of the War is imminent. And what a battle it would have been! Fought in the Strait which lies between the Kwang-tung and Shang-tung Promontories, at the entrance to that great Gulf of Pe-chi-li, in which so many of the dim possibilities of Asiatic politics are locked up, it could hardly have been otherwise than decisive, and might conceivably have foreshadowed the early termination of the War. Although, too, only two or three hours of daylight remained, who knows what terrific blows might not have been exchanged even in this brief interval, without reckoning the chances of a continuation of the grim conflict far into the watches of a moonlit night? But it is not to be. The fleets are not to separate without some sharp fighting, but it is time to dispel the illusion that a greater combat will take place, and that in another hour the 12-in. guns of the battleships may be roaring; swift cruisers may be striving to outmanœuvre ships of their own class in order to bring a heavier weight of metal to bear upon their sides; and the little

destroyers eagerly seeking for their opportunity to rush in and disable some monster, a single discharge from one of whose smaller guns at a less preoccupied moment would wreck them hopelessly. For we are on the heels of what, apart from the humanitarian aspect—it must not be forgotten, by the way, that a decisive victory is not always an inhuman thing—may surely be classed as one of the sharpest disappointments of modern war.

Having greatly lessened the distance between his fleet and that which he is pursuing, Admiral Togo for some time steers a parallel course at a range of about nine miles, and then bears in. The Russians immediately change their course as many points, and this manœuvre is repeated several times, until the Russians are steering due west. It is now about 7.30, and the Russian Admiral decides to put an end to a situation which is rapidly becoming acute. He is under the impression that the Japanese are preparing to place a division of cruisers and torpedo-craft between him and the Kwang-tung Promontory in order that, during the night, they may force, by persistent torpedo attacks, some of the Russian ships to break their formation, thus leading up to an advantageous engagement in the morning. Admiral Togo's actual procedure does not seem to warrant this belief, and the probability is that, had the Russians continued on their course, they would have experienced something heavier than persistent torpedo attacks in the course of the next few hours. Be this as it may, the Russian Commander comes to one definite conclusion, namely, that he will not fight, and proceeds to act on it by putting over his helm and steering directly for Port Arthur.

Admiral Togo, hitherto bitterly disappointed, we may be sure, at this clouding over of a glorious prospect, signals to his Fleet that he will give chase, and the ships, wheeling to the right, now come into the formation known as "line abreast." But it is growing dark, and "line abreast" is not a formation which can with safety and convenience be retained. Accordingly "line ahead"—of which an illustration was given on page 96—is re-formed, and, as the squadron nears Port Arthur, the Japanese Admiral signals to his destroyers to go in and attack.

Under the command of Captain Asai the three torpedo flotillas respond gladly to this inspiring command. At their first onslaught the Russian Fleet is thrown out of its alignment, and it is only with a semblance of its former impressive regularity that the squadron reaches the roadstead and casts anchor between ten and eleven o'clock, the rearmost ships still heavily engaged with the attacking mosquitoes. It is bright moonlight, and the search-lights are working, but again and again during the night the daring little torpedo-craft dash in and out, braving the ships' fire, chancing the mines, and now and again speeding one of their deadly messengers on its errand of destruction. Only with the most careful deliberation are the Russian ships able to enter the harbour in this doubtful light, and it is morning before all are through the narrow channel. Meanwhile, the Japanese claim to have sunk a battleship of the *Peresviet* type, and to have damaged the *Diana* and the *Askold*. It is only fair to add that the Russians repudiate these losses, but the Japanese declare their conviction that three torpedoes took effect on three ships, and the strict accuracy of the Japanese reports

has hitherto been remarkable. On the other hand, the Russian despatches have more than once been found to be misleading, both as regards the loss sustained and the damage, sometimes wholly imaginary, which is stated to have been inflicted on the enemy.

The Japanese account of the cost to them of this affair is quite explicit. "Destroyer *Shirakumo's* wardroom damaged, three men killed, one surgeon, two men wounded. Torpedo-boat *Chidori* received one shot aft engine-room, but no casualties. Torpedo-boats 64 and 66 slightly damaged. No other damage."

Whatever uncertainty may prevail as to the actual damage done to the Port Arthur Fleet by the Japanese torpedo-craft on this remarkable occasion, there is no sort of dubiety as to the incompetence and vacillation displayed by the Russian commanders mainly concerned. In such a connection it is well to quote opinions which are beyond suspicion of partiality, and partly for this reason, partly as striking evidence of the feeling aroused at St. Petersburg by the news of the attempted sortie and its results, the following excerpt is given from the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*. The telegram is dated June 23 :

"Public opinion has not been very deeply affected by the reverses on land, as it reckons upon the large forces under General Kuropatkin to restore the fortune of the Russian arms. It is, however, exasperated by the naval defeat of June 23, which was not even the result of a battle. This evening an Admiral observed to me that the naval situation, which had become favourable, had again been terribly compromised by a lack of vigilance which was inconceivable after the experience acquired at the beginning of the War. The Russians had again lost the naval

superiority, and if Port Arthur were seriously menaced from the land side there would be nothing left for the fleet but to let itself be sunk with honour, as it was henceforth incapable of fighting with any chance of success. The night of June 23 might be considered as fatal for the maritime power of Russia in the Far East as was that of February 8.

Fleet on the occasion of the sortie had been succeeded as Commodore by Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky of the *Peresviet*, upon whom the command at Port Arthur had previously devolved for a time on the death of Admiral Makaroff. There is also very little doubt that the silence observed at first by Admiral Alexeieff with reference to the sortie,




Photo: Renard, Kiel.

RUSSIAN CRUISER *DIANA*.

"That section of the public acquainted with the facts is highly indignant at the negligence of the Admirals. This feeling finds expression in exceptionally violent reproaches against Admiral Alexeieff for surrounding himself with the nonentities who have remained masters at Port Arthur since the death of Admiral Makaroff."


It is significant that some refugees, who, about a fortnight later, reached Chifu from Port Arthur, reported that the Admiral who commanded the Russian

coupled with attempts on the part of several Russian Press correspondents at the front to suggest that Russia had gained a naval victory instead of having sustained a not inconsiderable reverse, have accentuated the growing popular distrust of the Viceroy and his methods.

On the night of June 27th Admiral Togo strikes yet another blow at the Port Arthur squadron. This time the instrument chosen is the 12th Torpedo-boat Flotilla, which makes its way into the roadstead, but is discovered by the

watchful search-lights. The forts open a heavy fire, but the valiant little ships take no notice, and proceed to surround the Russian guardship, a battleship or a cruiser with two masts and three funnels, which is keeping watch and ward near

tagonists, and doubtless the forts slacken fire for fear of hurting friend as well as foe. A Russian destroyer is seen to capsize and sink, and Torpedo-boat Flotilla No. 12 runs out again to sea, doubtless well satisfied with its fine performance.



Stereograph Copyright: Underwood & Underwood London and New York.

RUSSIAN GUNBOAT BOBR ON THE LIAO RIVER AT NIU-CHWANG.

the base of Golden Hill. Torpedoes are launched, and one takes effect, for the big ship sinks swiftly, with a tremendous explosion and an uplifting of huge volumes of water as she settles into her grave. By this time the Russian destroyers are rushing to the attack. They are promptly met by their smaller an-

No mention is made by Admiral Togo of any damage to the ships, but the enterprise has not been without loss, fourteen being reported as killed, with three wounded.

On June 28th, a Russian destroyer, under command of Lieutenant Burukoff, arrives at Niu-chwang, having success-

fully run the Japanese blockade. Her officers not only protest that Admiral Togo's account of the proceedings on June 23rd is exaggerated, but declare that during the last five days the Russian Fleet has made two cruises in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. A charming picture is drawn of the condition of affairs prevailing inside Port Arthur. "The blockade is not effective, as the enemy remains out of range. The population, which comprises many ladies, among the number being Mme. Stoessel and Princess Lieven, is full of enthusiasm. The bands play every day, and, finally, provisions are plentiful and cheaper than at Niu-chwang. Perfect confidence prevails." In order to provide an equivalent for the above for native consumption, the Chinese at Niu-chwang are duly assured that the Japanese Fleet has been completely destroyed!

For some days at the end of June the Japanese ships continue to throw shells into Port Arthur without however doing much damage. The object is doubtless to assist the land operations, which are progressing rapidly, and to which attention will be devoted in separate chapters. Meanwhile, the mine-clearing operations in Talien-wan have also been proceeding briskly, and the Bay is believed now to be fairly safe. But there is still danger to be apprehended from submarine mines. On July 5th the old wooden Japanese cruiser *Kaimon*, while carrying out a special mission outside Talien-wan in a thick fog, strikes a Russian mine and sinks, three officers, including Comman-

der Takahashi, and nineteen non-commissioned officers and men, being missed. The remainder of the crew are saved, and the vessel itself is no great loss; but the incident is a painful reminder of terrible possibilities still to be reckoned with.

Before leaving this portion of our subject, a note may usefully be made of a remarkable reference made on July 3rd by the leading Tokio journal to certain contingencies in regard to the Port Arthur Fleet. The journal in question, carefully weighing, we may be sure, its words, professes trust in Germany's neutrality, but expresses apprehension lest she may consent to allow the Port Arthur squadron, in the event of its escape, to take refuge at Kiao-chau, where the Russians might land their armaments and save the ships. The eyes of some careful students of international politics may have been opened a little by the subsequent statement that "should Germany adopt such a course Japan would reluctantly be compelled to regard her as Russia's ally, and to appeal to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance." There is no present necessity to attach undue significance to such an observation, unsupported as it is by the weight of official authority, but none the less the pronouncement, with all irresponsibility considered, brings once more before us the existence of those hidden fires on the thin crust overlaying which the Russo-Japanese War is being waged with such reckless indifference on the one side, such deadly earnestness on the other.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE PORT ARTHUR PROBLEM—QUESTION OF ASSAULT—COMPLICATIONS—PRELIMINARY MEASURES—SIEGE OPERATIONS—EARLY FIGHTING.

IT is quite possible that to many students of the Russo-Japanese War the most irritating, and in some respects the most tedious, operations to follow hitherto have been those directed by land against Port Arthur. To some it may have seemed unaccountable that such a desperate performance as the Battle of Nan-shan, described in Chapter XXVIII., should not have had a prompter sequel in the shape of an assault which, relatively, could hardly have been more costly than the attack on the Nan-shan position, and which, if successful, would have solved the first and, perhaps, the biggest problem of the War. All along it has been understood that the Japanese were prepared, if necessary, to make these sacrifices forthwith, and to justify them by the time saved, not to speak of the desirableness of checking Russian efforts to recuperate behind the walls of this massive stronghold!

There is, perhaps, something to be said for this line of argument, at any rate theoretically. Just as in an ordinary battle a commander sometimes deliberately expends hundreds of gallant soldiers in order to produce a certain effect as rapidly as possible, in order to save time, or in order to prevent the enemy from massing inconveniently, so in sieges an apparently reckless assault sometimes pays very well. But, of course, the conditions must be reasonably favourable, a good deal more favourable, at any rate, than they were in the case of Port Arthur, even after the first advanced

position of the defenders at Nan-shan had been carried with brilliant success.

If we take a backward glance at the position of affairs shortly after the Battle of Nan-shan, we shall quickly understand how many obstacles lay in the path of a further Japanese advance against the land defences of Port Arthur, putting aside the immense strength of those defences, and the immediate weakness of the Japanese in heavy artillery. As regards the attack on Nan-shan, the situation had been altogether different. Although here, too, the Russians were most strongly placed, with numerous guns of position to oppose to the Japanese field pieces, the Japanese had, in the first place, no other work claiming their present attention, and, secondly, were in strength amply sufficient for the object they had in view. The earliest business of the three divisions of the First Army of Japan landed under General Oku was to isolate Port Arthur effectively, and this could not be said to be done until General Stoessel's "sally-port" on the Kin-chau isthmus had been captured. Again, to have employed more than three divisions in achieving this object, difficult and risky as the work was, would have been absurd, since, as we have seen, there was not room even for this force to move without being badly crowded. Accordingly this, the first real operation of the siege, was adventured, and the end justified the means.

But immediately after the Nan-shan engagement the conditions changed alto-

gether. It is true that an important advantage has been secured by the occupation of Dalny, but the counterbalancing disadvantages are very great. By this time the Japanese plan of campaign in Manchuria is beginning to mature, the rainy season is approaching, and the Second Army, or the bulk of it, will be wanted further north to co-operate with the First Army and the force landed at Takushan. This call to the north is emphasised by the news that an army is being detached from the main Russian force at Liao-yang for the purpose of relieving Port Arthur. The relieving expedition must be met and crushed, to prevent the Japanese lines of investment from the bare chance of being taken between two fires. The question of numbers, also, takes a different shape. Even if three divisions can still be left before Port Arthur by landing fresh troops from Japan—a course which is, as we shall see, pursued—

such a force would be of no use for the purpose of "rushing" a stronghold like this. It takes the equivalent of two Japanese divisions to garrison this great fortress properly, and, that being the case, we may take it that an attempt to "rush" the place with less than, at least, 100,000 men would have been utterly hopeless. It is conceivable that if two or three times the number of men who fought at Nan-shan had hurled themselves against Port Arthur in the very early days of June, a sufficient number might have got in to ensure a capture,

but the sacrifice of life would have been truly awful. Moreover, the Japanese could not possibly have concentrated 100,000 men at this point without seriously compromising their success in other directions. It is not easy to say precisely what they did do in the matter of providing troops for the investment, while at the same time permitting General Oku to march northward, meet General

Stackelburg's relieving force at Telissu, beat it back, and then join hands with the other two armies in Manchuria. But it is very certain that it was not contemplated at Tokio to supplement the costly assault on Nan-shan by immediately throwing a still larger force at the chain of powerful forts which constitute the inner defences of Port Arthur. The Japanese plan of campaign evidently includes many deliberate sacrifices, but such sacrifices are carefully calculated, and, intensely eager as the General Staff must be to have

the Port Arthur question finally disposed of, the operations in Manchuria cannot be starved for lack of men, more especially now when war wastage on a large scale is likely to commence.


Accordingly, what appears to have been done is this: General Oku takes up north with him the 3rd and 4th Divisions, and is, apparently, reinforced with other troops before he issues from Port Adams to fight General Stackelburg at Telissu. He leaves behind him the 1st Division, which fought under him at Nan-shan, and thus commences forthwith the investment



THE JAPANESE VICTORIA CROSS.
The Order of the "Kinshi Kunsho"
(Golden Kite) conferred for conspicuous
valour in battle on land or sea.



AN EPISODE DURING THE BATTLE OF NAN-SHAN.
*Every man who took part in the third attack on Nan-Shan Hill
fell before the Russian fire, and in the hail which followed
the Russians could be seen peering over their earthworks at
their fallen adversaries.*



of Port Arthur. A little later the 11th Division arrives from Japan, and the land operations before Port Arthur now proceed under command of General Nogi.

On June 28th the Japanese landed the 6th Division of 20,000 men at Kerr Bay, and in the course of the ensuing week three large transports and a number of smaller ones arrived at Dalny, bringing an independent artillery brigade with heavy siege guns and provisions for the 11th Division.

Thus by the beginning of July we have three complete divisions at full war strength allocated to the siege of Port Arthur, and these, with the artillery brigade, and a constant stream of reinforcements, should indicate the presence within striking distance of the fortress itself of at least 60,000 or 70,000 men, from quite an early stage of the proceedings. This in itself is a very remarkable achievement considering the calls which Japan has had to meet in other directions, and the not inconsiderable losses which she has already incurred in forcing the Nan-shan position, and in confronting Kuropatkin with the armies of Generals Kuroki and Oku and the force landed at Takushan.

And now let us pause awhile to examine the nature of the task which lies before this besieging force, and to discuss briefly and discursively the steps likely to be taken to effect the reduction of such a mighty stronghold as Port Arthur unquestionably is.

An excellent general idea of the fortifications of Port Arthur will be gained by a study of the plan given on page 437, in which the principal works are very clearly marked, and useful notes are added on the positions taken up in the siege of 1894. But, of course, it is hopelessly impossible to denote by any one

plan, or in any such concise description as can here be given, the real strength of a fortress upon which years of toil and millions of money have been expended. It would need a volume to picture at all accurately the manner in which fort, so to speak, works in with fort in this massive scheme of defence; how escalade is guarded against, protection from reverse attack secured, communication maintained, and so forth. Then there is the question of armament, one of almost overwhelming magnitude in a fortress, the artillery park of which alone contains 500 field guns of various patterns, in addition to the great pieces mounted in the forts. At best, in a popular work of this description, a vague outline only is possible of a gigantic system of permanent fortification, in which Russian military engineering has found its highest expression since the days when General Todleben gave the Allies such trouble half a century ago.

Of the various accounts of Port Arthur as a fortress, which are accessible to the general public, perhaps the best is that given in anticipation of the war by a writer in the *Broad Arrow* of January 23rd and 30th, 1904. From this we may borrow the statement that the land-fortifications are semi-closed works, with their "gorges," or entrances, protected by loop-holed masonry walls of enormous strength. In the great ditches which surround these formidable works there are covered passages known as "kaponiers," from which, as well as from galleries in the escarps and counter-scarps, a fire can be directed against any storming party that has swarmed into the ditch, and is preparing to scale the parapet. The guns, which range from 5.9-in. to 11-in. breech-loaders, are mounted *en barbette*, on disappearing

carriages, or on over-bank fire carriages of the Poutiloff pattern. The total number of the guns actually mounted in the fortress is given as 400, but of these a large proportion belong to the batteries on the sea-face. Another interesting description of the defences of Port Arthur is given by a writer in the German *Reichswehr*, who describes the perimeter of the fortress as divided into seven sectors, four on the land and three on the sea front. This authority, however, includes both as land and sea sectors certain forts and batteries in the neighbourhood of White Wolf Mountain, which seem to partake of the nature of outworks, and so are not included in the scope of the plan given on page 437. White Wolf Mountain, it may be remarked, lies about two miles to the south-west of the base of Tiger's Tail. Of the five remaining sectors mentioned by this writer one is made up of the works on Golden Hill (Forts Nos. 10 and 11 on the plan), another of the Forts (Nos. 12, 13, and 14) on Tiger's Tail. The first land sector would seem to correspond with Forts Nos. 7, 8, and 9 on the plan; the second with Nos. 4, 5, 6; the third with Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The fourth (land) and seventh (coast) sectors are the "outworks" just mentioned as being grouped near White Wolf Mountain.

The first land sector has three large and nine small works armed with nearly 100 guns. The works in the second sector occupy the plateau north of the town, and prevent No. 1 sector from being enfiladed from the land side. The third sector comprises the heights west of Port Arthur, and protects the preceding sector from reverse attack on being turned. This is said to be the weak point of the whole defence, as the hills are narrow, low, and separated by "dead" ground,

i.e., ground which cannot be reached by the fire of the guns in the forts, and in which an enemy can therefore collect and take breath for a final rush. This sector is one and a half mile in extent, and comprises several closed works with many open batteries, and sixty guns of medium calibre.

From the above selected details it will readily be seen that even on its weakest side Port Arthur is a place of uncommon strength, and that, even assuming a pretty complete knowledge on the part of the Japanese of the details of its design and armament, there is little hope of capturing this huge monument of engineering skill by a *coup de main*. On the other hand, it may well be that the up-to-date besiegers will depart rather freely from the old-world deliberation with which the reduction of fortresses used to be carried out, and will impart a good deal of vigour and freshness to the time-honoured process of "laying siege."

Siege operations, from the earliest dawn of history, have exhibited a good deal of sameness, and yet have always been rather favourite objects of study alike to the military expert, the historian, and the general public. Probably such sieges as that of Troy, which lasted ten years, and that of Nineveh, in which Sardanapalus held out for seven, were unspeakably tedious to all concerned. Yet they have cast a glamour not only over contemporary history, but over posterity to an extent scarcely paralleled in the case of any other sort of warlike operation. The sieges of Jerusalem and Byzantium have attained historical prominence out of all proportion to their military significance; while the details of the defence of Mafeking will probably be remembered by many schoolboys of the next generation who have forgotten

the date of Salamanca, and are uncertain as to the whereabouts of Plassey. Doubtless it is the personal factor which enters largely into this estimate. The blood is naturally stirred by the thought of heroic endurance exhibited by a handful of sturdy defenders holding out, perhaps, against an enveloping army. Or one likes to read of glorious assaults, of desperate forlorn hopes, of terrible hand-to-hand encounters, in which the besieged have all the advantages which an artful defensive can give them, while the attackers are inspired by fury born of baffled hopes and mad determination to win at all costs a coveted prize. But, apart from all this, it is a fact that sieges have always had a singular attraction for those engaged in them, in spite of the serious discomfort involved. The mixture of stately deliberation, and what Kipling's Mulvaney would call "sumpshuous fightin'," of scientific preliminaries with headlong collisions, of passive resistance with exhilarating counterstrokes, has always appealed strongly to those who have actually participated in sieges of the less lurid sort. There has even been a period in history—the time of Marlborough and Turenne—when sieges were regarded as a fashionable amusement, in which more especially the French Court delighted, judging by the frequency with which, in all the panoply of puff and powder and beautiful millinery, it used to attend these interesting operations.


The methods of "laying siege" which have been adopted in successive ages have a close family resemblance. The establishment of a preliminary blockade was practised by Asiatics at a very early date, while the Greeks and Romans habitually used works of circumvallation in addition to their superior "engines"

in the way of "tortoises," rams, catapults, and movable towers. In the Middle Ages mining was freely resorted to, and modern shell fire was more clearly foreshadowed by machines which threw bars of hot copper, or, for a change, putrid carcasses. But a preliminary blockade and then a cautious advance under artificial cover, with a view to obtaining a "superiority of fire"—these are features which in one form or another have marked the opening of nine-tenths of the more important sieges of history from time immemorial to the present day. The main difference has been in the method of obtaining the artificial cover necessary to enable the besiegers to draw closer to the walls or ramparts of the place besieged. In modern times the system adopted has been the opening of successive "parallels," or lines of trenches, connected by other zig-zag trenches so arranged as to expose those advancing along them as little as possible to the fire of the besieged. But the latter-day process of laying siege has been largely modified by the nature of the artillery employed, and we may take it for granted that, in besieging Port Arthur, the Japanese have given more thought to the emplacement of their siege guns than to the elaborate devices by which military engineers have hitherto assisted infantry to creep gradually closer to the ramparts it is proposed eventually to carry by assault.

At first sight it may seem as if in a very modern siege the advantages lie altogether on the side of the defence, provided that really adequate care has been taken to make the fortress all it should be as regards its power both of resisting attack and inflicting damage on the attackers. We see Port Arthur with its 400 guns, many of them of the largest

size and the greatest power, with parapets said to give no chance to the escaladers, with every sort of device for subjecting an attack to a deadly flanking fire, and many may wonder how the Japanese can hope to deal successfully

sians years of peace to mount their hundreds of big guns in the most advantageous positions. Will it not be hopeless for the Japanese to attempt to bring up artillery of equal weight and power in the time at their disposal?



THE DEFENCES OF PORT ARTHUR.

with such active opposition as is here involved. How—to ask an elementary question—will it be possible for them to obtain that superiority of fire without which an assault must be either impossible or too dreadfully costly to contemplate seriously? It has taken the Rus-

Even should they succeed in performing this tremendous task, does it follow that they will succeed in overcoming the defending artillery so completely, and in breaking up the enemy's ramparts so effectively as to render a subsequent assault feasible?

The answers to these questions do not necessarily indicate the course the siege of Port Arthur may take. That is as yet wholly uncertain ; but it is none the less interesting to discuss by the light of a little technical knowledge such possibilities as surround the situation at the close of June. First, let us look back a little to the quotation made from the pages of the *Reichswehr* with reference to Port Arthur's defensive capabilities. It will be noted that particular use is made of the term "sector" in this connection, and that the perimeter of the fortress is assumed to consist of several of these sectors ranging from perhaps half a mile to a mile and a half in length. Now, the modern art of laying siege is not necessarily to attack the entire perimeter, but to concentrate attention upon one sector, and, by breaking down the defence at this one point, to pave the way for entry and capture of the whole. For every scheme of fortification is liable to the same defect as a chain, the strength of which is the strength of its weakest link, and when one sector in the perimeter has been weakened to the breaking point, the end is not far off.

The main object of the besiegers then must be to establish a superiority of fire over one sector of the defence, and in order to do this it is not necessary to bring up anything like so many guns as there are in the whole fortress which is undergoing siege. For the defenders could not in any case crowd all their guns into this one sector, even if they could readily move such monsters in the face of a pretty continual bombardment. Moreover, they cannot with safety denude any portion of their perimeter of guns lest the enemy's infantry should promptly select that portion for an overwhelming assault. We now begin to

perceive that the defenders of a first-class fortress can hardly be assured of the latter's impregnability. As an able critic remarks, "against the high-angle fire of heavy howitzers, in positions invisible to the enemy, supported by the sweeping, scythe-like action of shrapnel fired by high velocity guns, fortress defence soon experiences the sense of all its inherent weakness. With ample bomb-proof cover and resolute troops, the enemy may not be driven out ; the hotter the fire the less the chance either of reinforcement or retreat. But a closed work can be so wrecked and overwhelmed by the converging fire of distant batteries that its main armament may be reduced to impotence during the progress of the succeeding assault." It is, therefore, quite conceivable that, with a number of guns quite inferior to Port Arthur's copious armament, the Japanese may silence the works in the sector chosen for attack without much difficulty. This once done, and the Japanese infantryman afforded a chance of coming to close quarters with the bayonet, the guns in other sectors may be rendered useless, and the fortress may fall with but a tithe of its ammunition expended.

The co-operation of the Navy, too, must be intelligently reckoned in any estimate of Japan's capacity to reduce a fortress the weakness as well as the strength of which may prove to lie in its marine aspects. We have seen already the Japanese battleships bombarding Port Arthur from Pigeon Bay, and a glance at any map of the Kwangtung Promontory will show that there is not a point in the area of the Port Arthur defences which cannot be reached from one side of the promontory or the other by modern naval guns. Knowing as they do to a nicety the position of all

the works in the scheme, it may not be impossible for the Japanese ships to drop 12-inch shells into forts which, however admirably equipped with ordinary bomb-proof shelters, will hardly refuse admittance to these persuasive projectiles.

While, then, it may be freely admitted that the siege of Port Arthur is a task of unusual gravity, and one which the Japanese in particular are certain to approach with becoming caution; but it must not be supposed that the obstacles involved are in any way insuperable. In point of fact the Japanese are probably far better placed as regards the comparatively speedy reduction of Port Arthur than we should have been had it become necessary to lay regular siege to Pretoria. Not only have they a sufficiency of men, with facilities for prompt reinforcement, but they can bring up siege artillery with particular ease and readiness now that Dalny is in their occupation, and the weary work of clearing the mines from Talien-wan has been practically completed. Interruption is to all intents and purposes out of the question, unless Kuropatkin succeeds in hurling back the combined armies in the north with more vigour than seems at present likely to be exhibited. The only really disturbing factor, outside the sacrifices which are looked upon as inevitable, is the continued existence of the Port Arthur Fleet, and its recently renewed activity. In all other respects the Japanese have already secured advantages which are quite extraordinary, considering the short time which has elapsed since the land operations against Port Arthur were commenced, and the possession of which cannot now be neutralised by anything which the Russians, either inside or outside the beleagured fortress, can conveniently do.

The first occurrence of serious fighting by land in the vicinity of Port Arthur is recorded as taking place on June 26th. There had previously been some minor struggles for positions to the east of the town, but on this occasion the attack made by the Japanese was a very vigorous one, and is said to have been delivered by, practically speaking, the whole of the infantry force available. This would mean that both the 1st and 11th Divisions—the 6th had not yet been landed—were engaged, to the number of about 40,000 men. Unfortunately no Japanese official report is available, and the Russian despatch is somewhat meagre and difficult to follow without the Russian staff map, in which some of the most interesting heights are marked by figures only.

As far as can be gathered from the unsatisfactory information procurable, the operation commenced at 4 o'clock in the morning of June 26th, with a bombardment by Japanese warships in Siao-ping-tao Bay, which lies about 14 miles east of Port Arthur. This bombardment is said to have been directed against the whole coast towards the north from the bay to Mount Uitselo, and under cover of it the Japanese attacked two heights, evidently close to the coast, which were held by East Siberian Riflemen. The latter having made a stubborn resistance, and finding their rear threatened by a Japanese detachment landed for the purpose, retired, after suffering heavy losses, to the heights of Lung-wang-tang, some eight miles east of Port Arthur. The Japanese attacked this new position in very great force, but the Russian despatch claims that they were repulsed. General Gilinski, however, admits that on the following day there was "some outpost firing," and he adds quite


casually—his despatch is dated June 30th—"the Japanese are emplacing batteries on the summit of the Lung-wang-tang Mountain." From which it would seem that, despite these repulses, the Japanese are not to be denied, and that by the last day of June their guns were on a convenient height only eight miles from Port Arthur, and considerably less from the line of forts.

There is reason to believe that the fighting on June 26th was very severe. The Russians admit having seven officers wounded and 200 soldiers killed or wounded. It is added that the Russian mines "exploded at the proper time, blowing up at least 50 Japanese." According to unofficial reports received in Tokio the Japanese casualties numbered about 100, while the Russians left 40 dead, and lost two machine guns and a quantity of rifles and ammunition.

It is extremely difficult to give any clear accounts of the early fighting in front of Port Arthur, owing to the meagreness of the accessible information, much of which, moreover, is clearly untrustworthy. Some idea of the quality of the rumours which prevailed during this period may be gleaned from the sensation created about the middle of July by a report, to which the Russian General Staff gave currency, to the effect that on the 10th and 11th the Japanese had made a desperate attack on Port Arthur, and had been repulsed with a loss of 30,000 men. The "30,000 story," as it came to be called, was widely circulated and believed, until the Japanese finally issued a categorical statement declaring that on the days on which they were stated to have been so badly defeated there had been no fighting whatever, except, possibly, some desultory firing between outposts.

On July 4th there was evidently a pretty stiff encounter in which, according to some accounts, the Russians took the offensive and obtained some success. The *Times* correspondent at Tokio, however, telegraphing on July 10th, favours the idea that, though the Japanese casualties on the 4th were heavy, the troops, assisted by the Fleet, succeeded in capturing Miaotsui Fort, mounting eight guns, which affords a good emplacement for bombarding the eastern section of the defences. He adds that the Japanese are evidently advancing in two columns, the first, as we have already seen, moving against the east side of Port Arthur from Dalny, the second concentrating on Shui-shi-ling ("Naval Camp"), which lies three or four miles north of Port Arthur. Shui-shi-ling, which will be easily found on the plan on page 437, is strongly fortified, and is regarded as a "cardinal outwork," to gain possession of which the Japanese are prepared to undergo heavy losses. In the war with China in 1894 the Japanese occupied this place strongly before they took Port Arthur, and used the hills as a position for their siege guns.

At this point we may now leave the siege of Port Arthur, as to the speedy termination of which the utmost confidence prevails among the Japanese. The *Express* correspondent at Tokio declares, indeed, that the fall of Port Arthur and the defeat of General Kuropatkin's Army are being anticipated with almost amusing certainty, the only doubt being as to which event will occur first! "All the manufacturers of Chinese lanterns are busy turning out thousands of these effective illuminations in all kinds of quaint designs—torpedoes, shells, warships, and guns. Thousands of the lower classes are out in the forests gathering




PREPARING TO WELCOME THE JAPANESE: STRENGTHENING THE DEFENCES AT PORT ARTHUR.

twigs and leaves for the decoration of houses and restaurants, and the flag-makers are also very busy, for there is a huge demand for Japanese and British flags. The restaurants and tea-shops are putting up decorations, consisting chiefly of leaves, flags, and flowers, in readiness for the many dinner and tea-parties that will be held on the great day. Many well-to-do people in Tokio intend, as soon as Port Arthur has fallen, to visit the fortress, especially those who have lost relatives in the fighting around it. Accordingly, shipping companies are making arrangements to take touring parties at special rates. There is some apprehension, however, as to whether

the War Office authorities will step in and prohibit anything of the sort."

Such confidence may or may not be justified by the event; but public exhibitions are premature and hardly to the taste of Western nations. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Japanese are not the only people who have counted warlike chickens before they were hatched, and that some excuse for these anticipations may be found, not only in the previous successes which Japan has already won, but also in the arrogance displayed by Russia before the War taught her that Japan was not to be crushed by bluffing forecasts of humiliation and defeat.



A TYPICAL JAPANESE GUNBOAT, THE *AKAGI*.

(This boat rendered valuable service in the attack upon the Nan-Shan heights.)

CHAPTER XXXVII.

RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS—ALEXEIEFF AT MUKDEN—KUROPATKIN AND THE GRAND DUKE BORIS—HOME AFFAIRS—THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND HIS RUSSIAN REGIMENT—STOPPAGE OF BRITISH STEAMERS.

THE time has now arrived for another of our periodical reviews of the situation from the Russian standpoint. The latter does not, perhaps, present so many features of activity and attractiveness as does the steady advance of the armies of Japan or the brilliant operations of her fleet. But there is much of very real interest in Russian movements at this period, and it may well be that some of the developments, to the recording of which this chapter will be devoted, will have results of deep significance outside the area of the War. For we seem to be nearing a point at which Russian indifference to international opinion may produce some awkward complications. There is also a growing danger lest the professed neutrality of certain European nations may not prevent them or their representatives from doing and saying things which the belligerents may be justified in construing into acts of unfriendliness. Such side issues may not hitherto have been regarded as matters of great moment in dealing with ordinary wars. But this is not an ordinary war, and it is absolutely necessary to its proper treatment that, whenever an unmistakable sign of outside possibilities in connection with it occurs, it should be noted, and its tendency carefully examined. Hitherto the ring has been kept with creditable strictness. But there are flushed faces and clenched fists to be observed among the spectators, and the

world will be fortunate if it escapes a lurid sequel to the present orderly combat.

But, before we pass to the indications which seem to justify these forebodings, we may direct our attention first to the Russian movements in the field, and then to Russia at home. As regards the former, not a great deal of change has taken place since the defeat at Telissu of General Stackelberg's force produced such an unhappy modification in General Kuropatkin's plans. That a good deal of change was intended is probable, but Commanders-in-chief in Manchuria have to reckon with a rainy season, which defies even the marvellous endurance of the Russian soldier, and there is reason to believe that Kuropatkin has very recently had a striking illustration of this fact. The precise course of events at Liao-yang during the closing days of June and the early days of July, is extremely difficult to realise, the Russian censorship of all foreign correspondence being most strict; while naturally great reticence is observed as to proceedings which are open to sharp criticism on the ground of vacillation and unwise postponement. But the following is accepted by a high authority as an accurate account of what occurred at this interesting period. The passage is extracted, with one or two omissions, from the war commentary in the *Times*. It commences by recalling the capture of the

passes on June 27th, of which a detailed account was given in Chapter XXXIV. :

"That night Kuropatkin at last realised his position and ordered a retreat upon Hai-cheng, a movement which ought to have been begun, at the latest, eight days earlier, and to have been continued to Liao-yang on the evening of the 27th, also at the latest. Kuropatkin was now to experience the full meaning of time lost in war. His force at Kai-ping, in the greatest danger, could not respond to his injunctions to retire, since at the same moment that the irruption of the Japanese over the passes was in progress it was engaged upon a reconnaissance in force right away down to Sun-yao-cheng, twenty-two miles further south, in search of the coy Japanese, and it could not retire until this reconnaissance had returned.

"But worse was to follow. Kuropatkin himself returned to Hai-cheng in his *train de luxe*, and thence, upon receipt of disquieting news from his left, continued on to Liao-yang, and made fresh dispositions for a general rearward movement upon this town. It was too late; and though Reuter's Agent significantly dated his despatches from "The Russian Headquarters, Liao-yang," he might have added that it was a headquarters without an army.

"On the 28th, the morning indicated for the commencement of the retreat, *afflavit Deus*, the rain began to come down in torrents. The downpour continued without intermission, certainly for three days, and perhaps for longer; the bivouacs of the army at Ta-shi-chao and Hai-cheng were inundated, carts and their teams were swept away, and soldiers had to choose between swimming along the Imperial highway or drowning.

"As to all the consequences of a mis-


chance, which should have been fully anticipated, we are still in doubt. But we hear, and can believe, that the troops setting out were obliged to return, and that Kuropatkin, finding his army could not follow him, made a virtue of necessity, counter-ordered the retreat, and rejoined his troops by rail to face the music."

The position of Kuropatkin with the main forces of Japan pressing in upon him, and with little freedom of movement for his own troops owing to the encompassing sea of mud, is sufficiently embarrassing. But he appears not to lose heart, and during the next fortnight labours unceasingly to cope with a situation which presents many puzzling features. Despite the many great difficulties of the Russian commander-in-chief's position, and the disheartening circumstances attached to his command, it must be admitted by all unprejudiced judges that Kuropatkin, during the first two weeks of July at any rate, deserves admiration for his manly attitude, and his vigorous determination to make the best of a bad business.

It must not be forgotten that throughout these trying times Kuropatkin has still to deal with the opposition, direct and indirect, of Admiral Alexeieff at Mukden, whose anomalous position is becoming more and more intolerable. An insight into the state of affairs in this direction is afforded by the special representative of the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger* at Niu-chwang, who remarks that the performances of the Viceroy are beginning to constitute a positive danger to the prospects of Russia in the campaign, as well as a serious hindrance to General Kuropatkin. "He appears," says this plain-spoken correspondent, "to assert his right to retain a considerable body of troops around his person in Mukden,

much to the disgust of the officers, who are said to refrain from mutiny only from the consciousness that a representative of the Tsar cannot be got rid of by violent means. Admiral Alexeieff himself lives in his state car on the railway. A roof has been constructed over the car, and flowers have been planted around it. The Viceroy countermands military

from an authoritative source. The Grand Duke while at the front had been guilty of many indiscretions, and so moved was General Kuropatkin by what came to his ears that he summoned the royal offender to his presence, and peremptorily ordered him to get rid of certain undesirable persons in his *entourage*. "Your Excellency appears to forget," said the Grand Duke,



REMOVING THE BIG GUNS FROM THE FORT AT NIU-CHWANG.

orders, and detains reinforcements as they arrive by inspecting them, while his Chief of Staff is sent two or three times a week to Ta-shi-chao in order to observe the movements and dispositions of General Kuropatkin."

Nor have the Commander-in-Chief's personal embarrassments been confined to Viceregal interference. There has been grave trouble at Liao-yang owing to the behaviour of the Grand Duke Boris, some very strange details of which subsequently reach the *Berliner Tageblatt*

"who stands before you." "No, I do not," retorted the General. "Your Imperial Highness is merely a lieutenant in an infantry regiment, while I am the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces. You, as a subordinate, must obey, or take the consequences." The story goes that the Grand Duke, mad with rage, drew his sword and slashed savagely at the General. The latter avoided the full force of the blow by stepping back, but the sword is said to have grazed his nose, inflicting a disfiguring wound. The Com-

mander-in-Chief remained for some days in his quarters, and in the meantime sent a strongly-worded complaint to the Tsar. The Grand Duke was accordingly recalled, and ordered to betake himself in disgrace to Archangel. Even if the story be not minutely accurate, the fact of its appearance in a responsible German paper is suggestive, and it may be taken for granted that, at any rate, the behaviour of the Grand Duke was of a gravely objectionable character. Nor can one fail to sympathise with a Commander in the field who has difficulties of this sort to deal with, in addition to the anxieties inseparable from a conflict with a numerous, skilful, and hitherto successful enemy.

Still further trouble has arisen in connection with the Military Attachés, and much comment is aroused by the recall of Colonel Audeoud and another officer, who represent the Swiss Government, and are said to have incurred General Kuropatkin's displeasure. Colonel Audeoud, on his return to Berne, disclaims any knowledge of General Kuropatkin's motives in taking this unusual step, and declares that he himself has habitually observed a most discreet attitude. The incident is not of serious significance, but it seems, when taken in conjunction with other evidence of friction, to foster the view that things at Liaoyang about this time are not in a very comfortable state, and that the work of the Commander-in-Chief is not being rendered smoother by a completely harmonious environment.

On the other hand, General Kuropatkin probably derives a full measure of consolation from the fact that week by week his forces are growing, and that in this way the might of Holy Russia is beginning slowly to assert itself. Lat-

terly the Russian authorities have been rather vague in their statements of the performances of the Siberian and Manchurian railways; but there is reason to believe that these are now working with great regularity, and that the number of troops now at Kuropatkin's disposal is appreciably larger than it was even such a short time back as the date of Telissu. Perhaps no better proof of this could be cited than the attention which the Russians are paying to their hospital trains, which, we may be reasonably sure, would not have been so well looked after had the railway not been able to meet satisfactorily the demands made on it for the transport of sound soldiers to the front.

An interesting and instructive account of the Russian arrangements for the transport and care of the wounded is given by a Kieff correspondent, who writes, under date of July 12th, that the twenty-sixth military hospital train fitted out by the Russian Ministry for War has just left Kieff for Irkutsk. "The whole of the Manchurian and Siberian Railway lines," he adds, "has been systematically split up into sections, and numbered hospital trains, replete with the best surgical and other appliances obtainable, have been apportioned to these sections. The staff of each train includes three or more fully qualified doctors, from six to ten nursing sisters of the Red Cross Society, and from thirty to forty hospital assistants. Each train has accommodation for from two hundred to three hundred wounded and sick. The hospital train referred to above is destined to run solely between Irkutsk and Kazan. Here the hospital train and hospital steamer or barge services link up. From Kazan the seriously wounded will in future be despatched to various hospital

establishments in the vicinity of the Volga, Sheksna, and other waterways by barge, or specially-fitted light-draught steamer. The special department of 'military communications for the transport of the wounded' is at present perfecting an organised system of transport into home centres by water, and, to judge by the extensive preparations being made all the way from Astrakhan to Cherepovitz, the arrival of considerable numbers of Russian wounded is clearly anticipated. The kindly co-operation of the management at Franzensbad and other foreign water-cure resorts, who have offered to allow Russian wounded officers and others to take advantage of their facilities for treatment free of charge for stated periods, is much appreciated in military circles in Russia."

But, admirable as these domestic arrangements for the care of the sick and wounded seem, there appears to be considerable one-sidedness about Russian humanitarian methods. It will be recalled that an important result of that great Hague Convention, which had its origin in the peaceful aspirations of the Tsar, was the suggested institution in all civilised wars of a "prisoners' intelligence bureau." With the article of the Convention which deals with this point Japan has faithfully complied, and has furnished to the Russian authorities full reports every ten days. It is declared in Tokio that, notwithstanding this excellent example, Russia has failed sadly in her duty to humanity by neglecting to furnish any but spasmodic and unsatisfactory reports regarding the considerable numbers of Japanese prisoners in her hands. The consequence is that hundreds of Japanese families are being kept in an agony of suspense concerning the fate of their relatives. This is an

altogether different question from that of the "atrocities" in the field of battle, with reference to which a certain amount of conflicting but, on the whole, rather trivial evidence is forthcoming on both sides. There are wild beasts in most armies who occasionally do unspeakable things under the influence of battle fury, but whose performances are no more typical of those armies than the inmates of a criminal lunatic asylum are typical of a country's intellect and character. But it is a black blot on Russia's credit that in this matter of the prisoners' intelligence bureau she should have displayed cold-blooded apathy and neglect, while Japan has been taking such extreme care to act humanely with regard to the numerous Russian captives in her power.

Mobilisation in Russia is proceeding more or less actively, the 5th and 6th Army Corps now being under orders for the Far East. Early in July the Tsar, who appears of late to have taken up a stronger attitude, reviews a portion of these troops, and wishes them "God-speed," both in his own name and that of the Tsaritsa. It is to be hoped that this Imperial solicitude has the desired effect, for there are queer stories afloat of the reluctance of the Russian soldiers to respond to the mobilisation orders. It is even said that in one district young fellows are taking drugs known to produce serious illness in order to avoid military service. Probably this unsoldierly spirit is fostered by the reports which are beginning to be circulated as to the privations to be endured at the front. It must be remembered that a certain number of sick and wounded are now coming back to Russia, and these, we may be sure, are telling stories which would never have passed the censor had they been committed to paper.

Not that the censorship has been wholly successful in suppressing unfavourable descriptions of the state of affairs in the Far East. Of one of the methods by which it has been evaded a rather amusing story is told. About the middle of May the mother of one of the Jewish surgeons who had been sent out from Warsaw to the War received a letter from her son, which duly bore the stamp of the censor, and which, on the face of it, was written in a most contented spirit. The writer stated that he was in good health, that admirable order prevailed among the troops, who were certain of victory, and were amply supplied with necessaries, and that there was so little illness that army surgeons had hardly anything to do. The letter concluded with a request that some Hebrew books should be sent to him. The titles of these would have roused the censor's suspicions if he could have translated them. They were, "Famine and Destitution," "Consequent Fearful Epidemics," "Scarcely any Sanitary Appliances," "Demoralisation of the Army Constantly Increasing," "End of Discipline," and "Wish I were taken Prisoner."


Other leakages take place, as, for example, a letter from an officer in high command to a brother officer apparently at Niu-chwang, a translation of which is given by Reuter's correspondent at that place. The writer speaks of the brave Russian soldiers as going into battle like sheep to the shambles. "None can deny their loyalty, but until they are properly officered their loyalty is wasted." The officers are described as constantly quarrelling, and fighting so vigorously for their own interests that the common enemy is forgotten. "Everyone, from the Viceroy and General Kuropatkin

down to insignificant subalterns, quarrels, and is unwilling to obey orders.

. . . Jealousy and suspicion are rampant throughout the army. The members of our secret service are so busy spying on each other that they cannot apprehend spies, and Japanese agents carry on their work with impunity."

It is not surprising that, in view of the reports which must now be growing common even in Russia of this unfortunate condition of affairs at the front, mobilisation continues to be hampered by irregularities. It is specially unfortunate that a bad example should be set by officers of the reserve, who constantly transgress by several days the period fixed for mobilisation, and in some districts fail to put in an appearance at all. So serious does the scandal become that an Order of the Day is issued by the General Staff dealing with the subject in vigorous terms, and announcing that the heads of the various recruiting departments will be held personally responsible for any future negligence. Such incidents are not particularly inspiring, but they afford valuable evidence of the doubtful working of methods of conscription in the case of unpopular wars.

In connection with the present mobilisation an episode must be recorded which at the time gave rise to serious discussion, and of which the last may not be heard for many months to come. One of the regiments going to the front enjoys the distinction of having the German Emperor as its Colonel-in-Chief. This is the 85th (Wiborg) Infantry Regiment, and it was only in accordance with Continental military custom that, on its being ordered to the Far East it should receive some sort of message from its Imperial Chief, just as did our own Royal Dragoons, another corps of which the



RUSSIAN BIVOUAC
IN A MANCHURIAN TEMPLE.



German Emperor holds the Colonelcy, when they went out to South Africa. But it was noticeable that, while in the case of the Royal Dragoons the Kaiser's message was correctly brief and simple, in that of the Wiborg Regiment he was quite singularly profuse in his felicitations. Not only did his telegram convey to the corps his congratulations on the prospect of meeting the enemy, not only did he express pride in the fact that his Wiborg Regiment would have the honour of fighting for the Emperor, the Fatherland, and the Russian Army, but he took pains to add, "My sincere wishes accompany the regiment. God bless its standards!"

Considering that Japan is, diplomatically speaking, a perfectly friendly nation as far as Germany is concerned, it is very natural that the publication of this remarkable telegram in the military organ, the *Russki Invalid*, should have aroused considerable comment. Even in Berlin the message was regarded in many quarters as "a demonstration too friendly in the manner of its expression not to deserve criticism." In St. Petersburg hopes were at first freely expressed that the message foreshadowed the abandonment by Germany of her position as a mere onlooker of events in the Far East. A day or two later, however, those Russian organs which had supported this view somewhat ostentatiously retracted, evidently "by order," what they had said. It is interesting to note the excellent behaviour of the Tokio Press, which even treated the telegram in a bantering spirit. It supposed that "the usual explanations and extenuations" would follow, and expressed a hope that his Majesty would invoke the blessing of Heaven on the Japanese standards, "whereby very perfect neutrality will be

attained." But there is little doubt that the message rankled a good deal in Japan's bosom, and that it will be long before it is forgotten.

While on the subject of mobilisation a note may be added on the financial strain which the constant stream of reinforcements is causing. So serious this is, that it has been decided in future to mobilise Army Corps which have only a small division of cavalry attached to them, the transport and keep of horses being found to involve intolerable expenditure. It is somewhat remarkable to find a country that has hitherto affected to regard the cost of military operations with sublime indifference thus keenly affected by a question of roubles in relation to an arm on which it specially prides itself. The explanation possibly is that the famous Russian war chest, the possession of which was supposed to give the Army of the Tsar such an important advantage, has been sadly impoverished by the heavy drafts made upon it by the fortification of Port Arthur and other Far Eastern enterprises of the days before the War. But, in any case, Russia is wise to be careful, for it is estimated by experts that the campaign is already costing her the comfortable sum of 1,800,000 roubles (£191,520) a day.

Towards this vast expenditure a certain amount of contributions are forthcoming in the way of War Subscriptions, but as to these there does not seem to be any marked enthusiasm on the part of the public. The millionaires of Moscow are described by Russian correspondents as very niggardly in their contributions, so much so that the Governor of the city, the Grand Duke Serge, pointedly asked the most wealthy of them why they gave so little in proportion to their known

possessions. The reply was strongly typical of the view taken of the War by the Russian commercial classes. It was to the effect that the merchants and manufacturers looked upon the War as "a frivolous and useless enterprise, which could only end in failure and industrial ruin; that it had already caused immense losses to the trade and industry of Russia, and that they considered it more patriotic to spend 10,000 roubles a day, as the speaker was doing, in paying workmen, though there was no work for them to do, and thereby preventing them from joining the Socialist agitation, than to assist in continuing a war which could only inflict endless miseries on the Russian people."

Among the lower classes the War is rendered unpopular by the pressure exerted by the officials, in spite of the Tsar's announcement that all contributions are to be purely voluntary. In the villages the Government Commissioners tell the head of each commune that the latter will suffer if a certain sum, which the Commissioners themselves fix, is not forthcoming. In the towns everyone who makes an application to the authorities is informed that, unless he subscribes to the War, it will not be granted. It is hardly surprising that in these circumstances the people of Russia should not expend much enthusiasm upon an enterprise which, in spite of the heroic attempts to obscure the defeats that have been sustained, in spite of the popular confidence in Kuropatkin and his brave soldiers, is felt to have involved Holy Russia in humiliation not easily to be ignored or forgotten. Into darker aspects of the public discontent, to which some allusion has been made in previous chapters, we need not yet pursue our enquiries further. During the last quar-

ter of a century in Russia there has secretly been put together all the machinery for making the most of any sort of popular feeling against the tyranny and rapacity of Russian officialism. But, active as Socialist and other propaganda unquestionably are at this juncture, they have not as yet been able to influence the conduct of the War beyond hampering, as already noted, the process of mobilisation, and producing an occasional outburst of undisciplined objection to the methods of compulsory service.

The chief sop which the authorities continue to throw to a public particularly weary of the repeated disasters encountered by the Port Arthur Fleet is the existence and preparation for early despatch to the Far East of the Baltic Squadron. To such an extent have anticipations clustered round the latter that one would suppose it to be an organisation of altogether irresistible strength, the mere sailing of which from Russian shores will strike complete dismay into the enemy, and bring about a speedy termination of the War. But the truth seems to be that, putting the difficulty of coaling *en route* aside, there is little or no chance that more than one of seven battleships which are talked of in this connection will be ready for despatch to the Far East this year. There remain six cruisers and some torpedo craft which, no doubt, would be a welcome reinforcement to Admiral Skrydloff if they ever succeed in reaching him, but the presence of which in Asiatic waters will hardly give Russia any overwhelming superiority over the splendidly efficient Navy of Japan, even assuming the escape of a fair proportion of the Port Arthur Fleet. Lastly, there still exists the fear that Port Arthur may fall, and with it the *point d'appui* of the reinforce-

ing squadron. In fine, save for the purpose of propitiating a populace which is too ignorant to understand clearly the points involved, the Baltic Squadron has no present practical importance as far as the War is concerned, and a great deal must happen and be done and undone before any reinforcement from Kronstadt can help to restore Russia's lost naval prestige in Far Eastern waters.

But there are other Russian ships in Europe besides those in the Baltic. In his Introduction to this publication, Mr. Diósy drew attention to the enclosure of the Black Sea Fleet by the International Treaties regulating the passage of war-ships through the Dardanelles, and foreshadowed the complication that would inevitably arise if the treaties in question were set at naught. Although so far there has been no absolute violation of these engagements, there have been attempts on the part of the Russian Government to play fast and loose with the question of the Dardanelles passage in a manner which, even at an early stage of these happenings, produced the gravest misgiving not unmixed with indignation on the part of the maritime countries of Europe.

For many years past, and more particularly since 1886, when it was reorganised, the Russian Navy has been supplemented by what is known as a Volunteer Fleet, a number of merchantmen which in time of war can be armed and used to some extent as cruisers. This Fleet has its own management and capital, and in peace time provides, or rather, used to provide, for the regular traffic between Odessa, Port Arthur, and Vladivostok, also undertaking the tea-trade and passenger traffic between China and the Black Sea, and the transport of troops from Odessa to the Far East. The Fleet

is at all times under the orders of the Russian Admiralty, and some of the latest additions to it are very fine vessels. One or two have fallen into the hands of the Japanese since the commencement of the War, but there are still a fair number remaining in the Black Sea and clearly in want of employment, since the regular traffic to Vladivostok and Port Arthur is not likely to be resumed for some little time, and even the tea trade with China is, so far as sea-transport is concerned, liable to dramatic interruptions.


From quite an early date in the War Russia has availed herself somewhat offensively of the right of search possessed by belligerent nations during the course of hostilities. We have already seen her destroyers stopping British liners in the Red Sea, and more recently have had to record the seizure of the British ship *Allanton* by the cruisers of the Vladivostok Squadron. To the first we, as a nation which has always upheld the right of search, could raise no objection even though the source from which the destroyers obtained their coal appeared suspiciously obscure. The seizure of the *Allanton* was a matter of a different complexion, and aroused strong protests on the part of the shipping community and the Press, which pointed out that in this and similar cases the right of appeal from the judgment of the Prize Court affords small alleviation of a very serious grievance.

But the growing irritation as to Russian performances in this direction rose to fever pitch when it transpired that Russia proposed to exercise the right of search and even seizure by means of Volunteer Fleet cruisers which she had previously passed through the Dardanelles on the flagrantly false pretence that they were in no sense war-ships, and

were even entitled to sail under the Red Cross flag.

It appears that early in June two cruisers of the Volunteer Fleet, the *Smolensk* and the *Peterburg*, were designated for "Government service outside the Black Sea." Even their commanders

in the proper Turkish quarters, the steamers safely passed the Dardanelles forts. When they had reached Constantinople the officers were informed that the ships had been raised to the rank of second-class cruisers, that they were destined for the East, and that all on



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF JUNE, 1904.

were, however, kept in the dark as to their real rôle and destination. The orders of the commanders were sealed, and the senior officers and certain junior officers who unexpectedly received a rise in rank were enjoined to observe the strictest possible reticence. By flying the Red Cross flag, and possibly with the help of pressure and persuasion exerted

board were to consider themselves on active service. Certain quick-firing guns, which were now found to be among the Red Cross equipment of these innocent merchantmen were, it was intimated, for use if necessary; while, as the ships' cargo was largely coal in bags—even the decks being laden—it was evidently hoped that a long career of usefulness

lay before them. On June 9th the two newly-fledged cruisers entered the Suez Canal, thus giving the lie to certain cynical official assurances from St. Petersburg that those two vessels had never left the Black Sea!

On June 18th a considerable sensation was caused by the stoppage of the German mail steamer *Prinz Heinrich* by the *Smolensk*, which confiscated a portion of the mails, thereby exciting immediate and profound excitement in Berlin. The Imperial Chancellor, Count von Bülow, at once instructed the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to protest against the action of the *Smolensk*, and in the German Press the dubious character of the latter gave rise to heated discussion. It was argued that if the *Smolensk* were a warship she could not have passed the Dardanelles; if the *Smolensk* were not a warship she could not have stopped the *Prinz Heinrich* and confiscated the mails for Japan. The *Kölnische Volkszeitung* adds the significant declaration that "every ship has her own individual and certificated character; secretly to alter this in any way has hitherto been peculiar to filibusters."


But there is worse to come. On July 9th the Peninsular and Oriental Company's intermediate steamer *Malacca*, carrying passengers and cargo from London to China and Japan, sails from Suez for Singapore. She has on board some 3,000 tons of cargo, including, as is usual, a quantity of Government stores. Among the latter are about twenty tons of explosives for Hong-kong. At about half-past ten in the morning of July 13th the *Malacca* is stopped by the Volunteer Fleet cruiser *Peterburg*, about seventy miles north of Perim. The Russian officer who is sent aboard objects to the *Malacca's* cargo, especially,

it seems, certain steel plates and food-stuffs taken on at Antwerp. The ship's manifest is also declared to be faulty, and, notwithstanding the angry protests of the captain, the *Malacca* is held in arrest for a couple of days, when the *Peterburg's* consort, the *Smolensk*, appears, and further action is taken by the Russian "cruisers." It is asserted that in the interval some of the *Malacca's* European crew are taken on board the *Peterburg* and offered bribes to give information. The captain naturally objects to this proceeding, and is threatened with arrest! His increased exasperation, and that of the passengers, may be imagined when, on the arrival of the *Smolensk*, a Russian prize crew of forty is sent on board the *Malacca*, the British flag, which the captain had taken the very British precaution of causing to be nailed to the mast, is torn down, the Russian flag is hoisted in its place, and the vessel is taken to Port Said, where she arrives on July 20th, and is detained by the Egyptian Government.

The sequel of this remarkable incident will be narrated presently. Meanwhile, however, it is interesting to note the manner in which the Queen of the Ocean acts when there is reason to believe that unwarrantable liberties have been taken on the high seas with the British flag. It seems that not until Monday, July 18th, is any official news forthcoming of what has happened to the *Malacca*. We shall see later how diplomacy deals with the question; but it is deeply gratifying to British sensibilities to be able to add that on this same Monday the world is read a lesson in sea-power which it is not likely to forget. From Suez, like a giant bloodhound slipped from its leash, the mighty cruiser *Terrible* goes south, with orders, it is said, to watch these two

unmannerly Russian craft who fly the Red Cross Flag one day and pose as warships the next. There are no more impressive cruisers in the world—the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* perhaps excepted—than the *Terrible* and her sister ship the *Powerful*, both, to all intents and purposes, fast battleships of over 14,000 tons, and capable of steaming over 22 knots an hour. As the *Terrible* speeds southward from Suez the bulk of the British Mediterranean Fleet leaves Malta for a cruise, the first port of call being, curiously enough, Alexandria. This is merely the British Navy's way of show-

ing its readiness to deal with all possible eventualities in any quarter in which it "has interests." When the news came of the confiscation of the *Prinz Heinrich's* mails, the German Press commented with some bitterness on the fact that not a single German warship was anywhere near the spot where the outrage had occurred. But, before the British Press could comment on the seizure of the *Malacca*, a first-class British cruiser was half-way down the Red Sea, and eleven great British battleships and four cruisers were within easy distance of the Mediterranean end of the Suez Canal.



THE DARDANELLES: LOOKING TOWARDS CONSTANTINOPLE.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

TEN YEARS AGO—JAPAN'S WAR WITH CHINA—PORT ARTHUR IN 1894—THE OPERATIONS
IN LIAO-TUNG—COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS.

THE present seems a favourable opportunity for a somewhat extended reference to the operations of the Japanese in 1894 in a theatre of war which included many of the chief points of interest in the present struggle. It is not intended to deal with the Chino-Japanese War in detail; to do so would take up not one, but a dozen chapters of this publication, and entirely obscure the original narrative. But there is a peculiar interest attached to the 1894 operations, more especially as regards Port Arthur, because comparisons and contrasts are furnished of very real significance from the standpoint alike of the historian, the soldier, and the student of national character.

It may be mentioned for the benefit of those who wish to pursue this subject rather further than seems desirable in a work of this kind, that a useful Epitome of the War between Japan and China is published by the Intelligence Division of the War Office. But the military facts contained in this chapter are derived chiefly from a very succinct account of the Japanese attack on Port Arthur in 1894, by Lieutenant W. Hyde Kelly in the *United Service Magazine* for July, 1904. This source of information has been freely supplemented, as will be seen, by references to the vivid description of the operation given by Mr. Hilliard Atteridge in the "Wars of the Nineties," and by utilising extracts from

"Heroic Japan," which appeared in a special article in the *Daily Telegraph* of May 30th, 1904.

Before we come to look closely into the matter of the Port Arthur operations, a few general remarks are necessary in order to emphasise the similarities and differences in these two campaigns, between which an interval of a bare decade lies. The similarities are chiefly connected with the shortness of the interval. In all wars waged in the same theatre there is one stable factor, the climate; but, when one comes to look into the heart of things, it will be found that in nine cases out of ten that is the only factor which is invariable after the lapse of a considerable number of years. It may be true that national character remains more or less the same in the majority of cases, but even here remarkable changes can and do take place. A hardy nation may become enervated by prosperity, or a stronger admixture of fighting races may stiffen a country's backbone. A wonderful change may be wrought by the right kind of military training, of which perhaps no better example exists than the case of the Egyptian soldier, who stood fast as a soldier should under Kitchener, but fifteen years before was slaughtered like a sheep under Hicks Pasha. It might be thought that strategical considerations would not be altered much by the effluxion of time; but strategy depends



AT CLOSE QUARTERS: JAPANESE DETACHMENT
ATTACKED BY COSSACKS.



largely on communications, and communications, especially in the East, have changed a very great deal in the last fifty years. To take a familiar instance, the strategy necessary to deal with a possible rising in India is very different now from what it was in 1857, if only by reason of the network of railways and telegraphs which enables striking forces to be sent with the utmost despatch to threatened parts. Natural features remain much the same, of course, but a bridged river, and a mountain pass through which a decent road has been blown and hacked by skilful pioneers, are very different obstacles from the raging torrent and almost impenetrable defile which stemmed, perhaps, the advance of impetuous invaders of a few generations back.

In a short ten years, however, there is not usually much movement as far as the face of the country and strategical considerations are concerned. Consequently, in 1904 we see the Japanese following closely in their own footsteps left in 1894, attaching, as then, first-class importance to obtaining a naval superiority which should enable them to take their troops by sea, and land them at whatever point might be deemed favourable, and operating by land in Korea and in the region of the Motien-Ling, and against Port Arthur. Nor is the manner in which they set about these tasks very greatly in advance of the ability displayed in 1894, although here and there some notable instances occur of the thoroughness with which lessons of intervening warfare have been absorbed. There is the same perfect organisation, the same care for the individual soldier, the same perfection of transport and supply arrangements, the same clock-work precision, the same admirable leadership. The most serious progress

made has been in the naval direction, where not only vastly increased strength has been attained, but where extraordinary results have been accomplished by special training, more especially in the matter of handling torpedo craft and of gunnery. In the army the greatest advance made has been in the matter of quick-firing artillery, and, what is almost equally important, and does not necessarily follow as a matter of course, the training required to use such improved weapons to good purpose.

As to the differences : first, there is the railway, which speaks for itself ; secondly, the immensely improved fortifications of Port Arthur ; and finally, of course, the character of the resistance. Taking the last and most serious consideration into special account, there is no question that from the opening of the war with China the Japanese regarded the Celestial soldiery with complete contempt, which was heightened by the miserable show it made under infamous leadership. But they have never ceased to respect the Russian rank and file, however clearly they may have perceived that the latter also were badly led and directed. Although the Japanese soldier has shown himself man for man the equal of his Russian antagonist, and has more than once repulsed him, or turned him out of a strong position, when the real odds were by no means in favour of Japan, the fact remains that the Russian fighting-man must be taken, and is taken, by his present enemy very seriously. This means that, more especially as regards Port Arthur, the Japanese preparations have had to be largely modified, and that contrasts between the two campaigns will occur to which the succeeding narrative of what happened in 1894 will lend particular emphasis.

As Lieutenant Hyde Kelly remarks, the naval battle of Hay-yang-tai on September 17th, 1894, had left the Japanese in complete command of the sea, only some six or eight vessels being left in the Chinese fleet, which now cruised in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li to convoy transports laden with troops to Port Arthur, or wandered rather aimlessly from Port Arthur to Wei-hai-wei. The capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese would deprive what remained of the Chinese fleet of its most important base, and would also largely assist the Japanese operations against Peking.

As in the present campaign, the Japanese had already commenced their land operations before they set to work to attack the great fortified stronghold of Port Arthur. Already the First Army of Japan, 35,000 strong, was in the field under the command of Marshal Yamagata, whose task it was to clear the banks of the Yalu and the Motien Pass from the Chinese troops under General Sung, and in 1894, as in 1904, it was to the Second Japanese Army that the operations against Port Arthur were primarily entrusted. As we shall see, this Army was able in the earlier campaign to bring the work to a triumphant conclusion; while in 1904 only one division of General Oku's original force appears to have been left before Port Arthur. But it is interesting to note another partial coincidence, as to which we may anticipate a little. We have in previous chapters of the present narrative seen how General Oku was, in the first instance, called northward by the attempt of General Stackelberg to relieve Port Arthur. It is worth mentioning that in the 1894 campaign, also, an attempt was made to get the Japanese between two fires in the lower portion of

the Liao-tung Peninsula. For, when the fate of Port Arthur was sealed, General Sung, having collected some 8,000 troops from the north, made a desperate attack upon the Japanese at Kin-chau, but was repulsed—although the Japanese garrison was but 1,500 strong—having suffered much the same sort of rude shaking as General Stackelberg experienced at Telissu.

But, to return to the actual attack on Port Arthur. The Second Army of Japan in 1894 was very much smaller than that of General Oku. It consisted of the 1st Division under General Yamagi, a brigade of the 6th Division under Major-General Hasegawa, a siege train, line of communication troops, etc., in all about 29,000 fighting-men, under the command of the Marshal Oyama, who in 1904 is Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Armies in Manchuria.

Three further points of resemblance between "then" and "now" present themselves. In the first place, the Second Army was in both cases kept waiting for some time in the Ping-Yang inlet before it sailed directly for the Liao-tung Peninsula. Again, the main landing was in both cases near Pi-tsu-wo. Finally, the first struggle was for a position on the Kin-chau Isthmus. After that the points of resemblance mostly disappear, and equally instructive contrasts begin to be observable.

In 1894, the first batch of the Second Army disembarked on October 24th at the mouth of the Hua-yuan River. An advance party was pushed forward on the 25th to Pi-tsu-wo, twenty-four miles in the direction of Port Arthur, and the 1st Division followed on November 1st.

On the evening of November 5th the Japanese 1st Division arrived before Kin-chau. It will be remembered by those

who read Chapter XXVIII. of the present narrative that the Russian position, of which Nan-shan Hill was the centre, was about two miles south of Kin-chau, and that the Russians made no serious attempt to defend the latter, which was from an early stage in the fighting commanded by the Japanese guns. The Chinese, instead of taking advantage of the extremely strong Nan-shan position, made the thoroughly Chinese error of garrisoning Kin-chau—doubtless because it was a “walled town”—with 6,000 men, and holding a small position in front of it.

The result of this foolish proceeding was soon apparent. The position in front of the town was easily rushed by the Japanese infantry on November 6th, and artillery having been hurried up was brought to bear upon the town itself. Supported by the guns, two regiments of infantry (six battalions) advanced towards the walls. After an artillery preparation of two hours, the 2nd Regiment (2nd Brigade) blew in the north gate and entered the town, the Chinese garrison taking to its heels southward pursued by the 1st Brigade. The Japanese loss was quite trivial, a marked contrast indeed to the 4,000 casualties on May 26th, 1904.

Dalny was not then in existence, but Talien-wan was commanded by six Chinese forts armed with modern guns. Just as the evacuation of the Russian position at Nan-shan in 1904 meant the evacuation of Dalny also, so in 1894 the retreat of the Chinese from Kin-chau was followed by a prompt withdrawal from the forts commanding what is now sometimes known as Dalny Bay. During the night of November 6th the defenders of these forts joined the fugitives from Kin-chau in making the best of their way into


Port Arthur, and on the 7th the forts fell into the hands of the Japanese. The latter now shifted their base of operations against Port Arthur to Talien-wan, just as they did in 1904. They had not, of course, the facilities which the existence of Dalny afforded for the landing of heavy guns and other war material and stores, but, on the other hand, Talien-wan was not strewn with mines as in the more recent case.

Thus Japan, almost without striking a blow, came into possession both of the first line of the Port Arthur defences and of a new and convenient base which allowed the line of communication with the Hua-Yuan River to be dispensed with; and the troops to be absorbed into the fighting line. By November 13th the bulk of the Second Army was concentrated at Kin-chau, and four days later it moved forward in two columns, encamping on November 20th at Tu-cheng-tu and Shuang-tai-kau, which lie about six miles north and nine miles north-east, respectively, of Port Arthur. On November 20th Marshal Oyama called his senior officers together and explained his plans for the assault on the following day. These plans are admirably reproduced by Mr. Hilliard Atteridge as follows, and should be studied in connection with the map of the Port Arthur defences given on page 437.

“The troops were to form up at 2 a.m., ready to march from their camps between Shuang-tai-kau and Tu-cheng-tu, so as to be put in position before Port Arthur by dawn. They were to march in three columns; on the right General Yamagi, with the main body, consisting of the bulk of the 1st Division; in the centre General Hasegawa’s brigade; on the left a small column of all three arms, moving between Hasegawa’s troops and the sea,

and guarding the flank of the advance against a possible sortie from the forts on the north ridge. At dawn the fleet would open fire on the forts nearest the sea. The artillery of the 1st Division on the right would come into action against

to its rear, the heavy guns of the siege train were to come into action near the village of Shui-shi-ying" (the "Naval Camp"), "firing first at the Itzu plateau and the Pine Tree Hill Fort (Sung-shu-shan), and in the second stage of the



From Stereograph Copyright, Underwood & Underwood, London and New York.
RUSSIAN WAR CRAFT IN HARBOUR AT DALNY, BEFORE ITS EVACUATION.

the forts on the Itzu plateau, taking up a position on a ridge facing the north side of the plateau, and distant about a mile from the forts. In this position the guns could also be brought to bear on the gap leading to the town. On the left of the field artillery, and a little

fight devoting all their attention to the western forts on the ridge. Hasegawa was to occupy the high ground of Shui-shi-ying, facing the ridge forts, on which he was to open fire.

"During this bombardment General Nishi, with the 1st Brigade of Yamagi's

Division, was to work round to the west or south-west flank of the Itzu plateau. For the greater part of the way his march would be concealed from the Chinese by a lower range of hills running north and south. In fact, he would be under cover until his troops moved over the crest of the range opposite their objective and deployed for the attack. All this time his movements would not in any way mask the fire of the Japanese batteries. It was expected that, by the time Nishi was ready to advance, the guns of the Itzu-shan would have been silenced, and their garrisons very much demoralised by the Japanese shell fire. The forts would then be attacked by Yamagi's two brigades, Nishi moving against the flank, and Nogi against the front of the plateau, the artillery meanwhile concentrating its fire on the ridge, especially on Sung-shu-san and the Erlung forts. As soon as the Itzu-shan forts were taken, Yamagi's and Hasegawa's columns would make a converging attack on the western forts of the ridge, and, after clearing Sung-su-shan and the Er-lung of the Chinese, rush down into the town."

It will be understood, of course, that the forts in 1894 were not, either as regards trace or armament, what they are ten years later; but the scheme of defence was relatively a strong one, and the garrison quite sufficient, had it been of the right fighting quality, to make a stubborn resistance. There were about 14,000 Chinese in the fortress. The forts on the north were garrisoned by 3,300 men, with 3,700 in reserve; 2,000 manned the eastern defences. The coast defences were held by 4,100, and there were about 1,000 raw levies round the dockyard.

At 2 a.m. on the morning of Novem-

ber 21st, the Japanese columns were in position for, if necessary, an immediate attack. The 2nd Brigade, with two mountain batteries, supported by the 1st Brigade, were north-east of Itzu Hill. Hasegawa's Brigade formed the central column, with the flanking column mentioned in Mr. Atteridge's summary of the plan of attack two miles to the left rear.

The following is the description of the early morning cannonade given by the authors of "Heroic Japan," who had the advantage of consulting the official Japanese records. (The spelling in the extract is altered to coincide with that of the plan on page 437.)

"The night was clear and the moon shone with a placid, silvery radiance. There was not a breath of wind; all was silent. But as the day broke the field siege guns burst into flame, and with their thunderous cannonade roused the enemy from their sleep. The van of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, under Major-General Nishi, suddenly made its appearance to the north-west of the western fort on Itzu-shan. Mountain artillery, siege guns and field guns, forty cannon in all, began pouring a continuous stream of iron into the three devoted forts on this 'Chair Hill,' for that is the signification of Itzu-shan. The Chinese defended themselves stoutly.

"The forts on Sung-shu-shan, as well as the coast forts, replied to the Japanese attack with reverberating volleys from their large guns. It seemed as if the tremendous uproar would rend the very heavens. The shells from the various forts, moreover, inflicted much damage on the besiegers, while every shot from the Japanese side told. After what seemed about an hour the Chinese fire slackened, and then ceased alto-

gether. The 3rd Regiment, who had continued to advance while the attack was going on, then scaled the hill from the right side, and rushed with wild cheers on towards the forts, which they carried at the bayonet's point. At 7.30 a.m. the 1st Battalion reached the left flank of the second fort, and

hands of the Japanese. This was at about eight o'clock in the morning."

After the capture of the Itzu-shan forts there was sharp fighting between the 1st Regiment, which had moved to the assistance of the 3rd Regiment, and a party of 1,000 Chinese who attacked with some vigour, but were driven back in



JAPANESE SIEGE ARTILLERY IN WINTER.

carried the place by storm. Shortly afterwards the 2nd and 3rd Battalions followed the road taken by the 1st. While this was being done the forts on Peiyu-shan (this is doubtless the unnamed fort to the east of No. 3 on the plan), and Sung-shu-shan kept up an incessant fire on the advancing Japanese. But after the fall of the third fort the first and second were easily taken. The three forts of Itzu-shan thus fell into the

half-an-hour. By this time the Chinese retreat was being effectively cut off, a process in which the Japanese Fleet assisted by steaming round towards the west coast, and firing on the fugitives in that direction. Eventually the Chinese concealed themselves as best they could in the Liau-ti-shan Promontory. The remainder of the operation is thus graphically described by the authors of "Heroic Japan":—

"The Japanese field artillery now advanced to the attack of the Sung-shu-shan forts. The Chinese there, already greatly intimidated by the capture of the Itzu-shan forts, were preparing to flee for dear life, leaving the forts undefended, when some shells from the field guns hit the powder magazine, causing a terrific explosion. The forts were at once silenced. This occurred shortly after 11 a.m.

"The assault upon the forts in Er-lung-shan and Chi-Huan-shan had meanwhile been begun by the mixed brigade under Major-General Hasegawa. The brigade had no field artillery, while their siege guns failed to reach the forts; mountain guns were therefore brought into requisition, which occasioned an immense amount of labour. The Itzu-shan forts having been occupied by the 1st Division, the soldiers were now led around to the rear of the two hills. The Chinese were thus brought under a cross-fire, being attacked simultaneously in front and the rear, and therefore speedily gave over the contest; the seven great forts and these two hills behind were silenced at about the same time. It was then a little after mid-day.


"All the inland forts having thus been successfully captured in the forenoon, an advance was made upon the coast forts. Field-Marshal Oyama commanded the 1st Division to attack the port itself, while the Mixed Brigade was partly to cover the flank of the 1st Division, and partly to intercept the retreat of the enemy to the north-east. The left column now joined the Mixed Brigade. Highest among the coast forts stood those on Huang-chin-shan (Golden Hill). They contained cannon of very heavy calibre, easily turned in every direction, whose range included not only the in-

land forts, but even those in the place occupied by the Japanese artillery. There was one gun in particular which had greatly annoyed the besiegers at long range, throwing shells in the direction of the Itzu-shan, Er-lung-shan, and Sung-shu-shan forts. It was thus absolutely necessary to attack this high fort first of all, and, in order to carry out this plan, the 2nd Regiment, which had been left to guard the field-guns, was ordered to advance to the assault. So soon as the order was given the 2nd Regiment rushed into the town, shooting down all opposition, and engaging in a hand-to-hand encounter. Veering around the men then stormed the forts on Huang-chin-shan. These were one and all occupied shortly after 4 p.m. The Mixed Brigade had in the meanwhile carried Lao-li-tsui by assault.

"At this moment strains of military music were heard coming from the parade ground inside the town. This was soon recognised as the music of the band belonging to the Staff of the 2nd Army. They were playing the grandly impressive National Anthem of Japan--'Kima ga yo.' As the triumphant music echoed over the hard-fought field, the Japanese troops gave vent to their loyal enthusiasm in cheer upon cheer.

"The next day the Japanese troops advanced to attack the remaining forts, but found them deserted. The Chinese had decamped to the last man."

A careful study of the above very interesting and picturesque details will clearly show what an immense difference there is between the past and present attacks on Port Arthur at nearly every stage of that formidable operation. But a further glance at the sketch given in Chapter XXXVI. of this narrative will also reveal the fact that the Japanese are



BELEAGUERED PORT ARTHUR. A BRISK
MOMENT IN A RUSSIAN BATTERY.



well aware of the difference in question, and are under no illusion as to the enhanced difficulty of the task that lies before them to-day, when Port Arthur is garrisoned by real soldiers.

Although casualties afford no very accurate basis in such a connection, it may be mentioned that the Japanese losses in the capture of Port Arthur in 1894 were only 66 killed, 350 wounded, and about a dozen missing. It is hardly necessary to point out that, putting the Nan-shan battle on one side, this figure is not large compared with the casualties already inflicted on the Japanese by the Russians in the first few days of the fighting round Port Arthur, and that the latter have not been the price of any considerable success, or have been set off by much greater losses on the Russian side. At Nan-shan, as we have seen, victory was only won at a great sacrifice, and, although the Russians may be blamed for not having clung to the bitter end to such a fine position, the contrast between the fighting here and at Kin-chau in 1894 is sharply significant.

Into a comparison of the strength of the defences in 1894 and 1904, respectively, it would be hopeless to enter now with any chance of attaining really accurate results. But it is obvious that the Russians have some advantage in being forewarned by the procedure in the Chino-Japanese War of what might happen if the Itzu forts were not held with sufficient stubbornness and skill. It may be taken for granted that they have left as little as possible to chance in this quarter, and they are backed up by the circumstance that their garrison is numerically twice as large as was the Chinese garrison in 1894, and probably at least ten times as full of pluck and resistance.

On the other hand, the Japanese have one or two points in their favour which can be readily discussed without having recourse to technicalities. The first of these is the undoubted moral advantage possessed by those who have accomplished a feat once, and are full of lively confidence in their ability to accomplish it over again.

Keenly though the Japanese may appreciate the increased difficulties that lie before them, they are naturally uplifted by the thought that, even in the teeth of Russian opposition, they have overcome the preliminary obstacles which barred their way in 1894, and which must once more be surmounted before the vital attack upon Port Arthur can with hope of success be delivered. There is added cause for hopefulness in the reflection that there can be little concerning the strength and weakness of the Port Arthur defences which is not known to, and has not been duly provided for by, the Japanese General Staff. A modern fortress is very full of deadly traps for the unwary, and even to those who know its secrets it affords plenty of deterrent risks. But really accurate intelligence in such cases does more than lessen the tale of inevitable loss. It tends to make even the intelligent private feel that he is not being hurled upon some dim mysterious enterprise, but is engaged in an operation which his superiors think it something more than possible to bring to a glorious conclusion. We may take it for granted that there is no clearer idea in the brain of the Japanese soldier than the conviction that he is being not only properly led, but that his actual leaders are being properly directed by *men who know*. If we want an example of the confidence which is inspired by this frame of mind, we have one ready to our hand.

in the case of Lord Kitchener. The British soldiers who fought under his direction in the Khartoum Expedition were not inspired with any particular reverence for his leadership, but they knew him to be in truth what he supremely is, an Organiser of Victory, who leaves no stone unturned, not only to provide his own force with all that it is possible to give it in the way of transport, supply, and equipment, but also to find out all there is to find out as to the best way of getting at the enemy's vitals. Of all substitutes for the galvanic influence which is only exercised over great armies by the very greatest of commanders, perhaps the best is the reputation for not acting unless, and until, the chances of victory are three to one in favour of the offensive.

Another advantage which the Japanese have to-day, and which was only possessed by them to a limited degree in 1894, lies, it is almost needless to add, in the co-operation of their ships. We have seen how, when Port Arthur was held by the Chinese, the Japanese fleet took little part in wresting the fortress from them. But the case may be, as has been technically explained in Chapter XXXVI., very different in 1904. Although we may be sure that Admiral Togo will not recklessly adventure his splendid ships against the long-range guns of the forts on the sea-front, the bombardments upon which he will now enter will probably be more scientifically

destructive than any he has carried out hitherto, and, if he succeeds in taking any of the closed forts in reverse, the assistance lent to the siege guns will be of incalculable value.

Finally, we may take it that the siege artillery now being used is, itself, in weight and power altogether superior to that which was posted on the ridge north of "Naval Camp" in 1894. Further, it is practically certain that there will be many more guns, and that these are being dispersed so as to bring a terrific concentration of fire from perhaps a dozen different points on any given sector of the defences. The effect of such a cannonade cannot but be very impressive even against improved defences resolutely manned, for it goes without saying that the guns will be worked with the maximum of scientific skill, and that very little powder and shot will be wasted in producing mere "sound and fury, signifying nothing."

For the present we may now leave the problem of the attack of Port Arthur, in regard both to its former solution ten years ago, and to the attempt now being made to solve it under very different conditions. The careful reader has now before him ample material to enable him to realise the immensity of the task involved, and also, perhaps, to gain some idea of the manner in which that task is now about to be attacked a second time by such a nation of endless warlike possibilities as Japan.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE SECOND ARMY—DELIBERATE MOVEMENTS—THE RUSSIAN POSITION—ADVANCE ON KAI-CHAU—A REAR-GUARD ACTION—OCCUPATION OF KAI-CHAU—THE SITUATION.

IN Chapter XXXII. we followed, chiefly by the light of the Russian official despatches, the advance of the Second Army of Japan under General Oku from Telissu to Sun-yao-chen, leaving it on June 23rd with its outposts thrown out in the direction of Kai-chau (Kaiping). The secrecy still observed by the Japanese General Staff at Tokio makes it impossible to state with absolute confidence the movements of this Army for the remaining days of June and the first few days of July. But the despatches of General Sakharoff, who appears to be acting as General Kuropatkin's Staff representative at Kai-chau, together with other incidental information, enable a pretty shrewd guess to be made as to what is going on by way of prelude to General Oku's continued advance, and to the Japanese occupation—presently to be described—of Kai-chau.

General Oku has much to keep him occupied during this interval, and it is not in reality at all surprising that he does not hurry forward with any particular alacrity from the neighbourhood of Sun-yao-chen.

In the first place, although by no means wanting in initiative and daring, the commander of the Second Army is one of Japan's most cautious and sagacious leaders, and the experience and wisdom he has acquired in a long career—he is now fifty-seven years of age—are of special value in the avoidance

of mistakes due to precipitancy at this important juncture. Again, he is not by any means a free agent, and it is essential that his rate of movement northward should be governed largely by the operations of his colleague in command of the First Army, even if both he and General Kuroki are not already to some extent restricted by the imminent appointment of Marshal Oyama as Commander-in-Chief. It must be remembered that not until four days after General Oku threw out his outpost line to the north of Sun-yao-chen did the passes fall to the troops of the First and Takushan Armies, and it is clear that, until this preliminary to anything like concerted action had been satisfactorily completed, any very free movement on General Oku's part might have proved risky. For the Takushan Army's rôle for the present seems to be to afford assistance to whichever of the other two armies requires it. But it does not follow that it can readily afford such assistance to both the First and Second Armies simultaneously. On June 27th, as described in Chapter XXXIV., the Takushan Army co-operates with General Kuroki by capturing the southern Fenshui-ling in a very masterly manner. Later, as we shall see, it works in very effective unison with the Second Army. But it is doubtful whether its strength would have allowed it to strike both right and left, and at the same time to keep up that appearance of wall-like stability to

its immediate front, which is necessary for the success of a gigantic enveloping movement.

Apart from these considerations, General Oku has to look to his communications and supplies. The latter he

on the coast at or below Sun-yao-chen. The Japanese are extremely reticent on this subject ; but the Russian despatches seem to indicate a distinct increase in the numbers of the enemy, whose " vast encampments " evidently produce some



A JAPANESE FIELD HOSPITAL: BRINGING IN THE WOUNDED DURING AN ACTION.

probably continues to receive for the most part from the sea, and there is very little doubt that the Japanese soldiers by this means fare a good deal better than their opponents. It is also very possible that reinforcements for General Oku's Army are being landed at points

depression in General Sakharoff's spirits. Certainly the Japanese are well prepared for effecting reinforcements by sea, for a detachment from Admiral Togo has made a study of the west coast of Liaotung, taking soundings at places likely to be found useful for disembarkations.

Reports forthcoming at the beginning of July show that General Oku's Army at this period was in capital "fettle," the health of the troops being excellent; but it is believed that the cavalry experience considerable difficulty in the matter of fodder. However, the rains will soon produce an ample supply of herbage, and some assistance in other respects will now be lent by the rail. For all the bridges between Port Adams and Wa-fang-tien have been repaired, and trains are now running, which doubtless serve to bring up to the new front such local supplies as are available in central Liao-tung. It is particularly noted in the reports from General Oku's Army that the Chinese everywhere are welcoming the Japanese, readily supplying vehicles and labour, and accepting Japanese notes in payment.

At the commencement of July the Russian force immediately opposed to General Oku appears to consist of a division commanded by General Sampsonoff, which occupies Kai-chau; to the south-east of Kai-chau is another force under command of General Tschirikoff; and to the eastward of Kai-chau are General Mishtchenko's Cossacks, which seem to have been pretty busily engaged in reconnaissance work ever since the early days of the Russian occupation of Northern Korea. Even assuming that General Tschirikoff has a whole division under him, the barrier to the Japanese advance would not seem a very serious one. But the probability is that by this time all intention of making a vigorous stand at Kai-chau has been abandoned by the Russians, and that the troops mentioned are only in position as a screen, which in due course will be withdrawn to the accompaniment of rear-guard action.

At this point it is expedient to examine a little closely the condition of affairs on the Russian side, since that may help to explain the leisurely advance of General Oku on Kai-chau. On page 209 mention was made of the march towards Ta-shi-chao of two Russian regiments which had come up from Kai-chau; and in Chapter XXXVII. again there is an indication of a considerable Russian concentration at the former place. The supposition is that when the passes fell, General Kuropatkin would have been glad to bring in all his forces to the south of Liao-yang, and that he did in fact actually order their withdrawal. But on June 28th there was a terrific downpour of rain which lasted for several days, and rendered the proposed retreat—which, as a matter of fact, was strategically the best thing to be done—out of the question. Accordingly, a very large Russian force remains in position at Ta-shi-chao, and, as the latter is only some fifteen miles north of Kai-chau, it is clear that in any case the Japanese advance from Sun-yao-chen must be carried out with caution.

Finally, the Japanese, who probably have suffered, like the Russians, some inconvenience from the heavy rains, have their attention still further taken up by a reconnaissance in force, which the enemy carries out apparently with great boldness and skill on July 4th. According to the Russian despatches, the reconnoitring troops succeeded in driving back small bodies of the enemy's advanced guard, and eventually seized the railway station at Sun-yao-chen and the heights three miles east of the town. The Japanese, in due course, dislodged the intruders, but may well have been impressed by their vigour and determination. On the following day a Russian patrol carried

the reconnaissance yet further by pushing through to the rear of the Japanese line of observation at a point some fifteen miles east of Sun-yao-chen. The information thus gained may have been instrumental in confirming the intention not to dispute the possession of Kai-chau. But it shows, in any case, a very keen appreciation of the military requirements of a situation which might otherwise have seemed rather undignified. There is an assertiveness which is rather refreshing in this sudden demonstration of activity, and the behaviour generally of the Russians at Kai-chau since they pulled themselves together after Telissu is in favourable contrast with the inertia which seems to have set in at Liao-yang.

At last the Japanese make a move. On July 6th they commence operations for occupying Kai-chau, and from the morning of that day until the afternoon of July 9th there is fighting, not very deadly perhaps, but very much in earnest, and very interesting from the professional standpoint. For here we have one of those highly attractive performances known as rear-guard actions, which bring out the highest qualities of a retreating force, and sometimes give the force in pursuit more trouble than they seem to be worth. It needs first-rate troops and a brave and skilful commander to retire in the presence of a superior enemy with the minimum of loss and with the maximum of continued opposition to the enemy's further advance. Some of the historical examples of rear-guard actions are among the most interesting of all operations of war, and, although in the present instance no special brilliancy of conception or execution is noticeable, and the absence of detailed information makes the fighting rather hard to follow, it is evident that

the work on both sides reflected no little credit on troops and leaders alike.

In the first place, it should be mentioned that, on the part of the Japanese, the movement towards Kai-chau must be considered not only as a separate performance, but as belonging to the great "co-ordinated advance" of the three armies now opposed to General Kuropatkin's forces. The signal for this co-ordinated advance has only just been given by the capture of the passes. Between July 1st and 3rd General Kuroki has made one step further by pushing to the immediate east of Liao-yang. It is now General Oku's turn to roll up, as the *Times* correspondent at Tokio puts it, the other end of the Russian line seventy-five miles away.

The position at nightfall on July 5th is, as far as one can judge, as follows: The advanced guard of General Oku's Army is at Erh-tau-ho-tse, which is only twelve miles south of Kai-chau, and it is hardly likely that it has any very precise idea of the number of the enemy directly in front of it. For all General Oku may know, the Russian force at Kai-chau has been strongly reinforced from Ta-shi-chao, and it may be necessary to fight a battle of some dimensions before Kai-chau can be occupied. On the other hand, the Russians by their recent reconnaissance have ascertained that General Oku is in stronger force than they, perhaps, imagined, and probably by this time they have fully decided to retire from Kai-chau without offering battle. Accordingly, most of the stores and a considerable portion of the troops are withdrawn, and the first stage of a long rear-guard action commences.

But why, the reader may ask, is it necessary to have any rear-guard action at all in such a case? Why should not

the Russians "fold up their tents like the Arabs, and as silently steal away," leaving the Japanese to enter Kai-chau when and how they please? They have done this once or twice before in the present campaign, notably at Feng-hwang-cheng, and in a sense at Sun-yao-chen also. But in both those cases the conditions were different. Whether the Russians do or not eventually make a stand at Ta-shi-chao, it seems certain that it was their intention to make the latter a point of strong resistance at the commencement of July, and it would have been very poor generalship to evacuate in undignified haste a position only fifteen miles off. To do so might, indeed, have been to court a serious disaster. For if the Japanese had seen any sign of a scuttle out of Kai-chau—and we may be sure that they were vigilantly on the watch—they would have at once dashed forward, and would probably have driven the retreating force pell-mell on Ta-shi-chao, subsequently attacking the latter position before the defenders had recovered from the confusion consequent on having perhaps 20,000 of their comrades hurled back upon them.

The Russians, of course, know enough of the elementary rules of warfare to avoid running risks of this sort. Accordingly, they determine to make the Japanese occupation of Kai-chau as difficult and tedious as possible. They evidently succeed in this design, for, as already mentioned, the fighting lasts for four days. Nor is it likely that the bulk of the force originally at Kai-chau was at any time engaged. The greater probability is that the Russians were for the most part represented only by Sampsonoff's Ussuri Cossacks, and that these contested almost every inch of ground in very stubborn fashion, deluding the

attack, perhaps, into the belief that their numbers were much greater than they were. This is one of the main features of rear-guard fighting, and by some commanders has been demonstrated to perfection. It will be understood that the great object of the rear-guard is to check the pursuit, to give time to the main body to conduct its retirement in an orderly manner, and finally, to withdraw itself without suffering undue loss. This is achieved by alternate or successive retirements of portions of the rear-guard force, the portion which has retired taking up a fresh position a little further on. It devolves upon the portion that is left behind to make as brave a show as possible, in order to disguise the fact that any retirement has taken place. Sometimes a retirement is so gradual, and so skilfully concealed, that at the last only a few men are left, making as much show as possible by rapid and continuous firing, and when these have melted away, the enemy rushes up not only to find the rear-guard gone, but a little later to come on him in another good position as full of fight and resistance as before.

It is not quite certain whether the whole of the four days from July 6th to 9th may be classed as rear-guard fighting pure and simple, for the evacuation of Kai-chau by the main body of the Russian force may not have commenced until the 7th or 8th, and technically speaking, until it did commence the force south of Kai-chau was not a rear-guard, but an advanced guard. But the point is not of real importance, having regard to results. In any case, we may take it that the whole of the fighting in the period mentioned was of the character described, the Japanese advancing very cautiously because they did not

know whether at any moment the presence of a very large Russian force might not be revealed; the Russians clinging to successive positions, and foiling every effort of the enemy to turn their flanks. To speak of the fighting as an important Japanese victory seems absurd. The losses on both sides appear to have been trivial, and the fact that the Russians caused the Japanese to expend four days in contesting a few miles of ground, is pretty clear evidence that the latter did not have it all their own way, in spite of their greatly superior numbers.

The Japanese advance began, as noted before, on July 6th, the troops marching to the west of the railway as the ground on that side was more level. Contact with the enemy seems to have been established forthwith. The Russians to the number of about 1,600 were holding the heights to the east and north-east of Erh-tau-ho-tse, and these heights had to be cleared by the Japanese before any definite progress could be made. Fighting continued on Thursday and Friday, the Russians making a stubborn resistance in successive strong positions among the mountain passes. An attempt was made by the Japanese to

turn the Russian flank by sending along the seashore six squadrons of cavalry, but the latter appear to have been successively held by the Cossacks. The general advance of our Japanese could not, however, be stemmed, and on the evening of Friday the 8th, General Oku's



GENERAL SAKHAROFF, KUROPATKIN'S STAFF
REPRESENTATIVE AT KAI-CHAU.

Army was in position only four or five miles south of Kai-chau, with its right wing thrown forward in preparation for a turning movement. On Saturday morning at daybreak, the Japanese commenced a hot artillery fire from the heights captured on the preceding day. After this preparation they advanced against the outer positions occupied by the Russians in front of Kai-chau, driving the enemy, at eight in the morning, to his last line of defence around the town.

The Russians were now posted on the top of high precipices, and here they held out until about noon, when they were again forced to withdraw, their retirement covered by Russian guns posted on the high hills to the north of the town. The Japanese promptly occupied the last line of the enemy's defences, and for a space pursued the Russians in the teeth of the artillery fire from the hills. The latter was, how-

ever, found to be rather galling, and, accordingly, the Japanese guns were brought up into fresh positions, and succeeded during the afternoon in silencing those of the enemy. By the evening the Japanese were in possession of Kai-chau and the heights to the immediate north of the town.

The eventual descent upon Kai-chau appears to have been a swift and sudden one, and Mr. Ernest Brindle, the *Daily Mail* correspondent at Niu-chwang, mentions the interesting fact that a handful of 150 men who had been left behind with orders to destroy the railway station had not time to do so, but retreated hastily, leaving even their personal effects behind them.

With the exception of this important omission, the Russian rear-guard appears to have carried out its retirement with singular skill. One regrets to have to record the fact that among the Russian killed was Captain Count Nyrod, of the General Staff, who fell after the abandonment of the last position, and to whose brilliant performance of his duty as Chief Staff Officer with the rear-guard the comparative success of the retirement was due. The writer says "comparative success" advisedly, for a careful study of the available information supports the view that, although the Japanese achieved their object, their actual achievements are hardly so praiseworthy as those of their adversaries. As has been remarked before, casualties are no real criterion of defeat. The Japanese won a real victory at Nan-shan, although their losses were very much more severe than those which they inflicted on the Russians. In the present instance the Japanese had 24 killed and 129 wounded, and the Russians declare that their total


losses in killed and wounded did not exceed 200. Considering that the Japanese could not have had less than 50,000 men moving at Kai-chau, the Russian garrison of which on July 6th can hardly have been more than 20,000, while the rear-guard, which did most of the fighting, was probably only a few thousands strong, the palm must surely be awarded to the latter for a genuinely superior performance.

On the other hand, there is no gain-saying the fact that by the occupation of Kai-chau the Japanese have gained a very important advantage. In the first place, communication now becomes much more easy with the Takushan Army, since there is a useful route to Siu-yen in place of the mountain paths which connect the latter place with Sun-yao-chen. Supplies can still be drawn from the sea, and the railway to the south can still be utilised as a means of communication with Port Adams and with the force investing Port Arthur. Finally, the Japanese are now admirably placed for bringing pressure to bear not only upon Ta-shi-chao, but also upon Yingkow, the Port of Niu-chwang. For in the former case the Second Army will have the assistance of the Takushan Army, while in the latter it can readily call the Navy to its aid.

The value of the co-operation of the Takushan Army becomes apparent very quickly. Evidently forewarned of General Oku's movements, the commander of this force, presumably General Nozu, sends a column with a view to threaten the rear of the Russians at Kai-chau. This column, marching by two roads, finds the enemy on the 9th posted on hills commanding both roads. The Russians hold their position on the southern road till evening, but on the

northern road, where they had only two battalions and one battery, they are driven back. On the morning of July 10th the Japanese on both roads combine to drive back the enemy from the high-

mander of the Takushan Army. Accordingly, they seem to have detached forces to watch the roads between Siu-yen and Kai-chau, in the hope that these would act as a wedge driven between the two



RUSSIAN INFANTRY, WEARING THE WHITE SUMMER TUNIC, ENTRAINING NEAR ST. PETERSBURG.

lands of the southern road. The Russians retire toward Ta-shi-chao.

The probable meaning of the above is that, while the Russians at Ta-shi-chao clearly anticipated that the force at Kai-chau would have to retire, they were anxious to forestall the resulting communication between Oku and the com-

Japanese Armies. Doubtless it was these forces which the Takushan Army column encountered, and by driving them in upon Ta-shi-chao it must have rendered General Oku an important service. Moreover, the linking up of the two armies is now virtually complete, and we may take it for granted that their united

strength is at least equal, if not considerably superior, to the Russian force at Ta-shi-chao. Indeed, the Russian calculation gives them a joint strength of seven divisions, which, with reserve brigades, would make up a total strength of about 140,000 men.

But, whatever this strength may be, the Japanese evidently do not intend to presume upon it. No sooner have they occupied Kai-chau than they proceed to throw up earthworks, evidently with the special intention to protect their left flank, a Russian descent upon which might mean serious interference with their receipt of supplies from the sea. These field-works are begun on July 10th, and on the 13th a Russian engineer officer discovers on the heights north of Kai-chau, between the railway line and the so-called Imperial or Mandarin Road, a redoubt and more than ten infantry trenches, each sufficient to contain a company. A tower standing near the road was seen to be surrounded by trenches, and three or four batteries of artillery were observed.

While these defensive precautions are being taken, General Oku's cavalry make determined reconnaissances in the direction, and to the south-eastward of Ta-shi-chao, minutely scrutinising such of the Russian camps as are visible behind the outpost screen, and taking careful stock of the considerable works which the Russians are throwing up in front of their position. For the enemy have been very industrious in this respect during the break in the rains, additional batteries being placed at vital points, and guns mounted in emplacements excavated out of the hillsides. Some 4,000 Chinamen are said to be assisting in the work, and it is very suggestive of Japanese persistence in espionage that among them

should be discovered a Japanese captain in disguise.

For ten days General Oku continues in seeming immobility in front of Ta-shi-chao; but experience has taught us that these intervals are not usually employed by Japanese commanders or their troops merely in reconnaissance and field fortifications. In all probability exhaustive preparations are being made for what may prove one of the most significant movements of the campaign. In the meantime we may profitably study a very interesting sketch of Ta-shi-chao and the country in the neighbourhood, which was published in the *Times* of July 16th, and is written with special reference to the prospect of an important engagement. Ta-shi-chao village, we are told, stands on the right bank of a small stream with many affluents, which flows north-west to the Liao river, joining it to the north of the Russian railway terminus near Yingkow. "The whole of the left bank of this stream is flat open country for a considerable distance, but about midway on the road to Ta-shi-chao to Yingkow and to the south of it there is an isolated hill known as the Ta-ping-shan (great level mountain), which rises to a height of 200 feet, and commands all the surrounding plain. It is almost certainly crowned by works and held by a strong garrison. On the right bank—that is to say, on the north side of the aforesaid stream, and stretching some distance west of Ta-shi-chao village and northwards nearly to Hai-cheng—there is a tumbled, billow-like region of hill country offering some advantages for defence. The highest points of these hills are said to be not to the eastward, as we should expect, but to the west and north of Ta-shi-chao. The highest point is said to be the isolated hill known as Yao-chi-san.

due west of Ta-shi-chao village, with its southern slopes falling down to the stream at its feet. This point is 1,000 feet high and has a distinguishing temple on its summit, besides, doubtless, many Russian defences. The railway and the wretched track known as the Imperial road to Mukden cross the stream between

shi-chao there is open country, and it was probably here, on the banks of various small affluents of the main stream, that the Russian camps were observed by General Oku. It would be the natural place to expect to find them. North and north-west of village and junction other hills rise irregularly, the highest point to



GENERAL COUNT NOZU.

this hill and the village. Both these bend westward until the branch line junction is reached. Here they separate, the railway threading the hills and passing west of Hai-cheng, while the cart track bends a little further west and then runs to Hai-cheng, following the western limit of the hilly country.

"Immediately around and for some distance up stream to the east of Ta-

the north being at an elevation of some 900 feet. These hills appear to lie in more or less isolated clumps and ridges, those which seem to offer themselves as natural positions for an army rising to 300 and up to 700 feet, exclusive of the two points already named. This hilly district apparently connects north-west of Ta-shi-chao with the mountains traversed by the Ta-ku-shan force, and the

lie of the ground appears to suggest an attack from the north-west, since to south and west there are flat, open plains devoid of good positions for the enemy's guns save at Ta-ping-shan. Five tracks lead into this district from the country now occupied by the Japanese, the four northerly ones all coming from Siu-yen and the southerly track from Kai-ping (Kai-châu). The road furthest to the north comes from Si-mu-cheng (To-mu-chan) and leads to Hai-cheng; two others debouch at the head waters of the main stream upon which Ta-shi-chao stands, and a fourth leads out of the hills some way to the south of the stream, leaving a broad track of level country to be crossed before the Russian position on the hills west, north and north-east of Ta-shi-chao can be gained. Tactically the whole position may be and should be strong, and if at this season the nature of the crops south of the stream do not impede movement, there is here a fine field of action for the Russian cavalry. If this description, gathered from accounts and sketches by an Englishman who is acquainted with the district, is approximately correct, the natural line

for an attack would seem to be from the north-east and north, utilising the hills which give cover to an advance from this side. The position should be quite secure from assault from south and west—that is to say, from the direction of Yingkow and Kai-ping (Kai-chau)."

It goes without saying that the course of events at and in front of Ta-shi-chao is causing the greatest excitement at Niu-chwang. The position of the Russians here is peculiarly uncomfortable, for they can do little to stem a determined Japanese onset, and yet they are naturally inclined to hold on to the last moment before retreating on Hai-cheng. For it is of some advantage to them to have the control of the Liao river, and further they cannot honourably retire without blowing up the Russian gun-boat *Sivoutch*, which lies aground in the river. The officers of this unfortunate vessel are stated in Reuter's telegram to be calmly awaiting the inevitable, and to have saddled horses waiting at the quay-side so as to be ready to escape on the approach of the Japanese! Whether the blue-jackets are included in these discreet preparations is not mentioned.



GUARDING THE LINE

CHAPTER XL.

GENERAL KUROKI'S ARMY—THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED—ADVANCE FROM FENG-HWANG-CHENG—A RUSSIAN GENERAL WOUNDED—BATTLE OF MOTIEN-LING.

ANTICIPATORY allusion has already been made at the close of Chapter XXXIV. to the attack delivered by the Russians on July 4th against the Japanese outposts at Motien-ling. Later information confirms the view that this was a very brisk little affair, partaking of the nature of a night-attack, for it was hardly daybreak, and the fog appears to have been much thicker than the ordinary morning mist. The Japanese outpost attacked was evidently surprised, and the picket retired on its support—only one company being involved—closely pursued by the Russians. A very fierce bayonet fight ensued, and matters would have gone hardly with the Japanese, who were largely outnumbered, but for timely assistance lent by two fresh companies who came up to reinforce. These opened fire from a neighbouring wood, and the Russians, believing that the reinforcement was a strong one, retired under a heavy fire. The incident recalls dimly, and on a very minor scale, the fog battle of Inkerman, and is further a good example of the risks to which night-attacks so-called—which are commonly night-marches culminating in an attack at or just before daybreak—are exposed. In this particular case the whole idea of the movement seems to have been a mistaken one, for, even had it been successful, the small force engaged could not have maintained its ground against the

greatly increased numbers which would immediately have been directed against it.

On July 5th, 1,300 cavalry of the Russian Chichinsky Regiment attack the new Japanese position at the north of Fen-shui-ling, near Saimatse. This attack is repulsed without much difficulty, the Japanese having only four killed and three wounded. These trivial attacks, which appear of no value for reconnaissance purposes, and have not sufficient backing to justify our regarding them as serious attempts to regain lost ground, are rather puzzling. Indeed, the *Times* correspondent, telegraphing from General Kuroki's headquarters on July 7th, seems fully justified in remarking that the disconnected efforts of the enemy during the past fortnight indicate an absence of preconceived plans, and constitute almost conclusive evidence that General Kuropatkin is without sufficient force to take the initiative.


In a very marked contrast to this is the attitude of the Japanese. As to the possession of adequate strength for the accomplishment of the purpose in hand, Kuroki may not be in a position to cope with Kuropatkin's main force without the assistance of the Takushan and Second Armies; but he has all the troops he needs to enable him not only to maintain his ground, but also to continue that steady, if slow advance, which sometimes paralyses an enemy even more effectually

than rapid forward movements. Both this and the existence of carefully pre-conceived plans are illustrated in a striking manner by the proceedings on General Kuroki's right during the first few days of July, in the course of which he pushes boldly up to the eastward of Liao-yang, occupying on the 6th Hsien-chang, 30 miles north-east of Saimatse, from which a Japanese detachment expels 300 Russian cavalry without sustaining any loss whatever. Those who have read the preceding chapter carefully will have noted that these movements have their counterpart, on the extreme left of Japan's combined front, in General Oku's advance on Kai-chau, and consequent "rolling-up" of the Russian right.

Of late, some important changes have taken place with regard to the movements of General Kuroki's Army. Now, for the first time during the War, the Military Attachés and Special Correspondents are permitted to accompany the troops in their advance, instead of remaining behind with General Kuroki's Headquarters. The Correspondents are mostly attached to the Staffs of the Divisional generals, and are thus often enabled to get a near view of the actual operations, a welcome change from their position hitherto. Of the British Military Attachés present with the Second Army, it is arranged that Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton shall remain with General Kuroki, while Colonel Hume accompanies the "Western Column." Precisely what is meant by this last term it is difficult to say, but contemporary information from a Russian source leads one to suppose that at this date the Japanese armies in Manchuria are distributed roughly as follows: On the left we have

General Oku with three or four divisions fronting Ta-shi-chao; in the centre the so-called Takushan Army, the strength of which is still uncertain, but which is said to contain the 10th Division, and to be now in actual co-operation with the Guards Division—the latter, it will be remembered, formed part of the original First Army—in the advance towards Hai-cheng. The remainder of the First Army, namely, the 2nd and 12th Divisions, are stated to be marching from Feng-hwang-cheng in the direction of Liao-yang and Saimatse respectively. In other words, one of General Kuroki's original Divisions appears to have been detached for the purpose of assisting the pressure on Hai-cheng and Ta-shi-chao, while his remaining two Divisions form a western and eastern column, the one maintaining the pressure on Liao-yang while the other looks very much as if it were intended to work gradually round from the north-east of Saimatse to the north-west, eventually, perhaps, threatening Mukden itself. Of course, this is only problematical, but the present probabilities lie in this direction, and a very instructive direction it is.

Feng-hwang-cheng may now be considered as having been left behind by the First Army, and, though there is nothing to indicate the exact location of General Kuroki's Headquarters, it may be assumed that they are not far in rear of the Motien-ling. The country through which the army has been advancing since it left Feng-hwang-cheng is described as "a succession of wooded hills, with narrow valleys lying between. The country is intersected by streams, and the roads are rocky and winding. There are many steep passes, and the engineers have to carry out an immense amount of road-building."



DEPARTURE OF A JAPANESE REGIMENT FOR THE FRONT. SCENE AT THE RAILWAY STATION. KOBE.

The climate is certainly trying, one day being oppressively hot, while the next brings a heavy chilling rain, which spells great discomfort for an army with but few tents available. "But neither sun nor rain affects the ardour of the troops, who are in fine condition and confident of victory. They are all keen to meet the enemy. The men are wonderfully hardy. There has been remarkably little straggling or dropping out of the line on the march."

Where cultivation is possible in the surrounding country the Chinese are busy working in the fields, regardless of the operations. They complain that the Russians have confiscated all their grain and provisions, and they willingly assist the Japanese to the best of their ability.

The Russians have left other traces of their recent presence in this region besides regrets among the unfortunate natives they have robbed of their little stores. On the Peking road over the Motien Pass, through which they retreated, there is a succession of fresh graves surmounted by wooden crosses with roughly pencilled names. One can imagine the passing Japanese columns glancing with kindly sympathy at these pathetic memorials of a worsted foe. Their quarrel is not with the individual soldier of the Tsar, nor do the better educated among them blame him for acts which are often foreign to his kindly, simple nature. To a nation which, like Japan, pays studied honours to the gallant dead, it must appeal to find that in all the turmoil of retreat the Russian troops have found time to raise rude emblems to the memory of their comrades, whom they have borne wounded from the battlefield, but have failed to bring to a better haven of earthly rest than a wayside grave.

During the first fortnight of July the Japanese Intelligence Department is very busy. Telegraphing from Liao-yang on July 12th, Reuter's agent remarks that General Kuroki's scouts have actually reached the inside of the Russian out-works, fifteen versts (a verst is, roughly speaking, 1,200 yards) east of the Russian Headquarters. Two have been captured, but two escaped, doubtless with useful information. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a good deal going on beyond the Motien-ling which will repay observation. The Russians are largely increasing their forces in this quarter, and the view is held that this may be with an intent to keep General Kuroki and the force to his left fully occupied, and to prevent any flank movement against the line of communication, or, as it may prove, line of retreat, from Ta-shi-chao to Liao-yang. A simpler explanation would seem to be that recent reinforcements render it more convenient for General Kuropatkin to push troops forward among the mountains than to keep them concentrated in the muddy vicinity of Liao-yang. In any case, as will be seen, this increase of the Russian force is about to have early results.

On July 14th there is some sharp fighting on the Japanese right, the origin of which is a little obscure owing to the unfortunate fact that, while the Russian report states that the Japanese were attempting to capture a defile near Saimatse, the Japanese account makes the Russians the aggressors. Both sides claim to have repulsed the enemy, but the Japanese state explicitly that the enemy left ten killed and wounded on the field, and the Russian official despatch admits sixteen wounded, and records the death of a Captain of Dragoons. In view of the contradictory accounts as to

the why and wherefore of the fight, the latter is mainly interesting by reason of its bringing disaster to an officer who has already been mentioned several times in this narrative, and whose portrait will be found on page 332. This is General Rennenkampf, whose division of Cossacks is thought to have originally operated southwards from Vladivostok, but who has recently been occupied in harassing the Japanese right. In the skirmish just mentioned General Rennenkampf is badly wounded, but remains on the field with his men. He is afterwards found to be suffering from a fractured thigh.

On July 15th the *Times* correspondent at General Kuroki's Headquarters telegraphs:—"This army is still inactive. The strength of the Russians beyond the Motien-ling has been greatly increased, but they are showing no sign of acting on the offensive. We have had ten days of fine weather, and rain is now probable. The Japanese line of advance is not determined."

Two days later this state of tactical and meteorological uncertainty gives place to a much more dramatic situation. Very early in the morning of July 17th the Russians once more take the offensive, and deliver attacks against several of the Japanese positions, notably that at the Motien-ling, the fighting being so severe and extended as to justify the application to it of that often misused term "battle."

In order to get even a general idea of this action, or group of actions, it is necessary to take as a starting point the Russian idea as to the disposition of the forces under General Kuroki's command. It will be remembered that in Chapter XXXIV. (page 418) it was recounted that the Japanese, having occu-

pled the Motien-ling, proceeded to turn the Russians out of their strong field-works near Lien-shan-kwan, from which the approach to the pass is commanded. It is at Lien-shan-kwan that the Russians believe the main force of the Japanese to be now concentrated, and they are further under the impression that the Japanese advanced guards have been strengthened in the neighbouring passes. "In order," says General Kuropatkin, "to determine the strength of the enemy, it was decided to advance on July 17th against his position in the direction of Lien-shan-kwan." But it was impressed upon the commander of the force that he was not to start with the object of capturing the pass, but to act according to the strength of the forces he should find opposed to him. The commander in question is General Count Keller, who has already distinguished himself in connection with the Motien-ling by allowing himself to be manœuvred out of it, without offering any sort of useful opposition to the determined enemy.

General Keller is given the equivalent of two divisions, that is about two dozen battalions, with some cavalry and artillery, wherewith to effect his object. A general reserve is formed and left at Ikhavuan, and the main attack is confided to Major-General Kashtalinski, whose name will be recalled in connection with the engagement at Kiu-lien-cheng. General Kashtalinski's central column consists of fourteen battalions and twelve guns. The original idea seems to have been that this central attack should have been supported by a flank movement of one battalion on the right, while a left column, consisting of three battalions, was to be dispatched against a pass to about three miles north of the Motien-ling. But in such a country a column of

fourteen battalions soon becomes split up, and this fact, combined with the bringing up of battalions from the reserve, is doubtless accountable for the division of the battle in the Japanese official report into no fewer than five distinct sections. As the fighting is not of first-class tactical interest or importance we need not trouble ourselves greatly with this discrepancy, but be content with a general outline, suppressing, meanwhile, a number of places which are mentioned in the reports, but cannot be found in any accessible maps.

The main attack is delivered on the Motien-ling position at 3 a.m. in the morning of Sunday, July 17th. A fortnight back a Japanese outpost had been, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, surprised in the Motien-ling, and, though they quickly recovered themselves, and drove back a superior force of the enemy, it is not improbable that some rather caustic remarks were made by General Kuroki as to the necessity for more complete vigilance. In any case, there is no lack of alertness among the Japanese outposts near Lien-shan-kwan this misty Sunday morning. The alarm is promptly given, and, while the outposts prepare to fall back gradually, artillery comes into action on the Wu-fang-kwan hills to the south of the pass, while a regiment of infantry under General Okazaki moves rapidly to a position previously allotted to it in the contingency of any such movement as that now indicated.

The Russians advance, closely following up the outposts which they have driven in, until, at 5 a.m., they have reached the high land at the west of the Motien-ling with a force which soon comprises the whole of the fourteen battalions allotted to General Kashtalin-

ski for the central movement. They deploy for the attack, but, owing to the incredible activity and good shooting of the Japanese, the advance is held in check from the start, although the defenders are outnumbered by three or four to one.


From 7 to 9 a.m. the engagement rages fiercely, the Japanese artillery posted on the Wu-fang-kwan heights doing especial damage without any adequate response on the part of the enemy. For the unfortunate Kashtalinski finds that his long and cumbersome field guns cannot be brought into action owing to the nature of the ground, and he has to rely for assistance, as far as artillery is concerned, on a single mountain battery. Under cover of the latter, first a single battalion, and then three battalions, advance against the heights, but are repulsed, the Japanese holding their ground not merely with tenacity, but, as will afterwards be seen, with a complete control of the situation.

About 8 a.m. General Keller sends three battalions from the reserve to reinforce General Kashtalinski, but it is all to no purpose. Between 9 and 10 a.m. a Russian retirement takes place, and then, with admirable audacity, the Japanese, who have been reinforced by part of a regiment and some cavalry, assume the offensive, and take up the pursuit. The latter continues for half-a-dozen miles, when seven Russian battalions rally and take up a position where, covered by four guns, they stand until the evening and then finally retire.

Meanwhile, four other fights have taken place among the passes. In the first instance, a Japanese reconnoitring company falls in with a Russian battalion and, both sides being reinforced, a sharp struggle ensues, resulting in a Russian retirement at 1 p.m. In another case,

a Russian regiment attacks a Japanese battalion, but subsequently retires, simultaneously with the retirement of the central attacking force from the Motienling. The third instance is that of an

great spirit at 8 a.m., and the Japanese company losing all its officers and non-commissioned officers. The Russian force is increased to a whole regiment, but the Japanese company is also rein-



JAPAN'S SCIENTIFIC WARFARE : THE FIELD TELEPHONE CONNECTING UP AN ADVANCED POST WITH HEADQUARTERS.

attack by a battalion of Russian infantry and a troop of cavalry on a Japanese outpost, consisting of one company posted to the north-west of a place called Hsimatang. Here the fighting is very severe, the Russians attacking with

forced, and by 4.30 the Russians retreat, the Colonel commanding having pinned on the breast of a dead man's tunic a visiting card, on which he had written : "We trust the Japanese will treat our dead and wounded kindly." Finally,

another attack on an outpost must be recorded, in which eight companies of Russian infantry and one or two troops of cavalry took part. In this case the Japanese infantry were reinforced by engineers, and drove the enemy back in a north-westerly direction at 1 p.m.

The Japanese losses in these various engagements are returned at forty-three killed, including four officers, and 256 wounded, including fifteen officers. The Russian loss is admitted to have exceeded 1,000, and the Japanese buried 200 bodies after the battle.

The Russians, as has been already mentioned, attacked with the equivalent of two divisions, the force including parts of the 3rd, 6th, and 9th Divisions. The fiercest fighters were said to be the men of the newly arrived 9th Division, whose fine physique was also noted with admiration by the Japanese. According to some accounts the Japanese were only represented by a brigade and a battalion, but it may have been that, in one way or another, a considerable portion of the 2nd Division, under General Nishi, was engaged. In a congratulatory telegram, despatched direct to the 2nd Division by the Mikado, his Majesty stated explicitly that the odds in favour of the Russians were as two to one.

As has already been suggested, this battle is not of first-rate significance from a professional standpoint, and, indeed, is mainly interesting by reason of some rather remarkable omissions. The inability of the Russians to use their artillery lends point to what has been said before as to their inferiority in this arm, not only as regards quick-firing, but also mountain guns. But it is not only in respect of their ordnance that the Russian conduct of mountain warfare does not come up to that of their nimble ad-

versaries. They do not seem to have realised that, in several other directions, specialisation is necessary in order to succeed in such operations as these in the vicinity of the Motien-ling, and that nimbleness and good shooting are more to the point than fine physique and apparently overwhelming superiority in point of numbers. Mountain warfare is a thing apart, and it is only carefully trained and specially equipped troops that can hope to excel in it, especially where vigorous adversaries are concerned.

As regards the guns, it should be recorded that among the skilled observers at the headquarters of General Kuroki's Army there was a disposition to think that the Japanese themselves did not make full use of their opportunities in this respect. It is suggested that when the offensive was assumed by them their guns were unaccountably left in position, instead of being taken on with the advance in order to increase the enemy's punishment. This may conceivably have been due to a fear lest the appearance of fresh Russian reinforcements from another point of the compass might find the guns in unfavourable circumstances from which they could not readily be extricated. Or it might have been thought that in such a close country, where no great stretch of landscape is visible, even mountain artillery would have few chances to assist what was to all intents and purposes a pursuit from about nine o'clock onwards. But presumably these excuses were duly taken into consideration by the foreign attachés and correspondents, and the fact seems significant that, in spite of them, a despatch commenting on the Japanese neglect to make the best use of their advantages was allowed to pass the censor.

Putting this aside, there is much to admire in the very conspicuous ability with which, generally speaking, the Japanese rose not only to the occasion but above it. It is one thing for a well-posted force to hold its ground in the face of a strong attack delivered over a considerable front by a force largely superior in numbers, and by no means deficient in dash and determination; but it is quite another matter for a heavily outnumbered defence to take the initiative, and, after repulsing the enemy, to accelerate his retirement by a vigorous counter-attack. The art of delivering counter-strokes is one which has not received any excessive amount of illustration in the history of warfare, and it will not be surprising if in future textbooks the Battle of Motien-ling becomes a rather favourite example of this effective means of reaping the reward of a good defence. Incidentally, it may surely be claimed of the Japanese that they are by nature peculiarly fitted to excel in this difficult direction. "The more active the defender," says that sagacious German authority, General Von Der Goltz, "the less he will feel himself bound to the first position he has chosen, and the stronger will he be. Motion and activity develop in war to a source of strength."

In the Motien-ling we see for the first time the Japanese acting on the defensive, and, from the moment the Russian attack is developed, the main characteristic displayed by the Japanese is "motion and activity." Not only are they ready, but they are full of life and go. They do not merely, like the Boers, pick out useful stones or other shelter, and from behind these pour an admirably aimed fire upon the hapless attack, preparing, meanwhile, if pressed, to vault on the back of a pony and gallop off to

safety. Such tactics are by no means to be deprecated in conditions such as those in which the Boers fought. But they might be fatal in a case where the security of a main body rests on the manner in which the outposts do their work. In sharp contrast to them is the Japanese plan of combining marksmanship with a stubborn defence, and supplementing both by an alert readiness to go forward the moment an opportunity presents itself for such a movement.

On July 18th and 19th the Japanese preference for the offensive again asserts itself strongly, and with equal success. When the earlier accounts of this operation were received, considerable confusion was created, and possibly some still exists, by reason of the different names selected by the correspondents to designate the place where the fighting occurred. Chanton, Kiaotun, Chowtow, are among some of the variations adopted, and, as at first the details of the operation were rather obscure, it looked as if more than one sanguinary engagement had been fought. Happily, however, one of General Kuroki's crisp reports arrived in due course, from which the principal events of the two days mentioned can be reconstituted with sufficient accuracy, and from which it is clear that Chanton, Kiaotun, and the rest are the same as either the Shaotien-se or Shanchutse of the official despatch.

On page 480 a reference will be found to the division of General Kuroki's Army into two columns, one maintaining the pressure on Liao-yang, while the other may perhaps be destined to threaten Mukden itself, and is, in any case, working round in what will eventually be a north-westerly curve. On July 17th we have seen a portion of the left or

westerly column, represented by the 2nd Division, attacked in the Motien-ling. We have now to turn our attention to the right column. This is about to take as its objective a place called Hsihoyen, which lies about fifteen or twenty miles to the north of the Motien-ling, and from which a road runs west by way of An-ping to Liao-yang, and east to Saimatse. It is clear that Hsihoyen is a very important place for the Russians, who, by holding it, not only block one of the roads to Liao-yang, but greatly hinder any attempt to threaten Mukden. General Kuropatkin has recognised this by causing the position to be strongly occupied by troops posted behind important defensive works. The position itself is one of very great natural strength. It is accessible by a narrow road only, and the defensive works are on rising ground from 60 to 300 feet in height, and command the approach for a considerable distance. The left is protected by an unfordable river, an affluent of the Tai-sze-ho, and the right cannot be turned except by a long *détour* of sixteen miles over a series of precipitous hills. It is almost needless to add that the approach is blocked by wire entanglements.

Here the Russians have, under the command of a lieutenant-general, four battalions of the 34th Regiment, three battalions of the 36th Regiment, one regiment of Cossacks, and thirty-two field guns.

The Japanese do not seem to be at all well posted as to the details of this force. In his first despatch, General Kuroki speaks of an enemy of unknown strength being encamped near Hsihoyen, and mentions that it was believed to be retiring northwards.

On July 18th the main body of the

right column of General Kuroki's Army arrives in the vicinity of Shanchutse, which, again, lies near Shaotien-se, some fifteen miles west of Han-chang, places which are only to be found on a few large scale maps. A battalion is sent out to reconnoitre, and is engaged by two battalions of the enemy. A fierce fight ensues, in which one company of the Japanese battalion loses its commander and all its officers.

At 6.30 p.m. the Japanese advanced guard and another battalion joins the fighting line, but at sunset the enemy are still holding their ground. The Japanese bivouac in battle order, and it is well that they neglect no preparations, for during the night the Russians make two counter-attacks with, it is said, bands playing, a rather remarkable accompaniment to a night operation. However, neither the bayonet nor the blare of trumpets avails against the wakeful Japanese, who repel the Russian counter-attacks at every point.

What follows is a singular proof of the ability of the Japanese generals to make up their minds swiftly in circumstances hardly favourable to calm deliberation. There lies in front an extremely strong position, strongly held by an enemy who has over thirty field guns to oppose to the Japanese mountain artillery, and who, so far, has suffered no disadvantage. However, Hsihoyen has to be occupied somehow, and evidently the Japanese have a sufficiency of troops. Indeed, though the point is not laboured in the Japanese despatches, the odds in the fighting in the Motien-ling and other passes on the 17th were probably here reversed. There is no discredit to the Japanese in this, more especially as the Hsihoyen position was one which few generals would care to tackle



SIR CLAUDE MACDONALD (BRITISH MINISTER) AND SIR IAN HAMILTON (BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHÉ) BEING RECEIVED BY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN.

unless the force at his disposal were double of that acting on the defensive. But, having stated the disparity in the one case, it is only fair to the Russians to indicate the probability that a similar disparity existed in the other.

Be the odds what they may, the Japanese commander does not hesitate long in making his arrangements. A force, the composition of which is not stated, moves out in the darkness on the long weary trudge, varied by hard climbing, which is necessary in order to turn the enemy's right. One hopes that some day there will be forthcoming more than a bare allusion to that difficult turning movement of sixteen miles, rendered at least doubly long by the steep hills which had to be scaled *en route*, and accomplished for the most part in that peculiarly trying heat which varies the monotony of tropical rains. It is certainly a movement which could only be dreamed of by a general with absolute confidence in both the spirit and the stamina of his troops, and the brilliant success which eventually attends it is merited alike by the boldness of its conception and the sturdy vigour of its execution.

For the rest, the preparations for the coming action are very simple. At midnight the artillery takes up two positions, one on the heights to the south of the enemy's camp, the other a concealed one in the valley, from which an indirect fire—a term used when the gun is fired at a target which cannot be seen—alone can be employed. The main body advances against the enemy's front, and a detachment moves against his left.

The action commences at dawn on the 19th with an artillery duel, which lasts from 5 to 9 a.m., when the fire slackens on both sides, the Russians having made

little or no good use of the superior weight and range of their guns.

The Japanese report is silent as to the progress of the fighting between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., but the probability is that it was of rather a desultory nature, the Japanese commander evidently being anxious to defer any important frontal movement until the flanking column should have a chance of appearing on the scene.

At 3 p.m. the turning movement is completed, and the gallant troops who have achieved it make a spirited dash at the enemy's right. The main body assumes the offensive forthwith, the Japanese artillery redoubles its fire, the enemy's infantry resists stubbornly, and what General Kuroki, studiously moderate in his language, calls "a violent conflict," ensues.

About five o'clock the Japanese resort to the time-honoured expedient of escalade. Escalade is usually applied to the scaling of the walls of a fortress by means of ladders, and is not often employed against any but permanent or semi-permanent fortifications. But even Russian field-works are sometimes rather formidable in character, and, moreover, the eminences to the south-west of Hsihoyen on which the Russians are posted are distinctly precipitous. Accordingly, the Japanese are well advised in fitting together the scaling-ladder lengths with which their well-equipped column is provided, and bringing them up to the foot of the steep heights from which the enemy's rifles are cracking. No small loss is suffered here, we may be sure. But the Japanese are not to be denied. One man falls, another takes his place, even as at the Ai fords before Kiu-lien-cheng and at Nan-shan, and by 5.39 p.m.—the scrupulous accuracy

of the official report is rather impressive—sufficient attackers have scrambled up the ladders, and the heights are carried with the usual shouts of "Banzai! Banzai!" After this the action becomes easy for the Japanese. The Russians are not only being rudely handled in front, but they know that their line of retreat is threatened by the Japanese left. By 8 p.m. they have cleared out of a very awkward situation, retiring in the direction of An-ping, and the whole position is in the hands of the Japanese.

This success, noteworthy as it is, has been won at some cost. On the Japanese side there are seventy-two killed, including two officers, and 452 wounded, including sixteen officers. One of the two officers killed is Major Hiraoka, who was the Japanese Military Attaché with the British Army in the Transvaal during the war in South Africa. It is said that to Major Hiraoka is due the strictness with which the war correspondents with the Japanese Army have been muzzled, he having been greatly impressed with the disadvantages attached to our loose methods of Press censorship on an important campaign. A very gallant and accomplished officer, his death is much lamented.

The Russian losses are not officially reported, but are believed to have exceeded 1,000. They left on the field 131 corpses.

The effect of this action is apparent to anyone who will take the trouble to glance at a map and note the improved strategic lines which the Japanese have secured for their advance. But for the present no advance takes place, and only minor outpost affairs are reported. In one of these, noted by General Kuropatkin as occurring on the night of July 19th, a Japanese post is surprised by a detach-

ment of Russian sharpshooters and a squadron of Cossacks, and twenty-one Japanese are said to have been bayoneted. From caps and other objects which were picked up it appeared that the outpost was composed of men of the 4th Regiment of the Guards. On July 22nd a force of Russians attempted to break the Japanese lines at Li-ho-ling, but were driven back with seventy casualties, the Japanese having only three wounded. Again, on the same day, 800 Russians with two guns having occupied Hanchang were driven out, presumably by a detachment from Hsihoyen, leaving six dead and twenty-six wounded on the field, while the Japanese only lost one man killed and one wounded. It is true that these last two accounts are not official, but they are reproduced by the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, and are just the sort of skirmishes that might be expected to occur when one force is pressing steadily onward to the heart of the enemy's defence, while the other is uneasily attempting to lessen by minor demonstrations a pressure which it cannot successfully meet by a general encounter.

Before leaving General Kuroki's Army, we may look back a few weeks to the period of its sojourn at Feng-hwang-cheng, in order to reproduce a very striking scene which was enacted by the 2nd Division, and of which Mr. E. F. Knight, the renowned war correspondent of the *Morning Post*, has given a notable description. An account of a Japanese funeral ceremony in Tokio has been given in a previous chapter, but the procedure followed in the case of Commander Hirose, impressive as it was, lacked something of the peculiar dignity which surrounds a memorial service for those slain in war held in the field itself.

Mr. Knight's beautiful word-picture is quoted from the *Morning Post* of July 28th:—

"It was certainly a most impressive ceremony, and the grand scenery formed a magnificent setting to the spectacle. About a mile from our camp a mountain spur—steep, thickly wooded, broken here and there by grey crags and bare streaks of ruddy earth, in pleasing contrast to the dark green—projects into the broad cultivated plain extending to the picturesque range, of which the beautiful Phoenix Mountain is the culminating point. This spur, after descending steeply for about two-thirds of the way down, forms an almost flat grassy terrace, from the edge of which there is a gentle slope to the plain below. On this terrace the ceremony, which opened at nine in the morning, was celebrated under the blue sky—the site being such a one as our Druids of old might well have chosen for a similar honouring of the dead after battle. On the plain below, fronting this natural altar, such troops of the 2nd Division as were available, about 8,000 men of all arms, were drawn up in brigade formation, the infantry being on the right, the cavalry in the centre, the gunners and sappers on the left, all the men wearing their khaki uniforms, which showed up well against the reddish plain. On the terrace itself, where the officiating priests had prepared a sacred enclosure, were Prince Kuna; General Baron Nishi, commanding the 2nd Division; Generals Shibuya Fuji and Matsumaya; officers of the Headquarters Staff and others; the foreign military attachés, and the foreign correspondents. The outer enclosure was formed by flags, red, black, blue, yellow, and white, symbolical of the five elements, earth, fire, water, metal, and wood. It was

within this enclosure that the priests celebrated before us the honouring of the dead, according to the rites of the Shinto religion, the national creed of Japan. The essence of this religion is practically ancestral worship, and so here this day the prayers were offered to the deified forefathers of the race, and more especially to Hachu-man-gu, a famous Japanese general who lived 2,000 years ago, and who is now regarded as the god of war. Grand was the scene before one as one looked from the terrace down the grassy slope towards the plain, where the soldiers were drawn up, and beyond them over the cultivated fields, some green with young crops, others bare and ruddy of hue where the Chinese farmers were peacefully ploughing, the great Phoenix Mountain forming a noble background to the vast landscape. And impressive, too, was the spectacle if one stood below, near the motionless ranks of the soldiers, and looked up the green slope at the sacred place on the terrace where the Shinto priests had prepared and consecrated their open temple of the gods, for from here the steep wooded height seemed to rise like a perpendicular wall behind this wind-swept natural altar."

Mr. Knight here proceeds to describe several details of the Shinto rites, of which mention has already been made in Chapter XXVI. of this narrative. He continues:

"From the plain below, where the troops were drawn up, the bugles sounded the general salute and the ceremony opened. First the priests, approaching the altar with genuflections and chanting of prayers, stood before it and reverently clapped their hands thrice in unison—the Shinto highest salutation to the dead. Then the chief priest, taking from the

table in his hands the large pine branch I have mentioned, waved it thrice solemnly over the altar, then moving from place to place slowly he waved it in like fashion thrice over the tables of offerings, his fellow-priests, General Nishi and his staff, and the foreign military attachés, in the order as I have given it; and lastly, facing the troops, he waved it to and fro in front of them—

and, after saluting the altar, read an oration, of which the following is a close translation :

“ ‘We have assembled here on this sacred ground outside the walls of Feng-whang-cheng on this the 19th day of June, in the thirty-seventh year of Meiji, to do posthumous honour to the memory of those brave officers and men of the 2nd Division who have died.



From Stereograph Copyright, Underwood & Underwood, London and New York.

RUSSIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH, ALONG THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

this, as it was explained to us, being an act of purification or sanctification. Next, a soldier brought up the various offerings of grain, fish, fowl, and fruit, and the priests, receiving these in their hands, laid them on the altar with many prayers and genuflections. The chief priest, after bowing low before the altar, read from a scroll a long prayer, in which he presented the offerings.

“ General Nishi next came forward,

“ ‘You, brave dead, bade farewell to your native soil with the rest of us last March, and took part in the memorable attack on Chiu-lien-cheng on the 1st of May, having reached the banks of the Yalu in the face of hardships and privations. This fight, which was, in fact, our initial one, was one well calculated to make manifest to the world the merits of our Army, and also to have its effect on the spirit of our soldiery. But, as

the saying goes, "Japanese courage never fails, until death has subdued it." And now the whole world knows what occurred. The enemy's defences, made strong by nature and art, were for us easily-won prizes. The glory of Japan has been exalted thereby, and the prowess of our men has been whetted at the edge.

"Most of you fell on that memorable day, and at this very moment we fancy that we see you so gallantly fighting. A few more men have died in the later skirmishes, and many have fallen a prey to disease, unrewarded for their meritorious deeds. Our hearts bleed at the thought of you, brave noble dead. Rest in peace, precious souls; rest comforted in the sweet consciousness that your brilliant exploits shall be emblazoned in golden letters on the pages of history, and that your grand example of self-sacrifice shall be handed down from generation to generation.

"Situated as we are at the front we are ill-provided to make fit preparations for the occasion, and meagre are our offerings; but we commend our praise and our gratitude to the consecrated memory of the dead."

"Having completed this oration, General Nishi again saluted the altar. Then the general, Prince Kuna, the Japanese officers present, and the foreign

military attachés, each in turn, took up from the table on which they were spread one of the smaller white-bound boughs, and laid it on the altar. This brought the Shinto ceremony to a close. The troops presented arms and were marched off the ground. All the Japanese present followed the impressive ceremony with reverent attention—not only those who were followers of the myriad-deities Shinto faith, but also those who were Christian or Buddhist, for this symbolical tribute of honour to the brave dead appeals to men of any creed. The proportion of Christians among the officers of this army is far larger than we had supposed possible before we came to Japan, and of the officers I meet the majority appear to be Methodists. The Shinto ceremony over, two Buddhist priests, clad in rich silken robes, conducted a similar service in honour of the slain, with the accompaniments of genuflections and chanting, the burning of incense, and the beating of gongs. The same altar was used by them, but on it were now placed lighted candles and flowers. In front of the altar was a censer of burning charcoal, and into this at the close of the service the general, the Japanese officers, and the foreign attachés, each in turn, and in the same order as before, threw a stick of incense."

CHAPTER XLI.

RE-APPEARANCE OF THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON—A "DEPLORABLE ACCIDENT"—
THE CRUISERS IN THE TSUGARU STRAIT—THE SINKING OF THE *KNIGHT*
COMMANDER—INDIGNATION IN GREAT BRITAIN.

"THE Vladivostok Squadron, consisting of two warships and four torpedo-boats, was seen off Hokkaido yesterday morning." Thus runs a Reuter telegram from Tokio, dated July 14th, and it is not easy to measure accurately the amount of disquietude and, in some quarters, gloomy foreboding, created by this short and simple message. Ever since Admiral Skrydloff arrived at Vladivostok there has been grave uncertainty as to the possible performances of the Vladivostok Squadron, and, while here and there the news of the reappearance of the latter on the high seas may be regarded as likely to provide one or two sensationally interesting incidents, there is a growing feeling that such raids may portend real mischief to other interests besides those of Japan. The seizure of the British steamer *Allanton* has produced a distinct feeling of apprehension in this country lest fresh similar incidents may take place to emphasise our distrust of Russian methods. But it is safe to say that in no quarter is the possibility seriously entertained of any such outrage as that which is about to be placed to the Vladivostok Squadron's credit.

Before proceeding to discuss the details of the incident in question, it may be briefly remarked that about a fortnight has elapsed since the Vladivostok Squadron, under command of Vice-Admiral Bezobrazoff, succeeded in giving Admiral Kamimura the slip on the night of

July 1st. Of the interval which has elapsed since the latter event—which will be found described at the end of Chapter XXXII.—there is no authentic record as far as either the squadron or Vladivostok itself is concerned. But it is conceivable that the continued presence of such an exceedingly active individual as Admiral Skrydloff will have produced several changes in the daily life of the garrison, besides, in all probability, securing for Vladivostok a rather more favourable attention from Harbin in the matter of supplies. Indeed, there does not seem sufficient reason why at this time the commissariat conditions at Vladivostok should not have greatly improved, and, though business is doubtless at a standstill, the place should not be wanting in life and movement. It is true that the local daily paper has finally ceased to appear; but in a garrison news circulates quickly, and apparently little of importance can take place in the town or harbour which cannot be included in a comprehensive survey from one of the neighbouring hills.

A recent incident of interest may have been the arrival of two German ships which have been purchased by Russia, presumably for the purpose of adding them as second-class cruisers to the Vladivostok Squadron. Some obscurity shrouds the existence of these vessels, but a significant reference is made to them in a despatch from its St. Peters-

burg correspondent published by the *Petit Parisien* on July 19th. The correspondent states that a "deplorable accident" has occurred at Vladivostok, one of the two German ships above-mentioned and a Russian torpedo-boat having been destroyed by striking mines when entering the harbour. No other allusion to this episode is forthcoming, but it is hardly likely to have been reported by the St. Petersburg correspondent of a French paper unless on good authority. Assuming the accuracy of the report, one can understand the uneasiness likely to be caused at Vladivostok by the fear lest fresh disasters may arise from mines either faultily laid by the Russians themselves, or left behind him by Kamimura as a souvenir of his last visit. Of the actual loss itself, Vladivostok, perhaps, reckes little, for it is not to be compared with that of the *Bogàtyr*, the only fighting ship of the squadron which has as yet been lost, and that through an accident. Russians are, as regards their fighting strength, habitually full of cheery optimism, and the loss of a single torpedo-boat and a merchantman would probably be received with composure, as long as the *Rossia*, *Gromoboi*, and *Rurik* remained to uphold, after their fashion, the honour of the Russian Navy.

Reverting to the appearance of the Vladivostok Squadron off Hokkaido, or, as it is sometimes called, Yezo, the northern Island of Japan, it will have been noted that only "two warships," with four torpedo-boats, are reported. From what follows it seems probable that these vessels, after being sighted on July 13th, either returned to Vladivostok, or were joined by the remaining cruiser of the squadron, the torpedo-boats returning independently to harbour. For the next message with reference to these incon-

venient rovers is dated Tokio, July 20th, and is to the effect that the *Rossia*, *Gromoboi*, and *Rurik*, unaccompanied by torpedo-boats, had passed Tappi Cape in the Tsugaru Strait—the latter separates Hokkaido from Hondo Island, and in some maps appears as Sangar Strait—at half-past three that morning. At seven they were discerned from Hakodate, steaming eastward. Their discovery was at once reported to Tokio, and warnings were sent to the shipping on the east coast. "Merchantmen are hurriedly seeking cover," is the conclusion of the message. The despatch is followed a few hours later by another to the effect that a small Japanese coasting steamer, called the *Takashima Maru*, has been overhauled by the Russian squadron to the eastward of the Tsugaru Strait, but has been magnanimously released, probably because its destruction could hardly have compensated Russia for the cost of sinking her. On parting from the *Takashima Maru*, the Russian squadron steams to the south-east at full speed.

To some, perhaps, the meteoric fashion in which these cruisers flash through the Tsugaru Strait is a little remarkable; but it must be remembered that the Strait lies only about 400 miles nearly due east of Vladivostok, and that consequently the squadron which entered it in the small hours of Wednesday morning probably only left harbour on Monday night. The chances of its being sighted on Tuesday were remote, for it would have been impossible for the Japanese to keep continuous watch and ward in the hope of bringing about an action with the squadron in the Sea of Japan. The difficulty of watching the two entrances of Vladivostok Harbour has already been noticed, and, when this and other circumstances are taken into consideration, it will be



SKRYDLOFF'S PURSUER: REAR-ADMIRAL KAMIMURA, THE WATCHER OF VLADIVOSTOK.

understood that a swift and powerful division of cruisers, acting on information procured by an adventurous torpedo flotilla, might well hope to reach the Pacific from Vladivostok by way of the Tsugaru Strait without interruption.

The Russian ships are next sighted at 7 a.m. on July 21st off Iwate Prefecture, steering southward. Since releasing the *Takashima Maru* they have captured one small steamer and sunk another. At noon on July 22nd they are seen near Ibaraki, still going southward, and another glimpse is caught of them the next morning to the south of Cape Idzu, which lies about ninety miles south-west of Tokio. They are evidently steaming slowly in order to economise coal, and speculation is rife as to their intentions. Some think that a serious attempt is to be made to threaten Tokio; but a more likely suggestion is that interruption of the trade between America and Japan is aimed at. All possible steps are taken in Japan to suspend the traffic, but considerable apprehension is expressed as to the safety of steamers already *en route* from Canada and San Francisco.

It presently becomes clear that these apprehensions are fully justified. On July 25th the English Press publishes a telegram from Tokio containing the sensational intelligence that the Vladivostok cruisers have sunk the British steamer *Knight Commander*, bound for Yokohama from New York. At first the British public can hardly believe the news to be true, although the seizure of the *Malacca* and other extravagances on the part of the volunteer cruisers in the Red Sea have in some measure prepared it for surprises of this character. It is felt that the marked difference in the status of the Russian vessels concerned puts matters in this case on quite another plane, and the

utmost reluctance is shown to accept the assertion that Russian naval officers of rank and experience have committed such a breach of international law without extraordinary and altogether improbable provocation.

But, as the facts become gradually known, no improvement in the statement of the case is apparent. The *Knight Commander* was a screw steamer of 6,394 tons, and traded between the United States and the Far East. The crew numbered sixty, of whom twenty-one were Lascars. The ship is stated to have carried on this cruise no explosives nor munitions of war, but among her cargo, which consisted chiefly of rice and flour, was a quantity of iron work for railway bridges, which, it is suggested, was being carried from New York for use in Korea. The *Knight Commander* sailed from New York on May 6th, and from Manilla on July 11th.

It is said that the *Knight Commander* was thirty-five nautical miles off Cape Idzu when, at half-past seven in the morning of July 23rd, she met the three cruisers of the Vladivostok squadron. It is not difficult to imagine the curiosity mingled with apprehension with which the European portion of the crew must have regarded this formidable apparition. Probably at Manilla they will have read that the squadron has been roaming the seas in rather an arbitrary fashion, and may even have heard of the seizure of the *Allanton* in the Tsugaru Strait about June 18th. They cannot therefore be altogether surprised at meeting the Vladivostok cruisers, although they may well have hoped that by this time the Japanese Navy would have been able to prevent such an ugly demonstration within easy distance of Tokio Bay. As to the appearance of the cruisers, that is not by any

means reassuring. Very grim and forbidding they look, and, by all accounts, a good deal the worse for wear, as far as man-o'-war spickness and spanness are concerned. They are crowded with men, doubtless with a view to placing prize crews on useful captured vessels. Altogether, the captain and crew of the *Knight Commander* may well regret a *rencontre* which must cause delay, and may even, it is doubtless anticipated, cause the vessel to be sent to the Vladivostok Prize Court for adjudication on her questionable cargo. For the captain, at any rate, must be aware that Russia has declared a number of innocent articles of merchandise to be contraband of war, on the ground that they may assist the enemy in his hostile operations, and it can hardly be denied that unfavourable construction may conceivably be put on the ironwork carried by the *Knight Commander*, if it be assumed that it is intended for the bridges on the Korean railways.

Whatever may be the doubts and fears entertained on the *Knight Commander* as to these debatable points, the period of uncertainty is a short one. There is a brief colloquy, after which the amazing announcement is made that within half-an-hour the crew must come on board one of the Russian warships. In haste and confusion the order is obeyed, since resistance to it is out of the question. And then, without more ado, the British steamer *Knight Commander* is sunk!

At three o'clock the Vladivostok squadron falls in with another British steamer, the *Tsinan*, from Australia. This vessel is stopped and boarded by an officer from the *Rossia*, who expresses himself with remarkable frankness. He says that the Vladivostok squadron has received instructions from St. Petersburg to treat

the British flag with great respect, but that if the *Tsinan* has railway material on board she, too, will be either seized or sunk. As railway material is not commonly imported by Japan from Australia the *Tsinan* passes muster in this respect, and her captain is then informed that he will be required to carry the *Knight Commander's* crew of Lascars to Yokohama. The Lascars are accordingly sent aboard, and the captain of the *Tsinan* is ordered by the Russians to blow off steam, and not to allow his ship to move until the warships have disappeared beneath the horizon. The European members of the *Knight Commander's* crew are detained on board the cruiser *Rurik*, and the squadron steams off in the direction of Tokio Bay.

When, through the *Tsinan's* arrival at Yokohama, the fate of the *Knight Commander* became generally known, the matter at once assumed a very serious aspect. It was felt on all sides that here was a question altogether separate from that of the seizure of the *Malacca*—to which further reference will duly be made in the course of this narrative—and that complications of the greatest gravity might ensue unless the incident were promptly and effectively dealt with. The Prime Minister, on being approached, intimated plainly that a breach of international law had been committed, a protest was lodged with the Russian Government, and an enquiry opened in Japan by Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Minister at Tokio. But, apart from these obvious steps, the whole episode was closely discussed by the Press, and a general conclusion arrived at that the Russian ships had acted in a manner which was utterly unwarrantable, and which we, as the premier maritime nation of the world, could not but warmly resent. As the sinking of the *Knight*

Commander is not only a direct outcome of the War, but is likely to rank hereafter as a very significant historical event, a few remarks may serve both to explain the situation, and to reflect a very notable exhibition of popular feeling.

In common fairness, the Russian view of the case must be stated. According to a telegram received by the Tsar from Admiral Skrydloff, with reference to the cruise of the Vladivostok Squadron, the *Knight Commander* only stopped after a fourth shot had been fired at her. On the vessel's being boarded it was found that it was carrying to Japan a cargo of from 3,500 to 4,000 tons, composed mostly of railway material. Admiral Skrydloff continues: "Having established the fact that the *Knight*


Commander was undoubtedly carrying a contraband traffic for a belligerent party, and not being able to bring her to the nearest Russian port, owing to her not having enough coal on board, without manifest danger to the squadron, we sank the *Knight Commander*, after taking off all her crew and removing her papers."

It should be added that some of the Russian newspapers contended that the Commander of the Russian Squadron acted throughout in accordance with the Russian prize code, which enables captured vessels to be sunk if they cannot be safely taken to the nearest Russian port.

In looking at the incident of the sinking of the *Knight Commander* from the British standpoint it will be seen that, in the first instance, a very debatable question arises as to what may fairly be called "contraband of war." According to the Russian view, nearly everything comes under this heading, even provisions; but the British Government has already given Russia to understand that, in the matter of foodstuffs not intended for the consumption of the Japanese Army and Navy, she cannot accept the Russian definition. It remains to be seen whether a similar objection will be lodged in the matter of railway material, but it is sufficiently clear that a belligerent Power, by pressing the definition of "contraband of

war" to its utmost limit, can do a great deal to paralyse the commerce of non-belligerent nations, unless some international agreement on the subject is shortly and definitely arrived at.

But it is in the second aspect of the *Knight Commander* case that the more serious question arises whether a neutral vessel, even if it be carrying unquestionable contraband of war, can be sunk until its status has been determined by a properly constituted Prize Court. If a warship can take the law into its own hands in every case, in which to carry out legal formalities would be incon-



MAP OF JAPAN.

venient, the law becomes a perfect farce, and the most frightful injustice may be done, the most terrible losses inflicted upon trade, almost at the whim of a harsh and unscrupulous naval commander.

Everything, of course, hinges on the question of neutrality. If a vessel flies the flag of a belligerent nation, and is unfortunate enough to fall into the hands of an opponent, it runs, whatever its character, an obvious risk, the extent and nature of which depends largely upon the humanity and opportunities of its captor or captors. It may be said, of course, that when a ship belonging to the mercantile marine of a neutral Power violates the neutrality to which its Government is pledged, it forfeits the right to be considered from any but a hostile standpoint. But even neutrals who have misbehaved have rights under the usually accepted code of international

law, and one of these is that a vessel carrying what is alleged to be contraband of war shall be taken to a port belonging to the belligerent Power into whose hands she has fallen, and there judged by a properly constituted Prize Court, from whose decision there may or may not be an appeal. It is monstrous that if a warship does not find itself in a position to carry out this formality it should be content merely to take over the crew and passengers of the unfortunate vessel, and should then be permitted to sink the latter without any further question being raised. If such practices were recognised internationally as legal, there is no end to the difficulties which might arise, more especially when the term "contraband of war" is subject to such elastic interpretation as that which the Russians put upon it. The suggestion that the Admiral commanding the Vladivostok Squadron was justified in his action by




Photo : F. G. O. Stuart, Southampton.

THE MALACCA.

the Russian Admiralty regulations governing the treatment of prizes may suit Russian ideas of justice, but not necessarily ours. If a Government chooses to lay down laws as regards the treatment of foreign shipping which are utterly inequitable and objectionable from a foreign standpoint, it must not be surprised if those laws are not regarded as internationally binding. A strong nation may, of course, impose its will upon a weak one in such matters; but Great Britain does not happen to be a weak nation, and her maritime interests are very precious to her.

Accordingly, the British public takes the *Knight Commander* case very seriously, all the more seriously, perhaps, because the *Malacca* incident has shown a disposition on Russia's part to take very strange advantage of her belligerent position. The general indignation does not find expression in any particular exhibition of jingoism; but the nation is behind the Premier in his emphatic statement that an act has been committed which is contrary to international usage, and for which, accordingly, an explanation must be asked. We shall see later the upshot of this, as of the *Malacca* incident. But, meanwhile, it is well to place on record the circumstance that already the Vladivostok Squadron has discounted its somewhat dubious success in the matter of sinking transports and unarmed merchantmen belonging to its antagonists by wounding the susceptibilities, if not by provoking the resentment, of at least one first-class European Power.

Returning to the actual movements of the squadron, it would seem that for some days it hung about the neighbourhood of Tokio Bay, evidently on the look-out for shipping from America. Its

complete achievements during this period are not recorded; but it is admitted by Admiral Skrydloff himself that on July 24th the German steamer *Thea*, bound from America to Yokohama with a full cargo of fish, was sighted and stopped. "She was regarded as a legal prize, and after her crew had been taken off, the *Thea* was sunk, owing to the impossibility of bringing her to a Russian port."

There is little doubt that there were some narrow escapes about this time of vessels coming from America with cargoes, which, under Russian rules, might be classed as contraband. Considerable anxiety was felt for some days about the Pacific mail steamer *Korea*, from San Francisco, which was known to be carrying a cargo of £200,000 in gold for Japan, and other contraband of war. It is very possible that the squadron had been specially advised of the sailing of this vessel, for it is understood that for some time past the Russian Government had been represented at the leading ports of the world by agents, whose business it was to ascertain and report whether contraband cargoes were being shipped to Japan. This, of course, was a perfectly legitimate precaution, and one could have had, in general, but little sympathy with steamship owners who deliberately violated the neutrality declared by their Governments, and suffered the ordinary penalty of carrying contraband for the sake of extra profit. At the same time, the average British newspaper reader probably learnt with very distinct satisfaction that on July 29th the *Korea* arrived safely at Yokohama, having escaped the clutches of the three valiant commerce destroyers which were doubtless lying in wait for her.

At about noon on July 30th the squadron, fearing, perhaps, that further delay

would be dangerous, proceeded once more to the Tsugaru Strait. At about three o'clock, near the northern coast, a Japanese third-class cruiser, with three torpedo-boats, was sighted, and behind it a sailing vessel with four torpedo-boats. Simultaneously, there appeared on the left coast of the Strait a coast defence battleship. These followed, for some distance, the Russian Squadron, which was steaming slowly at eleven knots possibly through fear of mines; but of course an attack by the Japanese in such circumstances would have been madness. Moreover, it was probably anticipated that the Vladivostok

cruisers would shortly run up against a much stronger detachment of the Japanese Fleet, which was known to be looking out for it. By extraordinary good luck the Russians completely evaded the latter, by which it was never even sighted, and in due course the three cruisers, with their spoils, consisting chiefly of ships' papers and a number of captive passengers and sailors of various nationalities, regained the Golden Horn.

It should be mentioned that in this cruise the Vladivostok Squadron was commanded by Rear-Admiral Jessen,

Admiral Bezobrazoff having, it is understood, been transferred to Port Arthur. It was by Rear-Admiral Jessen's order that the *Knight Commander* was sunk, and in other ways he may claim to have established a very objectionable record. It is estimated that his cruise has caused 200,000 tons of chartered shipping to be detained for ten days, involving a loss of a million and a half pounds sterling.




OVERLOOKING VLADIVOSTOK.
(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")

One might be inclined to feel some small admiration for the audacity of the Vladivostok Squadron in perpetrating this raid, but for the fact of its encounter with the Japanese third-class cruiser and the coast defence battleship


which it met in the Tsugaru Strait on July 30th. It is conceivable that considerations of prudence may have deterred Admiral Jessen from opening fire with big guns, which might have warned a larger Japanese squadron of his presence in the Strait. But that, after sinking and seizing a few unarmed merchantmen, he should have done nothing but show his heels to a third-class cruiser and a coast defence battleship, is a sad blot upon the honour of the Russian Navy, the officers and men of which must have been ashamed of such an exhibition of cowardice.

It remains to be seen whether Nemesis will overtake the Vladivostok Squadron; but it is stated on high authority that its exploits have not only produced difficulties abroad which will not easily be settled, but have also stimulated the Japanese to fresh efforts in the direction of the capture of Port Arthur. If that prize can be grasped by Japan, and if, simultaneously, the Russian ships in Port Arthur Harbour cease to be a possible menace, the turn of Vladivostok will not be long in coming. The Russians themselves seem to have a foreboding of this, for there is noticeable at the end of July a significant renewal of interest in the northern port, which has been left so much to itself since the War

began. On July 30th it is telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Admiral Alexeieff is expected at Vladivostok, and on August 1st the *Echo de Paris* publishes an interesting despatch with reference to certain military preparations said to be on foot for the defence of the "Sovereign City of the East." The despatch confirms the report that the 1st Army Corps is to be sent shortly to reinforce General Linievitch's Division at Vladivostok. General Kuropatkin may find it difficult to spare any such substantial detachment, but the suggestion is not without importance as showing that the Russians are alive to the peril which must soon encompass their alternative stronghold in the Far East.



THE MAIN STREET, VLADIVOSTOK.
(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")



RUSSIAN CYCLIST SCOUTS.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE SECOND ARMY OF JAPAN—RUSSIANS AT TA-SHI-CHAO—THE JAPANESE ADVANCE—
BATTLE OF TA-SHI-CHAO—A NIGHT ATTACK—THE RUSSIANS RETIRE—THE
JAPANESE AT NIU-CHWANG.

WE have seen how, from July 10th to July 20th, the Second Army of Japan, under command of General Oku, continues in seeming immobility in front of Ta-shi-chao (page 376). We have further been enabled, by the light of an interesting description, quoted at the end of Chapter XXXIX., to gain some idea of the country which lies ahead of the Japanese troops during this period. It is a country offering several marked advantages for defence, the main features being an irregular chain of hills, running, for the most part, from S.W. to N.E., and fronted on the south and west by flat open plains

which afford few, if any, positions for attacking artillery. Here the Russians are posted on the Ta-ping-ling and other eminences to the south-west and south of Ta-shi-chao, their position extending about ten miles, with the right resting on a village some five miles from the sea-shore, and their left on a point a little east of the road from Kai-chau to Hai-cheng. On their right they have a considerable force of cavalry, with which they probably hope to roll up the Japanese left if a chance presents itself of dashing down between the hills and the shores of the Liao-tung Gulf.


There is no mistaking the fact that the

Russians not only have a capital eye for ground, but that they make, as a rule, the very most of a good defensive position. By taking up, in this instance, a line cutting obliquely, the direct line of advance from Kai-chau to Ta-shi-chao, and preparing to demonstrate with their cavalry on their right, they render it extremely difficult for the Japanese to make any sort of impression, more especially as the strong defensive works they have constructed at admirably selected points are held by an ample sufficiency of first-class troops. It is estimated by the Japanese that the enemy have altogether in front of Ta-shi-chao about five divisions and 100 guns, and, while the Russian official reports state that the numbers were not so great, there is reason to suppose that the bulk of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, consisting nominally of three divisions, was on the ground, together with the 1st and 9th Divisions belonging to the army formerly led by General Stackelberg. The whole force is commanded by General Zaru-baieff, and cannot aggregate much less than 50,000 men at a very low computation.

General Oku may well have found the state of affairs somewhat difficult to deal with, even after ten or twelve days of close observation of the enemy's movements, and careful scrutiny of the adjoining country. The situation is not wholly unlike that at Nan-shan, with the exception that the ground is less contracted. There is the same security enjoyed by the Russians in the matter of attempted flanking movements, and the Japanese have an added disadvantage in not being able to obtain, as they did at Nan-shan, effective assistance from their ships. Some of the gunboats might, perhaps, succeed in throwing a

few shells into the extreme right of the Russian position should they care to venture into such shallow water as is here indicated. But the damage would be extremely trifling, and could not affect the main attack. The latter must evidently be, in the first instance, a frontal one, and with so many good troops, and guns so strongly posted, the experiment can hardly be other than a costly one.

At a later date, the Russians declare that they had no intention of obstinately defending the Ta-shi-chao position, and that they had not thrown up any special defences. In justice to General Oku, and to the manly fashion in which he faced, for the second time, a very trying situation, involving an inevitable and serious sacrifice, the faithful historian must be permitted to doubt this statement. The Japanese state explicitly that the defences here are the best and most extensive they have as yet encountered. Folds of roofed-in trenches are extended round the steep hills, and gun emplacements, protected by wire entanglements, bar the ravines. Not only this, but all the evidence available goes to show that the Russians have for weeks past been increasing their forces at this point. The mere fact of General Zaru-baieff's presence is suggestive of an obstinate defence, for an Army Corps Commander would certainly not have been detached for the mere purpose of keeping the enemy in check. Again, there is a subsequent report, based on the statement of captured Russian officers, that General Kuropatkin himself looked on at one stage or another of the fighting near Ta-shi-chao, and this would hardly have occurred had the position been regarded as being on the same plane as that in front of Kai-chau.



SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE JAPANESE ADVANCE TO KAI-CHAU, TASHI-CHAO, AND YING-KAU.

There is, of course, every reason why the Russians should seek to make a strong stand at Ta-shi-chao. For, as has been noted several times previously, the place lies at the junction of the branch line to Ying-kow, and a Russian retirement from it means an end to Russian supremacy at Niu-chwang. It is difficult to understand why the Russians should so strenuously repudiate the suggestion that their intention was to do what it was obviously the right thing for them to do, namely, to cover Niu-chwang, so long as they considered the latter worth holding. If they had previously evacuated Niu-chwang, and had made every other preparation for a gradual falling-back on Hai-cheng and Liao-yang successively, they might have had some excuse for not defending Ta-shi-chao obstinately. But, as things are, we must either receive the Russian declaration that it was not intended to dispute Ta-shi-chao seriously with polite incredulity, or must lay a very bad strategical mistake to the account of General Kuropatkin and his lieutenants.

Before plunging into the tactics of a rather interesting and certainly very important operation, we may step aside for a moment to connect Ta-shi-chao with a remarkable incident, to which attention was drawn in Chapter XXX. On pages 365-6 of this story it was narrated how, in the summer of 1903, the Tsar sent M. Bezobrazoff to dog the heels of General Kuropatkin, who was then on special duty in the Far East, and how Bezobrazoff stole a march on Kuropatkin by hurrying home and securing the Viceroyalty for Admiral Alexeieff. Here is a little reminiscence of Ta-shi-chao, which appeared in the *Times* in the form of an extract from a private letter:—


“As I write, a scene comes vividly

before me. I was at Ta-shi-chao exactly a year ago—to be precise, on July 14th—and was present when Bezobrazoff, in the middle of a restaurant car swimming in champagne, and full of officers ‘vivified’ with wine, made a speech about the success of his mission, and so on. I little thought that I was witnessing something almost historical, and that a year later the Japs would be converging on that little station, which looks for all the world like a little place in Somerset. Three hours later we met poor Kuropatkin down the line. As someone said with absolute truth in the *Times* a few weeks ago, Bezobrazoff was bolting back to Petersburg to get the ear of the Tsar first. Had not Kuropatkin been too proud to race Bezobrazoff across a continent, this trouble might have been averted. But Kuropatkin ostentatiously stayed at Liao-yang to inspect, and arrived in Petersburg to find Alexeieff Viceroy of the Far East, though the appointment was not made public until two or three weeks afterwards. I did not see Kuropatkin that night, but had a talk with his Chief of the Staff; it was midnight, and we strolled up and down the track; he talked English, had something of that amazing Russian candour, and it was from the contemptuous way in which he spoke of Bezobrazoff that I first got an inkling of the true situation.”

The ends of poetical justice would, perhaps, have been better served had we found, *mutatis mutandis*, Admiral Alexeieff in command at Ta-shi-chao on July 14th, 1904, with M. Bezobrazoff as his Chief of the Staff. But the extract, which, even if discursive, links up the little place that looks for all the world as if it were in Somerset with one of the probable chief causes of the Russo-Japanese War, has a quaint interest of its own.

And now to business. It is a very interesting fact that what in reality is the first move in the operation against the Russian position near Ta-shi-chao, is not made by General Oku, but by that useful "Takushan Army" which has already done much excellent service in an

the eve of General Oku's attack on Ta-shi-chao, the Takushan Army again protrudes a detachment in the direction of Tomuchan (Shimucheng). At Pan-ling, which lies immediately to the east of Tomuchan, this detachment envelops the 17th Siberian Rifle Regiment, and



From Stereograph Copyright: Underwood & Underwood, London and New York.
JAPANESE IMPERIAL GUARDS

unostentatious and, as far as official despatches go, rather shadowy sort of way. It will be remembered that on the morrow of the occupation of Kai-chau, the Takushan Army put out a feeler, and, finding some detached Russian forces south-east of Ta-shi-chao, drove them in on the latter place (page 475). Now, on

drives it northwards, the Russians leaving fourteen killed and three prisoners. The engagement is, in itself, trivial, but the occupation of Pan-ling betokens a pressure from the north-east on General Zarubaieff's position near Ta-shi-chao, which he evidently finds, at a later date, uncomfortable, and which may have

helped to determine his actual movements on the night of July 24th.

But we must be careful not to anticipate too much. Let us rather return to General Oku's Army, which, on the morning of July 23rd, drives in the Russian outposts, and advances to a position, the left of which rests on the Kai-chau—Hai-cheng road, while the right is away to the eastward, and rests on a point some eighteen miles south-east of Tashi-chao. It is now found that the enemy's greatest concentration is to the west of Ta-ping-ling, and accordingly the front is changed, and at dawn on July 24th the advance of the deployed forces is in a westerly direction.

By 9 a.m. on July 24th the Japanese had come under the fire of the artillery on the Russian main positions, and from this time until evening it is evident that the attackers suffered severely. It is impossible to follow the fighting closely, for the Japanese official report is very meagre, the Russian despatches are very vague, and a graphic description, furnished by Mr. Ernest Brindle, the war correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, suffers from the absence of tactical detail. Mr. Brindle watched the action of the 24th from a tower on the outskirts of Niu-chwang, and the spectacle which he witnessed must, indeed, have been a moving one. But, as he himself frankly confesses, it was impossible to follow the course of the fighting very accurately, and when his account was sent off he was apparently under the impression that the battle was over by the evening of the day on which it commenced. His bright descriptions constitute, however, a useful supplement to the official account, and enable us to realise the extraordinary tenacity displayed by the Japanese in the face of a truly devastating fire.

It would seem that the attack was carried out mainly by the right wing of General Oku's Army, which showed extraordinary bravery, and, at one point, actually succeeded in penetrating the Russian line. But the difficulties of the ground were very great, it was impossible to obtain effective artillery positions, the enemy made an effective counter-attack, and the column was compelled to fall back. This is probably the incident alluded to by Mr. Brindle in the following vivid passage:—

"The Japanese retired to the hills, and to those looking on from a distance appeared to suffer a repulse. Puffs of white smoke and red flashes denoting bursting shells and shrapnel came from the Russian guns in ceaseless succession. The Japanese fire at the time was of a spasmodic nature, which ceased at noon, when a fresh Russian battery east of Tashi-chao disclosed itself and thundered across the intervening valley to the next hill.

"At two o'clock in the afternoon three rings of smoke that followed the crest of the mountain slightly north-east of the Russian position indicated that the Japanese were stationed at a new point. These rings increased and spread out in vast half-circles.

"The ridges of the highest surrounding hills soon showed a line confused and broken of Japanese, who began a descent to the next range. Surprised by this unexpected strategy, the Russians moved ten guns to the top of a long, low hill, the dark brown colour of which stood out with startling conspicuousness from the green grass and the white and red rocks that filled out the landscape.

"A terrific cannonade ensued for twenty minutes, and it became impossible to follow the progress of the fight be-

cause of the thick clouds of smoke. Presently there came a breeze, and the curtain lifted showing the Japanese line ten miles from Ta-ping-shan, on a precipitous height to the east dominating the whole country. The Russian guns were still firing, and appeared to be making good practice. The noise was tremendous. There was one continual roll of thunder, punctuated each moment by thuds that shook the earth."

The fighting round the fortifications on Ta-ping-ling was evidently of the most desperate character, and it was at this point the Japanese sustained their heaviest losses.

As to the direction of the attack, it seems that this must have altered more than once, the fighting at times being much of the same character as at Nanchan. "The Japanese did, indeed, make a number of consecutive attacks," says one of the Russian official accounts, and with our experience of Japanese heroism and indifference to death it is easy to imagine column after column hurling itself on the strong Russian defences, and falling back reluctantly with ranks shattered and ploughed by the deadly hail of shot and shell from the defenders' guns. On four occasions, according to General Zarubaieff, the fighting in the centre was at close quarters with the bayonet. But clearly the Japanese could make no headway against troops which had not, like themselves, been shaken by artillery fire, and, save in the one instance already recorded, in which, too, the foothold gained could not be maintained, penetration of the position was out of the question.

Eventually, in view of the enemy's heavy cannonade, and the impossibility of making any useful artillery response—for the Russian batteries "though

completely masked, searched the whole zone of the Japanese advance, whereas the Japanese guns had to manoeuvre in full view"—the infantry attack was suspended. At nightfall the Japanese bivouacked in close touch with the enemy.

The result of this day's fighting is, not to put a fine point on it, a distinct Japanese reverse. Practically speaking, no advantage has been gained, except a very dearly bought knowledge of the strength of the Russian defences, and the losses, though not a quarter of those sustained at Nanchan, are sufficiently severe to render it doubtful whether it is possible to make another frontal attack with any chance of success. There remains one hope, that of capturing the position by a nocturnal *coup de main*, and with characteristic boldness General Oku takes what some generals might consider a greater risk than that which would be involved in another direct assault by day.

For night-fighting is always risky. Even where the ground is fairly level, and every sort of precaution is taken, mistakes in direction will occur, and the confusion which takes place when the troops begin to press in on one another is hardly to be imagined by those who have had no experience of the process. Again, the most trifling thing at night will often produce a panic among even the best of troops, and a panic once started is not always as quickly stayed as was the case in the bivouac before Tel-el-Kebir. Even that queer scare, of which Mr. Frederic Villiers gives a notable description in his "Pictures of Many Wars," seemed likely at one moment to prove serious. "In the twinkling of an eye the men, with suppressed curses, were struggling to their feet and fixing bayonets, and huddling together in square formation, apparently to resist cavalry. Even the



"DEATH, THAT RECONCILES ALL MORTAL FEUDS, HATH MADE THEM ONE."
After the great engagements in Manchuria, friend and foe are often to be seen stretched side by side in the field awaiting burial. Above the heads of the Russian fallen are frequently planted the icons, or sacred pictures and symbols.

supports scrambled to their feet as the panic wave passed over the desert. 'For God's sake, what's the matter?' whispered the officers, as they tried to suppress the excitement of the men. But to this day there is no valid answer given for this remarkable scare. It was called the nightmare of that famous march. The excitement soon died out, but there was little further sleep."

If such alarms can take place during the bivouac before a night march, what panics are not possible during the march itself, when each soldier feels that every moment is bringing him closer to an enemy who, for all he knows, for all his leaders may know, is thoroughly on the alert, and may at any instant crumple up the attack by a charge of cavalry, or by suddenly opening fire from a long line of guns?

Well, then, may any leader hesitate to resort to a night attack, even when his troops are fresh, and the ground before him is not calculated to produce mistakes in direction, and consequent huddling of units between which a distinct interval ought to be preserved. But General Oku has not even these points in his favour. His men have been fighting for fifteen hours, and in that time have been repeatedly repulsed with grievous loss. They cannot but be weary, in spite of their indomitable pluck, and a night march is doubly trying to tired men. Nor is the "going" at all of the best. Even if a fair start can be obtained on level ground, there are hills to be negotiated by at least some portion of the attacking force, and what in daylight is a mere mound is at night a mountain, as far as its capacity to deflect a straight advance is concerned.

Yet General Oku takes the risk, and he takes it with an audacity which is

curiously complete. For he does not resort to that easier, but still difficult, form of night operation which consists of a march under cover of darkness with the intent to deliver an assault at the first streak of dawn. He elects to adopt the still more risky process of a real night attack, such as is only undertaken by the commander of a large force in very exceptional circumstances. As a rule, such attacks are only delivered by small bodies in order to harass the enemy and to create a panic. In attempting a real night attack with a force which he expressly states was a strong one, General Oku, on this occasion, touched a pinnacle of tactical daring which lifts his exploit in conception, at any rate, higher even than Tel-el-Kebir.

The preparations for the night attack must have been made early in the evening, for it is evident from the result that no time was lost. No details of the preliminary arrangements are given, but we may take it that they followed the usual course on such occasions, with the addition, maybe, of one or two improvements, which the experience gained in long and careful training has suggested. For it is probable that the Japanese, with their accustomed thoroughness, have made a very special study of military night operations, just as they have of the difficult and dangerous business of manœuvring torpedo-craft at night with lights out. For otherwise, it is hardly conceivable that such an enterprise as the present one would have been undertaken with so little hesitation, and so smartly carried to a successful conclusion.

It is not hard to picture the scene that takes place when the order is circulated among General Oku's gallant troops for the delivery of a night attack. One can imagine both officers and men.

fatigued as they are, brisking up not a little at the thought of once more getting to close quarters with the enemy, without having to undergo the fearful preliminary shattering which has so heavily discounted the chances of every heroic assault made during the past day. One can imagine, too, the General and his Staff discussing, with some anxiety, the prospects of the operation; for it goes without saying that they cannot regard it with anything like real confidence. If a night attack had afforded any great hopes of proving the nearest and best way into the heart of the enemy's position, we may take it for granted that this expedient would have been tried before attempting a series of costly frontal attacks by daylight. But General Oku, doubtless, sets to the advantage of the effort he is about to make the fact that the Russians, notwithstanding their successful defence, must be a little exhausted, and may well be alarmed to the verge of panic, to find their restless enemies pressing on them during the hours of darkness.

As to the preparations for night fighting, these are usually somewhat elaborate, for it is necessary that each unit in the force selected for the attack should have the most precise instructions as to the direction to be taken and the rate of progress to be maintained. As a rule, reliance is placed on compass bearings, and we may be sure that in an up-to-date army like that of Japan, in which every cavalry trooper carries a field-glass, there is no officer unprovided with a compass, the dial of which is treated with luminous paint, or with some similar contrivance for reading bearings in the dark. For, of course, the use of matches or lights of any sort is altogether prohibited in well-ordered night operations. Native

guides will doubtless be dispensed with by the Japanese on this occasion, as the distance to be traversed is so short, and has actually been covered by many of the troops during the past few hours; but specially selected officers will have been detailed to lead the attacking columns, and others to check the distance traversed.

There is a weird difference between the setting-out of a force on a night operation and the forming of troops for an attack by day. In the latter case there is always a plentiful braying of bugles, varied by shrill whistle signals, and the barking of commands by word of mouth. Nor is it long before the cracking of rifles begins, and grows in frequency until, in a short time, there seems to be an almost continuous roar, interspersed with an occasional crash produced by volleys of musketry, or with the *pup-pup-pup* of the comprehensive Maxim. In a night attack there are none of these noisy accompaniments. From quite the start—if the operation be in good hands—there is not a bugle sounded, and every word of command is given in a low tone. Above all, it is impressed upon every man in the ranks that on no account must he fire his rifle, and care should be taken to see that no fire-arms are loaded. For the success of a night attack depends, first, on surprising the enemy, and then on the free and frequent use of the bayonet. It is hard to imagine a greater military crime than that of the man who "looses off" his rifle, during more especially the early stages of a night attack, for he not only may be wrecking an elaborate plan of operations, but he is certainly endangering the lives of scores, perhaps hundreds, of his comrades.

In almost complete silence, then, we

may imagine the Japanese columns moving off, probably at about eight o'clock on the night of July 24th. The usual method adopted where there are two or three columns employed is for them to march independently to what is known as the "point of assembly," after which the advance is continued in some compact formation until the "point of deployment" is reached. The troops are then formed for the assault, the signal for which may be given by a rocket. But it is very possible that in this case the point of deployment coincided with the point of assembly, and, in any case, the Japanese may have introduced some telling variations from our own practice, an outline of which has merely been given in order to enable the reader to realise an interesting and effective operation.

General Oku tells us that his night attack was delivered from his right, and that a strong force carried at 10 p.m. the enemy's first position east of Ta-ping-ling, thereafter attacking two more of his positions.

The nature of the fighting which took place at these points is very obscure. The Russian official despatches are curiously reticent as to the whole matter of the night attack, and, indeed, one can hardly gather from them that it took place. They speak of "a fusillade" which "lasted until late in the night," and it is declared that "the position was abandoned because the commanding officer did not deem it possible to accept battle the next morning while defending a position with a front of sixteen kilometres." General Sakharoff adds the evacuation of the Russian position was a complete surprise for the Japanese.

This is rather an interesting example of the difficulty sometimes experienced

by victors and vanquished in seeing eye to eye as regards the means by which a battle has been lost and won. The weak point of the Russian contention is that, if the evacuation was really carried out deliberately for the reason stated, it was a poor exhibition of rather cowardly incapacity. The Russians had already defended their ten-mile front with success for one day, and there was absolutely no reason why they should not again have repulsed the enemy had he ventured on another daylight frontal attack. It may have been that General Zarubaieff was conscious of some pressure from the direction of To-mu-chan, near which the Takushan Army was beginning to assert itself, and this might have justified his gradual withdrawal from the Ta-shi-chao position, the strongest part of which could then have been held till the last movement by a rear-guard. But a planned hasty evacuation after a successful defence seems an ignominious proposition, and even the well-wisher of the Russian Army will prefer to think that the only reason why the Ta-shi-chao position was so promptly abandoned was because it really was captured by a brilliantly successful night attack on a large scale.

A well-known character in one of Mr. Surtees's sporting novels cynically remarks that it does not matter much whether a horse kicks his rider off through playfulness or vice—the actual result is much the same in both cases. And so, whether General Zarubaieff had made up his mind to retire, or whether General Oku caused or accelerated his departure, does not, after all, make much difference to the course of events. General Oku says that at daybreak all the Japanese corps on the Ta-ping-ling were occupied on the heights eastward of Shang-hsi-tan—which lies six or seven

miles south-east of Ta-shi-chao—"after which the enemy began to retire toward Ta-shi-chao."

Assuming that at least a remnant of the enemy would be still in position, the Japanese commenced the morning's work with a brisk artillery fire, but the Russian reply was so feeble that an immediate advance was made, and by 7 p.m. Shang-shi-tan was occupied without resistance. Here it was found what a strong position the enemy had been holding, and admiration was expressed of the manner in which he had turned the natural advantages to the best account with trenches, forts, and defences of felled trees.

A pursuit of the retiring Russians is now organised, but in all probability the Japanese troops are too utterly worn out to carry it on with the vigour necessary to produce demoralisation in the enemy's ranks. At noon a large column forming the Russian rearguard is observed to pass Ta-shi-chao, moving northward. The Japanese follow this for some distance beyond the town without at first entering the latter, and then discover that the Russians, before retreating, have set fire to Ta-shi-chao itself, and to the railway station.

Thus ends the battle of Ta-shi-chao, a stubbornly-contested, and, as far as the night attack goes, a remarkable affair, in which the Japanese had 146 killed, of whom ten were officers, and 925 wounded, including forty-seven officers. The Russian casualties are not accurately known, but, according to the statement of captured officers, they amounted to about 2,000. It is also reported that among the wounded were Generals Sakaloff and Kondratovitch.

Despatches from St. Petersburg show that, notwithstanding the self-assertiveness of General Zarubaieff, the Russians

were profoundly impressed with the results of the Ta-shi-chao battle, the Russian war correspondents dwelling, in particular, on the extraordinary mobility and capacity for concentration displayed by the Japanese in connection with this action. It is added that the Russian troops are grumbling a good deal at the constant retreats, or, as the generals prefer to call them, "strategic retirements." Stress is laid upon the extreme difficulty of carrying away the wounded in such mountainous country as that round Ta-shi-chao, and it is said that in many cases badly hurt men have been obliged to walk, in spite of the suffering entailed. Excellent as is the spirit of the Russian soldiery, and marvellous as is their endurance, the voicing of such complaints shows that General Kuropatkin is now beginning to be confronted with an enemy almost as formidable as that which is keeping his forces so continually on the trot. For it is an evil day for an army on the defensive when the men begin to grumble at the plans of their leaders, and to point to the sufferings of the wounded as illustrating the cynical disregard of those in authority for the unfortunate pawns in their badly-played game. It is otherwise, of course, when an army's occasional reverses are being set off by notable triumphs, or, even, as in the case of that awful retreat from Moscow, which is the historical example of such painful movements, when the memory still survives of the Commander's previous great victories. But the Russian Army in Manchuria has no such conditions to inspire it. Perhaps the nearest approach to a genuine Russian success hitherto has been this very repulse of the Japanese from the Ta-shi-chao position on July 24th, and it is easy to understand that when, after even this

moderately promising performance, another "strategic retirement" should be talked of as imperative, the Russian soldier begins to lose heart and patience. Doubtless his confidence in Kuropatkin

much as if he had in person led the forward movement at Telissu, or taken a brisk offensive at Ta-shi-chao.

The natural sequel of the retreat of the Russians from the Ta-shi-chao position



From Stereograph Copyright, Underwood & Underwood, London and New York.

MAJOR-GENERAL FUKUSHIMA, THE GREATEST LANGUAGE EXPERT OF THE JAPANESE ARMY, WHO SPEAKS SEVERAL SIBERIAN DIALECTS, AND HOLDS A HIGH POSITION ON THE GENERAL STAFF.

is still great; but it is probably now being recalled that it is a good many years since Skobelev's former right-hand man held an active command in the field, and to the rank and file the good work which the Commander-in-Chief has been doing at Liao-yang may not appeal as

is not long in coming about. At last the crisis has arrived for the Port of Niu-chwang (Yingkow), where, for the past forty-eight hours, extraordinary excitement has been prevailing. From an early stage in our narrative, Niu-chwang has been carefully kept in view,

the probability of dramatic events in this quarter having, from the first, been clearly indicated. And now, as so often happens in war, the actual *dénouement* is rather tame. The explanation, of course, is that in many warlike cases the preliminary operations leading up to some important result are themselves so comprehensive, so thorough, and so detrimental to the enemy's capacity for further resistance, that at the last the "action of the piece" seems to crumble away, and there is nothing left but a little shouting. A recent instance of this was the capture of Pretoria, which, at one time, was expected to offer a tremendous barrier to our troops if only by reason of its powerful forts, equipped with all sorts of up-to-date aids to a stubborn defence. But, as we all remember, the actual entry of the British troops into the town was a very commonplace affair, for the simple reason that the work had been done weeks before our army approached those ugly fortifications. So with Niu-chwang, where, at the commencement of the war, it seemed as if the Russians could not but make a determined stand for political, as well as military, reasons. Yet, at the last, as we shall see, there is no stand at all. One afternoon the place is in the military occupation of Russia, the next in that of Japan, and the translation involves, as far as one can gather, the loss of not a single life, not even the firing of a single shot!

The Treaty Port of Niu-chwang (Yingkow) is, Mr. Clive Bingham tells us, the shipping place for the bean-cake trade. This article, manufactured throughout the two southern provinces, comes down the Liao River at normal times in hundreds of junks, and is sent in large quantities to South China, the Yang-tse,

Japan, and Korea. Skins, furs, cereals, and timber are also exported, though to no very great amount. Great Britain is considerably interested in the piece-goods business, and the Germans and Americans are also well represented. In 1899 it was feared that Niu-chwang would suffer greatly from the competition of Dalny; but, as has been noted, the latter, in spite of the efforts made by Russian officialism to popularise it, never succeeded in attracting an adequate resident population. The more recent vicissitudes of Dalny are likely to increase Niu-chwang's future commercial chances very considerably; but, in any case, the place is of marked importance, and the transfer of the administration from Russian to Japanese hands is a matter of commercial moment to three continents.

It is understood that if General Kuropatkin could have had his own way Niu-chwang would have been evacuated long ago, but that the occupation had been continued up to the last moment by order of Admiral Alexeieff. On July 24th came the Commander-in-Chief's final and peremptory instructions that a complete withdrawal is to be made, and the ensuing night and next morning, accordingly, some remarkable scenes are witnessed. During the hours of darkness the entire Russian civil population leaves the place, and in the morning 600 infantry, with six guns, and 300 cavalry evacuate the forts commanding the entrance to the Liao River. The Russian settlement is now set on fire, and a quantity of Russian property destroyed. Apparently a good deal of Chinese property suffers in the process, and it is not improbable that the Russians are leaving behind them liabilities which are not likely to be discharged. For Mr. Brindle, the *Daily Mail's* corre-

spondent, mentions that the burning of the Russian settlement was watched by thousands of Chinese, "many of whom were rich, and have lost heavily."

The railway station is also set on fire, and here the Chinese rush in and carry off everything they can lay hands on. The Russian commercial flag is left waving over the Russian Administration, and only M. Grosse, the Civil Administrator, and another official are left to represent the former masters of Niu-chwang.

The foreign residents, as may be imagined, have been going through a very anxious time. For the Russian evacuation means that they are left temporarily at the mercy of the Chinese population, and of the desperadoes who are known to be hovering about the town. There are no foreign gunboats in the roadstead, and unless the Japanese come very quickly mischief may be wrought which it will be impossible to repair. In the afternoon a band of robbers actually enters the settlement and begins pillaging some of the shops. The foreign residents have organised patrols, and these are about to deal with the marauders when the shout goes up, "The Japanese are coming," and the bandits quickly melt away.

Within ten minutes of the arrival of the Japanese the Russian flag on the Administration building is hauled down, and is replaced by the tri-colour of France.

At five o'clock a detachment of Japanese cavalry, one hundred and fifty strong, enter Niu-chwang to the accompaniment of noisy demonstrations of joy on the part of the Chinese; while a cordial welcome is accorded by a number of the foreign residents. Very spick and span the Japanese detachment looks, men

and horses, all, it is said, in the pink of condition, and the troopers exciting admiration by the completeness of their equipment. The officers intimate that they are under orders to return forthwith to Ta-shi-chao, but, at the urgent request of the British and American Consuls, they consent to remain overnight. After a tour of inspection, they encamp in the foreign settlement, having, it seems, made one prisoner, a Russian soldier, who, whether through negligence or by design, has not accompanied his comrades in their retreat. The Russian, says Mr. Brindle, "with an assumption of indifference, fanned himself with his cap. With a smile, one of the Japanese handed him a fan, on which were the national colours, and the Russian used it vigorously while a revolver was pointed at him." A trivial incident, but one quaintly typical of much that may happen before the struggle between Russia and Japan comes to an end.

Mr. Brindle is careful to add that the general deportment of the Japanese cavalry is such as can give no offence to any nationality. The officers are clearly men of tact, and when, at a conference which takes place between them, the Russian ex-civil Administrator, and the French Consular Agent, the latter states that the Russian buildings are now under the protection of the French flag, the courteous Japanese raise no objection.

On the morning of the 26th the cavalry detachment departs, leaving a small guard with a lieutenant in charge. The following day a battalion of Japanese infantry arrives, and also the Japanese Administrator, Major Takayama, who proceeds to issue a notice to the inhabitants stating that the Port of Niu-chwang is now under the control of the Japanese, and that life and property will be pro-


tected. The infantry battalion is now withdrawn some three miles to Niu-chia-tun, leaving at Niu-chwang only such number of soldiers as is deemed necessary for police purposes.

In the course of the next few days the Japanese succeed in effecting considerable changes at Niu-chwang. Very shortly after their entry the last representative of Russian officialism takes his departure, and the only interest which remains is the Russo-Chinese Bank, as to which a rather curious situation is created. This bank was organised and financed by the Russian Government for the purpose of furthering Russian interests in the Far East, and now has a strong foothold in China and Manchuria. Loans in force in Niu-chwang alone are said to amount to over five millions sterling. The Russians, before leaving, have handed over their interest in the bank to the French Consular Agent, but the appointment of the latter not having been made till after the opening of hostilities, the Japanese now decline to allow him to administer the funds of the bank, and there seems an excellent chance that the latter will fall into the hands of the Japanese as "legitimate spoils of war." A double Nemesis would thus overtake Russia. In the first place, it will seem strange if an institution which has done so much to further Russian interests in the Far East should now, by becoming Japanese property, help to thwart them. Again, it is an instance of poetical justice that Russia, who declined to recognise the United States Consuls appointed to An-tung and Mukden, although they had been appointed before the outbreak of war, should now be confronted by a Japanese refusal to acknowledge her ally's Consular Agent, whose appointment is of later date.

For the rest, the Japanese, as the *Times* correspondent at Peking, who makes a special visit to Niu-chwang, remarks, "step quietly into possession, displaying that wonderful power of controlling the Chinese, and inspiring confidence, which was so marked a feature in their work of occupation at Peking after the Boxer trouble." Large numbers of Japanese traders are now returning, and it is anticipated that the port will "now quickly recover from the effects of Russian domination, with its ruthless squeezing and corruption." At first some annoyance is caused by the publication of an order, signed by Marshal Oyama, to the effect that all neutral ships shall remain away from Niu-chwang, but the restriction is quickly removed, and Ying-kow is thrown open to trade, the importation of contraband of war destined for the Russians being alone forbidden. Major Takayama is shortly succeeded as Administrator by Major Yokura, and the circumstance is made the occasion of a farewell dinner, at which the foreign Consuls and the Commissioner of Customs are present, the assemblage showing that pleasant relations have been established between the new administration and all foreign interests.

On August 1st a Japanese battleship, a cruiser, and three gunboats arrive at Niu-chwang. For some days previously, search has been made in the Liao River for mines, and a number of these engines have been discovered and removed. By the 3rd, a large depôt of army supplies has been established at the burnt Russian railway station under a guard of 2,000 men, and transport and hospital ships were hourly expected.

Thus, quietly and methodically, is effected the Japanese occupation of Niu-chwang, which is a far greater blow to the



THE SEAMY SIDE OF WAR: WOUNDED RUSSIANS RETURNING TO LIAO-YANG.

Russians than might have been supposed from the military surroundings of the event. Strategically, it sets a seal upon the Japanese operations in the Liao-tung Peninsula—other than those in the immediate vicinity of Port Arthur—and does so with such completeness that any chance of a Russian recovery in this direction seems utterly and finally hopeless. There is now no link missing in the chain which stretches from the northern shores of the Liao-tung Gulf to the mouth of the Yalu, and south of a line drawn from Ying-kow to An-tung the country—Port Arthur excepted—is as completely under Japanese control as Korea itself, that other great peninsula to the domination of which Japan devoted early and close attention. There is something peculiarly impressive in this fresh instance of Japanese thoroughness, and one cannot but smile at the quiet tenacity with which this result has been achieved in the face of repeated counsels to Japan to hurry her course by making an earlier descent upon Niu-chwang.

For the rest, a great success has been achieved by lowering the prestige of Russia, more especially among the Chinese

It is said that the Chinese have long been confident that the Japanese would have no trouble in occupying Niu-chwang, and that for some time before the actual event a Chinese official was waiting in the neighbourhood to take over the Customs. But the *fait accompli* has always a significance of its own, and when the news of the Battle of Ta-shi-chao and its sequel was known in the tea-shops of Peking, some other sentiments besides those of satisfaction at the success of Japan are likely to have been freely expressed by the Chinese. In the hands of officials like Alexeieff, Russian self-aggrandisement has been too marked, her methods too coarse, and it is not surprising that China is willing to forget the drubbing Japan gave her ten years ago in the pleasure she experiences in seeing a more real enemy humiliated to-day.



A GLIMPSE ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.
(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")

CHAPTER XLIII.

RUSSIA'S TREATMENT OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING — THE *MALACCA* INCIDENT — THE DARDANELLES—DOUBTS AND FEARS—THE QUESTION OF CONTRABAND—THE *KNIGHT COMMANDER* AND THE *HIPSANG*.

IN fulfilment of the promise made on page 454, a halt will now be called in the march of warlike events in order to give the sequel of the *Malacca* incident, and to discuss briefly one or two other cases which have arisen out of Russia's treatment of neutral shipping. The question is one of quite extraordinary importance, not only as affecting the chance of foreign interference in the war, but also in its general relation to the subject of the rights and limitations of belligerents. An opportunity may be found later to put the legal aspects of the matter before the readers of this narrative. In the meantime, a plain statement of actual happenings, with, perhaps, a few discursive comments, may serve to recall what, at one time, threatened to be a very grave situation indeed, and what may still prove to have some inconvenient, if not serious, results.

In the brief reference already made to the seizure of the *Malacca*, several details have been omitted which subsequent events have surrounded with some interest. It appears that the examination which took place after the *Malacca* had been boarded by the Russians was conducted by a special set of officers of the Russian Intelligence Department, who were apparently on the *Peterburg* for this particular purpose. What follows is one of the most disgraceful proceedings ever laid to the charge of what, according to the Russian admission, were duly com-

missioned naval officers. According to the statement of the Secretary to the P. and O. Company "a number of the ship's people were sent on board the *Peterburg* to be examined in reference to the nature of the cargo, and were, in fact, offered inducements to give such information as would justify the seizure. . . . The Russians thought they had got a rich prize, and were prepared to bribe the officers of the ship in order to assist them towards that consummation." The *Times* supplements this information by details communicated to it by a trustworthy correspondent, who states explicitly that Captain Street, of the *Malacca*, was offered £2,000 as a present for himself if he would say that he had contraband on board. "Of course he indignantly refused. Other European members of his ship's company who were taken on board the Russian ship stated on their return that they, too, had each been spoken to separately, and, in turn, offered money to give evidence that the *Malacca* was carrying contraband."

It is a painful thing to be compelled to record such shameless actions on the part of the accredited representatives of a civilised and, diplomatically speaking, friendly Power. But there is no questioning the evidence of the P. and O. officials in the matter, and any Russian attempt to repudiate a charge so clearly substantiated may be dismissed as futile. The incident, of course, does not materi-

ally affect the main points at issue; but it does materially affect British capacity to place reliance upon the honour of Russian officers in carrying out duties of great delicacy and of grave international concern. Beyond this, the idea of offering a bribe to the captain of the *Malacca* to give false evidence in order to hurt his employers is not without a humorous side, which few of the hundreds of thousands who have come into contact with that peculiarly British institution, the "P. and O.," could fail to appreciate.

As showing the extraordinary elasticity of the Russian notions regarding "contraband of war," it may be mentioned that the Russian officers who boarded the *Malacca* had the assurance to state that any dry biscuits on board the ship, in contradistinction to sweet biscuits, constituted contraband! Such a definition would, of course, condemn every British ship on the seas, and it is amazing that a proposition so childishly ridiculous could ever have been advanced by the responsible officers of a Great Power.

After the seizure of the *Malacca*, the British engineers were turned out of the engine-rooms, Russian engineers taking their places. Before Suez was reached, however, the bearings became heated, and the Russians were obliged to ask the British engineers to set matters right.

While the *Malacca* was being taken to Suez under the flag of the Russian Navy, the feeling in Great Britain on the subject of the seizure had been growing very warm, and if the Government had not clearly indicated that it was taking prompt measures to secure an adjustment of the difficulty a very serious outburst of public indignation would undoubtedly have occurred. As things were,

considerable restraint was exhibited, the prompt demonstration on the part of the Mediterranean Fleet of its capacity to deal with any sort of ultimate complication having inspired remarkable confidence.

What passed between the British and Russian Governments on this interesting occasion is a Foreign Office secret not likely to be revealed. But the early upshot was that the Russian Government admitted that a mistake had been made, and instructions were issued for the release of the *Malacca* at the first port she should touch on her journey from Port Said, which, unfortunately, she had already left in charge of her "prize crew" when the settlement was arrived at. In order, presumably, to "save the face" of the Russian Government, the British Government consented to a formal fresh "examination" of the *Malacca*, on the understanding that a British Consular statement to the effect that the explosives on board were Government property would be accepted.

On July 27th the *Malacca* entered the port of Algiers, and the officer commanding the "prize crew," not knowing what had occurred, informed the French naval authority that he required 600 tons of coal and a good supply of water and provisions of all sorts, as he wished to continue his voyage for the Russian port of Libau. The Russian Consul at Algiers now boarded the *Malacca*, and was followed by the British Consul. A conference then took place, at which the Russian captain and a British officer belonging to the *Malacca* assisted. One of the hatches was opened, and the stores carried for the British Government were shown to be duly marked with the broad arrow, the operation lasting only five minutes. The

*Russians
Retreating.*

*Japanese
Artillery.*

*Russians
Remaining.*

*Japanese
Advancing.*



*Foreign Military
Illustrations.*

THE ACTION AT WA-FANG-KAU, OR TELISSU: THE RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS BEFORE THE JAPANESE.

Russian crew was landed, the Russian flag was hauled down, the British flag hoisted afresh, and the *Malacca*, in due course, continued her voyage for her original destinations.

It would be going too far to suggest that this was regarded as an altogether satisfactory termination of the *Malacca* incident. As a matter of fact, there were many who considered the attitude of the British Government in the matter of the seizure itself, apart from other considerations to which attention will be given presently, to be lacking in firmness and self-assertion. It was pointed out that the tearing down of the British flag, before the vessel had been adjudged by a Prize Court to be guilty of carrying contraband, was not in accord with the usual practice, and that in all the circumstances of the case it would have been more consonant with the dignity of Great Britain if the vessel had not been allowed to leave Egyptian territorial waters. On the other hand, it was felt we ought not to bark unless we were prepared to bite, and there was no anxiety to go to war over a question of this sort if any sort of honourable pacific settlement could be arrived at. Accordingly, the news of the release of the *Malacca* was received with general satisfaction, by no means impaired by the reflection that Russia had not been needlessly humiliated in the process of admitting her error.

Unfortunately for the growth of this friendly sentiment, the Russian Admiralty, apparently exasperated at the failure of designs upon the *Malacca*—as to which it is believed that particular instructions had been issued on the strength of special information conveyed by untrustworthy spies, took upon itself to cause the publication in the *Official Mes-*

senger of a so-called statement with reference to the *Malacca*, and the employment of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, a statement containing at least one inaccuracy. Here is the text of this document :—

“From the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War the Imperial Government took measures to prevent the transport of contraband of war to Japan by vessels of neutral countries. In the regulations sanctioned by the Tsar on February 14th, 1904, which Russia proposed to follow during the War, a list was given of articles regarded by us as contraband of war.

“It was also declared that the military and maritime authorities would reserve to themselves the right of rigidly executing the decision contained in the regulations for naval prizes sanctioned by the Tsar on March 27th, 1895, and in the instructions confirmed by the Council of the Admiralty on September 20th, 1900, regarding the procedure for stopping, visiting, and seizing, as well as for carrying off and delivering over vessels and cargoes seized.

“The vessels *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, of the Volunteer Fleet, having received a special commission, the term of which has already expired, on proceeding to their destinations acted in accordance with the above decisions, and while passing through the Red Sea stopped and visited all suspected vessels which they encountered in those waters.

“It was under these conditions that the commander of the *Peterburg* stopped, among others, the British vessel *Malacca*, the captain of which refused to show the ship's papers relating to the cargo, a refusal which led to the seizure of the vessel, and the decision to send it to Port Alexander III., Libau, with a view to throwing light on the matter.

"Nevertheless, in view of an official statement of the British Government that the *Malacca* was carrying British State cargo, the Imperial Government, acting in agreement with the British Government, decided that a fresh 'visit' should be paid to the seized vessel at the nearest port on its route in presence of a British Consul.

"The 'visit' took place at Algiers. The British Consul-General officially certified that the military stores on board the *Malacca* continued to be the property of the British Government, and that the rest of the cargo was not contraband of war. Taking this attestation into consideration, the Imperial Government decided to liberate the cargo and the vessel.

"This decision must not, however, be interpreted as a renunciation by the Imperial Government of its intention to despatch alike cruisers and warships in general to prevent the carrying of contraband of war for our enemy."

The inaccuracy referred to is the allegation that the *Malacca* was seized because the captain refused to show the ship's papers relating to the cargo. To this statement the P. and O. Company give an absolute contradiction, and the word of the company will certainly carry more weight with Englishmen than that of officials who have attempted to further their strange enterprise by flagrant experiments in corruption.


Again, while the Russian Admiralty is hardly to be blamed for trying to conceal the fact that it has yielded reluctantly to pressure, it is hardly gracious on its part to make the concession of the British Government as to the re-examination of the *Malacca* appear as a surrender of the original position taken up by this country. For the whole point of the British grievance was that the *Malacca*

ought never to have been stopped at all by the *Peterburg*, which had no sort of right to pose as a warship after having passed the Dardanelles as a merchantman and flown the Red Cross in the Suez Canal. It will be seen that the Russian official statement avoids any reference to this question. But the remark that the "special commission" given to the *Peterburg* and the *Smolensk* had already expired, is pretty clear evidence that the British Government had spoken with considerable plainness on the subject of the departure of ships of the Volunteer Fleet from the Black Sea as merchantmen with the idea of becoming warships as soon as ever they had passed the Dardanelles.

As far as the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* are concerned, the question has now been settled. Instructions have been duly issued to those vessels, and they are subsequently reported to be flying once more the Russian mercantile flag. It is further understood that the other Volunteer steamers which are in the Black Sea will not be permitted to play similar pranks to those which have caused so much ill-feeling in the case of the *Malacca*, and, as will be seen, in that of several other neutral ships. Certain assurances are given to the British Government on this point, which the Prime Minister appears to consider satisfactory. At the same time, it is evidently deemed desirable to take no chances, and there is a significant mention in a Russian paper of an incident which takes place about this time in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and which shows that the British Navy is, as usual, keeping its weather eye open. For the Russian steamer *Rossiya*, which arrived at Odessa on the evening of July 29th, appears to

have had an interesting experience. When approaching the Dardanelles she became aware of a very large, powerfully armed British cruiser—probably H.M.S. *Lancaster*, one of our newest ships, of nearly 10,000 tons, and with a speed of twenty-three knots—which was evidently


a port of assembly, it is pretty clear that if the next question of the Dardanelles takes in the near future an acute form, this country will not be wholly unprepared with the sort of arguments which experience has shown in such cases to be the most effectual.



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF JULY, 1904.

in the neighbourhood "on business." For on the appearance of the *Rossiya* the big British cruiser steamed round her, and examined her very carefully before allowing her to pass. When it is added that the British Mediterranean Fleet is about to engage in grand manœuvres, and has selected Smyrna as

Before leaving this portion of a subject which must necessarily be treated with some reserve, it seems expedient to say a few words as to the first cause of difficulties which ought never to have arisen between two nations, one of which is most anxious to observe the correctest neutrality, while the other should be



THE SEIZURE OF THE *MALACCA*: A BOAT'S CREW FROM THE VOLUNTEER STEAMER *PETERBURG* ABOUT TO BOARD THE LINER.

too preoccupied with her work in the Far East to be looking for trouble nearer home. It has been pointed out that many of the disabilities of Russia at the front have been, if not due to, at any rate, aggravated by, the constant and conflicting intrigues among the immediate surroundings of the Tsar. It now seems that the anti-British influence of the Grand Duke Alexander Michailovitch at the Russian Admiralty is largely responsible for the *Malacca* incident, and for the state of tension as regards the Dardanelles. Throughout the negotiations with the British Government, the Russian Admiralty has taken a stand which is utterly opposed to the more reasonable and pacific counsels of the Russian Foreign Office, and Count Lamsdorff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has utterly failed in his efforts to persuade the Marine Department to abandon its dangerous policy. Time will show whether from this unfortunate state of affairs a better understanding may be evolved; but it is, historically speaking, strangely interesting that, at such a critical period of the War in the Far East, European complications of the first magnitude should be fostered by the reckless interference of Russian Court animosities with the course of international politics.

It now remains to revert briefly to the doings of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* before instructions reached them to resume their mercantile character. On July 24th the German steamer *Scandia*, a Hamburg-American vessel of 4,800 tons burden, arrives at Port Said flying the Russian naval flag, and manned by twenty-eight Russians, including three officers. The *Scandia* is carrying a general cargo and rails for Japan. Instructions having been telegraphed by the

Russian Government to Suez and Port Said with reference to captures made by the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, the *Scandia* is released at sundown. The next day a similar procedure takes place in regard to the British steamer *Ardova*, Liverpool-owned, which is bound for Manila with a cargo of coal and explosives, consigned from the United States War Department for the use of the troops in the Philippines. On July 26th another P. and O. vessel, the *Formosa*, arrives at Suez, having been seized and provided with a prize crew by the *Smolensk*. She is released at eight o'clock the next morning. Finally, on July 27th, the German steamer *Holsatia*, which has been seized by the Russian Volunteer steamers, arrives at Suez with a "prize crew" on board, and is at once released. Other captures would, of course, have been made, but by this time the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* have received their instructions, and their career of questionable usefulness has come to an end. Considerable annoyance has been caused to two great Powers; Russia, at considerable expense to herself, has gained no tangible advantage whatever; and the question of reparation has still to be considered. On the whole, then, the "special commission" given to the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* can scarcely be described as a radiant success.

On the other hand, the work done by these two ships in a few days is an extraordinarily strong reminder of the possibilities arising out of an unscrupulous exercise of the right of search undoubtedly possessed by belligerents which use genuine warships for the purpose. Had Russia been represented in the Red Sea by real cruisers which had seized the *Malacca* on the ground that she was carrying contraband dry biscuits to

Yokohama, public indignation in this country might not have stopped short of mere protests. For the seizure and possible future confiscation of a valuable British liner on such trumped-up pretexts as this would have been construed as a wanton and intolerable attack on British commerce. Yet, in such a case, the illegality complained of in connection with the actual *Malacca* incident would have largely disappeared. The imperative necessity, then, for some valid international agreement as to what is and is not contraband, is emphasised in a very marked manner by the performance of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*.


Again, the general inconvenience to the world's carrying trade, which can be caused even by a second-rate naval Power, provided it happens to be a belligerent, has seldom, if ever, been so sharply demonstrated as in this case. Russia herself, at the moment of the *Malacca* and *Scandia* seizures, was hardly in a position to assume a dictatorial attitude at sea towards Germany; while it may safely be assumed that a collision between the British and Russian Navies would not have been a very comfortable proceeding for the latter. Yet if, instead of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, Russia were now to send a couple of destroyers with a few colliers into the Red Sea, she might contrive to stop British and German liners, and subject them to an inconvenient delay, without incurring the least risk of reprisals. Germany, doubtless, can make—it is suggested that she has made—arrangements with Russia which will insure her against a repetition of what has occurred. But if anti-British sentiments are to be fostered in Russia by those who have the ear of the Tsar, there is grave danger lest the "right of search" may still be

used in such a manner as to cause this country something more than passing annoyance. Considerable anxiety on the subject is manifested in England in the early part of August, for it is felt that, in certain contingencies, a pitch of exasperation might be reached, in which the consciousness of superior naval power might produce some very awkward developments.

The irritation and uncertainty arising from the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* episode are naturally intensified by what has occurred in the Far East in regard to Russia's treatment of neutral shipping. Of several cases which have arisen, those which concern this country most are the sinking of the *Knight Commander* and the *Hipsang*, and the capture of the *Allanton*. In the matter of the last-named, there is an appeal to St. Petersburg; but the very arbitrary manner in which the case appears to have been dealt with in the Vladivostok Prize Court has produced strong doubts of the impartiality of that tribunal, and its competence to adjudicate on matters in which British shipping interests are so closely concerned. It is felt that here, again, the fact that Russia has declared a quantity of articles to be contraband of war which are not recognised as contraband by other nations, puts even absolutely innocent traders at a complete disadvantage. It may be mentioned that even cotton appears in the Russian list, and the possibility that a valuable ship laden with cotton may be captured by the valiant Vladivostok cruisers, taken to Vladivostok, and legally confiscated, is naturally regarded with dismay by the English shipping community. So general is the feeling of apprehension created by the uncertainty as to the further lengths to which Russia may go in her inter-

pretation of the term contraband, that at the beginning of August the P. and O. gives formal notice of the discontinuance of its service to Japan.

which was released at Suez upon a formal declaration that she had no contraband on board. Yet it is definitely stated by the *National Zeitung*, of Ber-



THE GERMAN SS. SCANDIA, STOPPED IN THE RED SEA.

The sinking of the *Knight Commander* has already been described, and it only remains, at any rate, for the present, to record the fact that, as might have been expected, the Vladivostok Prize Court upholds the act as a perfectly correct and proper proceeding. But the matter is not likely to remain here, and it is almost needless to add that, if it were to do so, a precedent would be established which in future wars might operate with deadly effect against other shipping besides that of Great Britain. An interesting point in connection with the sinking of the *Knight Commander* is that she was sent to the bottom because she was carrying railway material to a Japanese port. It will be remembered that among the ships stopped by the Volunteer steamers in the Red Sea was the *Scandia*,

lin, on the authority of information from Essen, the centre of the great Krupp factories, that the *Scandia* was carrying 400 tons of grooved rails, consigned to Japan. This fact must have been known to the Russians, who, nevertheless, accepted the German assurance that the *Scandia* carried no contraband. Yet a British steamer carrying rails, and encountered by Russian warships, is held to have been caught so completely *in flagrante delicto* as to justify the latter in dispensing with even the small formality of a Russian Prize Court examination.


The cases which have arisen out of the action of the Vladivostok Squadron are viewed with the greater bitterness in this country because, had the Vladivostok Squadron been engaged in its proper business, that of fighting, they would

probably have never occurred. There is something extremely repugnant to British notions of fair and square warfare that powerful ships, which turn tail the moment they sight even far less heavily armed vessels of the enemy, should so deliberately go about the business of destroying neutral shipping on what seems sometimes the most frivolous pretexts.

The sinking of the British ship *Hipsang*, belonging to the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, is not on all fours with that of the *Knight Commander*, and, on the facts as originally reported, it was doubtful whether any outrage had been committed. The Russian authorities had issued very clear, and apparently not unreasonable, instructions as to the passage of neutral shipping within a certain distance of the coast defences of Port Arthur, and the Russian statement is to

said to have fired four shots across the *Hipsang's* bows, but Captain Bradley, the commander, refused to stop, whereupon a torpedo-boat ran out and sank the vessel. The Chinese rushed the boats, and the Europeans had to save themselves by swimming, and were finally rescued by the Russian torpedo-boat. The captain and crew were all kept in custody until August 2nd, when they were ordered to leave Port Arthur in a junk, which was provided for them. They were given no provisions, but, happily, fell in with a German steamer, which took them on board and landed them at Chifu.

It is only fair to Russia to state that at least one incident has occurred in which a praiseworthy readiness has been exhibited to act in compliance with the international laws respecting neutral



THE SS. KNIGHT COMMANDER, SUNK BY THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON.

the effect that the *Hipsang*, which carried three Europeans and eighteen Chinamen, passed Pigeon Bay early on the morning of July 16th. The forts are

shipping. In the early stages of the War a Liverpool steamer, the *Foxton Hall*, was detained at Port Arthur, and the owners lodged a claim for loss

and damage. Early in August it was announced that the Russian Government had duly paid compensation in this case, and frank gratification was expressed throughout the local shipping community at what was regarded as a speedy and favourable settlement of the claim.

But one swallow does not make a summer, and there is no question that a most serious outcome of the first six months of the Russo-Japanese War has been the feeling excited by the seizures and sinking of neutral shipping by the Russians. Nor has the feeling been confined to British shipowners. In the case of Germany, as already hinted, certain considerations of policy may have prevented the same display of resentment as marked the receipt in this country of the news of the seizure of the *Malacca* and the sinking of the *Knight Commander*. But even in Germany there has been plain speaking as to the confiscation of the mails on board the *Prinz Heinrich* (see page 454), and the sinking of the *Thea*, in the course of the last cruise of the Vladivostok Squadron. In referring to the latter, a Hamburg journal describes Admiral Jessen's proceedings as a "ludicrous anachronism," and a survival of the "robber romances of the middle ages," for which Russia will have to pay a heavy price. Nor are the United States at all disposed to acquiesce tamely in the high-handed exercise by the Russians of their right of search. Had not the *Ardova*, which was carrying U.S. Government stores to Manila, been at once released, it is understood that prompt action would

have been taken at Washington, and it is clear that the whole situation as regards the treatment of neutral shipping by the belligerents is being watched throughout America with the closest attention. The United States, it should be observed, are interested in the case of the *Knight Commander*, the cargo of which was of American origin, but in this instance the authorities at Washington have been glad to allow the British Government to take the necessary action on behalf of both owners and consignees.

It must not be supposed that Japan has been any more backward than Russia in asserting her right of search when occasion has seemed to render stoppage and search desirable. On July 8th, the British steamer *Hsiping*, belonging to the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, is said to have been not only searched, but captured by the Japanese, on the ground that she was laden with contraband of war. But, in the first place, the Japanese have other work for their warships than the administering of pin-pricks to foreign Powers; in the second, they carry out the ungracious task of search with courtesy and discretion; and, thirdly, their Prize Courts at Yokosuka and Sasebo are conducted with conspicuous fairness, and in the strictest accordance with modern international usage. Even in such favourable conditions, grievances no doubt arise, but they are insignificant compared with those inspired by Russia's blunt indifference to the most ordinary principles of equity, as accepted by the vast majority of civilised communities.

CHAPTER XLIV.

JAPAN'S STRATEGY—CAUTIOUS COUNSELS—DAREDEVIL HEROISM—NAN-SHAN, TELISSU, HSIHOYEN—NAVAL POLICY—PREPAREDNESS—A MIGHTY ARSENAL—NAVAL CADET COLLEGE—HOSPITALS—DOMESTIC SACRIFICES.

NEARLY six months of hard and almost continuous fighting have brought the Japanese to a second great turning-point in the history of their operations against Russia. The first was reached, as was explained in Chapter XXVI., about the end of the third week in May, by which date the Japanese First Army had driven the Russians back from the Yalu and advanced to Feng-hwang-cheng; the Second Army had been landed in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and a third force at Takushan; and Admiral Togo, if he had not succeeded in completely blocking Port Arthur, had, at any rate, reduced the Russian Fleet in that harbour to comparative inactivity. At the close of the third week in May a second phase of the War was commenced, which may be said to have lasted up to about July 30th, and to this period belong General Oku's successes at Nan-shan, Telissu, and Ta-shi-chao; the commencement of the siege operations against Port Arthur; and the capture and occupation of the Motien-ling and other passes by the First Army and the Takushan force. The interval includes, of course, numerous other episodes from the Russian and international standpoints; but these are the big events as far as Japan is concerned, and it is important to understand the nature of the situation they have helped to create before seeking to enter a third phase in which some wholly different conditions are involved.

What we have to remember is that, up to July 30th, we are still in the stage of, if not preliminary action, at any rate of preparatory effort, as regards Japan's great scheme of offensive strategy. Very patient, very thorough, have been Japan's naval and military counsellors in their method of tackling the innumerable details connected with the groundwork of their plan. But it is quite clear that they themselves are under no illusions as to the risks they run by trying to secure a decisive, far-reaching, and lasting triumph, instead of making an heroic attempt to bring matters to a swift issue by a *coup-de-main*. It is not too much to say that up to July 30th a single marked Russian success by land or sea would have caused the Japanese an amount of added labour altogether out of proportion to the actual loss or damage sustained. The case is rather similar to that of a fine piece of machinery, the various parts of which have to be produced separately in different workshops before they come to be finally "assembled" into the complete engine, or whatever else it is that is under construction. It may happen that an injury to some small part prior to assembling may cause a delay more vexatious and more costly than would be a comparatively serious accident to the completed machine.

The fact that the Japanese have fully grasped this significant truth is reflected in the extreme caution they have dis-


played throughout this second phase of their operations. There has been no lack of dash and heroism, but the strong feature of this period is the keen desire evinced by the Japanese not to leave undone anything which may serve to minimise the chance not of present but of future disaster. Judged by some standards they may at times have seemed almost unduly and unnecessarily prudent. But nothing succeeds like success, and when in the closing days of July we find the Japanese armies in splendid readiness for their first really concerted movement ; when we remember that a cordon has been drawn round Port Arthur which must surely render the ultimate capture of that stronghold a mere matter of time and needful sacrifice ; when to these considerations we add the well-nigh unimpaired fighting capacity of Admiral Togo's fleet, Japan's conduct of the business of war seems to exhibit some impressive advantages. Nor ought the consummate discretion which Japan has displayed, more especially throughout June and July, to lessen the interest with which we may well study lessons in practical warfare transcending in several important respects even those to be learnt from the tremendous struggle of 1870-71.

The anxiety felt by the Japanese themselves during the second phase of the War must have been very great, judging from various signs collected from a number of different sources. It is true that, outwardly speaking, there was a singular absence of anything like demonstrative feeling both among the troops at the front and at the leading Japanese towns. Dr. George Morrison, the famous Peking Correspondent of the *Times*, was in Japan during the first three weeks of June, and had an opportunity of witness-

ing the reception by the Japanese people of the news of the victories in the Liaotung Peninsula and of the disasters to the transports. "Nothing," he says, "could be more striking than the equanimity with which the news of victory and disaster alike was received." He comments, too, on the fact that the Japanese official communications reflect the self-restraint of the people in their singular freedom from vainglory and arrogant boasting. But another correspondent of the same paper, alluding to previous mishaps, says somewhat significantly, "To all outward appearances it would seem that the Japanese have felt their losses very slightly. Naval officers will talk to you of the end of their comrades in the *Hatsuse* and *Yoshino* with a smile ; in short, they will converse of the death of their men in a spirit which strikes us of the West as uncanny and devoid of feeling. But I am inclined to think that the loss of the *Yoshino* and *Hatsuse* on the same day really made a great impression upon the Navy, and it almost confirms me in the view which has constantly arrived at the back of my mind, 'that it is only in success that we know the Japanese.'"

It will be recalled in this connection that, when Admiral Kamimura failed to overtake the Vladivostok Squadron after its exploits in the Shimonoseki Straits, the Japanese were distinctly disheartened by his want of luck, and that in some quarters it was even suggested that by way of expiating his failure he should commit suicide. On the other hand, it will be admitted that even such losses as those sustained at Nan-shan were regarded with complete equanimity in consideration of the success which accompanied them.

It seems a little difficult to reconcile



A MÊLÉE IN A THUNDERSTORM: COMBAT BETWEEN COSSACKS AND JAPANESE CAVALRY AT THE BATTLE OF TELISSU.

these somewhat conflicting views of the Japanese attitude, but it is rather easier to do so when we take into account the nature of the incidents in question, and the effect which each had upon this second phase of the War with which we are dealing. Even among the less educated classes in Japan there seems to be a fairly accurate notion of what is really a serious blow to the country's fighting power, as compared with what comes under the category of eggs that have to be broken in order to make an omelette. But, even if we put all exhibitions of personal feeling on one side, we find in the whole conduct of the Japanese warlike operations throughout June and July something which seems to indicate an almost nervous anxiety not to make mistakes. No doubt this is partially due to the desire not to let one movement get too far ahead before its corresponding movement in some other part of the theatre of war is also well advanced. But there is little doubt that, after the Battles of Telissu and Ta-shi-chao, there was a hesitancy due to elaborate caution which, however justifiable in a weak army, is not always so praiseworthy in a strong one. The redeeming feature is that the end was duly reached, and that what had to be done was done without counting the cost in men, at any rate. But the history of warfare affords no plainer example than this of the occasional disabilities which a very elaborate plan of operations may impose upon generals seeking rather to carry out their appointed tasks than to display the initiative and capacity for following up a success, which are the attributes of the highest form of leadership.

It will probably be necessary later to return to these and similar strategical considerations. Meanwhile, as a set-off

to what has been said above concerning Japanese military caution, let us revert to the Nan-shan battle, which was described in Chapter XXVIII. by the light of the earlier despatches, but of which some interesting additional details have been furnished, more especially by the *Times* Special Correspondent above quoted, presumably Mr. Lionel James, who acted in a similar capacity for the leading journal in South Africa, and has otherwise a notable record of service. Here is his account of the actual storming of the Russian position, an account which both supplements and confirms that compiled by the present writer:—

“The right wing of Oku's Army occupied Kin-chau early on the 27th (June), and meanwhile the gunboats, preceded by a flotilla of torpedo craft, slowly felt their way into Kin-chau Bay to a nearer range than they had occupied on the preceding day. They had to advance with extreme caution, as there was every reason to apprehend that the Bay was mined. General Oku allowed his men but a brief respite after the leading division had captured Kin-chau. His field artillery was massed on the lower spurs of Mount Sampson and in the plain south-east of Kin-chau, and the fire concentrated on the two Russian works between which the railway passes. But a far more deadly preparation was in store for the Russians. By continuous sounding the gunboats had been able to work right round past the left rear of the foremost Russian works, and to open a searching shell-fire upon the defences they thus unmasked. The little torpedo craft also, creeping in to an annihilating range, filled the reverse of the Russian works with rapid fire from their spiteful six-pounders. The inferno of shell fire can well be imagined. But it was not

yet a one-sided struggle, and from dawn till dark the Russian, grim and dogged, held his own. And what a mark the Russian gunners had! It is doubtful, with perhaps the exception of Omdurman, whether gunners ever had an easier target than was given to the Russians that day. Out in the blue bay the black hulls of the gunboats, and on the isthmus three divisions—that is, between 30,000 and 40,000 men—were moving southwards across the narrow span. Forty thousand men massed over six square miles, for Kin-chau is only four miles from the summit of the Russian position and is under two miles across. So narrow is it that the stress of the advancing Japanese front pressed the flank battalions into the sea, so that men with their rifles held horizontally on their shoulders were wading chest deep in the water. Two peaks and a rib of hill rise athwart the Kin-chau isthmus. This was the sole cover afforded to the Japanese Army. Behind this the leading division massed. About noon, according to the evidence of the officers of the gunboats, two half-battalions of the 1st Regiment of Infantry debouched from the cover of the peaks, and the fire of the supporting artillery redoubled. It was to be an attempt to carry the nearest Russian work with the bayonet. Fifteen hundred yards had to be crossed, eight hundred down a slope to the deceptive cover of a miserable fishing village, and then a final seven hundred, the gentle upward slope of the Russian glacis. Down the slope the line of the glistening bayonets swept. Then there crashed the dreaded roll of small-arm fire. The Russian infantry had been waiting for the assault. Scourged, decimated, disordered, the forlorn hope reached the treacherous cover of the village. A

moment to breathe, and to enable the officers to pick the line of advance, and then a brief struggle to win a way up the glacis. A gallant effort, a few brave souls butchered in the toils of the wire entanglements, and the forlorn hope had failed—had been annihilated, except for the paltry few who found safety amongst the crumbling walls of the fishing village. As the assaulting column melted away, the artillery preparation reopened with increased energy. And thus the afternoon passed into evening. Between the lulls in the preparation other desperate assaults were attempted. But, though the field artillery gave respite to the Russian defenders, the ships had no mercy for them. One by one the vulnerable points in the line were searched out and rendered untenable. There is a limit to the amount of punishment that the best troops can sustain if the attack is from the rear as well as from the front. That limit will be reached much sooner if the troops have already suffered bombardment, as had the Russians in Port Arthur. Just before nightfall the limit came. A heavier assaulting force from the 4th Division found that it could face the diminished fire of the defenders. It struggled up to the entanglements and the abattis. Fresh lines of gleaming bayonets joined. The chafing columns of infantry behind it were let loose. The great shout which precedes victory broke out from ten thousand throats, and in a great glittering wave the bayonets were into the nearest work. It was all over. The Russians broke and fled. The Kin-chau heights were won."

Of the countless acts of personal devotion and gallantry which must have occurred during the Battle of Nan-shan, one highly typical is related by the Tokio Correspondent of the *Daily Express*.

"In one of the charges on the enemy's entrenchments the 1st Regiment of Infantry suffered very severely. The Commanding Officer, Colonel Ohara, fell with a severe wound in his forehead. He struggled up to encourage his men, but was too weak to stand. On seeing him again fall, two privates ran forward to his aid and tried to persuade him to retire, at the same time protecting him from further injury. The officer refused to leave the field, however, and the privates, seeing that persuasion was hopeless, hastily threw up a trench, amid a hail of the enemy's shot, and laid their commander in it."

Another action as to which some interesting additional information is now available is the Battle of Telissu (see Chapter XXXI.), which was fought on June 15th. A Vienna Correspondent quotes some telling extracts from a letter written by a Russian doctor a week after the battle was fought, in which particular stress is laid on the terrific fire of the Japanese artillery. Incidentally it is explained how the Japanese came to be accused, as they afterwards were, of firing on the Red Cross. "As the fire was increasing in intensity a communication reached the hospital, which had established itself in a small wood to the rear of the Russian position, that there were many wounded in the firing line. Three hospital wagons with Red Cross attendants and two doctors at once started and came under fire as they drove to the front. A horse was shot and shrapnel shells burst all round the wagons. 'See,' writes the doctor, 'that is how the stories originate that the Japanese fire on the Red Cross. The Red Cross acts imprudently and the blame is thrown on the Japanese.' The writer adds that the wounded soldiers as they were

brought in constantly ejaculated: 'This is no battle, it is a hell.'

"General Stackelberg went from position to position, but the Japanese fire increased in intensity, until the Russians seemed to be confronted by an overwhelming force. The Russian strength was 35,000 men. At seven in the evening the Russians asked for a truce to bury their dead and tend their wounded. The Japanese consented, so that the Russian dead and wounded were brought in undisturbed. Early next day the Japanese opened fire again, while their infantry stormed hill after hill, the rapidity of their movements being marvellous. At one o'clock General Gerngross made a counter attack to cover the retreat of the right wing, but soon the whole Russian Army was in flight, while the Japanese shot better and more quickly than ever and silenced one battery after another. The Russians lost nine guns, some of which there was not even time to spike, and were compelled to abandon six guns which the doctor alleges that they had captured."

The only other engagement to which we can usefully recur in this chapter by way of filling in unavoidable gaps due to imperfect information is, perhaps, that which led to the capture of Hsihoyen by the right column of General Kuroki's Army on July 19th. An attempt has been made to do justice to this remarkably brisk bit of fighting in Chapter XL., and details received later do not substantially alter the impression then formed of the general course of the action and its outcome. But it appears that a special interest is attached to the fighting at Hsihoyen by reason of the extended formations used by the Japanese with very satisfactory results. It has been pointed out how at Kiu-lien-cheng,

Nan-shan, and on one or two other occasions, the Japanese used the close German formation for the attack, and suffered serious losses accordingly. The view underlying the use of the close formation is that, increased casualties notwith-

ticular, the Japanese should have made a trial—and it would seem a very encouraging trial—of the looser method of which the British Army in South Africa was repeatedly the exponent. Such an example is not only gratifying



FIGHTING THEIR BATTLES OVER AGAIN: A STREET SCENE IN HIROSHIMA, JAPAN.

standing, a more decisive result is likely to be attained by the greater cohesion and momentum which is afforded at the "time of impact." It is most interesting that, after several important but dearly-won successes with the system advocated by German experts in par-

to ourselves as confirming the practical experiences which we have naturally hesitated to sacrifice to German theories. It also gives an excellent idea of the restless anxiety of the Japanese to go ahead in all that relates to the conduct of war, and not to be content with systems

merely because they are successful, if the adoption of those systems is found to mean extravagant sacrifices.

But in general, as one attempts to examine closely the individual operations of this remarkable War, one is brought back to the same starting-point, namely, that the Japanese success is first and chiefly due, not to caution, not to heroism, not to a sagacious willingness to learn fresh lessons in the course of the War itself, but to utter and complete readiness. Of this so many military examples have been given that more are scarcely needed—at any rate for the present. But since the second phase of the War has commenced some very striking explanations have been made of the naval preparedness of Japan, and to these it is now not only expedient but highly appropriate to devote attention. The months of June and July have not, it is true, been particularly fruitful in Japanese naval successes. But we are on the eve of great naval happenings, and it is fortunate that, before bringing to a close the record of the past six months of war on land and sea, we have been afforded a really useful glimpse into the true inwardness of Japanese naval as well as military efficiency.

First, a reference must be made to an article of altogether extraordinary interest and importance which appeared in the *Times* of June 18th, and in which the Tokio Correspondent of the paper gave as closely as he could remember the words used to him one evening in May by Captain Arima, the officer who commanded the first and second blocking operations at Port Arthur. After alluding to the signal progress made by the Japanese Navy in 1903, Captain Arima remarks:—"We model ourselves nautically upon England, of course, and we

are very conscious of the benefit we derive from doing so. Yet the growth to which I allude was in some measure due to departing from English traditions. It was at the close of 1902 or the beginning of 1903 that we recognised the imminence of a crisis such as must tax all our naval and military capacities to the utmost; recognised that if our Navy was to do the country real service it must at once learn how to fight. You will say, doubtless, that a Navy has no other business at any time. Yes; but what I mean is that the drills and evolutions laid down for Navies in time of peace are not adapted sufficiently to the conditions likely to exist in time of war. We set ourselves to devise a programme such that men following it closely in tranquil days would not be embarrassed by startling novel circumstances in the hour of conflict. I cannot enter into details, but I may say that before this War broke out we had already passed through most of the unpleasant experiences incidental to manœuvring in the face of an enemy. The work that has to be done by torpedo squadrons operating at night without lights was not strange to us. We had learned its difficulties and—at some cost—its dangers."

Captain Arima goes on to speak of the Japanese naval artillery. "We had learned," he says, "the potency of guns fired with full charges; and our men, observing the efficiency of the Ijuin fuse and the destructive force of the Shimose explosive, had acquired confidence in their ability to meet any enemy. With such weapons as modern science supplies nothing is needed except accurate handling. If an officer gives his gun detachment the right range, trained men may be trusted to hit the target nine

times out of every ten. Practice had convinced us of that months before the war broke out; and though it is a hard thing to judge chances of distance correctly when the gun platform is moving at a speed of eleven or seventeen knots, our conviction is that, the range once found, an officer ought never to lose it because of a calculable alteration in his own position."

The Japanese had also laboured to equip their squadrons with all appliances likely to be needed for repairing on the spot injuries received at an enemy's hands. It is a remarkable fact in this connection that during the first three months of the War not a single Japanese ship, not even a torpedo-boat, was compelled to return to harbour for docking purposes, although it is well known that on more than one occasion a certain amount of damage was sustained.

"As to our general strategy," Captain Arima remarks, "it has been largely guided by the consideration that our Navy is not elastic. Whatever resources we take into the fight must suffice us until the finish. Our first thought, therefore, was to expose our squadrons to a minimum of danger so long as their destructive potency was not thereby impaired. We have not courted conflicts at close ranges. We have avoided them, preferring to utilise to the full the immense potentialities of modern cannon.

Hence our frequent employment of high-angle fire. When the *Nisshin* and the *Kasuga* opened their career in Pigeon Bay they fired up to a range of 12,000 metres and their shells were effective. It is not our experience that this high-angle fire is specially severe on a gun. Besides, we have no lack of guns. But the gun-platform suffers. All things

considered, however, the advantages appear greatly to outweigh the disadvantages."

Such a statement of naval policy is, of course, rendered many times more impressive by the subsequent record of the actual performances of the Japanese Navy, performances of which as yet we have had a foretaste only. But even as a bare statement Captain Arima's quietly confident remarks cannot fail to convey the idea of extraordinary thoroughness, and of that

deadly form of earnest enthusiasm which of itself is such a long step towards the equalisation of apparently long odds.

We may now turn for fresh information to the records of the remarkable tour which, as mentioned on page 388, is being carried out at the invitation of the Japanese Government by the Foreign Naval Attachés and Correspondents, and some prominent members of the Japanese Diet, on the *Manchu Maru*. It will be remembered that this vessel left Yokosuka on June 12th. Yokosuka itself is an interesting place, and is



CAPTAIN ARIMA.

regarded affectionately by the older Japanese officers as the cradle of their Fleet. It has three dry docks, the largest 450 feet long, with one still longer in course of construction. Small cruisers, too, can be built here, and one has been recently launched, a third-class ship, every detail of which, guns and machinery, is of Japanese manufacture. But Yokosuka dwindles into insignificance when compared with the famous arsenal at Kure, off which the *Manchu Maru* anchored on the fourth day from the commencement of her cruise.

Kure lies in a bight among the mountains, and the sudden transition from the delicate scenery of the islands of the Inland Sea to the smoke and noise of the Japanese Pittsburg is remarked by all the favoured visitors on this interesting occasion. But considerations of the picturesque soon give way to more practical reflections as the wonders of this hitherto well-guarded storehouse of warlike secrets are revealed to admiring eyes. Here in the most truly concrete form is exemplified Japan's naval readiness for war in all that relates to material. It is, too, curiously typical of the Island Nation that even this knock-down evidence of her up-to-dateness has been withheld until much of the astonishment which it would otherwise have created has been forestalled by actual proof in other quarters.

From various accounts the following passages in a letter from the Special Correspondent of the *Standard* may be selected as indicating some of the most pointed lessons which the growth in fifteen years of this great arsenal conveys to Europe:—

"Kure is a fine example of the progress made by Japan during the last few years. It is essentially Japanese; you

will not find a European in all the numerous workshops. Whether it be an armour plate which is being moulded into shape, or an 8-in. gun, it has been designed, cast, and completed, in every detail, under the supervision of Japanese engineers and constructors. Western people, who imagine that Japan has still a great deal to learn from their higher civilisation, would have their eyes opened by a visit to Kure. The fact is that the Japanese have learnt their lesson so well that they bid fair to excel their tutors in their own special studies. With what legitimate pride does the head of a large firm in Sheffield or at Armstrong's show his visitors the process of making an armour-plate, or the casting of a big gun, as something not to be seen anywhere else in the world. Yet out in the Orient, 15,000 miles from England, amidst the most beautiful surroundings, they are doing exactly the same thing on just as large a scale. And all this by a nation whose modern history dates back thirty years. It means that the finest fighting race in the world, with the most abundant supply of cheap labour of any nation, are determined to cry "Halt" to the progress of the European in the Far East. "The Orient for the Oriental"—that will be the motto of Japanese statesmen during the next generation; and whether it be by force, or whether it be by commercial supremacy—which is the more likely and also the more effective course, and one best suited to the needs of Japan—European nations will find themselves gradually driven back.

"Surely no other people take such a conscientious interest in their work as the Japanese. The labourers are contented with their lot and are happy; you never see a sullen face such as is only too



HUMAN BIRDS OF PREY: CHINESE BANDITS ROBBING THE DEAD.

common among English and Continental workmen. Trade Unions are unknown, pay is small, and work is hard ; but what does that matter if their country is to benefit by their labours? There are no private interests in Japan at the present time ; all are content to work for the common weal. The humble coolie driving a nail into the plate of a torpedo-boat does not lose interest in the nail as soon as it is driven home ; he follows each movement of the boat in the little sheets on which the latest war news is distributed, and when she sinks a battleship he goes to his friends and proudly tells them that he has contributed towards the achievement. That is the spirit of the Japanese nation, and that is the spirit which will make them the paramount Power, without a rival, in Eastern Asia. One engineer told me that he had spent ten years in England amid dockyards and furnaces in order to study his profession. During the whole of this time he never returned to his country, and saw nothing of his family or friends. The Government paid for his education, and now he is paying back the Government."

The passengers of the *Manchu Maru* were personally conducted over the immense Kure workshops by Admiral Yam-anouchi, "to whose enthusiasm and long residence in England is due the perfection of the Kure plant." Some secrets, more especially those relating to the manufacture of the Japanese powder and explosives, were politely withheld, but even from a brief inspection it was easy to ascertain many significant facts. The Arsenal employs 15,000 men with 2,500 recruits and coolies in addition, and big guns and shells are being turned out in quantities amply sufficient for Japan's purposes. The guns are fitted with a

new endless screw mechanism which is a Japanese invention, and the Japanese claim that their naval ordnance is power for power the lightest and simplest in existence. Mines and torpedoes are made at Kure, and some startling exhibitions were given with the latter. A detail which appears to have greatly impressed the correspondents was the training of engineer and stoker recruits, the latter being busily and quite enthusiastically engaged in shovelling stones into wooden coops, which they emptied and filled repeatedly by way of practice in stoking.

The ship-building and repairing operations were, of course, carefully scrutinised, and presented several points of great interest. Only a single torpedo-boat, the *Aotaka*, the identical boat which torpedoed the *Retvisan* on the night of February 8th, was under repair. For months the only refitting done at Kure had been to the cruiser *Kasuga*, which, when she rammed the *Yoshino*, sustained slight damage. At the time of the *Manchu Maru's* visit a first-class torpedo-boat and two destroyers were under construction. But Japan has much higher aims in view. Admiral Yam-anouchi declares that by next January the armour-plate mill, supplied with 10,000 horse-power and trip hammers up to 8,000 tons power, will be completed, and two battleships of 14,000 tons each will be begun for complete construction in Japan!

There is no doubt that the publication in the leading journals of Europe of details concerning the great Japanese Arsenal at Kure created a notable impression. Most Europeans, with the possible exception of the Russian peasantry and other similarly benighted communities, must have been aware of the existence of Japanese home establish-

ments for the production of war material, but even to experts the revelation of the actual facts must have come as a surprise. In fifteen short years to have not only instituted an Arsenal of such magnitude, but to have kept it up to such a high standard of completeness, efficiency, and modernity, is in its way a more remarkable achievement than the creation of a first-class Navy with imported ships. The ease with which Japan can supply all her possible requirements in the way of guns and ammunition is a factor of extraordinary importance in the prosecution of such a war as that upon which she is now engaged. The statement that at a pinch twenty torpedo-boats can be turned out complete at Kure in a month gains added weight from the unrivalled record which the Japanese Navy has established in the actual use of these destructive crafts. But with many these reflections, serious as they are, must be temporarily thrown into shade by the dazzling contingencies of a future in which Japan will no longer be compelled to base her naval strategy on the fact that her existing Fleet is inelastic. When the keel of Japan's first battleship is laid at Kure a new chapter in the annals of the world will be commenced, and we may be sure that the Island Nation of the Far East will not be backward in filling that chapter with brisk incident and progressive history.

Before we leave the *Manchu Maru*—to return to it possibly at a later date—a few words must be given to another institution which its passengers were privileged to visit in the early days of their deeply instructive tour. This was the Naval College for Cadets at Edajima, where all the officers of the Japanese Navy are trained with the exception of the engineers, who receive a special

education at Yokosuka. There are about 600 cadets always in residence at Edajima, this total being distributed into three divisions according to the number of terms served. Some idea of the keen competition for cadetships may be gathered from the fact that for the next examination, when less than 200 vacancies will be offered, more than 5,000 candidates have entered. The age of candidates is sixteen, and when the competitive test is passed a most rigorous medical examination has to be faced. But when this ordeal is over "the cadet ceases to be the child of his parents, and becomes the child of the Government, which feeds him, clothes him, and educates him, not one single item of expense falling on his parents." The course lasts for three years, after which the cadet cruises for a year in one of the training-ships—often visiting England and America. It is an interesting circumstance that among the forty odd instructors at the College there is an Englishman who is present for the express purpose of teaching the English language.

The training at the College is intensely practical, the central idea being that the cadet should know more especially his gunnery and torpedo work before he joins his ship. The model room at the Edajima is said to have greatly impressed the foreign Naval Attachés; it includes among other fine pieces of work a magnificent model of a first-class Japanese battleship, over forty feet long, and complete in every detail. There is also a wooden erection on the drill ground representing exactly the deck of a modern battleship, the guns on the starboard side of which look out on the bay, and so can be trained for practice purposes on any passing vessel.

As for sports and pastimes, here is an extract from the *Standard* Correspondent's letter, which gives a vivid idea of the extent to which the hardening process

closed fists wherever a face appeared amid the dense mass of struggling, yelling humanity. There are two sides of about three hundred men in each. One



NURSES IN TOKIO.

is applied to officers of the Japanese Navy :—

“By way of ending the day's work the six hundred naval students indulged in an amusement, if it can be described as such, peculiarly Japanese. It so astounded all the foreigners who were looking on that for a long time it seemed almost impossible to believe that this was a recognised part of their training. We saw the quiet students of two hours previous converted into a horde of yelling, fighting savages, attacking one another with a fury which threatened destruction to all, kicking, shoving, and hitting with

side, the defending one, has a pole stuck in the ground, round which the defenders gather in a dense ring. A bugle is then blown, and the attacking party, with an awful yell, which when once heard can never be forgotten, charge at full speed on the devoted circle round the staff. The two sides meet with such violence that the first three or four ranks are thrown down and trampled on by those coming behind, whose object is to capture the pole. The combatants mount upon each other's heads, fighting with the greatest courage and desperation. When the pole is borne down the fight

is over, and all seem to be perfectly good friends again. The injured covered the ground after the fight we witnessed, but only one man was attended by the surgeon, and the rest were able to limp off the field."

From these striking evidences of the fashion in which, both as regards *personnel* and material, Japan has been, and is still, preparing for war, we may now turn to other aspects in which this extraordinary nation presents examples that Western civilisation would find difficulty in improving upon. Attention has already been drawn to the excellence of the Japanese

whither all the wounded soldiers are brought as rapidly as possible from the front in two Red Cross and four Army Hospital steamers, which are kept pretty constantly running for this humane purpose. There are at Hiroshima four hospitals, the Staff and three Branches. Except in serious cases, only first aid is given, says the *Standard* Correspondent, to the wounded on the field, and they are then despatched first to the Staff Hospital, where the very severe cases are kept, the lighter cases and convalescents being sent on to the No. 1 and No. 2 Branches, while the No. 3 Branch is kept for sick soldiers. As soon as the



THE PRICE OF VICTORY: JAPANESE WOUNDED SOLDIERS ENTERING TOKIO.

Army Medical system as regards actual service in the field. It now remains to make a brief allusion to the beautifully managed Army Hospitals at Hiroshima,

wounded are well enough they are sent from Hiroshima to hospitals in different parts of the country, and to the homes of the men. The largest of the head-

quarters hospitals is No. 1 Branch, where the Principal Medical Officer has under him a staff of 370, of whom 28 are doctors and 50 nurses. The smallest hospital of the four is the Staff, but the buildings are of a more permanent character. It is evident that everything is done that can possibly be done to alleviate suffering and promote recovery, and that the labours of the American and Red Cross doctors and nurses are much appreciated by the Japanese. It would seem, however, that Army nursing is taken more as a matter of course in Japan than it is in this country, for it is stated that, though the Japanese Red Cross Nurses are ladies, they are treated more as servants. They are described by an American lady doctor at Hiroshima as sympathetic and willing, but lacking in practical experience and knowledge and in "the faculty of making the patients obey."

This chapter may fitly be concluded with a purely domestic allusion. At its commencement note was taken of the attitude of the Japanese people generally towards war news, but no indication has yet been given of the effect which the War itself has had upon the inner life of the community. A deeply interesting letter from Murasaki Ayami, a Japanese lady who is acting as the Special Correspondent of the *Bystander* in Yokohama, supplies the deficiency with pathetic picturesqueness. After recounting the personal sacrifices made by the Emperor and Empress of Japan, with a view to swelling the war funds, this lady writes: "It is when living in the midst of the people, and when coming in daily contact with them, both in the towns and in the country, that the full realisation of the miseries and tragedies resulting from the war is borne in upon one.

A few days ago I wandered through an old cemetery that lies half hidden on the summit of the sacred island of Enoshima—a cemetery where little Buddhas and grey headstones mark the last resting-place of countless sleepers; a mound, freshly covered, where the offerings of food and the flowers not yet faded told of a recent sorrow; and from the old caretaker I heard this story. Oharu Nashisawa, the girl-wife of a non-commissioned officer, who was killed in the engagement in the Yalu Valley, on hearing the news of his demise, resolved to follow him, and thereby lighten her father-in-law's household expenses. She accordingly bade farewell to her family, and, arraying herself in her costliest garments, placed her husband's portrait in the tokonoma*, and falling on her knees before it, cut her throat with a small dagger."

Murasaki Ayami tells us that already want and misery among the poorer families whose fathers and husbands have been ordered to the front are being keenly felt. But the spirit of even the humblest is magnificent, and throughout the patient endurance of privation, and the still more terrible burden of sudden bereavement, the whole nation is sustained by the one sentiment that Japan will win.


One touching detail more. At many of the temples and places of worship in Japan women may be seen "who, after prostrating themselves before their gods and chanting a prayer or two, raise their hands to their heads and cut off their hair—thus not only signifying that they are widows, but registering the vow that they will not marry again. The severed locks are then bound with a broad band

* An alcove found in all Japanese rooms, reserved for the household's most sacred belongings.

of white paper and hung up at the entrance to the inner chapel, there to remain until a sufficient number of such offerings has been collected to weave into rope, as the rope made from human hair is said to possess an amazing strength, and is much valued in the field and on the ships where cords of great durability are required."

"A nation terribly in earnest" is the description given of the Japanese by one who knows them well. In this chapter a discursive attempt has been made to show how that earnestness extends through every stratum of Japanese life, from the strategy of the general in the

field to the votive offering of the poor little soldier's widow at home. It is well that in the contemplation of great scenes the eye should occasionally rest on some detail, provided that the latter strikes no jarring note. But at best an effort to give an idea of Japanese earnestness by means of isolated instances must fail. Japan has organised her present greatness on broad lines. It is only by taking broad views of her achievements and of her future possibilities that one can rightly estimate that remarkable combination of attributes which bids fair at least to treble her chances in this epoch-making War.



Drawn by Kubota Beisen.

OLD JAPAN.

View at Ōsaka in the Period An-sei (A.D. 1854-1860).

By permission, from "The New Far East," by Arthur Didosy.

CHAPTER XLV.


RUSSIA AND THE SECOND PHASE—NOTES ON PAST BATTLES—LIFE AT LIAO-YANG—THE
SIBERIAN RAILWAY—HOME AFFAIRS—DOMESTIC TROUBLES—A USEFUL PRESS—
PUBLIC DISTRUST.

FOR the Russians the second phase of the war may seem at first sight to have been more disastrous than was the first, and, if we judge only by results, this view will hold good. But the actual incidents of the fighting from the end of the third week in May until July 30th cannot be said to be so really damaging to Russian prestige and prospects as were those of the previous three and a half months. It is true that in no case did the Russians score a distinct success; that the Japanese soldiers repeatedly proved themselves man for man better than their opponents; and that, throughout this period also, the Russian strategy was the strategy of almost unqualified retreat. But to the practised eye there is a marked difference between the handling of all the Russian forces during June and July and the performances of February, March, April, and May. Certainly it is a much brisker interval, as far as actual fighting is concerned, and it will be noted that in almost every case the Russians betray no unwillingness to fight, and show a pretty stubborn front in the actual conflict. That they are out-classed and out-generalled is another matter, the actual aspect of which really supports the assertion that, if the Russian strategy had been on a level with the fighting qualities displayed during this phase by the brave Russian soldiers, the Japanese would have found at the end of July their position far more difficult, and their

prospects far less brilliant, than is really the case.

In a word, the Russians have during the last two or three months sacrificed to the attempted retention of Port Arthur their main chances of any sort of immediate success. In the circumstances it is hard to find fault with Kuropatkin's original design to remain more or less concentrated at Liao-yang, until he could gather sufficient forces to enable him either to accept battle at Liao-yang as soon as it was offered, or to advance and try to sweep the enemy out of Korea, or the Liao-tung Peninsula, or both. Port Arthur either was or was not defensible for a few months on the strength of its own resources. If not, it should have been abandoned, as one of Russia's best and most clear-headed generals, Dragomiroff, suggested from the first. If it was confidently felt that the place could stand a siege, it might have been allowed to take its chance. But, when the siege had once been definitely commenced, no relief ought to have been attempted until Kuropatkin was completely ready for a forward movement.

The second phase of the war gives in the defeat of Stackelberg at Telissu what may prove to be the key-note of the whole campaign, namely, blundering brought about by utterly foolish and improper interference. It is not by any means certain that a bold policy would



STACKELBERG'S FUTILE ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE PORT ARTHUR:
THE RUSSIAN SHELTER-TRENCHES STORMED BY THE JAPANESE.



not have served Kuropatkin very well if he had adopted it in the early part of May, instead of being forced against his will to adopt it in the early part of June. If, the moment the news of the landing at Pi-tsu-wo of the Second Army had arrived, he had hurried down sufficient troops, meanwhile "containing" the First Army and the Takushan force, as he should have been able to do without much difficulty, the Army of General Oku might, as has been previously hinted, have found itself in an awkward position, and the siege of Port Arthur might have been indefinitely postponed. But, as has been seen, this possibly golden opportunity was lost, and then, when it was too late, Stackelberg was despatched "to relieve Port Arthur," evidently at the Tsar's personal instance, and Kuropatkin's plans were from that moment thrown out beyond hope of recovery.

Looking back over the main incidents of this second phase we shall not find so much that seems deserving of fresh or renewed comment in the case of the Russians as we did in that of the Japanese. This, of course, is only natural when one side is engaged in the elaborate movements necessary to effect a series of envelopments, while the other is mainly content with what is little else than a succession of rearguard actions. There are, however, one or two details which may serve both to render the foregoing narrative a little brighter and clearer, and to prepare the ground for the operations of the very important and dramatic phase that is to follow.

The Russian failure, as well as the Japanese success, at Nan-shan is better explained by the supplementary account of the *Times* Correspondent quoted in the preceding chapter than in any of the earlier despatches. It was not clear be-

fore that the Japanese gun-boats succeeded in taking a part of the Russian position in reverse; that is, in working round so that they could throw shells into the rear of the Russian trenches. This explanation makes it much easier to understand why, after having withstood a series of repeated attacks from dawn till evening, the Russians should not have been able to hang on a little longer to a position which was so strong by nature, and the artillery defending which was so greatly superior to the artillery of the attack. But, of course, with their rear constantly harassed, the Russians may well have weakened a little in the defence of their front, and of that slight falling-off in stubborn opposition the Japanese were swift to take advantage. It is easy to be wise after the event; but it will readily occur to the student of the campaign that a few heavy guns firing seawards and to the southwest of the extreme left of the Russian position might have made all the difference, and turned what was a hardly-won victory for Japan into a very damaging repulse.

From Nan-shan to Telissu is a short step, chronologically speaking, but, as we have seen, in this interval the Russian chances of success are sadly diminished by the interference of Alexeieff at St. Petersburg with the now well-developed policy of Kuropatkin. On General Stackelberg's tactics the battle itself is the best commentary. He was simply out-classed, but he seems to have made the elementary mistake very common in a third-rate type of general, of showing boldness in an entirely wrong place. Had he shown it by hastening his concentration and attacking General Oku at Port Adams, a different result might have been recorded. But he seems first to

have chosen the Telissu position with an idea of defending it, and then to have taken the offensive without properly securing his right flank from an enemy whose known tactics have hitherto included, wherever possible, a wide turning movement.

Of General Stackelberg himself, of whom a striking portrait was given on page 373, a very unfavourable account appears in the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger*. According to this authority the loser of Telissu "resides in his own special train fitted up with every luxury. His wife and her sister are with him. In the hot weather Cossacks are employed with a hose to pour a continuous stream of water on the roofs of the cars. Water is scarce, and the troops are thus deprived of drinking water to enable General Stackelberg's cars to be sprinkled. Although there is abundance of room in the long train, General Stackelberg has refused to grant an inch of space for the accommodation of wounded officers."

One of the heroes of Telissu is General Sampsonoff, who is said to have performed prodigies of valour, and who is apparently a very popular commander among the Russian soldiery. It will be remembered that he was previously in charge of a considerable force which came into sharp collision with the Japanese at Wa-fang-kau, as narrated in Chapter XXIX.

Talking of Wa-fang-kau, in which, according to the Russian account, the Cossacks covered themselves with much glory, it may be remarked that, since that action, these dashing horsemen have had little chance of distinguishing themselves. General Mishtchenko is still roving along the Russian front for purposes of reconnaissance, and, judging from the fulness of the Russian Staff

reports, this duty is thoroughly and efficiently performed. There are Cossacks, too, still at work in Korea, but the force generally has by no means come up to the expectations formed of it, and far greater real importance has been attached hitherto to the work of the Russian infantry. To some extent this is explained by some damaging criticism in the *Russkoe Slovo* by a well-known Russian writer, M. Nemirovitch Danchenko, who comments on the way that, more especially, the Trans-Baikal Cossacks have been officered for the purposes of this war. It seems that in many cases officers of the Imperial Guard have been sent from St. Petersburg to supersede the old Cossack officers in the command of sotnias, and this is naturally resented by troops who are peculiarly clannish in their ideas. To command a Cossack sotnia properly, urges M. Danchenko, one must be a Cossack born, and the soldiers will follow such a leader through fire and water. Such frank Russian admissions of faulty military procedure are not common, and are on that account the more valuable in explaining minor causes of failure. It may be remarked that M. Danchenko does not confine his criticism only to the Cossacks, but makes particular reference also to the Caucasian Volunteer militia, of whom, also, great things are expected. These, he points out, are to be commanded by excellent officers of the regular cavalry, who, however, do not even speak the language of their new soldiers, and are completely ignorant of their customs!

This foolish method of officering units which require particular care in handling is, of course, the more disastrous in a military system, one of the chief results of which is to stifle initiative on the part

of the individual soldier. Throughout the Russian Army the troop or company officer generally has to think not only for himself but for each and every one of

safely through their position, and towards evening came to the village of Arthaisa."

After visiting several other villages, and gleaned information as to the Japanese forces, Volkoff's real adventures began. "Suddenly," he says, "a cavalry detachment of about twenty men with an officer came towards me. The officer rode out and asked in Chinese where the Russians were and what was their strength.

"I decided to sell my life dearly, for I knew it would be forfeited if I were captured. I pulled out my revolver, and as the two soldiers approached I fired two shots at them. Both of the men fell.

"Then I fired at the officer, bringing him to the ground, and afterwards emptied the revolver at four other men. The soldiers lost their heads and

galloped away, and as they did so I saw the four men I had shot fall severally from their saddles, badly wounded.

"Then I jumped on one of the horses, and galloped away for my life. I had to pass through the enemy's lines, but fortunately I soon saw our outposts, and I rode in, and was immediately taken into the presence of General Sampsonoff, and told my story."

Of the fighting in the Passes it is impossible to form a really clear idea without much more information than is likely to be available perhaps for a year or two after the war is over. Here again we have to distinguish between carefully co-ordinated attacks on the one hand and, for the most part, isolated defences on the other. As regards the Motien-ling, it is now suggested that, in spite of its



GENERAL SAMPSONOFF.

the men under him if he expects the best results in anything like unfavourable circumstances. It is only occasionally that the Russian soldier acting independently can be found to display such level-headedness, not to speak of marksmanship, as that exhibited by a spy named Volkoff, whose adventures, recounted in the Russian papers, are transcribed as follows by the St. Petersburg Correspondent of the Central News:—

"I shaved my hair in front like a Chinaman, tied on a pigtail, and put on a Chinese dress with slippers and hat. On the 19th (July), while a cross fire was going on, I seized the opportunity, and slipped away into the Japanese lines.

"They were at the moment advancing towards our troops, and were so busy that no one noticed me, and I passed

wonderful reputation, the Pass was not really defensible. According to the Special Correspondent of the *Standard*, "the position is a forest-clad mountain about one thousand feet above the river and valley, and traversed by a steep and winding path. The mountain is crowded with angles and 'dead' ground, on which large bodies of them could lie in perfect security. The slopes are steep, and there is no field of fire. The Russians had, therefore, formed a correct estimate of the tactical features of the Pass, and had not wasted their energies on any defensive works." This is an interesting new view which, as the Correspondent quoted remarks, is not necessarily upset by the first Russian attack upon the Japanese outpost in the Motien-ling. This attack of July 4th may have been an effort not so much to recover a valuable position as to retard a threatening advance. But, on the other hand, we have the evidence of experts that the Motien-ling properly defended is a very serious obstacle indeed, and it will be remembered that, as described in Chapter XXXVI., a subsequent and very resolute attempt was made on July 17th to recover the Pass by General Kashtalinski, acting under the orders of General Count Keller. We have also to take into consideration the fact that the Japanese in all their arrangements leading up to their attacks upon the Passes, appeared to regard the Motien-ling, with which they had become closely acquainted in 1894, with much respect. It must, then, be regarded for the present as a rather debatable question whether the Russians were justified in evacuating the "Heaven-Reaching Pass" with such celerity, or, to put it in

another way, whether they were not seriously to be blamed for allowing such a position to be so easily turned.

Let us now leave the area of actual fighting and find our way gradually to Russia. We may pause a while at Liao-yang, of which already a brief account has been given in Chapter XXX. To this may be added a striking little word photograph by Mr. Charles Hands of the *Daily Mail*, describing the Liao-yang railway station and the country to the south:—

"The open trucks laden with guns, the big horse wagons, the trucks of ammunition carts, the trucks filled with pontoons and other engineering appliances, the heavily-laden cars of all sorts of stores, but, above all, the cars and cars and cars—covered box cars—whose cargoes are the square-jawed, short-nosed, sturdy



GENERAL MISHTCHENKO.

Siberian soldiers—these tell of war. On the further side of the lines there is a row of booths like a fair, where the Chinaman is making his speedy fortune

by selling all sorts of rubbishy food and other wares to the passing soldiers.

"Outside the railway station, away to the right, a distinct mountain marks the beginning of the series of hills which lie between Liao-yang and the fighting to the south. On the west no mountains, but a flat alluvial plain, every visible square inch of it cultivated like a nursery garden, stretches smoothly away to the horizon, beyond which the broad Liao stretches its impassable barrier. To the northward, again no mountains—only the long Liao valley, through which a low embankment, like a single upturned furrow, holds up the railway line above the muds and the floods of the soon-coming rainy season. Little culverts innumerable intersect it, and here and there considerable bridges where watercourses and rivers coming from the hills to the eastward make their way across the valley to the Liao. The watercourses are dry now, but the stones and boulders which strew the deep channel show the force with which the waters rush down from the mountain-sides."

From Mr. Douglas Story of the *Daily Express* we may borrow a couple of anecdotes which he relates as part of a budget he acquired in "the Earl's Court of Liao-yang," the little pleasure-garden that has been laid out beneath the shade of the Ta-Pagoda, where in the evening the band plays and the Russian officers congregate. "It was here I heard the story of Captain Worolsoff, the sole survivor of Colonel Müller's battery of artillery from the cruel fight of Kiu-lien-cheng. I had seen the captain in hospital, lying very quiet and very grey, with a leg shattered by fragments of a Japanese shell. He had told me nothing of the deed that had brought this disaster upon him, had merely taken from a purse

at his bedside a jagged piece of iron and passed it to me, quietly smiling—sufficient comment from a soldier."


"I heard his tale in the shade of the imperturbable pagoda, learned how, on that bloody first of May, he had stood by his guns as on parade, holding his men to their posts, demanding from them all the niceties of discipline—head back, chest out, shoulders square, feet properly at attention—till every officer of the battery was dead or wounded, and he at length, too, fell crippled by a bursting shrapnel."

It was in this garden, too, that a little incident occurred which shows the Russian officer in a more chivalrous light than that in which he sometimes appears to us through his own indifference to our sort of sentiment. The news had come that a message of condolence had been received from the Japanese with reference to the sinking of the *Petropavlosk* and its gallant sailors. "An officer rose and proposed a toast to the enemy. The toast was received and drunk in all sincerity by those kind and simple soldiers of the Tsar."

From Liao-yang we pass to Mukden, which is now becoming crowded with soldiers, but which is soon to lose some of its official importance by reason of the Viceroy's departure for Vladivostok. There would seem to be lively times in store for both Liao-yang and Mukden in the near future. Such forebodings may extend even to Harbin itself. It is, perhaps, significant that Kuropatkin has recently ordered the removal from Harbin of all the numerous hangers-on whom a variety of inducements has tacked on to the skirts of the Russian forces in the Far East, and who, in the event of a possible retreat to this great junction, would have been an unmitigated nuisance.

Between Harbin and Moscow the Siberian Railway has been working steadily, but it is becoming very evident that General Kuropatkin will have to wait a long time before he can receive sufficient reinforcements to enable him to take the field with the four or five hundred thousand men which he regards as necessary for his purpose. Various estimates are given of the carrying capacity of the line, but all accounts agree in placing the number of troop-trains very low in consequence of the absolute impossibility of decreasing the number of trains carrying supplies. The most likely calculation is that rather under 20,000 men are being carried every

month, and, if this be accurate, Kuropatkin's outlook is rather gloomy, for his "war wastage" has been considerable, especially in the past two months, and, if he has received 40,000 fresh soldiers, probably a quarter at least of these will be required to replace recent casualties. Meanwhile there is much to be said for the energy with which during the progress of the war the construction of the Circum-Baikal line has been attacked and carried on. It is now hoped that trains will be running on this section at the end of September in time to escape the beginning of the autumn storms, which are very dangerous to navigation on the lake.




KUROKI'S LINES OF ADVANCE TO LIAO-YANG

In Russia itself we see little change in the conditions which have prevailed since the outbreak of the war, unless it be in the daily increasing unpopularity of the orders relating to mobilisation. It was mentioned in a previous chapter that cases had occurred of the taking of drugs by reservists in order to produce sickness and thus secure exemption from military service, but latterly more tragically effective measures have been adopted to this end. Towards the end of July three soldiers at Schlüsselburg, who were under orders for the front, committed suicide by hanging themselves, and on the 25th of that month a very painful incident occurred at Peterhof, where the Tsar was at the time in residence. A detachment of troops was entraining for the Far East when one of the soldiers suddenly left the ranks and threw himself under a passing engine, the wheels of which severed his head from his body. Even where such ghastly protests are not forthcoming the resentment expressed against the mobilisation orders is loud and deep. In St. Petersburg the students indulge in a street demonstration, and many arrests are made; while in provincial districts the reservists who have been called up have to be carefully restrained from talking among themselves, and the populace ventilates its indignation more freely than might have been thought possible in police-ridden Russia.

In the last week of July occurs the assassination of M. Plehve, the Minister of the Interior, who was responsible for the massacre at Kishineff, and whose severity has become a byword throughout Europe. It is a thoroughly Russian tragedy. The Minister's carriage passes along the street, a bomb is hurled, the Minister is killed with many other in-

nocent persons, a man is arrested, Nihilists are proud and happy, the Tsar is deeply moved, another Minister of the drastic sort is appointed, and the old reign of cynical injustice dashed with political assassination bids fair to start afresh. The incident does not affect the war materially, except possibly by widening the gulf between Russian officialism and the Russian public. Least of all does it seem to affect the incapacity of the Tsar to view the course of events in the Far East from the standpoint of his country's welfare, now in such grave danger of being hopelessly sacrificed to ignorant obstinacy and scarcely honourable pride.

Unfortunately both Russian autocracy and bureaucracy have the most useful sort of allies in both the Church and the Press. According to the Russian Correspondents of the *Times*, "the Russian Clerical Press asserts that the policy of the Russian Government which led to the war was not only just and right, but in accordance with the precepts of Scripture. In an article entitled 'Our Struggle with Japan from a Biblical Point of View,' the *Strannik* says that 'Russia has a providential mission to extend and maintain the Orthodox faith over the whole world. If Manchuria were left in the possession of the Chinese they would not feel the necessity of accepting Christianity, and would remain for ever in Japanese darkness. Hence the law of God forbids the restoration of Manchuria to China.'" The *Russia Palomnik*, a paper which circulates largely among the peasants, argues that the Emperor of Japan is Antichrist, and that it is therefore the duty of Holy Russia to make war upon him. The *Tserkovni Viestnik* declares that the war now waged by Russia is in accordance with the will of



THE CAPTURE OF KIN-CHAU.

36

The old Chinese walled town of Kin-Chau was the point d'appui from which General Oku launched his final attack upon the Russian works on the Nan-Shan heights. It was held by a regiment of Siberian Rifles and a field battery. At sunrise, after a most sanguinary struggle, the place was carried at the point of the bayonet by a Japanese brigade.

God. He ordered the Jews to exterminate the Canaanites, and the Japanese are the Canaanites of the 20th century!

Less pardonable than these ramblings is the injunction of the *Moscow Gazette* to the Russian commanders not to give any quarter to the Japanese: "Our great General Suvaroff," it says, "when he fought against the civilised French, very often gave the order 'no quarter' to his troops. This was not cruelty or barbarism; it was necessity. And now necessity forces us, in this war with a half-savage and barbarous nation, to adhere to Suvaroff's rule of 'no quarter.' In our war with Japan we are like a man attacked by a viper. It is not enough

to frighten it and leave it to hide in a bush; it must be destroyed; and we must do this without considering whether England and the cosmopolitan plutocracy object or not. To burden Russia with thousands of Japanese prisoners spreading dysentery, typhus, and cholera among the Russian people would, perhaps, be in accordance with humanitarian principles, but would be very unwise. No quarter and no prisoners should be our motto."

It is needless to swell the volume of evidence which goes to show that even

now official Russia is trying to blind itself and others to the realities of a situation brought about chiefly by a combination of blind arrogance and insane unpreparedness. Such examples as have been given have been selected from a

great mass of material with a view to showing some of the broader methods adopted. But much might be added as to the vagaries of the Russian censorship, the obvious "cooking" of news, and the wholesale "blocking" of articles in the foreign papers likely to instruct the Russian public as to the real state of affairs at the front. It is almost refreshing that, even among the middle and lower classes, such processes should

not be entirely successful.

Whether the bravery of the Russian fighting soldier will prevail, notwithstanding the dissatisfaction at home, remains to be seen. But in a war which after six months has produced little else but a succession of retreats and several ugly reverses, a nation has no dazzling outlook which is beginning to realise that in the balance with its slain sons and sorely taxed resources must still be weighed a heavy mass of ingrained official duplicity and ineptitude.



THE LATE M. PLEHVE, RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR THE INTERIOR.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE SECOND PHASE ENDED—THE SITUATION—NAVAL REFLECTIONS—MILITARY POSSIBILITIES—COUNTING THE COST.

IT has already been pointed out that the war has now passed through two great phases, the first terminating about the end of the third week in May, the second about the end of the last week in July.

Let us now ascend in an imaginary war-balloon of a paulo-post-future type of construction, and take stock not only of the whole area of operations, but of a variety of considerations, international as well as Russo-Japanese, which combine to render the end of July an excellent point at which to round off, as it were, one section of this story.

First, as comparatively little has been said in the two preceding chapters about naval matters, let us deal with the positions arrived at by both Japan and Russia in regard to their respective fleets. In order to emphasise the fact that the last week of May and the months of June and July constitute a distinct naval as well as military phase, it is expedient to anticipate a little, and to state that in August we shall see a new set of naval conditions evolved out of an occurrence altogether different from, and in advance of, anything that has yet taken place in the course of the war. There is no need to go into greater detail at present. It is sufficient to say that, while the efforts that have been made hitherto by Admiral Togo to bring about a fleet action at sea have been unsuccessful, the very near future will bring us in sight of that tremendous development, with results

which are of world-wide interest and instructiveness.

Having thus lifted a corner of the "cloth," behind which the next naval scene in our drama is being set, let us review briefly the naval events of the past ten weeks, and note how clearly they convey the idea of being merely preparatory to a great and comprehensive episode. The record is a meagre one as far as actual collisions are concerned. The main happening of that sort has been the one described in Chapter XXXV., when, to the general surprise, the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, to the number of twenty-five—six battle-ships, five cruisers, and fourteen destroyers—emerged from the harbour and steamed out to sea. It will be remembered that on this occasion, as on the fateful April 13th, when the battle-ship *Petropavlosk* was sunk, the battle-flags were hoisted and a general action seemed imminent, but the Russian Admiral's heart failed him, and he hurried back to Port Arthur. Some damage was inflicted on the Russian Fleet by the Japanese destroyers; but the engagement has no decisive results, and Admiral Togo has still to keep watch and ward over the entrance to Port Arthur, lest any junction should take place between the ships he worked so hard to cripple and bottle-up during the first phase of the war and the Vladivostok squadron, now at the zenith of its activity. He has, however, the satisfaction of feeling that his gun-boats and torpedo-craft have helped materially

to win the battle of Nan-shan, and further, he has no additional losses to deplore like that of the *Hatsuse* and *Yoshino*, which, for Japan, cast such a gloom over the third week in May.

Incidentally it may be mentioned, as a supplement to the details already given of the cruise of the Naval Attachés and Correspondents on the *Manchu Maru*, that the latter were given on July 17th a sight of the Japanese Fleet, and were even invited on board the flagship *Mikasa*. The Admiral welcomed the Naval Attachés of seven nations in his private cabin, and afterwards received thirty Correspondents in the ward-room. All appear to have been greatly impressed by the magnificent spectacle presented by the war-worn but still splendidly efficient Navy of Japan, and, after a pleasant interchange of courtesies, the guests gave three hearty cheers for the Admiral's continued victory. No special significance is attached to this interesting meeting, but it merits record as a somewhat unusual accompaniment of a state of naval warfare, and it accentuates the transitional character of the period with which we are dealing.


The performances of the Vladivostok squadron need no comment beyond that which they have already received; but here, again, it may be remarked that the first fortnight of August has in store one of the strange revenges which the whirligig of Time is so fond of bringing. In this second phase, as to some extent in the first, we have seen the *Gromoboi*, *Rossia*, and *Rurik* using their great strength, not in valiant opposition to the enemy's warships, but in the sinking of transports and the harassment of foreign trade. We have seen Admiral Kamimura foiled time and again in his efforts to catch these three big conger-eels, and we

have seen Russia gloating over the latter's exploits as if they were glorious naval victories. Poetical justice demands a change of scene, and for once the demand is to be met with dramatic swiftness and completeness by historic actuality. The end of July marks the real term of the original Vladivostok Squadron's career of impudent destructiveness and fortunate escape from the consequence of its actions, legal and otherwise.

Let us turn now to the military situation, the critical nature of which could hardly be more sharply defined than it is. "The prelude to concerted action" is the simple and satisfactory definition of the work of the Japanese Armies during June and the first thirty days of July; but as we shall see, a fresh act will commence on July 31st, for then it may be said that the real co-operation between General Oku's, General Kuroki's, and the Takushan armies begins. But we must take the Russian Army also into our purview if we are rightly to grasp the character of the stage at which we arrived. Here, too, there are signs of a turning-point. There may be more retirement, more desultory attempts to stave off the day of ultimate collision. But we have a military beginning of an end defined far more clearly for Russia at the close of July than it has been hitherto, and of this no one seems more conscious than Kuropatkin himself. In this case the march of events does not allow us to anticipate; but it may be readily foreshadowed by the most casual reader of the foregoing narrative that much must happen during the ensuing month of a totally different character from what has happened before. Japan has worked patiently and effectively in

this direction, nor has Russia, in spite of reverses, been idle. There is much in the position at the end of July to make us think that Japan, having brought her converging armies almost to a point—mathematically speaking, they are now set round an arc of a very small circle—has only to go forward, complete the envelopment, and crush her adversary so badly

dicting utter defeat for an army, the soldiers of which are not only dogged and tenacious, true fighters, and, when properly led, capable of extraordinary feats, but also, in a marked degree, self-recuperative. We have had occasion throughout the first six months of the war to remark this quality as one strongly distinctive of Russian modes of warfare.



RUSSIAN PRISONERS GOING ON BOARD JAPANESE TRANSPORTS EN ROUTE FOR JAPAN.

that he will have little further fight left in him for months to come. But we must not jump too hastily to conclusions. Japan knows better than any other nation but Russia—perhaps knows better than even Russia herself—what it will cost her to bring Kuropatkin finally to bay, if it be possible to force a battle on him, and she rightly approaches the task with deliberate caution. Of Russia, it may be said that it is idle to be premature in pre-


Just as the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, after having been torpedoed, shelled, and otherwise knocked about so badly that even experts were inclined to regard a large proportion of the ships as entirely *hors de combat*, has twice succeeded in making a gallant show of strength—though not of pluck—outside Port Arthur, so, after such a damaging defeat at that at Telissu, Stackelberg's troops soon re-formed, and not many days later

were presenting a very fairly bold front to the foe. The force, again, which fell back from the Nan-shan position after an experience of a distinctly nerve-disturbing character, took its place without more ado in the defence of Port Arthur, and assisted with becoming spirit in rendering the investment of that fortress a frightfully difficult and costly operation. Where troops lack this recuperative power it is often safe to generalise from precedents, but, where the power is present, even if one cannot say with Napoleon III. *tout peut se rétablir*, one should make allowances for possible upsets of even the most expert calculations and the most likely predictions.

The time has not yet come for us to rule pages of our narrative into grim columns showing the cost in blood and treasure of this great conflict. But it may be very roughly deduced from expert calculations that up to the end of July the Japanese Army, apart from Port Arthur, as to which no trustworthy figures are yet available, has lost about 11,000 killed

and wounded, and the Russians from two-and-a-half to three times that number. The proportion of wounded to killed in the case of Japan is reckoned by the *Times* military critic at four to one, the proportion being rather less in the case of Russia. In addition, the Russians have lost 113 guns and 18 Maxims. At the end of the first six months of the war it is estimated that, if it continues another six months, the total expenses spread over the year will amount to one hundred and sixty millions, of which one hundred millions will have been spent by Russia.

Here our narrative of the first two phases of the war comes to a close. But, inasmuch as grave issues of international concern have arisen since war broke out, some of which still remain undecided, a more fitting conclusion to this, our First Volume, will be found in the succeeding chapter, in which an expert treats learnedly yet lucidly of a wide subject with which none but a real expert is competent to deal.



A MAIN THOROUGHFARE IN DALNY.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR.

BY AN EXPERT.

INTRODUCTORY.

IT may possibly have occurred to many of the readers of this History that they would like to know something, if only a little, of the International Law (including the Law of Neutrality) bearing upon the various incidents which have taken place in the course of the Russo-Japanese war, more especially those in connection with maritime matters. Among these may be mentioned, more particularly, the cases of the Russian gunboat *Mandjur*, the *Fuping*, *Hsiping*, *Mombasa*, the German mail steamer *Prinz Heinrich*, and the British vessels *Malacca* and *Knight Commander*.

The object of this Chapter, therefore, is to present, as briefly and in as popular a form as the subject permits, the more important rules relating to the proper conduct of hostilities. The task of dealing with so extensive and intricate a subject in the space of this article is not by any means an easy one; but the reader will no doubt derive a certain amount of interest from its perusal, if not a great deal of information.

The Law of Neutrality alone is a very extensive subject, and it is not possible to do more than deal very briefly with it here.

I.—GENERAL COURSE OF HOSTILITIES.

As a general rule, war is the last method resorted to by a State to obtain redress for injuries or wrongs done to it by another Power, and recourse should not be had to hostilities until all amicable means of procuring satisfaction have been tried. Of the various methods of amicably arranging disputes between nations, we may mention Agreement between the Powers, or Agreement through the intervention of another Power, and Arbitration.

Should amicable measures prove un-

availing, the affronted Power may adopt certain forcible methods of obtaining redress—*falling short of actual war, however*—such as Pacific Blockade, Embargo, Reprisals, Retorsion, or Naval Demonstration. Let us mention these shortly. The Blockading of the ports or coasts of an offending Power has frequently been resorted to in modern times as a method of exacting redress. Some recent instances of blockades were that of Formosa by France in 1884, of Greece by the fleets of Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Russia, and Italy in 1886, and Crete in 1897. It may be mentioned here that *pacific* blockades differ from those effected during hostilities in this respect, that in the former case the blockading forces cannot seize the ships of third parties; but once war has commenced, any neutral ships which may try to run the blockade are liable to be captured and confiscated. Embargo signifies the provisional sequestration of ships or property. Being merely an act of sequestration, the ships or other property are released as soon as disputes are at an end; but should war break out they are liable to confiscation.

An example of Reprisal was the bombardment of Foochow by the French in 1884. It is, in its ordinary sense, the seizure by a Power of property on the high seas, or in the territory or territorial waters of another Power. Reprisals are either public or private, the former being where a State authorises its officers or agents to seize the property or citizens of another State, and the latter being those in which the State gives Letters of Marque to private individuals. This latter form is, however, seldom adopted in time of peace.

In the Chino-Japanese war of 1894, Japan did her best to discourage acts of reprisal or revenge, it being her wish to carry on the war by civilised methods as

far as possible; and she prohibited the employment of privateers, and strictly forbade plunder, even of the most trivial character. There is a limit even to Japanese patience, however; and in the present war, owing to an attack in February, 1904, by the Russian Vladivostock squadron upon two unarmed merchant vessels, one of which was sunk with a loss of 100 lives, the Japanese Government threatened the severest measures of reprisal, more especially as Japan had given Russian merchantmen freedom of her seas until the 16th February. In fact, this act of the Russian squadron was regarded as a case of outrageous piracy. Retorsion merely means retaliation. It is usually resorted to in cases of discourtesy, unfriendliness, injustice, or harshness.

A state of war is usually set up by the first open act of hostility, and it is no longer necessary for one Power to address a formal Declaration of War to the other. In the war of 1894 between China and Japan, a formal Declaration was made by the latter on August 1st, 1894, China's being issued the next day. A state of war had, however, been in existence as long before as the 25th July, for on that date a Japanese squadron engaged some Chinese warships which were escorting transports with troops on board. One of these transports, the *Kow Shing*, was fired on and sunk, and the incident caused considerable outcry and discussion at the time. Moreover, at the same date Asan had been captured by the Japanese. In the present war Japan broke off her diplomatic relations with Russia on the 6th February, 1904, and the war commenced with the first act of hostility on the part of the Russians, their gunboat *Koriets* having fired on some Japanese transports and their escort off Chemulpo. On the 11th February, 1904, Japan delivered her formal Declaration of War, and on the same date Declarations of Neutrality were made by Great Britain and all the other great powers.

Our space will only allow of our touching very lightly upon the effects of war on property and persons. With respect to *treaties*, the effect of war is to abrogate some and suspend others. Property ac-

quires an "enemy character" according to circumstances. With a few exceptions, property of the enemy can be seized in any place where hostilities may be carried on; and as a general rule, an enemy's property found at sea is liable to seizure and confiscation, unless it is connected with its owner's neutral domicile.

As regards the effect of war upon persons, we naturally consider *combatants* in the first place. Members of the *public* armed forces of the enemy, being combatants, armed, and offering resistance, are liable to direct destruction of life and limb, by the laws of war; and on surrender, to treatment as prisoners of war. Where hostilities arise between two countries, one of which is to a certain extent subordinate to the other, the question arises whether the armed combatants in the subordinate country should be placed in the category of belligerents or not. Of late years the tendency has been to acknowledge them as belligerents, and Great Britain acted on that principle in the Boer War with regard to the irregular combatants of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. The same question arose in the Franco-German war of 1870, with respect to the *Francs-tireurs*, and Count Bismarck announced to the French Government that only those Frenchmen who could at *rifle-shot distance* be recognised as soldiers would be considered and treated as such by the Prussians. By the *Conference of Brussels*, 1874, bodies of men under some responsible leader, conforming to the usages of war, and sufficiently distinguished by certain marks, are to be recognised as entitled to belligerent rights.

The giving of Quarter may be mentioned in connection with the subject of hostile relations between persons. At the present day quarter is granted except under very exceptional circumstances. The general duty to give quarter, however, does not protect an enemy who has personally broken the laws of war, who has stated his intention not to give quarter, or whose government has committed acts justifying the making of reprisals. In the Chino-Japanese war quarter was as a rule freely given by the Japanese. There was one notable ex-

ception, however, after the capture of Port Arthur. This was a massacre of men, women, and children, which lasted for four days, until only some thirty-six Chinamen were left alive, and these were only spared in order that they might bury the dead, and in their caps were placed papers with the inscription, "This man is not to be killed." With this exception the war with China was waged on the part of the Japanese in accordance with the best of modern traditions. As a matter of fact the Japanese denied that the Port Arthur atrocities were committed by their regular soldiers, and alleged that they were the work of some drunken coolies who were attached to the army. The following Proclamation, which was made by Count Oyama to the army on the 22nd April, 1894, says much for Japan's humanity:—"Belligerent operations being properly confined to the military and naval forces actually engaged, and there being no reason whatever for enmity between individuals because their countries are at war, the common principles of humanity dictate that succour and rescue should be extended even to those of the enemy's forces who are disabled by wounds or disease." The Proclamation added that Japan had signed the Geneva Convention in 1864, and that "her soldiers had already been instructed that they are bound to treat with kindness and helpfulness such of their enemies as may be disabled by wounds or disease." By way of a contrast to the Port Arthur massacre we may mention that when Wei-hai-wei was taken the Japanese released all the Chinese soldiers and foreigners, with the exception of one Von Hanneken, an American who had broken his *parole* given on the occasion of the sinking of the *Kow-Shing*.

With regard to the treatment of sick and wounded, humanity imposes upon combatants the duty of treating them properly; and by the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1868 the sick and wounded must be collected and tended, and whilst they are in military hospitals or hospital ships they are to be treated as neutrals. Surgeons and others engaged in tending sick and wounded are also regarded as neutrals; and military hospitals and

ambulances are neutralised so long as they are occupied by sick or wounded. The following episode, which took place at the battle of Kin-lien-cheng, is only one of many such-like: A Russian soldier, by name Sorokine, was wounded in the eyes, and retired from the fighting line supported by one of his comrades. Suddenly two Japanese soldiers appeared, one bearing the Red Cross flag. The other motioned with his rifle as a sign for the unwounded Russian to go away. The Japanese soldiers then skilfully washed and dressed their patient's wounds, and he was handed over to his own people. In connection with this subject it may be stated that at a banquet recently given in New York to Baron Kentaro Kaneko (formerly Minister of Justice and of Agriculture and Commerce) he made a stirring speech, in which he stated that since the outbreak of the present war the Japanese had treated the Russian wounded soldiers and sailors with the utmost kindness, and had even buried drowned Russian soldiers with Christian ceremonies. The Baron added that "when the numerous wounded Russian soldiers were taken to our Red Cross hospital after the battle of the Yalu, the Japanese soldiers brought cigarettes and wine out of their scanty rations to comfort them."

Whilst dealing with the subject of the effect of war upon *persons*, a few words with respect to *prisoners* may not be amiss. In the absence of treaties laying down different rules with regard to them, prisoners may be ransomed, kept until the war is over, or exchanged absolutely or on certain conditions (as, for instance, on their "*parole*" not to serve again during the war or until exchanged). If a prisoner attempts to escape he may be killed during his flight; but should he be recaptured he can only be punished with closer confinement. If he should, however, join in a plot for a general escape of prisoners, he may be punished with death. Where practicable, prisoners must be supplied with reasonable food, clothing, and shelter; and in some cases they are given a monetary allowance.

The question has frequently arisen as to whether *Newspaper Correspondents* are

liable to be made prisoners. Some authorities have decided in the affirmative, but presumably they can only be detained for special reasons; and as a matter of fact *anybody* can be made a prisoner for special reasons. The French Official Handbook for the use of officers directs newspaper correspondents to be detained so long only as military necessity may warrant. At the commencement of this war the Russian authorities drew up some most stringent regulations to be observed by war correspondents with the Russian army. In connection with this question, it may be remembered that early in the war the *Fawan*, a vessel chartered by the *Chicago Daily Press* correspondent, was captured by two Russian "destroyers." Officers and marines were placed on board, and the correspondent and crew were sent below and heavily guarded for a time. The *Fawan* was ultimately released, however, and nothing more came of the incident.

As our readers are aware, wireless telegraphy has been largely employed in this war by both combatants, and Admiral Alexeieff is said to have threatened to treat as a spy a newspaper correspondent who made use of wireless telegraphy within the zone of operations of the Russian Fleet.

We will now pass to another subject, namely, some of the *methods of waging war*, and in this connection there does not appear to have been any employment by the Japanese of *Privateers*, either during the Chino-Japanese war or the present one. The parties to the Declaration of Paris, in 1856, decided to abolish privateering, which is chiefly plundering, and all the civilised Powers have signed the Declaration except Spain, Mexico, and the United States. Some regrettable incidents occurred, however, on the part of the Russian volunteer squadron, which we shall refer to later on—notably, the seizure of the P. and O. Liner *Malacca*, and some other British and German vessels. Among the other methods of warfare which are forbidden by the laws of civilised nations may be mentioned *assassination*, or murder by treachery; but killing by surprise (ambush for instance) is permissible. It is also unlawful to

poison food or water which is likely to be consumed by an enemy; also the use of poisoned weapons. Guns, also, must not be loaded with nails, glass, or scraps of metal, etc. Happily the present war appears to have been carried on without recourse to these methods.

With regard to projectiles, more especially of the explosive type, the Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868) forbids the use of any projectile which, being filled with a fulminating or inflammable substance, shall weigh less than 400 grammes (*i.e.*, a little less than 1 lb.). By the *Brussels Conference* of 1874 it is laid down that "the laws of war do not recognise in belligerents an unlimited right to choose the means of destroying the enemy." This question was also dealt with by two of the Declarations at the *Congress at the Hague*. The 2nd Declaration had for its aim "the prohibition of the use of any projectile having for its sole object the dispersion of asphyxiating or injurious gas." This Declaration met with the unanimous assent of the Powers; but to the 3rd Declaration, prohibiting "the use of balls which readily expand or flatten themselves in the human body," Great Britain would not agree, as it struck at the use of the "dum-dum" bullet.

As regards the employment of the French "mélinite," and the German "roburite," the ground for maintaining that they do not transgress the 2nd Declaration of the Hague Congress is, that neither their *sole* or even main object is the dispersion of noxious or injurious gases, but simply the same object as the ordinary shell—namely, destruction by concussion or explosion, any formation of gas being incidental and trifling in amount. On the other hand, the amount of destruction or suffering inflicted is immaterial if the result attained is considered to be proportionate. For instance, no objection is made to the legitimate and proper use of mines or torpedoes, and it is perfectly permissible to ram a vessel and sink her with all hands.

In the course of a paper on "Problems of Neutrality connected with the Russo-Japanese War" read at the Royal Naval

College, Greenwich, by the Rev. Dr. Lawrence, the lecturer referred to the floating of mines *on the high seas*, and the destruction, by a Russian mine, of the Japanese battleship *Hatsuse*, and consequent terrible loss of life. The lecturer observed that there were no precedents for guidance in dealing with the matter. It seemed to him, however, that every sound principle was against a belligerent transforming any part of the open sea into a mine field. At the same time, if mines placed in belligerent waters, where they might be properly used, got loose, and floating about interfered with neutral navigation, then the case was on all fours with that of a stray shot which, missing one of the belligerent ships, might perchance do damage to a neutral vessel in the vicinity. Vice-Admiral Harris, who occupied the chair on the occasion of this lecture, expressed his opinion that while belligerents certainly had a right to lay mines within the three-mile limit, it was undoubtedly an interference with the rights of neutrals to place them ten miles out. Suppose, he said, we were at war with France, and each side laid mines ten miles out in the Channel, life would not be worth living for any merchant vessel using those waters. Of course, the mines in the Yellow Sea might have broken adrift, and he hoped that was the case. It is believed in naval circles that this question will be brought to the attention of the Hague Tribunal, in order that a clause bearing on it may be added to the rules of law which the tribunal has laid down.

Abuses of flags of truce, of the badges or flags of the Geneva Convention, or of the military insignia or uniform of the enemy, are breaches of the laws of war. An instance of abuse of the white flag appears to have occurred at the battle of Nan-shan (Kin-chau). It was stated by a wounded Japanese officer that the reason why the Japanese losses in that battle were so heavy was that the Russians displayed a white flag and apparently surrendered. "We advanced," he said, "and were on the point of passing them when the enemy fired point blank, killing and wounding many of our men." It may not be generally known

that while the enemy is not bound to receive a flag of truce, the bearer of one is inviolate, and may not be fired upon, injured, or even taken prisoner.

The principal instance of *bombardment* was, of course, that of Port Arthur. The bombardment of unfortified and undefended places is forbidden, except where it occurs in connection with the destruction of valuable naval or military establishments, or where supplies are forcibly withheld. In the Chino-Japanese War, on the 18th and 19th January, 1895, a Japanese squadron bombarded Tung-chow in order to divert the attention of the Chinese troops from Yung-chow, the point at which the Japanese force was to land. The operation, never intended to be more than a diversion, was altogether insignificant, but the missionaries in Tung-chow formulated a complaint that the Japanese *wantonly bombarded a peaceful town*. There was no doubt, however, that it was defended by forts, which replied to the Japanese fire. It is now the practice to give notice permitting women, children, and other non-combatants to leave places which are about to be bombarded; but it seems that this notice is not legally necessary.

The use of *savage auxiliaries* by one civilised Power against another, although it is strictly condemned, can hardly be termed illegal; and savage troops may undoubtedly be employed where they are regularly embodied, trained, and led by European (and now presumably by Japanese) officers.

The use of *spies* is allowable, but in the event of their capture the penalty is death by hanging after trial by court-martial. During the Franco-German War of 1870 the Germans treated as spies persons crossing their lines in balloons. These were severely punished, although the death penalty was not enforced; and now, by the Declaration of Brussels, balloonists are no longer treated as spies, and their *status* as prisoners of war is defined by the Official Manual for officers of the French army.


We now come to an important subject, namely, that relating to *ships* and *maritime relations* during hostilities. The

ships of an enemy, both warships and merchant vessels, may be attacked and captured in their own ports and waters, in the ports and waters of the attacking Power, and on the high seas; but they cannot be interfered with in *neutral* ports or waters. Government ships of a belligerent may be captured unless engaged in exploration or scientific investigation; unless they are *cartel-ships* (i.e., public or private vessels employed exclusively as transports for the conveyance of exchanged prisoners); or are hospital ships flying the Geneva cross, and designated as such, and other vessels carrying sick and wounded under that flag. The enemy's *private* ships may be captured, except those lying in the enemy's ports at the commencement of hostilities; but enemy ships entering territorial waters after war has commenced are liable to seizure and confiscation. Fishing boats engaged in *coast* fishing, and their gear, are exempt from seizure, but not those engaged in *deep-sea* fishing. In connection with the subject of fishing-vessels, and as an illustration of the splendid patriotic feeling among all classes of the Japanese, it may be mentioned that early in the war the poor deep-sea fishermen (whose livelihood is ever a very precarious one) were preparing to set out for the fishing grounds off the Korean coast, but they first consulted the naval authorities at Tokio as to whether they could do so with safety. On being advised to abandon their project on account of the risks to which they would be exposed in wartime, the fishermen resolved to utilise their craft as a volunteer fleet for use in their country's service as opportunities should offer themselves.

Belligerent vessels which at the outbreak of war are on a voyage to a hostile port from a hostile or a neutral one, and vessels which have commenced loading at an enemy's or other foreign port (not having issued from such port), are usually exempted from capture during a specified period; and permission is occasionally granted for an enemy's vessels with cargo for a hostile port to enter and leave same safely. A difficulty will be remembered which arose in connection with the

Russian gunboat *Mandjur*, which the Chinese, on the 17th February, 1904, had warned to leave Shanghai, under pressure of the Japanese Consul. As the Russian captain did not seem at all inclined to clear out, representing that he was awaiting orders from his Admiral, the Japanese stationed the *Akitsushima* cruiser at Woosung, under orders to keep an eye on the gunboat. On the 27th March the Chinese Foreign Office advised the Taotai at Shanghai that the Russian Minister at Peking had agreed to dismantle the *Mandjur*, which operation was completed on the 31st March, the *Akitsushima* leaving immediately afterwards.

During the course of the war there have been many incidents illustrative of the right of *visitation and search* of vessels of different nationalities. The object of this visitation and search, it may be explained for the benefit of the lay mind, is to ascertain the nationality of a ship and the nature of her cargo. The right is strictly a belligerent one, and does not exist in time of peace, except by Treaty. The warships or government vessels of neutral Powers *cannot at any time* be visited and searched by a belligerent; and an enemy's *private* vessels may only be stopped, visited, and overhauled in time of war *on the high seas*, with the object of discovering whether they or their cargoes are *contraband of war, or otherwise liable to seizure*. Piratical vessels, or those suspected of being pirates, can be visited at any time. Respecting this right, which is frequently abused, a strong attitude was assumed by Captain Presbitero of the Italian cruiser *Marco Polo*, who reported that on the 14th March, 1904, near Suda Bay, he came across the Russian *Dmitri Donskoi*, also a cruiser. The Russian (which had previously stopped several men-of-war and merchantmen) fired a blank shot across the bows of the *Marco Polo*; but Captain Presbitero, who questioned the Russian's right to dictate to a neutral warship, declined to stop, and forthwith continued his voyage to China without further molestation. The Japanese, on the other hand, seized the Norwegian steamer *Hermes* on the 9th February, 1904, near Port Arthur,



A TEMPLE PRISON - HOUSE: JAPAN'S HANDSOME TREATMENT OF HER RUSSIAN CAPTIVES.
Russian prisoners from Nan-Shan and Kin-Chau in a Buddhist Temple at Matsuyama, Japan.

and took her into Nagasaki. Near Chefoo, also, they took three other Norwegian merchantmen, the *Lena*, *Activ*, and *Sentis*, all of which were found to be laden with coal for the Russians. On the same date the Russians were kind enough to sink a British steamer, the *Fuping*, at Port Arthur. The *Fuping* was leaving the harbour, and when abreast of the Russian guardship, the latter, without giving any warning, fired three shells, two of which hit the British ship in the bows and seriously wounded five Chinese passengers. The *Fuping's* papers being subsequently found to be all in order, the Russian captain apologised to the British commander, alleging that it was a *mistake*! The other British steamers, the *Frankby* and *Ettrickdale*, laden with coal for China, were also stopped by the Russians, but were subsequently released. They also detained for eight days the Norwegian steamer *Mathilde*, on a voyage to Nagasaki, but she was afterwards released. An unfortunate incident, however, occurred in connection with the *Hsiping*, a British steamer which, through stress of weather, sought shelter on the 10th February in the roadstead of Port Arthur, as did also the British steamer *Chingping*, and the German steamer *Pronto*. When night came on the Russian authorities ordered the lights on all these vessels to be put out. Subsequently a Russian war-vessel came into harbour and commenced firing on the ships, the *Pronto* receiving most of the shots. The forts also commenced to fire on both the Russian man-of-war and the merchant vessels! Next day the Russians ordered the *Hsiping* to proceed to Dalny, where she was detained for four days under guard, in spite of the protests of her captain, the Russians alleging that their mine-transport had been blown up and no one knew the positions of the mines. Finally the *Hsiping* was allowed to continue her voyage to Shanghai. Among other British ships captured and detained were the *Foxton Hall* and the *Rosalie*. The British India Mail Steamer *Mombasa* was chased in the Red Sea by a Russian fleet, after two shots had been fired across her bows, but after a long examin-

ation she was allowed to proceed. More recently some incidents took place which threatened serious consequences at the time, namely, the seizure of the German Mail Steamer *Prinz Heinrich* and the British liner *Malacca*, also the sinking of the British steamer *Knight Commander*, all of which exploits were effected by the so-called Russian "volunteer" squadron.

With respect to a *volunteer* navy, its legality largely depends upon the amount of control which the Power employing it exercises over the ships and their crews. It stands to reason, however, that if a merchant vessel starts on a voyage as such, she must retain that character till her voyage is ended; and if she throws off the guise of a merchantman and assumes that of a warship, she cannot be considered other than a pirate.

Before proceeding to consider the Law of Neutrality it may be added that, for the purpose of protecting neutral Powers, and deciding as to the validity of captures and adjustment of claims, all civilised Powers establish Prize Courts. The jurisdiction of such Courts extends not merely to captures by warships of their own flag, but also to exceptional captures during peace. A Prize Court must be a duly constituted one, sitting in the territory of the captor, or of his ally, but not in neutral territory. Japan organised, in the Chino-Japanese War, a Prize Court, issued Prize Laws, and even despatched law officers to the headquarters of the army and to the flagships of her navy, in order that they might advise on such questions of International Law as should arise during the war.

NEUTRALITY.

One of the most important questions at the outbreak of the war was the position which China would take up, and whether she would pronounce her neutrality and abide by it. Early in February she issued Imperial Edicts announcing that war had broken out between Russia and Japan, and that, seeing that those nations were friendly with her, she must declare her neutrality. The Viceroy and Governors were therefore enjoined to maintain neutrality, preserve order, and protect

merchants and property. At Pekin the authorities were specially warned against allowing evil rumours to spread; the importance of protecting foreign legations and churches was emphasised; disturbers of the peace were threatened with severe punishment, and grave offenders with decapitation.

Being neither judge nor party, a *neutral* must exhibit such absolute impartiality that neither of the belligerents may obtain any substantial advantage or privilege over the other; on the other hand, a *belligerent* must pay scrupulous respect to the sovereignty of his neutral neighbours. A neutral is not permitted to give armed assistance to either party, even though he may have promised to do so before the war; he may not lend money to either side, or guarantee such loan; he must not permit the passage of belligerent troops through his territory, or the levying within it of troops for belligerent service; nor may he give or sell armed ships or other instruments of warfare to a belligerent. Furthermore, he must prevent and cancel all acts of hostility, either in the neutral territory itself or in the adjacent waters, prohibit the exercise of any belligerent jurisdiction therein, disarm and intern any troops attempting to traverse neutral territory, and set at liberty all prisoners of war found within its borders. A *belligerent* must not carry on hostilities within neutral territory; use neutral harbours for fitting out expeditions, recruiting men, or obtaining supplies of arms and stores; nor use neutral territory as a base of operations. He must scrupulously observe all regulations of neutral states as to the admission of their cruisers and their prizes into neutral ports, and the amount of innocent supplies they may take on board; must disarm and intern their troops driven across neutral frontiers, and make reparation to any state whose neutrality he may have violated.

The subject of *visitation and search* of vessels has already been dealt with at some length, and it need only be added that by the 2nd Article of the Declaration of Paris: "The neutral flag covers enemies' goods, with the exception of

contraband of war"; and by the 3rd article, "Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag." With regard to *convoy*, it seems clear that the right of search cannot be defeated by the acceptance of convoy, and resistance on the part of convoying ships renders all the convoyed vessels liable to capture.

The subject of *contraband of war* is an important one, there being great diversity of opinion as to what articles may be classed as contraband, and frequently treaties are entered into between nations, in which are specified the various articles which are to be considered by them as contraband; and belligerents generally publish a list of the articles to be so treated. Provisions, being articles of ambiguous use, are not, as a rule, contraband; but they may become so under certain circumstances. In the case of the *Frau Margaretha*, on the 25th July, 1805, Dutch cheese on a voyage from Amsterdam to Quimper was held not to be contraband, whilst on the following day Dutch cheese fit for naval stores, going on a voyage from Amsterdam to Corunna on the ship *Zelden Rust*, was condemned owing to the proximity of the destination to the naval port of Ferrol. In 1885 France, during her war with China, declared rice contraband. Articles of widest usage are generally contraband, as horses, sulphur, saltpetre; and materials for naval construction, such as timber, spars, engines, engine fittings, sail-cloth, rope, copper, hemp, and tar, have been considered contraband by mutual consent; also money, clothing, and unwrought metals. Coal was declared contraband by France in 1859 and 1870; but during the Franco-German war England considered that it ought to be determined by its destination.

Early in the present war (February, 1904), in reply to a Cardiff firm who had approached him, Lord Lansdowne said: "I am to state, generally, that coal is an article *incipit usus*, not *per se* contraband of war, but if destined for warlike, as opposed to industrial, use, it may become contraband. Whether in

any particular case coal is or is not contraband of war is a matter *prima facie* for the determination of the prize courts of the captor's nationality, and so long as such decision when given does not conflict with well-established principles and rules of International Law, his Majesty's Government will not be prepared to take exception thereto. I am to add that his Majesty's Government are not at present aware that any declaration on the subject has been made by either of the belligerents." On the 10th February Japan published a notification of the various articles to be deemed contraband, among which *coal* was included. This was followed by the Russian regulations, issued in March following, which included "every kind of fuel, such as *coal*, naphtha, spirits, etc." Raw cotton was also specified as contraband in the Russian schedule; but, in answer to various enquiries, it was stated that the declaration applied only to raw cotton suitable for the manufacture of explosives, and not to cotton yarns or tissues. It has been stated that the Japanese Government foresaw the probability of coal being declared contraband, and consequently had for years been laying in large stores of Welsh coal, which was imperative for the use of torpedo-boats and destroyers, owing to its smokeless character.

As regards *telegraph cables*, those between points in the territory of an enemy are generally subject to such treatment as the necessities of war may require; but cables between the territory of an enemy and neutral territory may be interrupted within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy. A submarine cable between two neutral points is generally held to be inviolable, although censorship may possibly be exercised over it, as Great Britain did in the West Indian ports during the Spanish-American War. In March, 1904, the Japanese Consul at Chefoo warned the Great Northern Telegraph Company that any attempt to repair the cable between Chefoo and Port Arthur would be deemed a breach of neutrality, and the Company replied that no attempt would be made to do so without the permission of the Japanese Government. As regards *despatches*, these are commonly classed as contraband. By hostile despatches is not meant ordinary mails.

In concluding this article one cannot refrain from paying a tribute to Japan for the way in which she has observed the rules of International Law in her present conflict, her chivalrous treatment of her wounded and prisoner enemies, and her strict compliance with all the laws and usages of neutrality.

